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i PREFACE 
This  thesis  is  an  examination  of  the  relationship  between  the  Ukrainian 
nationalists,  led  by  Petliura  (The  Ukrainian  Peoples'  Republic)  and  both  Germany  and 
Poland  in  the  period  1918-1922.  The  work  begins  by  analysing  the  historical 
relationships  with  both  countries  prior  to  the  First  World  War.  The  Polish  relationship 
was  far  more  long  term  and  the  experience  of  the  17`h  century  struggle  for 
independence  by  Ukrainians  against  Poland,  had  a  major  impact  on  the  development  of 
Polish  history  and  on  Ukraine's  drift  into  a  union  with  Russia.  This  historical 
experience  also  influenced  the  theories  of  Pilsudski  and  Wasilewski,  as  to  how  the 
Russian  Empire  could  be  reconstructed  after  its  collapse,  and  the  role  of  Ukraine  in  the 
reconfiguration  of  states  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  Leon  Wasilewski,  the  political 
and  cultural  theoretician  who  influenced  Pilsudski,  contributed  extensively  to  the 
historiography.  His  works  on  the  subject  include,  Zarys  stosunköw  galicyjskich 
(Warsaw,  1906),  Ukraina  i  sprawa  ukrainska  (Krakow,  1911),  Die  Ukrainer  in 
Russland  und  die  politischen  Bestrebungen  derselben  (Vienna,  1915),  Na  Wschodnich 
Kresach  Krdlestwa  Polskiego  (Piotkrdw,  1916),  Die  Ostprovinzen  des  alten 
Polenreiches  (Lithauen  u.  Weissruthenien  die  Landschaft  Chelm  -  Ostgalizien  -  die 
Ukraina)  (Krakow,  1917)  and  La  paix  avec  1'Ukraine  (Geneva,  1917).  I  utilised  the 
classic  works  on  Ukrainian  history  for  this,  examining  the  long  term  historical  role  of 
Poland  in  Ukraine.  These  include,  Orest  Subtelny,  Ukraine:  A  History  (Toronto: 
Toronto  University  Press,  1988)  and  Paul  R.  Magosci,  A  History  of  Ukraine  (Toronto: 
Toronto  University  Press,  1996),  along  with  Andreas  Kappeler,  Kleine  Geschichte  der 
Ukraine  (Munich:  C.  H.  Beck,  1994). 
Although  the  thesis  addresses  primarily  the  situation  after  World  War  I  and  the 
military  collapse  of  Germany  in  Eastern  Europe,  I  also  examine  the  historical 
relationship  between  Germany  and  Ukraine,  which  came  to  the  fore  in  the  period  of 
World  War  I,  and  especially  following  the  treaties  of  Brest  Litovsk.  This  period 
involved  the  German  recognition  of  Ukrainian  independence,  and  the  German 
intervention  in  Ukrainian  internal  political  and  economic  affairs.  These  issues  are 
addressed  in  Chapter  2.  It  also  is  necessary  to  examine  the  beginnings  of  strains 
between  Polish  and  Ukrainian  nationalism  and  the  competing  claims  to  territories,  such 
as  Chelm.  This  caused  a  problem  for  the  Germans,  who  were  in  the  position  of 
2 arbitrating  the  conflicting  territorial  claims.  The  German  military  occupation  of  Ukraine 
is  also  examined  and  the  dictates  of  German  policy  in  the  country.  The  role  of  Ukraine 
in  Germany's  overall  war  plans  is  also  analysed  and  how  the  Germans  placed  great 
importance  on  the  economic  place  of  Ukraine.  This  is  the  aspect  of  German-Ukrainian 
relations  prior  to  the  Nazi  period,  which  has  been  most  analysed  by  German  historians, 
and  I  have  utilised  these  sources,  together  with  material  from  German  archives.  One  of 
my  aims  in  examining  this  period  is  to  analyse  how  the  German  war  aims  in  Ukraine 
differed  from  those  following  the  war  and  during  the  early  years  of  the  Weimar 
Republic  and  to  what  extent  there  was  continuity. 
In  Chapter  31  have  analysed  the  serious  situation,  which  existed  between 
Poland  and  Germany  during  the  course  of  the  Versailles  Treaty  negotiations  and  until 
the  settling  of  the  plebiscites  in  areas  with  mixed  German-Polish  populations.  The  issue 
of  disputed  borders  bedevilled  Polish-German  relations  as  much  as  it  did  Polish- 
Ukrainian.  Upper  Silesia  and  East  Prussia  were  the  flash  points  and  the  situation  almost 
came  to  war  on  several  occasions.  The  German  hatred  of  Poland,  which  arose  from 
virtually  all  political  groupings  in  Germany,  cannot  be  overestimated,  and  the  sense  that 
Poland  was  France's  satellite  and  ally  in  Central  Europe,  whose  purpose  was  to  contain 
Germany  following  Versailles,  was  the  abiding  idea  in  the  foreign  relations  of  the  two 
states.  The  Soviet-Polish  War  brought  this  to  the  fore  and  I  am  examining  how 
Germany  swung  behind  Soviet  Russia  in  this  conflict,  albeit  its  ability  to  act  was 
severely  constrained  by  the  Entente  and  Versailles.  I  demonstrate  how  the  relationship 
could  lead  to  very  differing  views  on  the  issue  of  Ukrainian  independence  and  how  an 
opposing  position  was  nearly  always  adopted. 
Chapter  4  deals  with  the  military  situation  in  Ukraine  from  November  1918, 
when  Germany  surrendered  to  the  Allied  Powers,  until  March  1919,  when  German 
troops  eventually  left  the  country.  There  has  been  a  very  limited  historiography  on  this 
period  from  the  German  perspective,  unlike  the  role  of  the  French  and  the  anarchists. 
The  question  I  am  addressing  is  how  the  German  military  in  Ukraine  at  this  time, 
related  to  the  Ukrainian  nationalists,  and  whether  the  German  military  had  an 
independent  policy  or  were  merely  acting  on  Allied  instructions.  I  addressed  this 
question  by  examining  the  relationship  between  the  German  troops  and  the  French  and 
the  influence  of  Bolshevik  propaganda  on  the  German  army  in  the  east.  Most  of  the 
sources  here  were  from  German  archives  and  the  work  of  the  German  military  historian 
3 Kurt  Fischer.  K.  Fischer,  Deutsche  Truppen  und  Entente-Intervention  in  Süd  Russland 
1918/19  (Boppard  am  Rhein:  Harold  Bold  Verlag,  1973),  who  has  dealt  with  the 
German  military  role  in  Ukraine  in  the  most  detail.  I  also  consulted  Richard  Debo, 
Revolution  and  Survival:  The  Foreign  Policy  of  Soviet  Russia,  1917-18  (1979)  and 
Survival  and  Consolidation:  The  Foreign  Policy  of  Soviet  Russia,  1918-1921  (1990), 
also  Jeremy  Smith,  The  Bolsheviks  and  the  National  Question  (1999).  Michael  J. 
Carley,  Revolution  and  Intervention:  The  French  Government  and  the  Russian  Civil 
War  (1983)  was  also  a  relevant  source.  There  is  also  some  reference  to  the  German 
military  role  in  1919  in  the  recent  Perry  Moore,  Stamping  Out  the  Virus.  Allied 
Intervention  in  the  Russian  Civil  War  1918-1920.  (Atglen,  PA:  Schiffer  Military 
History,  2002).  However,  all  of  the  above  works,  with  the  exception  of  Fischer, 
concentrate  on  the  role  of  the  French  in  Ukraine,  and  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
Bolsheviks,  rather  than  the  German  -  Ukrainian  perspective. 
In  Chapter  5  the  foreign  policy  of  the  early  Weimar  Republic,  as  it  related  to 
Ukraine  is  analysed,  and  particularly  the  views  of  the  Auswärtiges  Amt  (Foreign 
Ministry).  The  principal  issues  here  are  to  what  extent  the  foreign  policy  of  the  German 
Republic  differed  from  that  of  the  empire  and  how  the  Foreign  Ministry  regarded  the 
Ukrainian  nationalists,  with  particular  emphasis  on  the  development  of  the  Polish 
-  Ukrainian  alliance  and  its  impact  on  German  policy.  Here  I  have  used  German 
archival  sources  from  the  Political  Archive  of  the  Foreign  Ministry  (Politische  Archiv 
des  Auswärtiges  Amt)  in  Bonn,  together  with  the  Bundesarchiv  (Federal  Archive)  in 
Potsdam,  which  includes  the  files  of  other  government  departments,  together  with  press 
reports.  The  issue  of  diplomatic  recognition  by  Berlin  of  the  Soviet  regime  in  Ukraine 
is  addressed,  and  particularly  attempts  to  pressurise  Berlin  by  holding  German 
diplomats  hostage  in  Kiev.  How  did  the  arrest  and  detention  of  Radek,  the  Soviet 
representative  in  Berlin,  impact  on  the  diplomatic  game  being  played  out  between 
Kharkov  and  Berlin?  To  what  extent  was  Germany's  refusal  to  recognise  Soviet 
Ukraine  the  result  of  Entente  pressure  not  to  do  so,  and  what  was  Germany's 
perspective  on  the  various  regimes  in  Ukraine  during  the  course  of  1919  and  1920? 
What  was  the  imperative  behind  the  Foreign  Ministry's  policy  of  `wait  and  see'? 
Following  this,  in  Chapter  6I  have  addressed  the  important  issue  of  German 
economic  interest  in  Ukraine,  which  dated  from  the  period  of  the  German  occupation. 
What  was  the  involvement  of  German  industrialists  in  formulating  policy  towards 
4 Ukraine  and  how  German  fears  about  the  loss  of  the  Ukrainian  market  led  to  an  attempt 
to  foster  good  relations  with  both  the  White  regime  of  Denikin  and  the  Soviet 
Ukrainian  government?  I  am  examining  the  influence  of  economic  realpolitik  on 
German  relations  with  Ukrainian  nationalists.  The  files  of  the  Economics  Ministry  and 
the  Reichs  Chancellory  files  in  the  Bundesarchiv  in  Potsdam,  together  with  Foreign 
Ministry  files  in  Bonn,  dealing  with  economic  affairs  were  used  as  sources.  The 
importance  of  the  economic  aspect  of  foreign  policy  to  the  early  Weimar  Republic 
cannot  be  overestimated,  and  especially  the  role  of  the  developing  eastern  market.  Once 
again,  very  little  has  been  written  on  this,  other  than  by  historians  concentrating  on  the 
broader  German-Soviet  relationship. 
The  role  of  Paul  Rohrbach,  as  the  leading  German  Ukrainophile  was  examined 
in  Chapter  7  and  his  attempts  to  establish  links  between  Ukrainian  nationalists  and 
official  Germany.  His  part  in  formulating  German  policy  towards  Ukraine  before  1918 
has  been  examined  by  many  German  historians,  but  not  much  has  been  done  to  analyse 
his  actions  after  World  War  I.  I  also  wanted  to  address  the  question,  how  did  his  views 
influence  German  policy  towards  Ukraine  after  1918  and  to  what  extent  were  his  views 
as  a  Baltic  German  typical  of  that  group?  For  this  purpose  I  consulted  his  writings:  Der 
deutsche  Gedanke  in  der  Welt  (Berlin,  1912),  Russland  und  Wir  (Stuttgart,  1915),  and 
Um  des  Teufels  Handschrift  (Hamburg,  1953),  and  an  examination  of  the  ideological 
underpinnings  of  the  Baltic  Germans  in  Robert.  C.  Williams,  Culture  in  Exile.  Russian 
Emigres  in  Germany,  1881-1941  (London,  1972). 
Chapter  8  analyses  Poland's  relations  with  the  Ukrainian  nationalists  from  late 
1918  and  the  establishment  of  the  Polish  Republic  until  the  Warsaw  Agreement  in  early 
1920.  My  aim  was  to  address  the  question  if  Poland  was  supportive  of  Ukrainian 
independence  from  1918  onwards  or  whether  there  was  an  anti-Ukrainian  orientation 
because  of  the  struggle  in  East  Galicia  and  the  need  to  present  the  Allied  Powers  with 
an  anti-Ukrainian  argument  during  the  course  of  the  Paris  peace  negotiations  in  1919. 
Several  Polish  historians  have  argued  in  the  course  of  the  1990s  that  Poland  had  been 
continually  supportive  of  Ukrainian  independence  and  I  wanted  to  set  out  to  disprove 
this  theory  These  historians  include  Zbigniew  Karpus,  Michal  Klimecki  and  Waldemar 
Rezmer.  The  1990s  saw  an  attempt  in  Poland  to  redefine  Poland's  relations  with 
Ukraine  for  political  and  economic  reasons  and  the  revisionist  rewriting  of  Polish 
history  was  an  aspect  of  this.  Utilising  the  files  of  the  Polish  Foreign  Ministry  (MSZ)  in 
5 the  Archiwum  Akt  Nowych  in  Warsaw,  I  examined  reports  from  Polish  embassies  in 
Berlin  and  London,  together  with  press  releases  issued  by  the  Polish  Press  Bureau  in 
London,  which  was  directed  by  the  MSZ.  As  secondary  sources,  I  consulted 
Dziewanowski's  monograph  on  Pilsudski's  attempt  to  construct  an  alliance  and  the 
essays  of  the  Canadian  Institute  of  Ukrainian  Studies  on  relations  between  Poles  and 
Ukrainians. 
The  period  encompassing  the  Warsaw  Agreement  and  the  Soviet-Polish  War  is 
dealt  with  in  Chapter  9.  I  did  not  examine  the  military  campaign,  but  rather  the 
diplomatic  and  political  relations  between  the  Polish  government  and  army  and  the 
government  of  the  Ukrainian  Peoples'  Republic.  As  well  as  consulting  Subtelny  and 
Magosci,  I  also  read  Thomas  Fiddick,  Russia's  Retreat  from  Poland,  1920  (1990)  but 
did  not  find  a  great  deal  there  on  the  Ukrainian  issue.  From  a  Ukrainian  perspective  I 
consulted  John  Reshetar,  The  Ukrainian  Revolution,  1917-1920:  A  Study  in 
Nationalism,  (Princeton  University  Press:  Princeton,  1952),  Ivan  L.  Rudnytsky,  Essays 
in  Modern  Ukrainian  History,  (Canadian  Institute  of  Ukrainian  Studies:  Edmonton, 
1987),  Anna  Procyk,  Russian  Nationalism  and  Ukraine,  (Toronto  University  Press: 
Toronto,  1995)  and  M.  Palij,  The  Ukrainian-Polish  Defensive  Alliance,  1919-1921.  An 
Aspect  of  the  Ukrainian  Revolution  (Canadian  Institute  of  Ukrainian  Studies: 
Edmonton,  1995). 
For  a  Polish  perspective  I  consulted  Zbigniew  Karpus,  Wschodnie  Sojusnicy 
Polski  w  Wojne  1920  roku.  Oddzialy  wojkowske  ukrainskie,  rosyjskie,  kozackie  i 
bialoruskie  w  Polsce  w  latach  1919-1920  (Torun:  Michael  Copernicus  University 
Press,  1999),  Z.  Karpus,  W.  Rezmer  and  E.  Wiszki  (eds.  ),  Polska  i  Ukraina,  Sojusz 
1920  roku  i  jego  nastgpstwa  (Torun:  Michael  Copernicus  University  Press,  1997). 
Dziewanowski's  Joseph  Pilsudski  also  explains  the  Polish  reasoning  behind  the 
invasion.  Another  older  Polish  source  is  A.  Przybylski,  Wojna  polska  1918-1921 
(Warsaw,  1930),  which  contains  a  lot  of  original  quotes  from  Pilsudski  and  Polish 
commanders  in  the  field.  Another  source,  although  one  dealing  primarily  with  the 
military  aspect,  is  Norman  Davies,  White  Eagle,  Red  Star.  The  Polish-Soviet  War. 
1918-1920  (London:  Mc  Donald,  1972),  although  this  concentrates  solely  on  the 
Soviet-Polish  issue.  An  important  source  is  the  collection  of  documents  from  the  Joseph 
Pilsudski  Institute,  New  York  and  published  by  the  Polish  Cultural  Foundation  in 
London,  Janusz  Cisek  (ed.  ),  Sqsiedzi  wobec  wojny  1920  roku.  Wybör  dokumentow 
6 (1990),  which  examines  Poland's  relations  during  the  Soviet-Polish  War  and  after  with 
various  neighbouring  states  including  Ukraine,  Germany  and  Czechoslovakia.  This 
illustrates  the  impact  of  the  struggle  on  the  whole  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  The 
questions  addressed  are;  did  the  Warsaw  Agreement  constitute  a  genuine  alliance  and 
what  was  the  balance  of  power  between  the  two  allies,  what  were  Polish  aims  in 
Ukraine  and  why  did  the  intervention  fail? 
Chapter  10  handles  the  struggle  in  East  Galicia  between  the  competing 
nationalisms  of  Poland  and  Ukraine.  I  begin  by  examining  the  special  status  of  East 
Galicia,  as  a  province  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire  and  how  Ukrainian  nationalism 
was  more  developed  there  than  in  Russian  Ukraine.  The  conflicting  claims  of  Poles  and 
Ukrainians  within  the  Hapsburg  Empire  are  briefly  examined  and  how  this  came  to  the 
fore  during  World  War  I  and  the  Austrian  and  German  negotiations  concerning  the 
establishment  of  a  Ukrainian  state.  The  Canadian  Ukrainian  historian  Paul  Magosci  is 
one  of  the  foremost  authorities  on  East  Galicia  at  this  time.  As  well  as  his  monograph  A 
History  of  Ukraine  (Toronto:  Toronto  University  Press,  1996),  I  have  also  drawn  on  his 
essay  in  Nationalism  and  Empire.  The  Hapsburg  Empire  and  the  Soviet  Union,  ed. 
Richard  Rudolph  and  David  Good  (Minneapolis:  University  of  Minnesota,  1992)  along 
with  Reshetar,  The  Ukrainian  Revolution,  where  Reshetar  examines  the  East  Galician 
situation  from  a  Ukrainian  perspective.  Another  source  has  been  the  collected  essays  in 
Andrei  S.  Markovits  and  Frank.  S.  Sysyn  (eds),  Nationbuilding  and  the  Politics  of 
Nationalism:  Essays  on  Austrian  Ukraine  (Cambridge,  Mass:  Harvard  Ukrainian 
Research  Institute,  1984).  The  importance  of  East  Galicia  in  both  the  military  and 
political  contexts  in  1919  is  examined  and  why  it  was  important  to  both  Bolshevik 
strategy  for  reaching  Hungary  and  Central  Europe  and  for  Entente  and  Polish  policy  for 
blocking  the  advance  of  the  Red  Army.  Here  I  examined  the  account  of  the  Bolshevik 
commander  Antonov-Ovseenko,  who  commanded  the  Red  Army  advance  in  the  region, 
in  B.  Antonov-Ovseenko,  Zapiski  o  grazhdanskoi  voine,  Volume  IV  (Moscow,  1924). 
Because  East  Galicia  had  a  different  history  prior  to  1918  and  because  its  central 
struggle  after  December  1918  was  with  Poland,  rather  than  Soviet  Russia,  it  is 
necessary  to  treat  it  separately  in  this  thesis,  although  it  was  an  essential  part  of  Ukraine 
and  the  history  of  East  Galicia  is  intrinsically  linked  with  that  of  the  rest  of  Ukraine.  It 
was  also  in  East  Galicia  that  enmity  between  Poland  and  Germany  became  most 
obvious. 
7 The  narrative  moves  forward  to  an  assessment  of  Polish  attempts  at  the  Paris 
Peace  Conference  to  persuade  the  Allied  Powers  to  grant  Poland  suzerainty  over  East 
Galicia.  Sources  for  this  are  primarily  the  Documents  on  British  Foreign  Policy  and 
Papers  relating  to  the  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States.  The  Paris  Peace 
Conference  1919.  The  question  why  the  Poles  were  successful  in  undermining 
Ukrainian  nationalism  in  East  Galicia  is  studied,  and  particularly  the  role  of  Polish 
propaganda  associating  the  East  Galicians  with  the  both  the  Bolsheviks  and  the 
Germans.  Sources  included  the  files  of  the  Polish  Foreign  Ministry  and  the  monograph 
by  Arnold  Margolin,  the  representative  of  the  Ukrainian  Peoples'  Republic  in  London, 
A.  Margolin,  Ukraina  i  Politika  Antanty  (Berlin,  1921).  The  reports  of  massacres  by  the 
Ukrainians  are  also  examined  and  the  files  of  the  Interior  Ministry  of  Poland,  which 
report  on  that.  The  issue  of  the  decision  of  the  fate  of  East  Galicia  at  Riga  is  examined, 
and  the  grounds  for  the  failure  of  the  Ukrainian  attempt  to  separate  East  Galicia  from 
Poland.  Historiography  here  includes  Andrew  Wilson,  The  Ukrainians.  Unexpected 
Nation  (London  and  New  Haven:  Yale  University  Press,  2000)  and  Alexander  Motyl, 
Turn  to  the  Right:  The  Ideological  Origins  and  Development  of  Ukrainian  Nationalism 
1919-1929  (Boulder:  East  European  Monographs,  1980),  which  examines  the  pro- 
German  orientation  of  Ukrainian  nationalism  in  East  Galicia,  as  a  reaction  to  Polish 
conquest. 
There  are  many  Polish  sources,  some  of  the  more  recent  are  Ludwik  Mroczka, 
Spör  o  Galicjg  Wschodniq  1914-1923  (Krakow:  Wydawnictwo  Naukowe  WSP,  1998), 
Barbara  Stoczewska,  Litwa,  Bialorus,  Ukraina  w  mysli  politycznej  Leona 
Wasilewskiego  (Krakow:  Ksicgarnia  Akademicka,  1998)  and  T.  Dgbrowski,  Ukrainski 
ruck  narodowy  w  Galicji  Wschodniej  1912-1923  (Warsaw,  1985).  Older  sources 
include  Z.  Zawadowski,  Rus  Podkarpacka  i  jej  stanowisko  prawnopolityczne  (Warsaw, 
1931),  J.  Sopotnicki,  Kampania  polsko-ukraiiiska  (Lvov,  1921),  J.  Rogowski,  Z  walk  o 
Lwow  (Poznan,  1929). 
Chapter  11  deals  with  the  Treaty  of  Riga  and  the  end  of  the  Polish-Ukrainian 
alliance  and  its  impact  on  the  Petliura's  regime  in  Poland.  I  wished  to  examine  whether 
there  continued  to  be  unrest  against  the  Bolsheviks  in  Ukraine  by  nationalists  after  the 
Polish  withdrawal.  I  also  wanted  to  explore  the  question  why  the  Poles  abandoned  the 
Ukrainians  at  Riga.  Was  it  because  of  the  imminence  of  the  uncertain  plebiscite  in 
Upper  Silesia,  or  the  policy  of  the  National  Democrats,  who  had  been  opposed  to  the 
8 Ukrainian  alliance  from  the  outset?  What  was  the  position  of  Pilsudski  and  his  allies  on 
the  ending  of  the  Ukrainian  alliance,  under  the  terms  of  the  Riga  Treaty?  I  also 
examined  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Riga,  especially  as  they  impacted  on  the  activities 
of  Ukrainian  emigres  in  Poland,  and  the  resulting  withdrawal  of  Polish  recognition  and 
toleration  of  the  UNR  regime  in  Tarnow.  Polish  and  Ukrainian  historians  have  tended 
to  have  very  different  views  of  the  Riga  Treaty  and  the  necessity  for  ending  the 
alliance,  with  its  concomitant  agreement  to  divide  Ukraine  between  Poland  and  Soviet 
Russia,  albeit  under  the  title  of  Soviet  Ukraine.  The  activities  of  the  anti-Polish 
Ukrainian  groups  are  analysed  and  their  attempts  to  destroy  the  Polish-Ukrainian 
alliance,  an  example  of  this  is  the  Vienna  conference,  where  they  called  for  an  alliance 
with  Germany,  and  other  countries  opposed  to  the  Polish  orientation. 
I  have  drawn  on  the  files  of  the  MSZ,  Polish  General  Staff  and  the  Leon 
Wasilewski  papers  in  Archiwum  Akt  Nowych,  Warsaw,  along  with  the  Trotsky  papers 
and  the  memoirs  of  Grabski,  the  National  Democrat  politician,  who  played  a  major  role 
in  the  Polish  government,  which  negotiated  the  Treaty  of  Riga.  Also  the  papers  of  the 
British  Foreign  Office,  and  the  article  by  Jan  Jacek  Bruski  on  the  parliament  of  the 
Ukrainian  People's  Republic  in  exile  in  Zbigniew  Karpus  (cd),  Polska  i  Ukraina, 
Sojusz  1920  roku  i  jego  nastgpstwa  (Torun,  1997)  and  the  article  by  Alexander 
Kolaiiczuk,  `Soldiers  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  Interned  in  Poland  (1920- 
1924)'  in  the  same  collection  of  essays.  Piotr.  S.  Wandycz,  Soviet-Polish  Relations 
1917-1921  (Cambridge  Mass.,  1969)  is  also  a  source  of  material  on  the  Soviet-Polish 
negotiations  at  Riga.  I  have  also  referred  to  the  essay  `Polish-Ukrainian  Relations'  in 
the  collection  of  essays  on  Ukrainian  relations  with  other  nationalities  edited  by  Ivan  L 
Rudnytsky,  the  Canadian-Ukrainian  historian,  Essays  in  Modern  Ukrainian  History 
(Edmonton:  CIUS,  1987),  where  he  refers  to  the  attempt  by  Poland  to  reach  a 
compromise  with  the  East  Galicians  before  the  Treaty  of  Riga.  Finally,  I  have  referred 
to  the  Polish  concerns  about  developing  economic  links  between  German  firms  and 
Soviet  Ukraine,  where  there  is  evidence  in  the  Polish  archives  concerning  this. 
Other  historiography  on  the  period  leading  to  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  is  the 
work  of  the  Polish  communist  writer  Markhlevsky,  who  held  a  pro-Soviet  and  anti- 
Ukrainian  position,  Y.  Markhlevsky,  Voina  i  Mir  mezdhu  Burzhuaznoi  Pol'shoi  i 
Proletarskoi  Rossei  (Moscow,  1921)  and  Clara  Zetkin,  Erinnerungen  an  Lenin  (Vienna, 
1929),  where  Zetkin  recounts  the  Soviet  desire  for  peace  and  Lenin's  view  of  the  treaty 
9 being  a  second  Brest-Litovsk,  which  would  grant  Soviet  Russia  a  breathing  space,  in 
order  to  crush  internal  dissent  and  Wrangel.  The  text  of  the  treaty  is  also  included  in  R 
SFSR:  Sbornik  Deistvushchikh  Dogovorov,  ii  (Moscow,  1921),  No.  51,  pp.  43-71.  On 
the  position  of  the  National  Democrat  Party  towards  the  Ukrainians  and  the 
establishment  of  the  eastern  frontier,  there  is  the  theoretical  work  by  the  leading 
National  Democrat  politician  Grabski:  S.  Grabski,  Uwagi  o  bletgcej  historyznej  chwili 
Polski  (Warsaw,  1922)  and  the  commentary  on  Grabski's  theories  by  the  Polish 
historian  Wojdylo  in:  W.  Wojdylo,  Koncepcje  spoleczno-polityczne  Stanislawa 
Grabskiego  (Torun,  1993). 
In  Chapter  12  1  turn  to  examine  the  issue  of  the  Ukrainian  prisoners  held  in  the 
Polish  internment  camps  from  the  end  of  the  Soviet-Polish  War  until  1924.  These 
prisoners,  who  had  fought  alongside  the  Poles  on  behalf  of  the  UNR,  were  held  in 
several  large  camps  by  the  Polish  authorities.  I  examine  the  question  of  where  they 
were  held,  the  conditions  of  internment  and  the  relationship  between  the  Polish 
authorities  and  the  internees.  There  has  been  very  little  historiography  on  this  issue  and 
the  main  source  was  the  Polish  historian  Zbigniew  Karpus's  work,  which  details 
statistics  and  dates  for  the  opening  and  liquidation  of  camps  and  the  numbers  held.  His 
major  work  in  this  field  is  Jeiicy  i  internowany  rosyjscy  i  ukrainscy  na  terenie  Polski  w 
latach  1918-1924  (Torun:  Adam  Marszalek,  1997).  Other  than  this  work  there  have 
been  very  few  detailed  accounts  of  the  internees  in  Poland,  except  for  earlier  works  by 
Karpus,  dealing  with  particular  internment  camps  and  groups  of  prisoners.  These 
include  Z.  Karpus,  Jei:  cy  i  internowany  rosyjscy  i  ukrainscy  w  Polsce  w  latach  1918- 
1924.  Z  dziejöw  militarno-politycznych  wojny  polsko-radzieckiej  (Torun,  1991),  Z. 
Karpus  and  W.  Rezmer,  Tuchola.  Oböz  je,  icöw  i  internowanych  1914-1923  (Torun, 
1997),  Z.  Karpus  `Raport  o  sytuacji  jer  cow  i  internowanych  oraz  o  stanie  obozu  w 
D,  Ibiu  pod  Krakowem  od  listopada  1918  do  1920  r'  in  Polska  i  jej  sqsiedzi  w  czasach 
najnowszych  Studia  i  materially  ofiarowane  Profesorowi  Karolowi  Grünbergowi  w  70- 
lecie  urodzin  (Torun,  1995)  and  Z.  Karpus,  `Oböz  jencöw  bolszewickich  i 
internowanych  ukraifiskich  w  Wadowicach.  Raport  z  listopada  1920  roku'  in 
Wojkowsky  Przeglqd  Historyczny,  Number  4/1994.  The  Ukrainian  historian  Alexander 
Kolanchuk,  has  also  researched  the  question  of  the  Ukrainian  internees  in  Polish  camps 
in  `2olnierze  armii  Ukrainskiej  Republiki  Ludowej  internowani  w  Polsce  (1920-1924)' 
10 in  Z.  Karpus,  Waldemar  Rezmer  and  Emilian  Wiszka  (eds.  ),  Polska  i  Ukraina  (Torun: 
Micheal  Copernicus  University,  1997). 
I  also  examined  the  records  of  the  Red  Cross,  using  the  International  Review  of 
the  Red  Cross  (from  the  British  Red  Cross  Society  archive  in  London)  and  the  volumes 
covering  the  years  from  1920  to  1926.  These  did  not  refer  at  all  to  the  Ukrainian 
internees  in  Poland  but  did  reveal  some  interesting  facts  on  Ukrainian  internees  held  in 
Czechoslovakia  and  the  attempts  of  the  Czech  government  to  persuade  them  to  return  to 
Poland.  In  this  way,  I  addressed  the  issue  of  why  the  Ukrainians  were  reluctant  to  settle 
in  Poland,  and  the  reaction  of  the  Polish  government  to  Ukrainians  trying  to  settle  there. 
The  question  of  the  situation  of  internees  in  Poland  was  also  dealt  with  in  the  Red  Cross 
reports,  by  the  visit  of  the  Red  Cross  delegation  to  Poland  in  1920  and  the  second  visit 
in  1921  to  investigate  the  conditions  of  Ukrainian  political  prisoners.  I  was  essentially 
addressing  the  issues  of  how  external  agencies  and  observers  regarded  the  plight  of  the 
Ukrainians,  as  the  historiography  was  rather  limited  otherwise.  I  sought  to  establish  in 
what  situation  the  Ukrainians  found  themselves  before  1924.  Finally,  using  both 
archival  sources  and  Karpus's  source  information,  I  tried  to  determine  how  and  why  the 
Ukrainians  finally  left  Poland  in  1924. 
In  the  conclusion  I  address  how  the  relationship  between  Germany  and  Ukraine 
and  Poland's  relationship  with  Ukraine  impacted  on  the  attempt  by  Petliura  to  establish 
an  independent  Ukraine  and  in  which  ways  it  did  this.  Also,  if  an  attempt  by  Polish 
historians  in  the  1990's  to  claim  that  Poland  had  consistently  supported  Ukrainian 
independence  from  the  outset  are  justified.  I  have  also  attempted  to  address  the  issue  of 
whether  there  continued  to  be  a  German  interest  in  Ukraine  and  in  Ukrainian 
nationalism  in  the  early  years  of  the  Weimar  Republic.  Clearly,  I  am  only  examining 
the  history  of  the  Ukrainian  nationalists  led  by  Petliura  and  the  Ukrainian  People's 
Republic,  rather  than  the  East  Galicians  or  the  pro-German  Ukrainians  led  by 
Skoropadskyi.  However,  these  other  groups  do  enter  the  discourse,  when  their  activities 
affect  the  decisions  of  the  Petliuran  nationalists,  or  their  Polish  allies,  or  how  the 
Petliuran  project  was  perceived  elsewhere.  I  have  attempted  to  navigate  the  shifting 
sands  of  Ukrainian  nationalism,  without  becoming  lost  in  the  myriad  details  of  its  rival 
adherents.  I  have  clearly  not  addressed  the  issue  of  Soviet-Ukrainian  relations,  except 
insofar  as  it  impinged  on  the  German  and  Polish  relationships  with  Ukrainian 
nationalism.  My  principal  aim  has  been  to  examine  the  relationship  between  these  two 
11 Central  European  countries  and  Ukrainian  nationalism  during  the  period  following  the 
end  of  World  War  I  and  the  establishment  of  the  frontier  between  Poland  and  Ukraine 
by  the  Treaty  of  Riga. 
In  the  wake  of  World  War  I  the  situation  in  Central  Europe  was  extremely  fluid. 
New  states  were  being  established  and  others  were  clamouring  for  recognition.  These 
states  emerge  or  almost  emerge  and  then  come  into  conflict.  The  situation  was 
extremely  multi-dimensional.  Most  historical  works  on  this  period  have  been  two- 
dimensional,  an  example  is  Norman  Davies's  White  Eagle,  Red  Star,  which  only 
examines  the  Polish-Russian  conflict  and  ignores  the  role  of  Germany,  Ukraine  and 
Lithuania.  The  Canadian  Institute  for  Ukrainian  Studies  has  produced  interesting  works 
analysing  the  Ukrainian  relationship  with  Germans,  Poles  and  others,  but  in  general 
English  language  historiography  has  steered  clear  of  the  subject. 
Most  historiography  relating  to  the  German-Ukrainian  relationship  has  seen 
1918  as  the  end  point  and  has  only  taken  up  the  theme  again  in  1933.  The  general  view 
has  been  that  German  interest  in  Ukraine  ended  with  Germany's  defeat  in  November 
1918.  I  am  demonstrating  that  this  was  not  the  case  and  that  the  Weimar  Republic,  even 
before  Rapallo  and  Riga,  attempted  to  develop  political  and  above  all,  economic  links 
with  Ukraine.  The  Polish  dimension  in  this  relationship  cannot  be  ignored,  and  German 
awareness  of  the  developing  links  between  Warsaw  and  the  nationalists  had  to  have  an 
effect,  as  German  policy  in  Eastern  Europe  was  always  seen  through  the  prism  of  its 
relationship  with  Poland.  German  historians  are  now  beginning  to  develop  this  theme  of 
German-Ukrainian  relations  in  the  wake  of  World  War  I.  Frank  Golczewski  of 
Hamburg  University,  who  is  the  leading  German  historian  in  the  field  of  modern 
Ukrainian  history,  is  currently  writing  a  monograph  on  German-Ukrainian  realations  in 
the  early  years  of  the  Weimar  Republic.  I  have  examined  some  important  aspects  of 
this,  both  economic,  military  and  diplomatic.  Utilising  German  archival  sources,  I  have 
sought  to  prove  a  continuing  German  interest  in  Ukraine. 
Relations  between  Petliura  and  Poland  are  the  other  side  of  this  multi- 
dimensional  relationship.  Most  of  the  English  language  historiography  has  derived  from 
the  Canadian  Ukrainians,  with  Rudnytskyi  and  Magosci  as  the  main  figures.  This  has 
been  generally  anti-Polish,  although  Rudnytskyi  attempted  to  understand  the  Polish 
position  and  in  particular,  missed  opportunities  by  both  Poland  and  Ukraine  to  develop 
a  more  positive  relationship  in  the  crucial  years  1918-1921.  From  the  Polish  side  the 
12 issue  was  not  widely  addressed  between  1945  and  1989,  with  the  exception  of  a  few 
historians  such  as  Dziewanowski.  Since  1989  a  new  Polish  school  of  historiography  on 
Polish-Ukrainian  relations  has  developed,  and  I  have  utilised  this  to  examine 
contemporary  Polish  discourse.  I  have  used  Polish  archival  material  to  argue  that 
Ukrainian  nationalism  was  not  regarded  favourably  by  the  Polish  state. 
Other  than  the  Canadians,  I  believe  that  my  work  is  one  of  the  first  attempts  to 
address  the  extremely  complex  issue  of  Polish-Ukrainian  relations  during  these  years. 
Also,  the  issue  of  the  Ukrainian  internees  in  Poland  has  not  been  examined,  other  than 
by  the  Polish  historian  Karpus,  and  I  have  drawn  important  parallels  between  their 
treatment  in  Poland  and  the  position  of  the  Ukrainian  internees  in  Czechoslovakia. 
Once  again,  this  emphasises  the  multi-dimensional  and  international  aspect  of  the 
struggle  for  Ukrainian  independence  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of  World  War  I. 
This  period  was  crucial  for  the  attempt  by  many  nations  in  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe  to  escape  from  the  ruins  of  the  collapsed  multi-national  empires  of  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Russia.  For  a  brief  period  from  1917  a  window  of  opportunity  opened, 
only  to  close  again  by  1920.  Some  nations,  such  as  the  Poles,  were  successful  in 
establishing  an  independent  state.  Others,  such  as  the  Ukrainians,  were  not.  I  am 
demonstrating  that  there  were  many  external  players  in  this  attempt  by  the  Ukrainians 
to  gain  their  independence  and  that  Germany,  and  especially  Poland  were  two  of  them. 
The  struggle  for  Ukrainian  independence  in  the  aftermath  of  World  War  I  cannot  be 
properly  understood  without  examining  the  roles  of  both  Germany  and  Poland,  and 
seeing  the  seed  of  future  relations  between  Ukrainian  nationalism  and  both  Poland  and 
Germany. 
The  origins  of  German  relations  with  Ukrainian  nationalism  during  the  Third 
Reich  date  back  to  the  experience  of  Polish  rule  in  East  Galicia  and  the  Polish  crushing 
of  Ukrainian  resistance  in  East  Galicia.  Also,  the  experience  of  the  Polish-Ukrainian 
alliance  of  1920,  and  the  failure  of  the  Poles  to  support  Ukrainian  claims  at  Riga  left  an 
extremely  negative  impression  of  Polish  policy  in  Eastern  Europe.  The  Petliuran 
experiment  was  short-lived  and  disastrous,  and  ensured  that  Ukrainian  nationalism 
regarded  an  anti-Polish  orientation  as  a  sine  qua  non.  The  crucial  period  for  Ukrainian 
nationalism  were  the  years  following  World  War  I,  and  the  opportunity  to  form  an 
independent  state  would  not  arise  again  until  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  in  1991. 
13 Ukraine  lies  in  an  area  of  Europe,  which  has  had  an  immense  geo-political 
significance  throughout  the  20th  century  and  during  two  world  wars.  I  have  analysed  its 
history  during  one  of  its  most  turbulent  periods  and  its  relationship  with  two  of  its  most 
important  neighbours.  I  have  contributed  to  an  understanding  of  the  history  of  Europe's 
second  largest  state  and  an  analysis  of  its  relations  with  two  key  states  in  Central 
Europe,  both  of  which  were  to  play  an  important  part  in  its  subsequent  history. 
14 CHAPTER  1 
GERMANY,  POLAND  AND  UKRAINE  -  AN  HISTORICAL  PERSPECTIVE 
Although  the  events  outlined  and  examined  in  this  thesis  occurred  in  the  years 
immediately  after  World  War  I,  the  Bolshevik  Revolution,  and  the  collapse  of  the 
Russian  Empire,  they  were  the  result  of  centuries  of  interplay  and  conflict  between  the 
three  countries  concerned.  Ukraine  came  under  the  influence  of  Poland,  Russia,  and 
Germany,  consecutively.  Each  coveted  the  rich  resources  of  this  large  and  abundant 
territory;  and  Poland  and  Russia,  at  least,  regarded  it  as  an  essential  part  of  their 
respective  empires.  Germany's  relationship  with  Ukraine,  at  least  in  the  modern  period, 
was  more  short-lived;  but  it  too  sought  to  dominate  this  country  at  the  heart  of  Europe. 
I  have  not  examined  the  relationship  between  Russia  and  Ukraine  in  this  thesis, 
and  it  is  in  many  respects  the  central  relationship  in  modern  Ukrainian  history  -  and  one 
on  which  there  have  been  many  studies.  In  my  opinion  the  relationship  between 
Ukraine  and  Poland  is  almost  as  central  to  the  development  of  Ukrainian  history,  and 
has  often  been  the  counterweight  to  Russian  influence  in  Ukraine.  The  role  of 
Germany,  while  not  as  central,  has  nonetheless  led  to  important  developments  in 
modern  Ukrainian  history  and,  indeed,  is  regarded  by  some  as  the  motor  of  Ukrainian 
nationalism.  The  view  that  Ukrainian  nationalism  was  a  German  creation  is  heard  as 
often  today,  especially  among  the  ranks  of  Russian  nationalists,  as  it  was  in  1918. 
Ukraine,  together  with  Byelorussia  and  East  Prussia,  lay  in  the  zone  of  conflict 
between  the  nascent  Polish  state  and  the  Teutonic  Knights  in  the  late  Middle  Ages.  The 
other  major  power  in  the  region  was  Lithuania  and  scholars  have  speculated  on  the 
possibility  that  Ukraine  could  have  become  part  of  a  Lithuanian  state  but  the  Teutonic 
Knight's  struggle  with  Lithuania  meant  that  Lithuania  was  drawn  away  from 
involvement  in  Ukraine  and  had  to  concentrate  its  resources  against  the  Teutonic 
threat.  '  Not  for  the  last  time  in  Ukrainian  history  had  the  role  of  the  Germans  played  a 
central  part  in  its  development.  In  the  next  few  centuries  it  was  principally  Poland  with 
which  the  destiny  of  Ukraine  was  linked.  According  to  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of 
Lublin  in  1569,  Kiev  and  Lviv  both  came  under  Polish  rule  -  the  newly  created  Polish 
Commonwealth  (Rzeczpospolita).  This  was  the  period  of  Poland's  greatest  influence  in 
Europe  and  became  for  Polish  nationalists  `the  Golden  Age',  when  Poland's  rule 
'Andrew  Wilson,  The  Ukrainians.  Unexpected  Nation.  (New  Haven  and  London:  Yale  University  Press,  2000),  p.  46. 
15 stretched  from  the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Seas.  2  Even  today  Polish  tour  guides  proudly  tell 
tourists  of  its  one  time  greatness  and  point  out  insignia  demonstrating  its  suzerainty 
over  Lithuania  and  Ukraine.  It  was  this  historical  memory  that  stirred  the  newly  created 
Polish  Republic  in  1918  and  even  today  has  echoes  in  Polish  foreign  policy.  3 
The  Polish  Commonwealth  made  several  fundamental  mistakes,  however,  in 
relations  with  its  Ukrainian  subjects.  It  sought  a  policy  of  Polonisation  and 
Catholicisation,  which  provoked  Ukrainian  resistance.  It  could  be  argued  that  the 
policies  of  Dmowski  and  the  National  Democrat  Party  in  1918  continued  to  pursue  this 
policy  and  that  nothing  had  been  learned  from  the  lessons  of  the  17`h  century.  The 
Ukrainian  historian  Viacheslav  Lypynskyi  (1882-1931)  argued  that  without  the  revolt 
of  1648  direct  and  indirect  Polonisation  might  have  led  to  the  eventual  disappearance  of 
the  Ruthenian  (Ukrainian)  nation.  It  was  in  response  to  the  threat  of  Polonisation  and 
Catholicisation  that  some  Ukrainians  sought  the  assistance  of  Moscow,  and  it  is  from 
this  time  that  the  other  major  player  in  Ukrainian  history  -  Russia  -  became  involved. 
Russia,  whether  Tsarist  or  Soviet,  would  remain  the  major  foreign  power  involved  in 
Ukraine  until  1991  (and  some  would  argue  that  it  remains  so  even  today). 
The  Ukrainian  Cossack  revolts  of  the  17th  century,  particularly  that  led  by 
Khmelnytskyi,  shook  the  Polish  Commonwealth  to  its  foundations  and  left  a  legacy  of 
bitterness  and  distrust  between  Poles  and  Ukrainians.  Regarded  by  Polish  historians  as 
a  Civil  War,  it  is  regarded  by  Ukrainian  historians  on  the  contrary  as  a  `War  of 
Liberation'.  It  also,  of  course,  led  to  the  alliance  and  eventual  union  with  Russia  under 
the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Pereiaslav  in  1654.  Soviet  historians  interpreted  this  as  the 
real  date  of  the  union  of  the  east  Slavic  peoples  and  their  true  destiny.  The  process  of 
union  with  Russia  was  not  immediate  but  was  a  very  slow  one,  culminating  in  full 
union  during  the  reign  of  Catherine  II  in  the  late  18th  century.  It  must  also  be 
remembered  that  parts  of  Ukraine  still  remained  under  Polish  rule,  particularly  Galicia 
and  Volhynia.  There  was  a  reversal  of  policy  in  1658  when  the  Hetman  (Ukrainian 
Cossack  leader)  signed  a  treaty  of  alliance  with  Poland  at  Hadiach.  This  was  the  treaty 
whose  articles  Pilsudski  knew  by  heart,  and  often  recited,  and  was  for  many  Polish 
nationalists  in  1918  the  source  of  their  hopes  that  an  alliance  with  Ukraine  could  be 
1  Paul  Magosci,  A  History  of  Ukraine  (Toronto:  University  of  Toronto  Press,  1996),  pp.  148-150.  3  Sherman  W.  Garnett,  Keystone  in  the  Arch:  Ukraine  in  the  Emerging  Security  Environment  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe 
(Washington,  DC:  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  1997),  p.  86.  4  Magosci,  A  History  of  Ukraine,  pp.  213-215. 
16 renegotiated.  The  treaty,  however,  was  never  implemented  and  Ukraine  continued  to 
move  into  the  Russian  sphere  of  influence. 
In  the  early  18t"  century  the  Ukrainians,  led  by  Hetman  Mazepa,  rebelled  against 
the  Russians  but  did  not  form  an  alliance  with  Poland.  Instead  Mazepa  chose  Sweden, 
which  was  at  that  time  a  great  military  power  in  northern  Europe  and  Russia's  strongest 
enemy.  A  clear  pattern  emerges  of  Ukrainian  alliances  with  Western  European  powers, 
which  are  in  a  position  to  challenge  Russia  for  control  of  Ukraine.  Mazepa  was 
defeated,  however,  at  the  Battle  of  Poltava  in  1709  and  Ukraine  remained  under 
Russian  rule. 
With  the  three  Partitions  of  Poland  in  1772,1793  and  1795  Poland  itself 
disappeared  from  the  map  of  Europe.  Russia  gained  Volhynia  and  all  of  Ukraine  west 
of  the  river  Dnieper.  Galicia,  however,  remained  outside  Russian  control  and  this  was 
to  have  huge  significance  for  the  development  of  Ukrainian  nationalism  in  the  19th 
century  and  in  the  period  after  1918.  After  the  disappearance  of  Poland  Galicia  came 
under  the  rule  of  the  Hapsburg  Empire.  This  province,  which  was  almost  50% 
Ukrainian  and  50%  Polish;  found  itself  within  a  predominantly  German  speaking 
empire.  The  Hapsburgs  later  divided  the  province  into  two  -  West  Galicia  and  East 
Galicia,  which  was  to  lead  to  major  consequences  after  the  break  up  of  that  empire  in 
1918.  West  Galicia  was  predominantly  Polish  whereas  East  Galicia  was  predominantly 
Ukrainian,  or  Ruthenian  as  it  was  then  known  as.  The  subsequent  histories  of  the  two 
parts  of  Ukraine,  one  in  the  Hapsburg  Empire,  the  other  in  the  Romanov  Empire  would 
diverge  significantly  in  the  19`h  and  early  20th  centuries. 
The  19`h  century  is  regarded  as  the  century  when  nationalism  came  of  age  and 
Ukraine  was  no  exception.  In  Galicia  the  Hapsburgs  gradually  recognised  the  claims  of 
the  `Ruthenians'  for  the  recognition  of  their  language  and  culture,  and  many  Ukrainians 
in  Galicia  began  to  travel  to  study  at  German  and  Austrian  universities,  thus  being 
influenced  by  the  ideas  of  German  nationalism  and  the  renewed  interest  in  folklore  and 
local  history.  It  is  from  the  late  19th  century  that  a  German  interest  in  Ukraine  develops, 
especially  among  theorists  such  as  Paul  Rohrbach.  Similarly,  Ukrainian  nationalists  in 
Galicia  (and  some  in  Russian  Ukraine,  who  travelled  to  Galicia)  began  to  come  under 
the  influence  of  German  ideas.  5  The  problem,  of  course,  was  that  Ukrainians  in  Galicia 
were  in  constant  competition  with  Poles,  whose  nascent  nationalism  was  another 
Andrei  S  Markovits  and  Frank  E  Sysyn.  (eds),  Nationbuilding  and  the  Politics  of  Nationalism:  Essays  on  Austrian 
Galicia.  (Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard  Ukrainian  Research  Institute,  1984). 
17 powerful  force  within  the  Hapsburg  Empire.  The  fault  lines  in  Galicia  already  appeared 
after  1849,  when  the  Hapsburg  viceroy  in  Galicia,  himself  a  Pole,  attempted  to  're- 
Polonise'  the  province  but  the  Ruthenians  were  strong  enough  to  resist.  The  city  of 
Lemberg  (Lvov)  was  for  Poles  an  ancient  centre  of  Polish  culture  and  learning,  and  any 
attempt  to  remove  it  from  the  Polish  cultural  sphere  would  be  strongly  resisted.  This 
would  come  to  a  head  in  1918,  with  the  collapse  of  the  Hapsburg  Empire  and  the 
rebirth  of  the  Polish  state. 
The  rivalry  between  the  Hapsburg  and  Russian  Empires  also  involved  the 
Ukrainians.  Particularly  in  the  late  19`h  century  and  in  the  years  approaching  World 
War  I,  St  Petersburg  sought  to  portray  itself  as  the  saviour  of  all  Slavs  under  foreign 
domination,  and  to  revive  its  claim  to  the  remnants  of  Rus.  Russian  treatment  of 
Ukrainian  nationalists  in  Russian  Ukraine,  however,  did  not  encourage  many 
Ukrainians  to  support  the  Tsar.  Restrictions  imposed  on  Ukrainian  cultural  expression 
there  in  1863  and  1876  demonstrated  that  St  Petersburg  would  not  tolerate  any  form  of 
identity  within  the  frontiers  of  Ukraine  other  than  that  of  `Little  Russia'.  6  Most 
Ukrainians  were  peasants  (80%)  and  Wilson  argues  that  the  cultural  repression  in  1863 
and  1876  was  to  prevent  the  Ukrainian  intelligentsia  establishing  institutionalised 
channels  of  communication  with  the  peasantry.  7  Furthermore,  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Empire  grew  increasingly  liberal  towards  its  Ukrainian  subjects  and  by  1914  there  were 
plans  for  a  Ukrainian  university  in  Lemberg,  and  separate  Polish  and  Ukrainian 
chambers  in  the  local  legislature.  Austria  was  proving  to  be  more  supportive  of 
Ukrainian  self-determination  than  Russia. 
Here  it  must  be  stressed  that  an  awareness  of,  or  support  for,  Ukrainian 
nationalism  was  by  1914  confined  to  a  small  section  of  the  intelligentsia.  The  vast 
majority  of  the  peasantry,  whether  in  Galicia  or  Russian  Ukraine,  had  no  other  identity 
other  than  as  a  resident  of  a  particular  village  or  province.  In  the  context  of  the  events 
of  World  War  I  and  the  Russian  Civil  War,  along  with  the  Soviet-Polish  War,  many 
Ukrainian  peasants  just  knew  that  they  were  anti-German,  anti-White,  or  anti-Polish, 
rather  than  firm  supporters  of  an  independent  Ukrainian  state. 
The  outbreak  of  World  War  I  in  August  1914  brought  Ukraine  into  the  centre  of 
the  struggle  between  the  three  great  empires  ruling  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  -  the 
Russian,  the  German  and  the  Austro-Hungarian.  The  front  line  was  at  first  in  Poland 
Rudnytsky  Ivan  L,  Essays  in  Modern  Ukrainian  History  (Edmonton:  CIUS,  1987),  p.  25.  'Wilson,  The  Ukrainians,  p.  79. 
18 but  gradually  the  forces  of  the  Central  Powers  (particularly  Germany)  drove  back  the 
Russians,  and  the  Austro-Hungarians  mounted  counter-attacks  from  Galicia.  Ukrainians 
found  themselves  in  both  the  Russian  and  Austro-Hungarian  armies  and  thus  had  a 
similar  fate  to  the  Poles,  who  were  conscripted  into  the  German,  Austro-Hungarian  and 
Russian  armies.  German  and  Polish  minorities  in  Russian  Ukraine  were  also  enlisted  in 
the  army  of  the  Tsar.  The  military  might  of  Germany  was  too  much  for  Russia,  and 
combined  with  massive  internal  stresses,  resulted  in  the  collapse  of  the  Russian  Empire 
in  February  1917,  to  be  replaced  by  the  Provisional  Government  in  Petrograd. 
The  collapse  of  the  empire  led  to  the  Ukrainian  nationalists  setting  up  an 
assembly  in  Kiev  in  February  1917  and  the  declaration  of  the  Ukrainian  People's 
Council,  later  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  (UNR).  8  Russia  was  still  engaged  in  the 
war  with  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  and  the  armies  of  the  Central  Powers  pressed 
on  into  Ukraine  against  the  demoralised  Russian  army.  In  the  interim  in  Russia  the 
Bolsheviks  overthrew  the  Provisional  Government  and  declared  a  Soviet  state. 
Within  the  period  covered  by  this  thesis  there  were  several  governments  in 
Ukraine  -The  Hetmanate,  Nationalist,  Soviet,  White,  Soviet,  Nationalist  and  finally 
Soviet  -  indeed  the  years  1918-1920  in  Ukraine  are  characterised  by  perpetual  changes 
of  regime  in  Kiev  or  Kharkov.  Prior  to  December  1918  the  Hetmanate  (the  pro-German 
government  led  by  Skoropadskyi)  was  in  power  in  Kiev,  this  was  followed  by  the  UNR 
regime  (the  Ukrainian  nationalists)  once  again  based  in  Kiev;  then  in  early  1919  by  the 
Soviet  Ukrainian  regime  based  in  Kharkov.  In  the  course  of  1919  the  Soviet 
government  was  replaced  by  General  Denikin's  White  regime,  which  was  later  replaced 
by  the  Soviet  Ukrainian  government  for  a  second  time.  In  early  1920  the  Soviet 
government  was  overthrown  by  a  Polish  backed  UNR  regime  (at  least  in  Right  Bank 
Ukraine).  This  was,  in  turn,  replaced  by  the  Soviet  Ukrainian  regime,  which  continued 
in  power.  In  the  interim,  large  armies  of  Whites,  Bolsheviks,  Poles,  Nationalists  and 
Anarchists  controlled  areas  of  Ukraine.  The  Germans  and  even  the  French  became 
involved. 
Germany  after  the  fall  of  the  Empire  in  November  1918  passed  through  a 
relatively  short  revolutionary  period  but  by  mid  1919  the  parliamentary  democracy 
known  as  the  Weimar  Republic  was  firmly  ensconced.  Poland  was  also  a  parliamentary 
democracy  after  December  1918  in  the  guise  of  the  Second  Republic. 
1  Wilson,  The  Ukrainians,  p.  122. 
19 In  January  1918  the  IJNR  declared  the  independence  of  Ukraine  minus  the 
Hapsburg  territories.  The  Bolsheviks  were  not  prepared  to  recognise  the  sundering  of 
Ukraine  from  Russia  and  invaded  Ukraine,  occupying  Kiev  in  February  1918.  It  was 
now  that  the  Germans  directly  influenced  the  fate  of  Ukraine  by  occupying  most  of  the 
country,  and  signing  the  Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  with  the  Ukrainian  nationalist 
government,  the  Rada.  The  Germans  thus  created  the  idea  that  they  were  the  initiators 
of  Ukrainian  nationalism.  In  April  1918  the  Germans  overthrew  the  UNR  government 
and  created  the  `Hetmanate'  in  Ukraine,  which  was  in  effect  a  German  satellite  regime. 
Now,  with  the  prospect  of  final  victory  in  the  east  in  sight  and  a  victory  in  the  west 
soon  expected,  the  German  High  Command  concocted  some  of  its  most  expansionist 
and  imperialistic  schemes  for  Ukraine.  9  Both  Bolsheviks  and  Germans  recognised  the 
economic  importance  of  Ukraine  as  `the  breadbasket  of  Europe'  and  the  source  of  huge 
reserves  of  iron  ore  and  coal. 
The  Ukrainian  peasantry  resented  the  Germans,  as  indeed  they  resented  the  Polish 
and  Russian  landowners  and  the  Jews.  When  the  German  troops  attempted  to 
requisition  food  for  the  war  effort  this  led  to  peasant  resistance  and  widespread  revolt 
against  the  `Hetmanate'.  With  the  defeat  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  in 
November  1918,  both  empires  disintegrated,  leaving  a  vacuum  in  the  borderlands  of 
Eastern  Europe.  The  withdrawal  of  the  Germans  from  Ukraine  led  to  the  seizure  of 
power  once  again  by  Ukrainian  nationalists  and  the  reinstatement  of  the  UNR 
government.  In  Galicia  the  end  of  Hapsburg  rule  led  to  a  struggle  for  independence  by 
the  Ukrainians  there  against  the  newly  formed  Polish  state.  10  In  Poland,  the  creation  of 
the  Second  Republic  encouraged  ideas  of  the  rebirth  of  the  Polish  Commonwealth  and 
of  a  possible  incorporation  of  Lithuania  and  Ukraine  within  its  frontiers.  In  Soviet 
Russia,  engaged  in  a  life  and  death  struggle  against  a  collection  of  White  generals  intent 
on  its  destruction,  the  view  was  that  the  reconquest  of  Ukraine  was  vital. 
The  mix  of  nationalities  in  Ukraine  in  the  period  1918-1922  was  not  the 
reasonably  homogenous  one  that  it  is  today.  In  the  former  provinces  of  the  Russian 
Empire  the  urban  population  was  predominantly  Russian  and  Jewish  and  the  percentage 
of  Russians  increased  further  east.  The  rural  areas  were  mainly  populated  by 
Ukrainians,  particularly  in  southern  and  central  Ukraine,  and  also  in  East  Galicia.  " 
'  Orest  Subtelny,  Ukraine  A  History  (Toronto:  Toronto  University  Press,  1994),  pp.  356-357. 
1°  Rudnytsky,  Essays  in  Modern  Ukrainian  History,  p.  65. 
20 There  were  also  many  Polish  landowners,  particularly  west  of  the  Dnepr,  and  there  was 
a  sizable  German  minority  in  the  area  adjoining  the  Black  Sea.  In  East  Galicia  the 
population  of  the  large  towns,  especially  Lemberg  (Lvov),  was  mainly  Polish  and 
Jewish. 
Here  I  am  engaged  principally  in  the  examination  of  relations  of  both  Poland  and 
Germany  with  the  Ukrainian  nationalists.  Although,  at  times,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
discover  their  relations  with  the  other  forces  struggling  for  power  in  Ukraine,  i.  e. 
Denikin's  Whites  and  the  Ukrainian  Soviet  regime.  Both  Poland  and  Germany  were  of 
course  part  of  the  broader  constellation  of  forces  in  Europe  in  the  aftermath  of  World 
War  I.  Ukraine,  not  sufficiently  strong  to  resist  the  threat  from  the  east,  needed  support 
and  its  rich  resources  lay  open  to  the  victor.  In  the  confusion  and  chaos  of  the  Russian 
Civil  War  both  Poland  and  Germany,  the  one  with  ancient  links  to  Ukraine,  the  other 
with  more  recent  ones,  would  be  engaged  in  a  duel  for  her  affection. 
21 CHAPTER  2 
GERMAN  WAR  AIMS  AND  UKRAINE,  1914-1918 
Following  the  collapse  of  Imperial  Russia  and  its  army  after  the  Bolshevik 
Revolution,  Ukraine  lay  open  and  undefended  to  the  might  of  Germany  and  its  army.  In 
the  early  months  of  1918  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  gradually  occupied  the  whole 
of  Ukraine.  The  Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  between  the  Central  Powers  and  Soviet  Russia 
in  March  19181  was  merely  the  diplomatic  recognition  of  a  fait  accompli.  Ukraine  was 
now  divided  into  two  zones  of  occupation  -  the  Austro-Hungarians  controlled  the 
Black  Sea  coast,  together  with  the  major  port  of  Odessa,  and  the  southern  steppes 
-  whereas  the  Germans  controlled  the  north  of  Ukraine,  together  with  its  capital  Kiev, 
and  the  industrial  area  near  Kharkov.  This  division  displayed  the  relative  power  of  both 
countries.  Germany  held  the  lion's  share  and  was  very  much  the  senior  partner  in 
Ukraine  during  the  period  of  occupation. 
It  is  important  at  this  point  to  ask,  what  sort  of  regime  held  power  in  Germany  at 
this  time,  and  what  were  its  aims  in  Ukraine? 
Germany  in  early  1918,  and  indeed  until  the  end  of  the  First  World  War,  was 
nominally  an  Empire  with  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II  as  its  leader.  In  reality,  however, 
Germany  was  a  military  dictatorship  led  by  the  High  Command  and,  in  effect,  by  two 
men  -  Hindenburg  and  Ludendorff.  They  had  effectively  sidelined  both  the  emperor 
(who  concurred  with  most  of  their  plans)  and  the  parliament  (the  Reichstag).  Under  the 
terms  of  the  German  constitution  the  Reichstag  had  only  limited  powers,  and  was  very 
much  at  the  behest  of  the  Kaiser  and  the  army  in  general.  All  parties  had  supported  the 
declaration  of  war  and  continued  to  support  the  government  and  the  Supreme 
Command  throughout  1918.  The  defeat  of  Russia  and  the  Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  were 
seen  as  a  major  advance  in  Germany's  war  plans  and  virtually  all  Germany  rallied 
behind  Hindenburg  and  Ludendorff.  The  way  was  now  open  for  Germany's  long-term 
plans  in  the  east  to  be  implemented.  Ukraine  was  to  play  a  major  part  in  these  plans. 
Even  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  many  thinkers  and  strategists  in  Germany 
had  advocated  German  control  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  These  ideas  have  been 
1A  separate  treaty  had  also  been  signed  at  Brest  Litovsk  on  February  9th  between  the  Central  Powers  and  Ukraine,  recognising  Ukrainian  independence  and  the  Rada  as  the  legitimate  government  of  Ukraine. 
22 well  covered  by  German  historians  such  as  Fritz  Fischer.  2  These  concepts  included  the 
plan  of  turning  Ukraine  into  a  German  colony;  which  would  supply  the  Reich  with 
unlimited  supplies  of  food  and  also  land,  where  German  colonists  could  settle  and 
create  a  new  area  of  German  culture  and  influence.  There  was  already  a  historical 
precedent  in  Ukraine  for  some  of  these  ideas.  In  the  18`h  century  a  princess  from  the 
province  of  Mecklenburg-Strelitz,  in  northern  Germany,  had  ascended  the  throne  of 
Russia  as  Catherine  II.  One  of  her  policies  was  to  introduce  German  settlers  into  her 
empire,  and  one  of  the  main  settlement  areas  was  southern  Ukraine. 
These  German  settlers  had  retained  their  language  and  culture  and  were  still  to  be 
found  on  their  original  land  in  1918.  To  the  imperialists  in  the  German  Supreme 
Command  these  settlers  were  but  the  first  wave  of  a  new  policy  of  colonisation.  Some 
in  the  Supreme  Command  (including  Ludendorff)  favoured  even  more  extreme 
measures.  They  hoped  that  with  the  defeat  of  Britain  and  in  conjunction  with  their  ally 
Turkey,  the  Caucasus  would  also  fall  within  the  new  German  empire.  To  these  theorists 
Ukraine  would  fulfil  a  vital  role  as  a  land  bridge  to  Asia,  and  the  Black  Sea  coast  would 
become  a  German  Riviera.  With  the  occupation  of  Ukraine  in  1918  many  of  these 
dreams  seemed  realisable. 
There  was,  however,  another  German  war  policy,  which  was  more  immediate  and 
seemed  practical  in  the  short-term.  This  plan  involved  supplying  the  cities  of  the 
Central  Powers  with  badly  needed  food  and  raw  materials  from  Ukraine.  In  1918  as  a 
result  of  the  British  naval  blockade  of  the  North  Sea  there  were  food  shortages  in  many 
German  cities.  For  the  German  generals  Ukraine  provided  the  solution.  The  plan  was 
that  food  in  Ukraine  would  be  requisitioned,  sent  to  the  Black  Sea  and  transported  from 
there  by  barge  up  the  Danube  to  the  cities  of  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany.  This 
would  allow  the  German  army  to  continue  to  fight  on  the  Western  Front  and  finally 
overwhelm  the  combined  forces  of  Britain,  France  and  the  United  States.  3 
What  was  the  economic  importance  of  Ukraine  both  to  Russia  and  Germany?  A 
litany  of  economic  facts  concerning  the  role  of  Ukraine  in  the  Russian  Empire  suffices. 
Before  World  War  I  three  quarters  of  all  coal  produced  in  the  empire  came  from 
Ukraine,  as  did  two  thirds  of  the  iron  ore,  three  quarters  of  the  manganese,  two  thirds  of 
the  salt,  four  fifths  of  the  sugar  and  nine  tenths  of  the  wheat  exported  from  the  empire. 
2  Fritz  Fischer,  Grinach  der  Weltmacht:  Die  Krlegszlelpolitik  des  kaiserlichen  Deutschland  1914-1918  (Dusseldorf,  1961).  3  Erich  Ludendorff,  Meine  Kriegserinnerungen,  1914-1918  (Berlin,  1922),  p.  531. 
23 The  Germans  had  propounded  the  idea  of  the  liberation  of  the  subject  peoples  of 
the  Russian  Empire  since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  and  this  was  an  important  element 
of  German  imperialistic  propaganda.  In  this  they  had  considerably  less  problems  than 
the  Austro-Hungarians  in  that  they  did  not  rule  a  multinational  empire  and  had  no 
major  Slav  groups  within  their  borders,  with  the  exception  of  the  western  provinces  of 
Poland  ruled  from  Berlin.  It  was  ostensibly  to  liberate  Ukraine  from  the  Russian  yoke 
that  they  entered  the  country  in  1918  and  they  were  to  maintain  this  fiction  up  until 
November  1918,  when  they  were  forced  out  of  the  war.  Berlin  regarded  the  Ukrainian 
nationalists  as  important  allies  in  the  battle  against  Russia  and  in  its  attempts  to  control 
Ukraine.  It  was  at  the  request  of  the  Central  Rada  (Ukrainian  Nationalist  government) 
that  the  German  army  first  occupied  Ukraine  in  February  1918.  The  Rada,  on  February 
23,1918  issued  the  following  declaration: 
In  order  to  put  an  immediate  end  to  the  pillaging  of  Ukraine  and  to  make 
possible,  upon  the  condition  of  peace,  immediate  promulgation  of  laws 
to  deal  with  the  condition  of  the  workers,  the  Council  of  People's 
Ministers  has  accepted  the  military  assistance  of  the  friendly  powers, 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  (...  )  They  are  coming  to  Ukraine  to 
suppress  disorder  and  anarchy  and  to  establish  peace  and  order  (...  ) 
They  are  coming  purely  to  help  our  Cossacks  who  are  staunchly 
defending  our  country,  our  land,  and  our  freedom  from  the  armed 
attacks  of  the  Russian  government,  the  Council  of  People's  Commissars, 
which,  like  the  old  tsarist  government,  wishes  to  subject  Ukraine  to  the 
authority  of  Russian  capitalists,  and  thus  to  enable  the  Russian  people  to 
live  on  the  labour  and  wealth  of  Ukraine. 
In  helping  the  Ukrainian  government  in  its  fight  against  violators  and 
plunderers,  these  troops  have  no  hostile  intentions  towards  us;  it  is  in  the 
interest  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  that  order  should  be  re-established 
and  an  opportunity  for  peaceful  work  to  be  given  to  the  toilers  of  Ukraine.  4 
Stefan  Horak's  work,  The  First  Treaty  of  World  War  I.  Ukraine's  Treaty  with  the 
Central  Powers  of  February  9,1918,  on  the  first  Brest-Litovsk  treaty,  between  the 
Central  Powers  and  Ukraine,  concentrates  on  German  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  Austro- 
Hungarian  relations  with  the  independent  Ukrainian  government.  It  was  Germany  and 
4  Xenia  Joukoff  Eudin,  'The  German  Occupation  of  Ukraine  in  1918',  in  The  Russian  Review,  1,1.  (Stanford:  Stanford  University 
Press,  1941),  p.  91. 
24 the  Central  Powers,  which  first  recognised  Ukrainian  independence.  There  were  two 
major  problems  for  Germany  however  with  this  policy  and  these  were  to  become 
apparent  within  a  few  months. 
A  separate  treaty  between  Soviet  Russia  and  the  Central  Powers  was  signed  in 
March,  ending  the  state  of  war  between  them,  and  gaining  Soviet  recognition  of 
Ukraine's  independence.  Horak  argues  that  the  treaty  with  Ukraine  speeded  up  the 
signing  of  the  treaties  between  Germany  and  Soviet  Russia  and  Germany  and  Romania, 
and  also  improved  Germany's  prospects  of  gaining  the  much  desired  supply  of 
foodstuffs,  thus  making  it  possible  to  realise  Germany's  war  aims  in  the  East  as 
formulated  since  1914.5 
The  parties  comprising  the  Rada  were  mainly  left-of-centre  and  leil,  probably  in 
Russian  terms  a  mixture  of  Mensheviks  and  Socialist  Revolutionaries.  Indeed,  when  it 
dealt  with  economic  policies  the  Rada  had  many  similarities  with  the  Bolshevik/Left 
SR  government  in  Russia.  A  principal  economic  demand  was  the  nationalisation  and 
redistribution  of  the  land  to  the  peasantry  and  the  breaking  up  of  the  large  estates.  This 
presented  a  major  obstacle  for  the  Germans,  how  to  requisition  the  food  and  grain 
supplies  they  needed  for  their  war  effort  from  millions  of  small  peasant  landholdings. 
There  was  also  the  ideological  and  political  aspect.  How  could  it  be  explained  to  the 
German  Junkers  and  large  landlords  that  Germany  was  now  the  ally  of  a  radical 
socialist  Ukraine,  which  had  nationalised  all  its  agricultural  land  and  would  probably  do 
the  same  with  its  industries?  For  the  suspicious  German  ruling  class  it  suggested 
revolution  and  the  prospect  of  the  virus  of  socialism  being  released  into  Germany. 
Furthermore,  it  appeared  to  the  Germans  that  the  Rada  would  not  be  able  to  fulfil  its 
obligations  to  them.  Colonel  von  Stolzenberg,  in  Kiev,  telegraphed  the  German 
commander  of  the  eastern  front  on  March  9,1918: 
It  is  very  doubtful  whether  this  government,  composed  as  it  is  exclusively  of 
left  opportunists,  will  be  able  to  establish  firm  authority.  Decisive  and  most 
difficult  battles  await  us  in  the  West.  If  it  is  impossible  to  do  it  any  other 
way,  then  we  must  take  by  force  what  is  absolutely  necessary  for  our  life 
and  fight.  6 
'  Stefan  I  lorak,  The  First  Treaty  of  World  War  I.  Ukraine's  Treaty  with  the  Central  Powers  of  February  9,1918  (New  York: 
Columbia  University  Press,  1988),  p.  139. 
`Taras  Iiunczak,  'The  Ukraine  Under  I-letman  Pavlo  Skoropadskyi',  in  The  Ukraine.  1917-1921:  A  Study  in  Revolution.  (ed)  Taras 
Ilunczak.  (Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard  Ukrainian  Research  Institute,  1977),  p.  62. 
25 There  seemed  only  one  solution:  to  replace  the  Rada  with  a  government  more 
pliable  and  more  sympathetic  to  Germany's  ruling  class  and  Supreme  Command.  The 
fiction  of  Ukrainian  sovereignty  would  have  to  be  maintained,  however,  both  to  pacify 
the  Ukrainian  population  and  to  mollify  world  opinion  that  Germany  was  not  acting  as 
a  coloniser  or  arrogant  occupier  in  Ukraine. 
General  Eichhorn  (the  German  commander  in  Ukraine)  received  the  order  from 
Berlin  to  replace  the  Rada;  first  he  had  to  cast  about  for  a  replacement.  His  choice  was 
General  Pavel  Skoropadskyi,  an  aristocrat  of  Ukrainian  extraction  and  former  general 
in  the  Russian  imperial  army.  Skoropadskyi  was  the  recognised  leader  of  the  large 
landowners  and  monarchists  in  Ukraine.  Although  he  longed  for  the  restoration  of  the 
Romanovs,  he  was  prepared  to  settle  for  a  Ukrainian  state  with  himself  at  its  head  and 
very  much  yoked  to  Germany.  His  supporters  saw  this  as  the  best  protection  against 
both  Soviet  Russia  and  its  designs  on  Ukraine  and  the  machinations  of  the  Ukrainian 
socialists,  whose  policies  were  anathema  to  Skoropadskyi  and  his  supporters.  In  April 
1918  the  Germans  agreed  to  hand  power  to  Skoropadskyi  and  the  Rada  was  dissolved 
by  force  of  German  arms.  Once  again  to  conceal  their  true  aims  the  Germans  turned  to 
Ukrainian  history  for  a  cover. 
In  the  17th  century  during  the  struggle  for  Ukrainian  independence  against  the 
Poles,  the  ruler  of  Ukraine  had  been  the  Hetman.  Hetman  was  the  title  of  the  ruler  of 
the  Cossacks  and  Skoropadskyi  now  adopted  the  title  of  Hetman  (to  which  he  had  some 
claim  by  inheritance)  and  Ukraine  changed  from  being  a  National  Republic  to  being  the 
Hetmanate.  The  Hetmanate  would  remain  (under  German  military  protection)  until 
November  1918. 
With  the  establishment  of  the  Hetmanate  the  true  period  of  German  and  Austro- 
Hungarian  occupation  began.  The  Hetman's  government  consisted  of  large  Ukrainian 
landowners,  reactionary  Ukrainian  nationalists,  and  former  Tsarist  army  officers.  There 
was  no  doubt  that  Berlin  was  the  paymaster  and  would  dictate  economic  and  foreign 
policy.  One  of  the  most  interesting  aspects  of  this  period  in  relation  to  German  policy 
was  that  Germany  continued  to  keep  lines  of  communication  open  with  the  Russian 
Whites.  This  policy  was  to  continue  in  the  early  Weimar  period  and  created  difficulties 
in  the  relationship  between  the  Germans  and  the  Ukrainian  nationalists.  An  example  of 
this  was  the  decision  taken  about  the  ultimate  fate  of  Ukraine  at  the  Spa  conference 
26 between  the  Kaiser  and  the  Supreme  Command  on  July  2-3,1918.  One  of  the 
conclusions  of  the  conference  was: 
The  overthrow  of  the  Bolshevik  government  should  not  be  sought  now;  at 
the  same  time,  however,  closer  ties  should  be  established  with  the 
monarchists  in  order  to  be  prepared  for  any  eventuality.  The  condition  for 
this  is  their  acceptance  of  the  Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk.  They  should  not  be 
deprived  of  their  hope  for  the  eventual  re-establishment  of  Great  Russia.  His 
Majesty,  the  Kaiser,  recommends  the  rallying  of  Russia's  orderly  elements 
in  Kiev.  7 
The  Hetman  called  for  the  levying  of  food  taxes  on  the  peasantry,  and  the 
peasantry  refused  to  pay.  German  army  detachments  were  sent  out  to  requisition  the 
grain  and  there  were  many  clashes  between  them  and  the  ofen-armed  Ukrainian 
peasantry.  Indeed  it  was  at  this  stage  that  Makhno  and  the  Anarchists  began  to  rally  the 
Ukrainian  peasantry  against  the  Hetman  and  the  Germans.  The  carefully  planned 
German  requisition  targets  were  not  fulfilled  and  by  September  1918  only  one-tenth  of 
the  food  supplies  had  been  collected.  Germany's  plans  for  feeding  its  armies  from 
Ukraine  were  foundering.  The  German  Supreme  Command  became  more  desperate  and 
more  determined,  and  further  troops  were  despatched  to  Ukraine.  The  Hetman's 
government,  for  its  part,  began  to  arrest  all  opponents  and  particularly  those 
nationalists,  who  called  on  the  peasants  to  resist  the  German  food  requisition  squads, 
and  for  Ukraine  to  be  a  truly  sovereign  state. 
The  first  signs  of  the  future  conflict  between  Poland  and  Ukraine  emerged  during 
this  period.  Also  the  role  of  the  Germans  in  mediating  between  Poles  and  Ukrainians 
was  central  and  added  to  Polish  suspicions  of  Germany's  role  in  relation  to  Ukraine. 
The  centre  of  dispute  in  early  1918  was  the  region  of  Chelm.  Chelm  lay  in  the  extreme 
west  of  Ukrainian  ethnographic  territory  and  now  lies  just  inside  the  Polish  frontier. 
The  Ukrainians  considered  Chelm  as  one  of  their  oldest  provinces  but  it  was  also 
considered  as  part  of  their  historic  territory  by  the  Poles,  who  feared  that  if  they  failed 
to  control  it,  their  chances  of  acquiring  East  Galicia  and  the  Vilno  region  would  be 
harmed.  Article  3  of  the  Treaty  of  Brest  Litovsk  stipulated  that  a  German  evacuation  of 
Politische  Archiv  des  Auswartiges  Amts.  Bonn  '(hereafter  referred  to  as  PAA)'.  Büro  des  Staatssekretar.  Russland.  Nos  52  and 
1500.  Minutes  of  the  Talks  on  Unsettled  Political  Problems  held  at  Spa  on  July  2-3,1918,  Between  the  Representatives  of  the 
Imperial  Chancellery  and  the  Supreme  Army  Command,  Under  the  Chairmanship  of  the  Kaiser. 
27 the  occupied  areas  was  to  begin  immediately.  These  areas  were  mainly  Chelm  and 
Volhynia.  8 
In  1918  Poland  was  under  the  control  of  the  Central  Powers  and  both  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary  wished  to  gain  the  support  of  the  Poles  for  their  war  effort.  The 
Ukrainians  were  concerned  about  increasing  Polonisation  of  the  Chelm  area  and, 
indeed,  of  East  Galicia.  The  Poles  protested  against  a  "fourth  partition  of  Poland"  but  as 
Horak  states,  these  protests  were  more  pretentious  than  substantial  because  the 
population  of  the  Chelm  region  was  predominantly  Ukrainian.  9  The  Hetman's 
government  protested  to  Vienna,  but  without  effect.  1°  The  Germans,  however, 
supported  Ukraine's  claim  to  Chelm,  and  Ludendorff  rejected  Poland's  claims  to 
Chelm  (as  far  as  the  river  Bug),  arguing  that  it  would  completely  destroy  Ukraine's 
confidence  in  Germany.  11  The  German  Foreign  Ministry  took  the  same  position.  In  late 
October  1918,  when  General  von  Beseler  requested  the  Foreign  Ministry  to  allow  the 
Poles  to  move  into  Chelm,  the  new  German  Foreign  Minister,  Wilhelm  Solf,  rejected 
the  idea.  On  November  9a  special  agreement  was  signed  in  Berlin  between  Ukraine 
and  Germany,  which  provided  for  the  dispatch  of  two  German  divisions  into  Chelm  so 
that  Ukrainian  administration  could  be  established  there.  However,  in  late  November, 
with  the  collapse  of  Imperial  Germany  the  Poles  moved  into  the  area  unopposed.  12 
Incidents  like  this  were  to  form  the  basis  for  the  Polish  belief  that  the  Germans  were 
behind  Ukrainian  nationalism  and  implacably  opposed  to  Polish  territorial  claims. 
In  December  1918  and  in  1919  this  would  become  a  serious  charge  from  the 
Poles  about  German  involvement  in  the  East  Galician  situation.  So,  even  before  the 
Polish  state  had  come  into  existence,  the  battle  lines  were  being  drawn  for  future 
Polish-Ukrainian  conflict  with  an  added  German  dimension. 
What  of  Soviet  Russia?  Lenin  and  Trotsky  watched  developments  in  Ukraine 
with  anxiety  and  dismay.  The  Socialist  Revolutionaries  called  for  outright  war  with 
Germany  and  regarded  the  abandonment  of  Ukraine  to  the  Central  Powers  as  a  betrayal 
of  the  Revolution,  and  of  both  the  Ukrainian  and  Russian  peoples.  At  the  fifth  All 
Russian  Congress  of  Soviets,  the  Left  SR  speakers  called  for;  "the  tearing  up  of  the 
Brest-Litovsk  treaty  (which  is  fatal  to  the  Russian  and  the  international  revolution)  in 
1lorak,  The  First Treaty  of  World  War  1,  p.  46. 
Ibid.  p.  155. 
O1eh  S.  Fedyshyn,  Germany's  Drive  to  the  East  and  the  Ukrainian  Revolution,  1917-1918.  (New  Brunswick,  New  Jersey.,  197  1), 
175. 
Ibid,  p.  176. 
'ý  Ibid. 
28 rcv0iU(l  +nau"v  style:  to  appeal  to  the  solidarity  of  the  German  workers  (...  )"''  Lenin 
saw,  however,  that  Germany  was  still  too  strong  to  confront  directly  and  that  Russia 
had  to  abide  by  the  terms  of  Ehrest-Litovsk.  The  SRs.  not  content  with  this  policy, 
derided  to  lorcc  the  issue  through  terrorism.  They  murdered  the  German  ambassador  in 
Moscow,  ('cunt  Mirhach,  and  thereby  hoped  tier  a  diplomatic  breach  between  Soviet 
Russia  and  (iermany,  and  the  beginning  of  a  new  rewlutionar\'  war  to  liberate  t  Ikraine 
from  the  Central  Powers. 
Lenin  and  the  Bolsheviks  were  not  prepared  to  he  driven  into  a  oar  with  (  iermany 
and  declared  war  instead  on  the  SRs.  the  Bolshevik  government  apologised  in  the 
fullest  manner  to  Berlin  and  immediately  began  to  hunt  don  the  assassins,  together 
with  most  of  the  SRS.  For  the  I  letman's  government  all  of  this  was  a  clear  indication 
that  any  left  wing  movement  in  Ilkraine.  might  expect  no  Russian  assistance,  at  least 
directly.  The  essential  belief'  of  the  I  Ictmanate  was,  of  course,  that  (  iermamv  would  go 
on  to  win  the  World  War  and  that  the  status  quo  would  retrain.  The  I4olsheviks  and 
their  supporters  in  Ukraine  believed  in  the  inevitable  deleat  ofall  the  connhatants,  and 
in  the  revolutionary  movement  in  (iermany  and  Austria-I  lungary. 
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I() The  Germans  for  their  part  were  strongly  anti-Bolshevik,  especially  Ludendorff, 
though  they  were  in  favour  of  German-Soviet  cooperation.  It  is  significant  that  it  was 
only  after  a  major  Allied  breakthrough  on  the  Western  Front,  that  the  Germans  agreed 
to  a  supplementary  agreement  with  Soviet  Russia  in  August  1918.14  Talks  between  the 
Hetmanate  and  the  Soviet  government  continued  during  the  autumn  of  1918;  but 
Ludendorff  requested  that  the  Hetman  be  advised  not  to  do  anything  that  could  be 
regarded  as  a  provocation  by  the  Bolsheviks.  '5 
The  Ukrainians  had  joined  the  Central  Powers  and  were  even  more  hated  by  the 
Allies  than  the  Bolsheviks.  It  is  from  the  period  of  the  Hetmanate  that  the  Allied 
distrust  of  the  Ukrainian  nationalists  began;  and  the  policy  of  the  British  and  French  in 
particular  began  to  take  a  pro-Russian  counter-revolutionary  direction,  which  would 
continue  throughout  the  Russian  Civil  War  to  the  detriment  of  the  Ukrainians.  One  of 
the  richest  ironies  is  that  Kiev  under  the  Hetman  became  the  centre  and  gathering  point 
for  those  Russians  who  wanted  to  restore  the  Tsar  or  establish  a  military  dictatorship. 
The  Hetmanate  was  to  be  short-lived,  however.  By  October  1918  it  was  clear  that 
Germany  was  facing  defeat  on  the  Western  Front.  In  Germany  Prince  Max  of  Baden 
was  appointed  Chancellor  and  this  signalled  the  end  of  the  military  dictatorship.  By  9 
November  the  Kaiser  had  been  compelled  to  abdicate  and  revolution  broke  out  in 
Germany.  The  changes  were  quick  and  unexpected;  as  John  Hiden  commented  in  his 
work  Germany  and  Europe  1919-1939:  "Wilhelm  Solf,  the  last  Foreign  Minister  of  the 
Empire,  woke  up  as  it  were,  the  first  Foreign  Minister  of  the  Republic,  servant  to  the 
all-socialist  Provisional  Government,  which  was  composed  on  10  November  1918,  the 
Council  of  People's  Commissars.  906 
The  changes  in  Germany  produced  chaos  in  Ukraine.  Germany  was  facing  its 
`Disaster  in  the  East',  the  first  of  two  such  experiences  in  the  20th  century.  The  position 
of  Austria-Hungary  was  even  more  desperate  than  that  of  Germany.  The  Austro- 
Hungarian  Empire  no  longer  existed  and  its  army  had  completely  collapsed.  Mutiny 
and  mass  desertions  broke  out  in  the  Austrian  zone  of  occupation  and  whole  Austrian 
and  Hungarian  regiments  marched  home  via  Galicia.  The  Hetmanate,  created  by 
German  arms,  was  now  powerless  and  the  only  force  between  the  Soviet  Russian  forces 
"Ilens  Gatzke,  'Zu  den  deutsch-russichen  Beziehungen  im  Sommer  1918',  in  Viertels]ahrhaJtefurZeitgeschichte,  111,  No.  1 
(January,  1955),  p.  73. 
IS  PA  AA:  Buro  des  Staatsekretar.  Hauptquartier  118.  Lersner  (General  I  IQ)  to  Foreign  Ministry  (Berlin),  Telegram  No.  2567, 
October  25,1918. 
16  John  lliden,  Germany  and  Europe  1919-1939  (New  York:  Longman,  1993),  p.  7. 
30 massing  on  the  eastern  borders  of  Ukraine  and  Poland  was  a  demoralised  and 
disorientated  German  army,  whose  empire  no  longer  existed  and  whose  role  was 
unclear  and  confused. 
The  Hetman  made  a  last  desperate  attempt  to  appeal  to  the  Entente  powers  to 
uphold  some  form  of  Ukrainian  autonomy  within  a  future  non-Bolshevik  Russian  state. 
On  November  14,1918,  three  days  after  the  signing  of  the  armistice  between  Germany 
and  the  Entente,  the  Hetman  issued  an  edict  calling  for  the  formation  of  an  All-Russian 
Federation.  The  Hetman  attempted  to  turn  the  position  of  the  Hetmanate  around  and 
reorientate  it  as  a  pro-Entente  state  and  part  of  a  greater  Russia: 
We  are  now  confronted  with  a  new  political  task.  The  Allies  were  always 
friends  of  the  old  united  Russian  State.  Today,  following  a  period  of  turmoil 
and  dissolution,  Russia  has  to  adopt  new  conditions  for  her  future  existence. 
The  old  might  and  power  of  the  Alt-Russian  State  must  be  restored  on  the 
basis  of  a  different  principle  -  that  of  federalism.  Ukraine  should  assume  a 
leading  role  in  this  federation  since  it  was  she  who  gave  the  example  of  law 
and  order  in  the  country;  it  was  also  within  Ukrainian  borders  that  the 
citizens  of  the  old  Russia,  oppressed  and  humiliated  by  the  Bolshevik 
despotism,  found  freedom  and  security.  Ukraine  took  the  initiative  in 
developing  friendship  and  cooperation  with  the  glorious  Great  Don  and  the 
glorious  Kuban  and  Terek  Cossacks.  These  principles,  which  I  hope  are 
shared  by  Russia's  allies  -  the  Entente  -  and  which  cannot  but  be  viewed 
sympathetically  by  all  peoples,  not  only  in  Europe  but  throughout  the  world, 
should  be  the  basis  for  Ukraine's  policy  in  the  future.  Ukraine  should  thus 
take  the  lead  in  the  formation  of  an  All-Russian  federation,  the  principal 
goal  of  which  should  be  the  restoration  of  great  Russia.  17 
The  Hetman's  government  was  linked  to  the  Germans  and  fatally  compromised 
in  the  eyes  of  the  Entente;  it  was  impossible  for  it  to  continue  in  power.  Furthermore, 
the  actions  of  the  Hetmanate  in  supporting  the  occupying  forces  had  also  fatally 
compromised  it  in  the  view  of  the  Ukrainian  nationalists.  It  no  longer  had  a  base  of 
support  and  consequently  collapsed.  On  December  14,  after  gaining  a  guarantee  of 
German  non-intervention,  the  troops  of  the  Ukrainian  nationalist  government,  the 
17  Fedyshyn,  Germany's  Drive  to  the  East,  p.  287-288. 
31 Directory,  entered  Kiev  and  the  Hetman  abdicated.  The  period  of  direct  German  control 
of  Ukraine  was  over. 
The  Armistice  signed  between  Germany  and  the  Allies  on  11  November  1918 
demanded  the  abrogation  of  the  Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  and  technically  placed 
Germany  in  a  state  of  war  with  Russia.  One  of  the  aims  of  the  Allies  was  to  prevent 
Bolshevism  from  reaching  Central  Europe  and  particularly  the  territories  of  the 
defeated  powers  -  Germany,  Austria,  Hungary,  Czechoslovakia,  Poland,  Bulgaria  and 
Ukraine.  Whereas  the  territories  occupied  by  German  troops  in  Western  Europe  were  to 
be  evacuated  immediately,  under  Article  XII  of  the  Armistice,  Germany  was  only  to 
evacuate  those  occupied  areas  in  the  east  formerly  belonging  to  Russia  when  the  Allies 
deemed  it  suitable.  A  new  role  was  being  found  for  the  German  army  in  Ukraine,  as  a 
force  sanitaire  against  the  Bolshevik  contagion.  On  18  November  1918,  the  Council  of 
People's  Commissars  in  Berlin  held  a  meeting  to  discuss  Germany's  relations  with 
Soviet  Russia.  Germany's  main  concern  was  the  attitude  of  the  Allies  towards  any 
rapprochement.  The  USPD  (Independent  Social  Democrat  Party)  supported  the  view 
that:  "The  Entente  is  willing  to  meet  the  present  bourgeois-socialist  republic  halfway  in 
the  matter  of  peace  terms  and  food  supplies,  but  only  as  long  as  the  government  adheres 
to  its  present  composition  under  Ebert's  leadership.  The  Entente  would  however 
intervene  with  all  its  might  to  forestall  the  rise  of  Bolshevism.  "18 
The  new  German  government  sent  a  dilatory  reply  to  Lenin  and  it  was  now  clear 
that  both  the  German  government  and  army  would  sit  on  the  fence  and  see  whether  the 
Bolsheviks  would  remain  in  power.  If  they  did,  then  Germany  would  reconsider  its 
position,  if  they  did  not  then  Germany  might  well  join  an  Allied  led  coalition  to  remove 
the  Bolsheviks. 
"  C.  B.  Burdick  and  R.  11.  Lutz  (eds),  The  Political  Institutions  of  the  German  Revolution  1918-1919.  (New  York,  1966).  p.  70. 
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GERMAN-POLISII  RELATIONS,  1918-922 
In  the  context  of  this  thesis  it  is  important  to  examine  the  underlying  rivalry  and 
tensions  between  Weimar  Germany  and  the  Second  Polish  Republic  in  the  years 
following  World  War  I.  Their  competing  policy  with  regard  to  Ukraine  was  just  one 
area  of  foreign  and  economic  policy  where  there  was  conflict  during  these  years. 
The  background,  of  course,  is  that  a  large  part  of  Western  Poland  had  been  ceded 
to  Prussia,  and  later  the  German  Empire  during  the  partitions  of  Poland  in  the  late  18th 
century.  These  areas  were  to  remain  part  of  the  Reich  until  the  end  of  World  War  I. 
Under  the  terms  of  the  Versailles  Treaty,  some  areas  were  to  become  the  territory  of  the 
new  Polish  state,  whereas  others,  with  mixed  populations  of  Poles  and  Germans,  would 
have  their  future  decided  by  plebiscite.  Two  areas  were  affected  by  this  -  East  Prussia 
and  Silesia.  This  would  be  the  dominant  factor  in  the  relationship  between  the  two 
states  in  the  aftermath  of  the  war. 
There  was  also  the  perception  in  Berlin,  largely  justified,  that  Poland  was 
France's  ally  and  satellite  in  Central  Europe,  whose  main  purpose  for  France,  was  to 
contain  and  control  German  recovery  and  expansion  in  the  region.  Thus,  Germany  felt 
surrounded  by  two  hostile  states  on  both  its  eastern  and  western  frontiers.  This  explains 
German  attempts  to  develop  some  form  of  alliance  with  Soviet  Russia,  which  it 
regarded  as  an  enemy  of  Poland  and  also  of  the  Entente.  Traditionally  Germany  had 
also  had  a  close  relationship  with  Ukrainian  nationalism,  particularly  following  the  first 
Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk,  and  Ukrainian  nationalism  was  in  conflict  with  Poland  in 
1918.  The  area  where  that  conflict  was  strongest  was  in  East  Galicia.  East  Galicia  had 
never  been  part  of  the  German  Empire  but  any  nationality  struggling  against  Polish 
rule,  drew  a  natural  sympathy  from  the  Germans  in  1918.  Were  not  their  people  being 
forcibly  incorporated  into  the  new  Polish  state  by  the  Entente? 
Roman  Dmowski,  the  leader  of  the  Polish  National  Democrat  Party,  had  spent  the 
last  year  of  the  war  in  Paris,  with  the  Polish  National  Committee,  which  was  recognised 
by  the  Entente  as  the  quasi-official  voice  of  Poland.  Following  the  Russian  Revolution, 
the  Entente  powers  were  firmly  committed  to  Polish  independence.  The  question  was 
what  was  Poland's  territory?  To  re-create  the  Poland  of  1772,  before  the  First  Partition, 
would  be  to  create  a  huge  territory  and  to  include  within  its  frontiers  millions  of 
Germans,  Ukrainians,  Lithuanians  and  Czechs.  Natural  frontiers  were  also  of  little  use  - 
33 Poland  had  no  `natural'  borders.  President  Wilson  had  promised  the  new  Polish  state 
"free  and  secure  access  to  the  sea"  but  Poland  had  no  seaport.  The  only  port  available 
was  Danzig,  whose  population  was  ninety  percent  German.  And  how  would  the  Poles 
reach  Danzig  and  the  Baltic?  A  Polish  `corridor'  would  have  to  be  created  through 
West  Prussia.  This  would  have  the  effect  of  isolating  East  Prussia  from  the  rest  of 
Germany. 
Pilsudski  had  been  the  leader  of  a  Polish  army  in  Austrian  service  and  had 
attempted  to  negotiate  Polish  independence  with  the  Central  Powers  but  they  had  been 
unwilling  to  go  so  far.  He  had  then  parted  ways  with  the  Germans  and  had  been 
imprisoned  by  them  as  an  unreliable  nationalist.  When  the  Kaiser  fell,  the  Germans 
released  Pilsudski  and  attempted  to  come  to  an  arrangement  with  him  around  future 
Polish-German  frontiers.  He,  however,  refused  to  negotiate.  They  then  allowed  him  to 
return  to  Warsaw,  where  he  was  declared  chief  of  state. 
Pilsudski  faced  a  terrible  dilemma.  To  the  east  lay  an  independent  Ukraine  and 
Lithuania  had  already  announced  its  own  independence.  Furthermore,  within  Poland 
proper  there  were  still  80,000  German  troops  and  another  400,000  in  Ukraine.  ' 
The  armistice  agreement  between  the  Entente  and  Germany  had  stipulated  that  the 
German  army  "withdraw  within  the  frontiers  of  Germany  as  they  existed  on  1  August 
1914".  The  aim  of  this  was  to  utilise  German  forces  in  the  east  to  prevent  the 
Bolsheviks  from  overrunning  Central  Europe. 
The  withdrawal  of  German  forces  from  Poland  proved  problematic  and  there  were 
many  clashes  between  Germans  troops  and  groups  of  armed  Poles.  This  soured  the 
relationship  between  Germans  and  Poles  considerably.  The  area  of  Posen,  with  Poznan 
as  its  capital,  proved  a  special  source  of  conflict.  It  had  been  part  of  the  German  Empire 
since  the  Second  Partition  of  Poland.  Although  the  majority  of  the  population  was 
linguistically  and  ethnically  Polish,  there  was  also  a  large  German  minority  -  almost  a 
million. 
After  the  evacuation  of  the  German  army  from  France  and  Belgium,  the  Supreme 
Command  decided  to  set  up  a  separate  Army  command  `Grenzschutz  Ost'  (Frontier 
Defence  Force  East)  for  the  protection  of  Germany's  eastern  borders.  2  Regiments  of 
veteran  troops  were  transferred  from  the  West  to  the  Polish  frontier  to  strengthen 
1  Richard  Watt,  The  Kings  Depart.  The  German  Revolution  and  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  1918-19  (London:  Weidenfeld  and 
Nicholson,  1969),  p.  396. 
2  lbid,  p.  423.  Freikorps  detachments  were  also  heavily  recruited. 
34 German  units  there.  The  German  Supreme  Command  also  speeded  up  the  withdrawal 
of  German  forces  from  Russia  in  order  to  force  the  Poles  to  concentrate  their  forces  on 
the  eastern  frontiers  of  Poland. 
Hostilities  began  in  Posen,  where  German  troops  and  Polish  irregulars  clashed  in 
December  1918.  The  Poles  were  victorious  and  captured  Poznan.  German  troops  were 
disarmed  and  Posen  came  under  Polish  control.  3  One  of  the  reasons  why  `Grenzschutz 
Ost'  had  been  unable  to  intervene  was  because  its  attention  was  totally  taken  up  by  the 
revolution  in  Berlin. 
In  January  1919  a  Polish  general  election  was  held  and  a  parliament  established. 
Poland  immediately  sent  a  delegation  to  the  Paris  peace  conference  and  Poland  was 
formally  recognised  as  an  independent  state.  Paderewski  became  Prime  Minister  and 
Foreign  Minister,  whereas  Pilsudski  remained  chief  of  state,  with  special  responsibility 
for  the  army.  Pilsudski  now  began  to  furiously  expand  the  army  and  the  Polish  army 
was  soon  in  action  on  all  fronts.  In  the  southeast  against  the  Ukrainians  in  East  Galicia, 
in  the  east  against  the  Red  Army,  and  in  Posen  against  the  German  Freikorps.  They 
were  also  in  action  against  the  Czechs  in  Teschen  and  invading  Lithuania  in  the  north. 
By  February  1919  the  Poles  controlled  Posen  and  Upper  Silesia. 
France  made  clear  that  she  would  support  Poland  in  any  way  possible.  Pilsudski's 
chief  of  staff  was  a  Frenchman,  General  Paul  Henrys.  Before  1917  Russian  had  been 
France's  main  ally  in  the  east  and  counter-balance  to  German  power,  now  Poland 
would  fulfil  the  role. 
In  Paris  Dmowski  appeared  before  the  peace  conference  to  argue  Poland's  case. 
He  contended  that  Poland's  frontiers  should  be  those  of  1772  but  that  those  frontiers 
could  be  extended.  He  gave  as  an  example  Upper  Silesia,  which  although  not  a  part  of 
the  Kingdom  of  Poland  for  nearly  seven  hundred  years,  was  now  inhabited  by  a 
population,  which  was  ninety  percent  Polish.  The  conference,  he  argued,  should  not 
rely  on  German  population  statistics,  which  were  misleading.  According  to  Dmowski, 
large  areas  of  Germany  (West  Prussia,  East  Prussia  and  Posen)  were  not  really  German. 
They  had  been  seized  from  Poland  unlawfully,  and  although  the  population  seemed  to 
be  predominantly  German,  this  was  only  because  German  statistics  had  been  falsified 
or  the  areas  artificially  colonised. 
'  ibid,  p.  400. 
4  Watt,  The  Kings  Depart,  p.  403. 
35 In  May  1919  Poland  feared  that  Germany  would  reject  the  Allied  peace  proposals 
and  launch  an  offensive  in  the  east  while  defending  its  frontiers  in  the  west.  Just  before 
receiving  the  Allied  peace  proposals  Germany  mobilised  its  forces  on  the  Polish 
frontier  as  a  show  of  force  and  to  deter  any  possible  Polish  moves.  5  At  the  same  time 
Paderewski  wrote  to  the  French  Foreign  Minister,  Pichon  on  May  6,1919  that  reports 
of  a  German-Soviet  alliance  were  reaching  the  Polish  government.  6  The  Commission 
on  Poland  recommended  on  March  19`h,  1919,  the  acceptance  of  most  of  Dmowski's 
proposals,  except  for  East  Prussia,  where  it  urged  that  a  plebiscite  be  held.  The  Allies 
agreed  to  Polish  claims  but  demanded  plebiscites  in  the  Allenstein  and  Marienwerder 
districts  of  East  Prussia  and  Upper  Silesia.  Poland  was  the  chief  beneficiary  of 
Germany's  territorial  losses. 
The  Versailles  Treaty  came  into  effect  on  January  10,1920.  Danzig,  with  an  area 
of  1,914  square  kilometres  and  a  population  of  331,000  (315,000  of  whom  were 
German)  was  awarded  to  Poland.  The  regions  of  Poznan  and  West  Prussia,  with  an  area 
of  42,927  square  kilometres  and  a  population  of  2,962,000  (1,080,000  Germans),  were 
also  awarded  to  Poland.  7  Poland  was  disappointed  that  the  western  frontier  with 
Germany  was  not  that  of  1772  but  was  careful  to  adhere  to  the  terms  of  the  Versailles 
Treaty  in  the  inter-war  period. 
The  governments  of  the  Weimar  Republic,  for  their  part,  also  agreed  to  abide  by 
the  terms  of  the  treaty.  Muller,  the  Social  Democratic  Foreign  Minister,  gave  a  speech 
to  the  Reichstag  that  Germany  would  seek  neighbourly  relations  with  Poland,  although 
it  did  not  agree  with  the  terms  of  the  treaty  in  the  east.  8 
With  the  outbreak  of  the  Soviet-Polish  War  in  1920,  the  German  Left  hoped  for 
the  collapse  of  Poland,  as  indeed  did  the  German  Right.  The  dockworkers  of  Danzig 
went  on  strike  and  refused  to  handle  war  materials  en  route  to  Poland.  9 
Morawski,  the  head  of  the  German  desk  in  the  Polish  Foreign  Ministry,  noted 
that:  "The  German  government  found  it  impossible  to  reconcile  its  foreign  policy, 
3Archiwum  Akt  Nowych.  Warsaw  '(hereafter  referred  to  as  AAN)'.  Archiwum  Iganciego  Paderewskicgo  711,  s.  44.  Paderewski 
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Nationalversammlung,  Sten,  Berichte,  328,  July  23,1919,  p.  1856. 
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36 which  demanded  the  annihilation  of  Poland,  with  its  domestic  policy,  which  was 
largely  directed  by  the  fear  of  a  Sparticist  revolution.  "10 
General  von  Seeckt,  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Reichswehr,  in  a  memo  to 
President  Ebert  and  Defence  Minister  Noske  in  February  1920,  admitted  that  a 
Bolshevik  advance  into  Poland  would  be  dangerous  for  Germany  but  Germany  alone 
would  have  to  deal  with  it,  and  not  by  an  alliance  with  Poland.  " 
The  German  government  remained  officially  neutral  in  the  face  of  the  Bolshevik 
advance  The  German  ambassador  to  Poland,  von  Dirksen,  wrote:  "The  representatives 
of  the  Western  powers  let  themselves  be  drawn  into  friendly,  yet  non  committal 
conversations.  The  Polish  government  had  no  intention  of  including  the  hated  and  still 
feared  German  neighbour  in  a  combination  of  any  sort.  "  12  This  indicates  that  though  the 
Russian  invasion  of  Poland  was  imminent,  the  Poles  would  still  not  seek  any  sort  of 
alliance  with  Germany,  and  illustrates  the  depth  of  anti-German  feeling  in  Poland. 
The  German  Communists,  who  supported  the  Russian  invasion  of  Poland  and  the 
attempt  to  establish  Soviet  power  there,  called  for  an  alliance  between  Germany  and 
Soviet  Russia  against  Poland.  In  August  1920,  Paul  Levi,  the  leader  of  the  German 
Communist  Party,  spoke  in  the  Reichstag  and  called  for  such  an  alliance,  which  would 
receive  the  full  support  of  the  Communist  Party  of  Germany.  A  prominent  former 
German  communist  said,  at  a  later  date  that  this  speech  was  directly  inspired  by  Karl 
Radek,  the  Bolshevik  leader,  who  dealt  with  German  issues.  13 
Lord  D'Abernon,  the  British  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  supported  the  policy  of 
German  co-operation  in  Poland.  Writing  from  Warsaw,  where  he  represented  Britain  on 
the  Allied  mission  to  Poland,  he  stressed  "the  importance  of  obtaining  German  co- 
operation  against  the  Soviet.  News  from  Paris  is  to  the  effect  that  German 
representatives  there  are  constantly  fishing  for  an  invitation  from  the  Entente  to  use 
German  military  force  against  the  Soviet.  "14  This  view  seems  to  contradict  the  view  of 
Seeckt  and  other  German  military  leaders  that  the  defeat  of  Poland  was  the  main  aim  of 
German  military  policy  in  Eastern  Europe.  However,  some  German  officers  regarded  a 
military  strike  against  the  Red  Army  as  being  the  means  of  mitigating  the  terms  of  the 
10  Foreign  Office  Records,  London,  Foreign  Office.  Series  371,  Volume  4827,  p.  6.  Sir  Horace  Rumbold  to  Lord  Curzon, 
September  3rd,  1920. 
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37 Versailles  Treaty  regarding  the  strength  of  the  Reichswehr,  and  possibly  regaining 
German  influence  in  Europe. 
On  July  31,  when  the  Red  Army  reached  the  border  of  East  Prussia,  the  German 
local  authorities  established  contact  with  them  and  were  assured  that  the  Bolshevik 
forces  "will  under  any  circumstances  respect  the  German  frontier,  they  were  forbidden 
under  penalty  of  death,  to  cross  the  border.  "15  The  Bolsheviks  were  being  very  careful 
not  to  stir  up  the  German  population  in  the  border  areas  and  to  give  the  appearance  to 
Berlin,  that  Soviet  Russia  would  respect  the  frontiers  of  Germany  and  do  nothing  to 
bring  Germany  into  the  war  on  the  Polish  side.  A  neutral  Germany  was  far  more 
preferable  for  Moscow,  than  a  Germany  called  to  arms  by  the  threat  of  imminent 
Bolshevik  invasion.  Moscow  had  to  pursue  a  very  difficult  path  in  relation  to  the 
German  bourgeois  government  in  Berlin.  The  hope  was,  of  course,  that  the  German 
workers  would  rise  up,  with  the  approach  of  the  Red  Army,  and  establish  a  Soviet 
Germany.  This  proved  to  be  as  illusory  as  the  belief  that  the  Polish  proletariat  would 
overthrow  the  regime  in  Warsaw. 
General  von  Seeckt,  the  leader  of  the  anti-Polish  faction  in  the  Reichswehr,  stated 
his  view  in  a  memorandum  on  July  31,  that  the  Red  Army  could  possibly  enter  the 
territory  of  former  German  Poland.  He  was  opposed  to  the  idea  of  sending  German 
troops  to  protect  the  German  minority  there,  as  this  would  be  considered  a  severe 
breach  of  the  Versailles  Treaty  and  the  Entente  would  intervene.  He  proposed  that  the 
German  government  should  publicly  ask  the  Russian  government  to  spare  the  German 
population  the  horrors  of  war.  This  would  demonstrate  to  the  world,  and  particularly  to 
Russia,  that  Germany  felt  responsible  for  this  territory.  It  would  establish  "the 
groundwork  for  the  recovery  of  the  land  snatched  from  us.  "16 
He  went  on  to  add  that  should,  however,  Soviet  Russia  accept  the  British  proposal 
for  a  peace  conference  in  London,  Germany  should  insist  on  participating.  He  hoped  for 
Soviet  support  "because  of  their  own  hatred  of  Poland,  if  for  no  other  reason.  "  Further, 
as  the  military  situation  now  had  developed  so  favourably  for  Russia,  he  expected  that 
never  "in  a  foreseeable  future  would  Russian  and  German  interests  be  so  parallel  as 
they  are  now.  "17 
1'  Albert  Norden,  Zwischen  Berlin  und  Moskau.  Zur  Geschichte  der  deutsch-sowjetischen  Beziehungen.  (Dieter  Verlag:  Berlin, 
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38 On  July  20,  the  German  government  passed  a  motion  declaring  neutrality  in  the 
Soviet-Polish  war.  The  government  immediately  forbade  the  export  and  transit  of  war 
materials  to  Russia  and  Poland.  18  This  would  have  a  far  greater  impact  on  materials  to 
Poland,  as  most  of  these  passed  through  Germany  from  France,  whereas  Russian 
supplies  did  not  pass  through  German  territory.  Therefore,  the  declaration  of  neutrality 
was  less  neutral  than  it  appeared. 
The  Konigsberger  Hartungsche  Zeitung  described  the  situation  in  the  border  town 
of  Prostken  on  August  10`h  1920  as:  "Here  on  the  border  one  can  hear  the  opinion 
expressed  repeatedly  that  now  Germany  has  the  opportunity  to  free  herself,  through  an 
alliance  with  Soviet  Russia,  from  the  unbearable  burden  of  the  Versailles  peace  (...  ) 
People  are  motivated  by  their  utter  hatred  of  Poland.  They  don't  care  at  all  about  the 
Bolshevik  economic  system,  but  they  don't  see  any  other  way  out  of  Germany's 
misery.  Their  enthusiasm  reminds  one  of  the  August  days  of  1914.  Even  officers  in 
uniform  have  gone  over,  as  it  has  been  confirmed  to  me  incontestably  from  various 
sides"19  This  was  referring  to  the  large  numbers  of  German  volunteers  crossing  the 
frontier  to  join  the  Red  Army  in  its  battle  with  the  Poles. 
The  Poles  also  believed  that  the  Soviet  government  was  making  overtures  to 
Germany  in  return  for  its  assistance.  Polish  agents  claimed  to  have  intercepted  letters 
from  the  Russian  government  to  Kopp,  the  Soviet  representative  in  Berlin,  offering  the 
German  government  Danzig  and  Upper  Silesia  in  return  for  military  aid.  20  During  the 
course  of  the  Red  Army's  advance  into  Poland,  a  group  of  Russian  officers  met  some 
German  nationalists  at  Soldau  in  East  Prussia  and  promised  them  the  liberation  of  West 
Prussia  and  its  restoration  to  Germany.  21 
The  leading  voice  of  anti-Polish  sentiment  in  Germany  was  General  von  Seeckt, 
Commander  of  the  Reichswehr.  In  1922  answering  Brockdorff  Rantzau's  Pro  Memoria 
on  the  future  of  German-Soviet  relations,  he  wrote: 
Poland  is  the  crux  of  the  Eastern  problem.  The  existence  of  Poland  is 
unbearable  and  incompatible  with  the  vital  interests  of  Germany.  She  must 
vanish  and  shall  vanish  through  her  own  internal  weakness  and  through 
Russia  -  with  our  assistance.  Poland  is  even  more  unbearable  for  Russia 
"  PA  AA:  Büro  des  Staatsekretlrs.  Russland,  (1680/3617),  800/991. 
1'  Ciechanowski  Deposit.  I  loover  Library,  Stanford.  A  Report  of  the  Polish  Chlef  of  Staff,  General  Rozmadowskl,  August  26,1920. 
Env  2,  No  38382/11.  Cited  in  Josef  Korbel,  Poland  Between  East  and  West.  Soviet  and  German  Diplomacy  Toward  Poland,  1919- 
1933  (Princeton  University  Press:  Princeton,  New  Jersey,  1963),  p.  90. 
10  Ibid,  A  report  of  January  20,1921;  No.  D.  S.  P.  93 
11  E.  H.  Carr.  The  Bolshevik  Revolution.  Vol  3,  p.  327 
39 than  for  us:  no  Russian  government  can  ever  reach  a  settlement  with  Poland. 
With  Poland  falls  one  of  the  strongest  pillars  of  the  Versailles  Peace,  the 
power  outpost  of  France.  To  achieve  this  goal  must  be  one  of  the  most 
fundamental  drives  of  German  policy  since  it  can  be  achieved.  But  it  can  be 
achieved  only  through  Russia  or  through  her  help.  Poland  can  never  offer 
any  advantage  to  Germany,  not  economic,  nor  political,  as  she  is  France's 
vassal.  22 
In  his  pamphlet  Deutschland  zwischen  West  und  Ost,  Seeckt  argued  for  the 
complete  disappearance  of  Poland  from  the  map  of  Europe.  Any  settlement  along 
ethnographic  lines,  even  if  favourable  to  Germany  could  be  no  more  than  a  truce.  23 
So,  it  is  evident  that  for  many  Germans,  particularly  those  on  the  nationalist  right, 
the  very  existence  of  Poland  was  anathema  and  they  would  do  all  they  could  to  weaken 
its  position.  They  were  very  clearly  of  the  view  that  Poland  was  France's  ally  and 
conduit  in  Eastern  Europe  and  as  such,  constituted  a  threat  to  Germany  ever  becoming 
a  powerful  state  in  the  region  again.  Furthermore,  Poland  now  held  sway  over  territory, 
which  for  centuries  had  been  populated  by  Germans,  and  which  Germany  considered 
its  own,  as  of  right.  Constrained  by  the  Versailles  Treaty  and  the  Entente,  the  new 
German  Republic  would  have  to  co-exist  with  the  new  Polish  state  on  its  eastern 
frontier,  but  would  be  a  grudging  and  resentful  neighbour.  The  German  Right  would 
bide  its  time  and  wait  until  circumstances  were  more  propitious  for  a  final  reckoning 
with  Poland.  In  the  interim,  Poland's  enemy  was  Germany's  friend. 
The  Treaty  of  Riga  and  the  ending  of  the  Soviet-Polish  War  put  paid  to  any 
German  ideas  about  altering  Poland's  frontiers,  although  the  situation  in  Upper  Silesia 
remained  unresolved.  It  would  be  decided  by  plebiscite.  The  Weimar  government 
resolved  to  accept  the  status  quo  and  accept  the  frontiers  of  the  new  Polish  state. 
However,  both  Germany  and  Russia  regarded  Poland  as  the  child  of  the  Versailles 
Treaty  and  hoped  to  revise  its  frontiers  at  some  point  in  the  future.  Eighteen  years  after 
the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Riga,  they  would  seize  the  opportunity  to  do  so. 
22  BA:  Secckt  Papers,  reel  24. 
23  1  fans  von  Seeckt,  Deutschland  zwischen  West  und  Ost.  (I  Iamburg,  1930),  pp.  30-31. 
40 CHAPTER  4 
TIIE  GERMAN  ARMY  IN  UKRAINE, 
NOVEMBER  1918-MARCII  1919 
The  German  Army  in  Ukraine  was  in  late  1918,  after  the  signing  of  the  Armistice, 
very  much  at  the  mercy  of  the  Entente  (Britain  and  France)  and  their  policies.  Britain 
and  France  were  now  reassessing  their  policies  in  the  East  and  particularly  with  regard 
to  Soviet  Russia. 
Britain's  main  expert  on  Soviet  Russia  at  this  time  was  Bruce  Lockhart,  who  had 
been  in  Moscow  from  October  1917  until  November  1918.  Lockhart  warned  the  British 
about  underestimating  Bolshevism.  Lockhart  criticised  the  opinion  (widespread  in 
Britain  at  the  time)  that  there  was  a  hidden  conspiracy  between  Germany  and  the 
Bolsheviks.  Lockhart  continued:  "We  will  never  correctly  understand  the  Bolshevik 
movement  or  analyse  its  danger  correctly  if  we  continue  to  regard  it  simply  as  the  tool 
of  German  imperialism.  "' 
Lockhart  recommended  three  possible  courses  of  action  to  the  British  Cabinet: 
1.  Ending  Intervention  and  entering  into  an  agreement  with  the  Bolsheviks. 
2.  Similar  to  above  but  instead  of  an  agreement  with  the  Bolsheviks,  to  offer 
support  and  financial  assistance  for  the  anti-Bolshevik  forces  in  Russia  and 
the  creation  of  a  string  of  national  states  on  Russia's  western  frontier. 
3.  Immediate  intervention  on  a  large  scale  to  support  the  White  forces  in 
northern  Russia  and  Siberia.  The  despatch  of  an  expeditionary  corps  to 
southern  Russia  to  join  the  anti-Bolshevik  forces  there  and  to  attack 
Moscow. 
Lockhart  left  no  doubt  that  the  third  course  of  action  was  preferable. 
At  a  Cabinet  meeting  on  13  November  1918  General  Wilson'  s  memorandum  `On 
our  Present  and  Future  Military  Policy  in  Russia'  was  reviewed.  Wilson  was  of  the 
opinion,  in  view  of  the  ending  of  hostilities  with  Germany,  Allied  troops  must  be 
withdrawn  from  Russia  at  once.  During  this  period  British  troops  were  already  in  the 
Caucasus  helping  both  the  White  forces  and  the  Georgian  nationalists,  they  had  also 
landed  in  North  Russia  to  support  the  Whites;  and  Japanese  and  American  forces  had 
1  Public  Record  Office  London  '(hereafter  referred  to  as  PRO)',  memorandum  on  the  internal  situation  in  Russia.  Cabinet  Papers 
24/73  G.  T.  6662. 
41 landed  in  the  Russian  Far  East.  The  French  were  also  hovering  off  the  Black  Sea  coast. 
Wilson  went  on,  however,  to  call  for  the  occupation  of  the  eastern  ports  of  the  Black 
Sea  by  the  Allies,  in  order  to  strengthen  the  anti-Bolshevik  forces  in  the  Caucasus.  With 
the  establishment  of  a  strong  and  non-Bolshevik  Russia  behind  the  buffer  states  there 
would  be  a  genuine  counterweight  to  Germany  in  the  east. 
The  Foreign  Secretary  (Balfour)  was  of  the  opinion  that  there  were  two  basic 
principles  involved.  Firstly,  a  crusade  against  the  Bolsheviks  was  out  of  the  question  as 
there  was  insufficient  support  for  it  amongst  the  British  population.  Secondly,  the  states 
on  Russia's  western  frontier  needed  to  be  supported.  Balfour  was  also  of  the  opinion 
that  Britain  should  continue  with  the  policies  reached  at  the  Convention  with  France  in 
December  1917,  i.  e.  that  British  influence  should  be  limited  to  the  area  between  the 
Don  and  the  Volga. 
In  the  event,  despite  these  policy  differences  British  troops  remained  in  Russia 
and  in  the  Black  Sea  area  the  British  continued  to  manoeuvre.  The  official  policy 
remained  one  of  non-intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Russia.  This  left  many 
questions  unanswered: 
The  question  had  not  been  answered,  however,  about  what  was  to  happen  to 
the  troops  already  in  Russia.  How  were  they  to  react  to  the  Bolshevik 
forces?  Were  these  forces  to  be  regarded  as  hostile,  should  the  British  forces 
act  defensively  or  offensively?  To  what  extent  should  the  anti-Bolshevik 
forces  be  militarily  supported?  How  should  the  German  forces  in  Russia  in 
accordance  with  Article  XII  of  the  Armistice  be  regarded?  Should  they  be 
regarded  as  allies  against  the  Bolsheviks  or  should  they  be  watched  with 
suspicion?  2 
British  policy  in  Russia  and  Ukraine  remained  very  unclear  and  befuddled.  On  8 
February  1919  at  a  Cabinet  meeting,  Churchill  was  driven  to  ask:  "If  we  are  going  to 
withdraw  our  troops,  it  should  be  done  at  once.  If  we  were  going  to  intervene,  we 
should  send  larger  forces  there.  s3  This  state  of  indecision  continued  until  March  4th 
1919,  when  it  was  agreed  to  withdraw  British  troops  from  the  Caucasus  and  give 
General  Denikin  1,000  British  military  advisors  instead.  The  British  did  not  regard 
Ukraine  as  within  their  sphere  of  influence  and  were  much  more  interested  in  the 
2  Kurt  Fischer,  Deutsche  Truppen  und  Entente-  Intervention  in  Sad  Russland  1918.1919.  (Freiburg:  Militärgeschichtlichen 
Forschungsamt),  p.  41. 
3  Ibid. 
42 Caucasus.  As  the  major  naval  power,  however,  their  navy  was  to  play  a  vital  role  in  the 
Black  Sea. 
It  was  the  French  who  were  to  play  the  largest  role  in  Ukraine  and  the  relationship 
between  Germany  and  France  was  to  be  a  major  factor  there.  Already  before  the 
signing  of  the  Armistice,  a  plan  had  been  drawn  up  to  despatch  French  troops  to 
Ukraine.  The  French  Prime  Minister,  Clemenceau,  wrote  to  General  Franchet 
d'Esperey  (the  Allied  Commander  on  the  Saloniki  Front)  advising  him  to  link  up  his 
forces  with  General  Berthelot,  Chief  of  the  French  Military  Mission  in  Rumania,  and  to 
intervene  in  Ukraine  using  Odessa  as  an  access  point.  In  the  opinion  of  General 
Franchet  d'Esperey  a  wholesale  occupation  and  intervention  in  Ukraine  would  be 
impossible  and  he  recommended  controlling  merely  Odessa  and  some  of  the  adjoining 
ports.  Clemenceau  disagreed  with  General  d'Esperey's  conclusions  and  the  plan  was 
entrusted  to  General  Berthelot.  In  the  event  d'Esperey's  opinion  was  proven  to  be 
accurate. 
In  November  1918  Berthelot  met  with  General  Denikin's  representative,  General 
Shcherbachev  in  Bucharest.  France  promised  to  land  12  French  and  Greek  divisions  in 
Ukraine  and  the  Crimea  and  to  use  Odessa  and  Sevastopol  as  bases;  and  to  fully  equip 
these  bases  with  weapons,  supplies  and  military  vehicles.  France  was  also  to  assist  the 
Volunteer  Army  (the  Whites)  by  occupying  Kiev,  Kharkov  and  parts  of  the  Don  and 
Kuban  regions.  Pichon,  the  French  Foreign  Minister,  was  in  favour  of  French  and 
Romanian  troops  linking  up  with  bands  of  Ukrainian  partisans  against  the  Bolsheviks. 
French  foreign  policy  regarding  Ukraine  displayed  tremendous  ignorance  of  the 
situation:  "An  indication  for  the  limited  understanding  of  the  situation  in  Russia  by  the 
French  Foreign  Ministry  was  the  notion  that  they  could  support  Denikin's  plans  for  an 
indivisible  Russia  and  also  the  federalist  if  not  separatist  ideas  of  the  Ukrainians,  which 
were  diametrically  opposed  to  those  of  Denikin's  and  went  together  like  oil  and 
water.  "5 
On  13  and  22nd  December  1918  Clemenceau  sent  the  commanders  in  the  east 
instructions,  which  were  to  clarify  France's  policies  there,  and  its  relationship  with  its 
allies.  The  plan  included  the  concept  of  separating  Ukraine,  from  Russia  proper  and 
4  A.  Delpeuch,  Les  Allis  contre  la  Russle  :  avant,  pendant  et  aprps  la  guerre  mondiale,  faits  et  documents.  (Paris,  1926),  p.  285. 
Ibid,  p.  45. 
43 thus  bringing  it  economically  to  its  knees.  6  Clemenceau  wrote:  "The  common  enemy  is 
Bolshevism  and  in  order  to  resist  it  more  effectively,  we  must  establish  a  Ukrainian 
barrier.  " 
France  would  then  continue  to  support  the  `forces  of  order'  in  these  regions.  In 
France  also  as  in  Britain  there  remained  the  fears  over  a  rapprochement  between  Soviet 
Russia  and  the  new  German  Republic.  Various  adventurous  plans  were  drawn  up,  by 
(among  others)  Marshal  Foch,  but  many  of  these  plans  foundered  on  the  hard  rocks  of 
financial  reality  or military  limitations. 
What  was  the  reaction  of  Germany  to  machinations  of  the  Entente  in  the  east? 
Article  XII  of  the  Armistice  (stipulating  that  German  troops  should  remain  on  the 
territory  of  the  former  Russian  Empire)  had  been  included  at  the  suggestion  of  the 
Germans.  The  German  delegation  saw  this  as  a  major  success  and  included  it  under 
their  definition  of  `defending  the  general  cultural  and  humanistic  values'.  7  Once  again 
there  was  an  inclusion  of  Germany  on  the  side  of  those  fighting  for  civilised  Europe 
against  the  pagan  hordes  of  Bolshevism. 
It  is  worth  reviewing  at  this  stage  what  had  been  happening  in  Germany  from  the 
signing  of  the  Armistice  to  the  spring  of  1919.  The  Army,  as  a  result  of  its  alliance  with 
the  Social  Democrat  government  of  Ebert,  was  now  back  at  the  centre  of  power  and 
many  of  its  officers  were  those,  who  had  served  the  old  regime  and  continued  to  believe 
in  its  tenets.  The  Supreme  Command  now  decided  to  play  the  `Russian  card'  for  all  its 
worth,  as  it  was  only  in  the  east  that  the  fledgling  army  of  the  Republic  (Reichswehr) 
had  room  to  manoeuvre: 
It  was  the  policy  of  General  Groener,  who  temporarily  guarded  the  OHL 
(the  Supreme  Command)  after  Ludendorff's  departure,  to  exploit  to  the 
maximum  the  notion  of  Germany  as  a  bulwark  against  Bolshevism  and  to 
take  part  with  the  Allies  in  a  military  crusade  against  Russia.  In  so  doing  it 
was  hoped  that  Germany  would  retain  a  strong  army  and  achieve  a  more 
favourable  peace  treaty.  Early  in  1919,  German  Freikorps  units  began  to 
`Micheal.  J.  Carley,  Revolution  and  Intervention.  The  French  Government  and  the  Russian  Civil  War  1917-1919  (Kingston  and  Montreal:  Mc  Gill-  Queen's  University  Press,  1983),  p.  150. 
Deutsch-sowjetische  Beziehungen  von  den  Verhandlungen  in  Brest-Litowsk  bis  zum  Abschluss  des  Rapallovertages.  Vol  1. 
(Berlin:  Staatsverlag  der  DDR,  1967),  p.  835.  Telegram  from  the  Army  Supreme  Command  to  the  War  Ministry,  31  December 
1918. 
44 leave  the  Baltic  front  in  fulfilment  of  Article  XII  of  the  Armistice  and  to 
help  hold  the  front  against  the  advancing  Red  Army.  8 
The  German  Army  had  also  to  function  with  a  potentially  hostile  Poland  at  its 
back.  As  the  Great  War  ended,  a  series  of  flashpoints  and  frontier  conflicts  developed 
with  Poland,  and  Germany  was  particularly  concerned  with  the  problem  of  East  Prussia 
being  cut  off  from  the  rest  of  Germany  by  an  independent  Poland.  Poland  was  at  this 
time  trying  to  clear  its  territory  of  all  foreign  troops,  including  German,  and  trying  to 
control  as  large  an  area  as  possible,  in  order  to  present  the  Paris  Peace  conference  with 
a  fait  accomplit.  A  clear  division  emerged  at  this  stage  in  Germany.  The  Supreme 
Command  wanted  an  out-and-out  war  with  the  Allies  against  Soviet  Russia,  whereas; 
the  SPD  government  and  the  new  Foreign  Minister,  Brockdorff-Rantzau,  wanted  a  far 
more  cautious  approach. 
Another  important  issue  for  the  new  German  government  was  the  position  of 
Russian  POWs  in  Germany,  many  of  who  were  Ukrainians.  In  early  1919  the  Allied 
Armistice  Commission  forbade  the  further  transport  of  Russian  prisoners  out  of 
Germany.  Marshal  Foch  announced  the  establishment  of  an  Inter-Allied  Commission 
for  the  Repatriation  of  Russian  Prisoners  of  War  in  Berlin  under  the  direction  of  a 
British  officer,  Major-General  Sir  Richard  Ewart.  As  Robert  Williams  commented,  the 
motive  was  quite  clear,  that  repatriation  would  only  increase  the  numbers  of  the  Red 
Army,  and  in  order  to  prevent  it,  the  Allies  were  prepared  to  house  and  feed  these 
prisoners.  9  There  was,  of  course,  no  distinction  drawn  between  Russian  and  Ukrainian 
prisoners.  The  government  of  the  Weimar  Republic  opposed  this  policy,  as  they  were 
not  enthusiastic  about  supporting  these  prisoners,  and  were  also  worried  about  possible 
Bolshevik  reprisals  against  German  prisoners  in  Soviet  territory.  A  German  agency  for 
repatriating  Russian  prisoners  (Reichszentralstelle  fur  Kriegs  -  und  Zivilgefangene)  was 
set  up  in  January  1919,  although  the  Allies  claimed  jurisdiction  over  it.  The  agency  was 
headed  by  an  SPD  Reichstag  deputy,  Moritz  Schlesinger,  and  it  tried  to  send  as  many 
prisoners  as  possible  back  to  Soviet  Russia  and  Soviet  Ukraine  in  the  course  of  1919.10 
The  German  Right  and  the  military,  together  with  sections  of  the  government, 
perceived  an  imminent  Red  Peril  because  the  army  in  the  east  was  in  headlong  retreat 
and  the  Red  Army  was  moving  to  fill  the  vacuum  in  Ukraine  and  the  Baltic.  The  panic 
'John  I  Tiden,  Germany  and  Europe,  p.  16. 
'  Robert  C.  Williams,  Culture  in  Exile.  Russian  Emigres  in  Germany,  1881-1941.  (London,  Cornell  University  Press,  1972),  p.  83. 
10  ]bid,  p.  84. 
45 and  sense  of  imminent  invasion  in  Germany  is  typified  by  this  appeal  from  the  German 
government  to  its  citizens  dated  9  January  1919: 
Comrades!  From  the  other  side  of  the  frontier  Russian  troops  threaten  our 
homeward  bound  fighters  and  threaten  to  block  their  safe  passage  (...  )  We 
must  defend  ourselves.  Report  to  the  Frontier  Protection  Corps!  We  will  not 
lead  you  into  a  new  war!  You  will  prevent  the  advance  of  disorderly  troops 
and  those  who  would  destroy  the  peace  of  our  land.  You  shall  prevent  the 
overrunning  of  defenceless  villages  and  towns.  You  shall  make  it 
impossible  that  aliens  pour  into  Germany  like  a  horde  and  settle  themselves 
here  (...  )  The  enemy  within  is  destroyed!  Defend  yourselves  against  the 
enemy  without!  11 
The  German  military  analysis  of  the  position  in  the  Border  States  is  quite 
revealing  and  also  applies  to  Ukraine.  On  9  January  1919  the  German  military 
representative  for  the  northern  Reich,  von  Reichenbach,  based  in  Stockholm,  sent  a 
telegram  to  the  Delegation  for  the  Eastern  Front  in  Berlin  (Delegation  Os(ront),  in 
which  he  set  out  his  opinion  on  the  situation  in  the  Baltic  States  and  Ukraine,  and 
particularly  in  regard  to  the  insecure  nature  of  their  governments: 
The  political  grounds  (...  )  are  as  follows:  a.  The  demands  of  the 
governments  existing  in  the  Border  States  to  protect  them  against  the 
advance  of  Soviet  troops  because  they  themselves  are  not  in  a  position  to  do 
so,  as  up  until  now  they  have  not  been  able  to  form  their  own  troop  corps 
and  to  arm  them.  However,  it  must  be  taken  into  account  that  none  of  these 
governments  have  their  roots  firmly  anchored  in  the  population,  but  are  far 
more  governments  who  only  have  limited  support  and  who  are  opposed  by  a 
stronger  proletarian  Soviet  movement  ... 
12 
In  the  Hetmanate  the  feeling  began  to  increase  that  Germany  would  now 
withdraw  from  Ukraine  and  that  it's  fate  would  be  decided  by  the  British  and  French. 
The  German  army  in  Ukraine  began  to  experience  a  similar  fate  to  that  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  -  desertion,  breakdown  of  discipline  and  loss  of  morale.  The  events  in 
faraway  Berlin  were  bound  to  influence  the  army  and  in  Kiev  a  Soldiers'  Council  was 
set  up,  along  the  lines  of  those  established  in  Germany  by  the  Spartacists  and  Left 
11  BA:  Revolutionsakten.  lleimatschutz  Ost,  Beiheft  23  (2500/3),  13253/4.  Appeal  from  the  government  of  the  Reich.  9  January 
1919.  Published  in  the  German  press. 
12  BA:  Revolutionsakten.  Beziehung  zu  Russland,  Beiheft  28g  (25083).  Telegram  from  the  German  Military Representative  for  the  Northern  Reich  in  StocCF!  ELM  to  the  Delegation  Ostfront  in  Berlin. 
46 Social  Democrats.  Many  German  troops  began  to  stream  westwards  towards  the 
Fatherland  via  Poland  and  the  Baltic  States.  As  German  power  in  Ukraine  began  to 
decay  the  Ukrainian  nationalists  began  to  stir  themselves  once  more  and  to  move 
against  the  Hetman's  government. 
Germany  was  not  in  a  position  to  support  the  Hetman  militarily.  As  his  troops  and 
police  began  to  be  attacked  all  over  Ukraine,  and  as  many  of  his  forces  began  to  desert 
to  those  of  the  nationalists,  it  became  clear  that  the  Hetman  and  his  regime  were 
finished.  The  German  Army  in  Kiev  met  with  the  *representatives  of  the  Rada  in 
December  1918,  who  now  termed  themselves  the  Directory.  The  main  condition  of  the 
Germans  was  that  their  troops  would  be  allowed  to  leave  Ukraine  unhindered.  The 
Directory  agreed,  and  the  Germans  duly  withdrew  all  diplomatic  recognition  from  the 
Hetman  and  recognised  the  Directory  as  the  legitimate  government  of  Ukraine.  In  order 
to  escape  the  vengeance  of  his  own  people,  Skoropadskyi,  disguised  as  a  German 
soldier,  left  Ukraine  for  Germany  with  the  retreating  German  forces. 
On  11  December  1918,  the  German  embassy  in  Berne  reported  to  the  AA  that  the 
Ukrainian  National  Committee  in  Switzerland  had  protested  to  the  Germans  about  the 
participation  of  German  troops  in  the  conflict  between  the  nationalist  forces  and  the 
White  troops  in  Ukraine.  The  Ukrainians  claimed  that  the  German  troops  had  assured 
the  Directory  that  they  would  not  get  involved  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Ukraine  and  that 
they  had  broken  their  agreement.  13 
On  December  19th  1918  the  Directory  assumed  power  as  the  government  of  the 
Ukrainian  People's  Republic.  Its  leading  figure  was  Simon  Petliura,  who  was  to  play  a 
major  role  in  Ukrainian  history  until  1921.  In  Galicia  the  Rada  of  Western  Ukraine 
voted  to  join  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  on  January  4  1919,  thus  it  was  that  for 
the  first  time  for  centuries  all  the  Ukrainian  lands  were  united  under  one  government. 
However,  this  time  of  euphoria  for  Ukrainian  nationalists  would  not  last  long. 
The  German  Ambassador  in  Kiev  was  less  than  complimentary  about  the  German 
troops  there  and  analysed  the  German  withdrawal  from  Ukraine  as  follows: 
The  principal  reason  for  our  withdrawal  lies  in  our  own  Eastern  Army. 
There  are  only  a  few  soldiers  to  be  found  in  our  remaining  troops  who  are 
under  35years  old  and  they  are  only  really  fit  for  garrison  duty  (...  )  In  this 
condition  our  Eastern  Army  has  not  been  a  fighting  force  for  a  long  time. 
13  PA  AA  Bonn:  Büro  des  Staatsekretlrs.  Allgemeine  Angelcgcnheiten  [Ukraine).  (R14388)  675. 
47 With  the  outbreak  of  the  revolution  in  Germany  the  discipline  among  the 
troops  has  declined,  partly  influenced  by  Bolshevik  ideas  from  nearby 
Russia  and  partly  from  concern  about  their  relations  at  home,  so  that  among 
large  sections  of  the  army  discipline  has  completely  collapsed  (...  )  The 
regiments  retreat  without  orders  towards  Germany  and  refuse  to  fight  the 
Soviet  troops  who  follow  closely  behind  (...  )  The  German  Eastern  Army  no 
longer  provides  a  defence  for  the  country.  14 
The  situation  reached  a  dramatic  new  turn,  when  it  emerged  that  German  troops 
stationed  in  eastern  Ukraine  were  allowing  Soviet  forces  to  enter  their  zone,  in  return 
for  assistance  in  their  being  transported  to  Germany.  On  20th  December  1918,  the 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Army  (Kiev)  contacted  Berlin  with  the  news  that;  "An 
agreement  was  made  between  the  Soldiers  Council  of  the  20th  Landwehrdivision  and 
the  Peoples  Commissar  of  the  Russian  Soviet  Republic.  "15  This  agreement  stipulated 
that  the  German  troops  would  withdraw  before  the  Red  Army. 
For  Lenin  and  the  Bolshevik  government  in  Moscow,  the  relationship  between 
Germany  and  the  Entente  was  clear,  and  the  role  of  the  German  army  was  central  to 
that: 
"A  popular  revolution  and  perhaps  a  proletarian  revolution"  was  "inevitable"  in 
Germany,  but  in  the  meanwhile,  he  warned,  "a  tacit  bargain  has  most  definitely  been 
struck  between  the  German  bourgeoisie  and  that  of  the  Entente  powers",  in  which  the 
former  would  allow  the  latter,  to  occupy  Ukraine  in  exchange  for  leaving  `a  portion  of 
the  spoils'  to  Germany.  16 
The  Directory  in  Kiev  seemed  to  be  in  a  position  of  strength  and  this  was 
emphasised  when  the  Directory  entered  into  negotiations  with  Lenin,  much  against  the 
advice  of  the  Ukrainian  Bolsheviks,  who  wanted  no  truck  with  what  they  regarded  as  a 
bourgeois-nationalist  regime  in  Kiev.  The  troops  of  the  Directory  surrounded  Kiev  and 
very  much  controlled  the  movement  of  the  German  troops  there.  The  main 
consideration  of  the  German  commanders  on  the  ground  was  the  safe  evacuation  of 
their  troops  back  to  Germany.  The  other  problem  was  how  to  comply  with  Article  XII 
of  the  Armistice.  This  was  brought  to  the  fore  by  Henot,  France's  representative  in 
14  PA  AA  Bonn:  Büro  des  Staatsekretlrs.  Allgemeine  Angelegenheiten  [Ukraine].  (R14388)  764.  Ambassador  Lersncr  in  Kiev  to 
Auswärtiges  Amt. 
IS  Ibid.  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  to  Auswärtiges  Amt. 
16  Richard.  K.  Debo,  Revolution  and  Survival:  The  Foreign  Policy  of  Soviet  Russia,  1917.18  (Liverpool:  Liverpool  University 
Press,  1979),  p.  379. 
48 Ukraine.  Henot  was  to  be  the  future  French  consul  in  Kiev  but  because  of  unrest  in 
Ukraine  he  had  stayed  in  Odessa.  His  role  was  to  interpret  instructions  from  Paris  and 
to  prevent  any  understanding  developing  between  the  Germans  and  the  Bolsheviks. 
Henot's  role  was  somewhat  unclear.  Carley  refers  to  him  as  "the  so-called  French 
consul.  "17  He  acted  in  the  name  of  the  Entente  in  Ukraine  and  was  well  connected  with 
the  anti-Bolshevik  Russians  and  was  also  strongly  anti-Ukrainian.  He  had  no  direct 
connection  with  Paris  and  went  to  Odessa  in  December  1918  carrying  a  proclamation 
signed  by  British  and  French  ministers  appealing  to  the  local  population  to  maintain 
order  until  the  arrival  of  Allied  troops.  18 
One  of  the  main  concerns  of  the  German  Army  was  the  railway  system  and  its 
safety.  In  an  era  before  road  transport  was  extensively  used  by  military  vehicles,  the 
railways  were  the  major  links  with  Germany,  and  vital  for  both  the  withdrawal  of 
troops  and  supplies.  Under  the  terms  of  an  agreement  reached  between  the  Ukrainian 
Directory  and  the  German  Army  Group  Kiev,  the  Ukrainians  guaranteed  the  safety  of 
German  troops  and  the  continuation  of  support  for  the  German  rail  depots  en  route.  The 
Germans,  for  their  part,  agreed  to  continue  to  pay  the  wages  of  Ukrainian  railway 
personnel,  and  the  Directory  permitted  German  troops  to  be  stationed  for  protection 
purposes  along  the  rail  lines  to  the  west.  Both  parties  also  agreed  that  in  order  to  supply 
the  civilian  population  in  Kiev  and  the  German  troops  there  that  trains  with  supplies 
would  be  allowed  to  travel  from  other  parts  of  Ukraine.  19 
On  14th  December  a  further  agreement  between  the  Directory  and  the  German 
Army  was  signed.  This  new  agreement  weakened  the  position  of  the  Germans  even 
further  as  all  rail  depots  and  public  buildings  of  the  Ukrainian  railways  were  now  to  be 
occupied  by  Ukrainian  troops  but  everything  possible  was  still  to  be  done  to  expedite 
the  retreat  of  German  troops  to  the  Reich. 
The  dire  situation  of  the  German  troops  was  obvious.  The  conditions 
of  the  Armistice  at  Compiegne  demanded  the  conservation  of  the  power 
relationships  existing  in  southern  Russia  at  the  end  of  the  war.  This  was 
impossible  because  of  the  lie  of  the  land.  Neither  the  internal  situation  in 
Ukraine,  nor  the  republican  sympathies  of  many  soldiers  for  the  Directory 
allowed  the  power  situation  to  remain  as  it  had.  To  that  could  be  added  the 
ý7  Carley,  Revolution  and  Intervention,  p.  118 
ý'  Ibid. 
10  Ibid. 
49 consequent  risk  of  destroying  the  only  functioning  link  with  Germany  -  the 
railway  -  as  a  result  of  the  intervention  of  German  troops.  20 
In  Odessa,  a  city  occupied  by  French  and  Greek  forces,  negotiations  continued 
between  the  French  and  the  representatives  of  the  Directory  about  the  possibility  of  co- 
operation  against  the  Bolsheviks. 
While  the  change  in  regime  in  Kiev  was  progressing,  the  withdrawal  of  German 
troops  and  the  constant  movement  of  troop  trains  heading  west  continued.  In 
accordance  with  the  Armistice  the  evacuation  of  German  troops  from  Ukraine  was 
ordered.  The  time  envisaged  for  the  withdrawal  of  all  German  troops  was  120  days.  2' 
The  military  situation  in  Ukraine  at  this  stage  was  by  no  means  straightforward. 
Apart  from  the  troops  of  the  Directory  and  the  German  Army,  there  was  a  Greco- 
French  force  based  in  Odessa,  the  White  Russian  Army  of  General  Denikin  in  the 
south-east,  a  Bolshevik  force  gradually  entering  Ukraine  from  the  east  and  the  troops  of 
newly  independent  Poland  threatening  Galicia  and  the  western  frontier. 
The  German  Supreme  Command  was  now  presented  with  a  major  logistical 
problem.  All  of  the  coal  supplies  for  the  operation  of  the  troop  and  supply  trains  came 
from  the  Donets  region  but  the  amount  of  coal  being  mined  there  continued  to  decrease 
during  the  last  two  months  of  1918  and  in  December  the  region  was  occupied  by  the 
Don  Cossacks.  Kharkov,  the  centre  of  the  coal  mining  area,  was  occupied  by  the 
Bolsheviks  in  early  January  1919.  There  was  also  a  chronic  shortage  of  both  railway 
engines  and  wagons.  The  growing  feeling  of  panic  and  threat  in  the  Reich  itself  led  to 
calls  for  the  army  to  be  withdrawn. 
The  Soviet  invasion  of  Ukraine  had  to  be  presented  as  an  action  supporting 
indigenous  Ukrainian  communists  and  not  as  a  foreign  occupation.  As  James  White 
commented: 
The  Baltic  region,  the  Ukraine  and  Belorussia  could  no  longer  be 
regarded  as  part  of  the  Russian  state.  Independence  movements  had 
developed  there,  and  had  been  given  recognition  by  the  German  military 
authorities.  An  offensive  by  the  Red  Army  would  be  regarded  as  a  foreign 
invasion,  and  would  certainly  be  so  presented  by  the  Allied  Powers.  This 
would  mean  that  intervention  against  the  Soviet  regime  would  take  the  form 
»Fischer.  Deutsche  Truppen  und  Entente-Intervention  In  Südrussland  1918-1919,  p.  61. 
21  Fischer,  Deutsche  Truppen,  p.  62. 
50 of  military  assistance  to  subject  nations  to  throw  off  the  yoke  of  Soviet 
occupation.  It  would  also  deprive  the  Soviet  regime  of  the  valuable  asset  of 
supporting  national  self-determination  in  contrast  to  the  Whites,  who  were 
pledged  to  restore  a  Russia  that  was  `one  and  indivisible'.  The  solution  to 
the  problem  was  to  create  independent  Soviet  states  in  the  path  of  the 
advancing  Red  Army.  22 
This,  of  course,  the  Bolsheviks  did  in  Ukraine,  choosing  Kharkov  as  the  seat  of 
the  government. 
It  is  ironic  that  the  Entente  had  no  intention  of  recognising  an  independent 
Ukrainian  state,  which  they  still  regarded  as  too  tied  to  Germany.  Soldiers'  Councils 
developed  throughout  the  Army  of  the  East  and  these  often  dealt  with  the  day-to-day 
negotiations  with  both  the  Ukrainians  and  the  Bolsheviks.  Many  conservative  army 
officers  regarded  them  as  `legitimised  mutineers'  but  the  government  in  Berlin  was 
prepared  to  tolerate  them,  as  the  alternative  could  be  a  complete  mutiny  in  Ukraine.  On 
the  other  hand,  many  officers  in  Ukraine  recognised  that  far  from  being  a  nest  of 
Spartacists  or  Bolsheviks,  many  Soldiers'  Councils  were  merely  the  efforts  of  the 
German  soldiers  themselves  to  ensure  some  sort  of  orderly  and  planned  withdrawal 
from  Ukraine. 
On  Ist  December  1918  the  Central  Soldiers  Council  in  Kovno  notified  the 
government  in  Berlin:  "The  Eastern  Army  fights  with  all  its  might  against  Bolshevism 
and  knows  what  misery  it  has  brought  to  Russia.  Our  soldiers  who  stand  on  the  Great 
Russian  Front  are  attacked  by  Bolshevik  hordes  and  often  suffer  bitter  losses.  With 
what  right  do  the  representatives  of  the  Russian  Soviet  government  meet  in  Berlin 
whom  we  regard  as  the  greatest  danger  for  Germany's  socialist  future?  "23  However,  the 
central  Soldatenrat  assumed  a  more  pro-Soviet  position,  when  it  sent  sent  a  delegation 
to  Berlin  on  1  January  consisting  of  its  chairman,  Asch,  the  chairman  of  the  Kovno 
Soldatenrat,  and  Lev  Zalin,  a  delegate  of  the  Kovno  Soviet.  The  delegation  spoke  to 
Scheidemann  of  the  Social  Democrats  and  to  Haase  of  the  Independents.  Haase  stated 
that  the  government's  time  was  taken  up  with  internal  problems  and  that  it  could  not 
give  its  attention  to  what  was  happening  on  the  eastern  frontiers.  Therefore  the 
government  delegated  decision  making  on  matters,  which  arose  there,  to  the  central 
32  James  D.  White,  'National  Communism  and  World  Revolution:  The  Political  Consequences  of  German  Military  Withdrawal  from  the  Baltic  Area  in  1918-1919',  in  Europe-Asia  Studies,  (Vol  46,  No  8,1994).  pp.  1361.1362.  _'  PA  AA:  Büro  des  Staatsekretirs.  Bolshevismus,  Bd  2,  Nr  2.  Central  Council  for  the  Eastern  Front  to  Peoples  Commissar  l  laase. 
Berlin.  1  December  1918. 
51 Soldatenrat  in  Kovno.  24  Although  Kovno  was  not  in  Ukraine,  but  in  Lithuania,  the 
situation  is  indicative  of  the  type  of  negotiations,  which  were  taking  place  along  the 
former  Eastern  Front. 
This  indicates  that  the  German  government  in  late  1918  and  early  1919, 
preoccupied  with  events  in  the  Reich  itself,  was  prepared  to  leave  decisions  in  the  east 
to  the  Soldiers'  Councils.  These  councils,  whose  priority  was  withdrawal  from  the 
occupied  areas  to  Germany,  were  often  prepared  to  enter  agreements  with  the 
Bolsheviks.  Obviously  this  was  a  major  concern  for  the  Entente  and  the  High 
Command  of  the  German  army. 
Fischer  contends:  "Deliberate  contact  between  the  German  troops  and  the 
Bolsheviks,  such  as  the  journey  undertaken  by  a  deputation  from  the  Kiev  Soldiers 
Council  to  Moscow  to  see  Lenin  and  the  agreement  reached  between  the  Soldiers 
Council  of  the  20th  Landwehrdivision  and  the  Soviet  government  remained  isolated 
cases  and  could  hardly  be  drawn  upon  by  the  Allies  as  proof  of  fraternisation  with 
Bolshevism  on  the  part  of  the  German  Army  of  the  East 
.,, 
25  Debo  also  supports  this 
thesis:  "The  situation  was  similar  in  Ukraine,  where  Lenin  had  hoped  that  the  German 
armies  might  become  allies  of  the  Bolsheviks.  Although  the  soldiers  of  a  small  garrison 
fraternised  with  the  Red  Army  and  sent  their  greetings  to  Lenin,  the  German  army  in 
Ukraine  retained  its  discipline  and  remained  subordinate  to  the  officer  corps.  "26 
The  main  rail  line  linking  Ukraine  with  Germany  ran  from  Kovel-Brest  to 
Litovsk-Bialystok  and  on  to  Grajevo-Prostken  (East  Prussia).  27  Increasingly  the 
retreating  troop  trains  were  being  attacked  by  bandits  and  partisans  seeking  food  and 
arms.  The  situation  worsened  with  the  withdrawal  of  the  German  10th  Army  at  the  end 
of  December  1918.  In  order  to  prevent  the  attacks  the  Army  Group  Kiev  ordered  that 
infantry  and  artillery  were  to  be  mounted  on  the  trains.  They  also  ordered  that  armed 
troops  were  to  be  positioned  on  every  engine  and  tender  to  ensure  that  the  drivers 
continued  the  journey  without  harassment  and  that  telegraph  equipment  was  also  to  be 
carried  in  every  train.  28 
The  momentum  of  withdrawal  developed  and  there  was  a  great  deal  of  co- 
operation  between  the  Directory  and  the  Army  Group  Kiev,  plans  were  drawn  up  for 
''  Ibid.  25  Fischer,  Deutsche  Truppen,  p.  72. 
26  Debo,  Revolution  and  Survival,  p.  402. 
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52 ten  trains  per  day  to  travel  to  Germany,  until  the  remaining  300,000  German  troops 
returned  home.  The  transportation  of  German  troops  was  now  to  be  the  responsibility  of 
two  distinct  transport  groups.  The  first,  based  in  Kiev,  would  handle  the  troops  in  the 
northern  Ukraine  facing  the  Bolshevik  troops  and  the  second  group  would  handle  the 
troops  in  the  southern  Ukraine  in  Kharkov,  Poltava,  Odessa  and  Nikolaev29.  The 
withdrawal  from  the  northern  Ukraine  continued  apace  and  the  last  troop  transports  left 
Kiev  on  26th  January  1919.  The  remaining  German  troops  were  now  on  the  Black  Sea 
coast  and  were  to  become  active  pawns  in  the  battle  of  the  Allies  against  the 
Bolsheviks. 
As  can  be  expected,  Moscow  watched  these  developments  with  great  unease. 
Already  after  the  end  of  the  war  the  Ukrainian  Bolsheviks  had  been  clamouring  for  the 
Red  Army  to  come  to  their  aid  and  `liberate'  Ukraine  but  the  German  Army  stood  in 
their  way  and  the  last  thing  Lenin  wanted  was  a  clash  with  the  Germans.  In  Berlin  the 
battle  over  the  diplomatic  recognition  of  Soviet  Ukraine  raged.  On  16  November  1918, 
Chicherin  (the  Soviet  Commissar  for  Foreign  Affairs)  and  Radek  made  a  number  of 
demands  on  the  new  German  government.  Among  them  were  two  demands,  which 
concerned  Ukraine: 
1.  The  German  government  should  instruct  the  German  military  authorities  in 
Ukraine  not  to  hinder  the  movements  of  Soviet  troops,  when  those  movements 
were  not  directed  against  the  German  army. 
2.  The  German  troops  should  disarm  the  White  forces  stationed  in  German- 
occupied  territory. 
The  Revolution  in  Berlin  in  early  January,  on  which  Lenin  had  set  his  hopes,  and 
its  subsequent  crushing  (together  with  the  deaths  of  Liebknecht  and  Luxemburg)  set 
back  Soviet-German  relations.  Russia  was  more  concerned  at  this  stage  about  German 
troop  movements  and  political  machinations  in  the  Baltic  States  than  in  Ukraine,  where 
the  Germans  at  least  seemed  interested  in  withdrawal.  Observing  the  absence  of 
German  troops  in  the  eastern  and  northern  Ukraine  Trotsky  gave  the  order  to  the  Red 
Army  to  conquer  Ukraine,  and  throughout  January  1919  the  Bolsheviks  moved  steadily 
westwards  towards  Kiev.  At  the  same  time  the  Volunteer  Army,  led  by  General 
Denikin  began  it's  campaign  to  `liberate'  the  `one  and  indivisible  Russia'  from  the 
Bolsheviks.  The  German  army  in  the  south  stood  between  these  forces. 
29  Ibid. 
53 In  Kiev  the  Directory  was  making  frantic  efforts  to  appeal  to  the  Allies.  The 
French,  in  particular,  were  demanding  the  ending  of  socialist  and  left-wing  policies  in 
return  for  some  form  of  recognition.  The  left  wing  parties  of  the  Directory  met  to 
discuss  the  situation.  Things  came  to  a  head  with  the  question  of  whether  the  social 
revolution  should  have  priority  over  the  national  question  or  whether  national 
independence  should  be  the  issue  above  all  others.  The  decision  was  for  the  latter  and 
with  that  decision  a  man  came  to  the  fore  of  the  Ukrainian  Peoples  Republic  (UNR), 
who  until  today  is  one  of  the  most  controversial  figures  in  Ukrainian  history  -  Simon 
Petliura.  The  further  history  of  the  UNR  was  to  be  closely  bound  with  his  personality. 
Petliura's  policy  was  to  seek  as  much  Allied  support  as  possible.  The  Directory  knew 
that  faced  with  a  row  of  enemies,  the  most  serious  one  was  the  Bolshevik  threat. 
Petliura  was  prepared  to  throw  in  his  lot  with  the  anti-Bolshevik  forces.  The  remaining 
German  forces  were  also  becoming  a  part  of  this  anti-Bolshevik  coalition. 
The  German  forces  in  1919  occupied  a  triangle  on  the  Black  Sea  formed  by 
Odessa-Nikolaev-Kherson.  This  area  was  strategically  vital;  not  only  did  it  control  the 
major  Black  Sea  ports  but  also  the  land  route  to  the  Crimea.  In  February  1919 
Bolshevik  troops  captured  Kiev,  and  the  Directory  relocated  its  capital  in  the 
northwestern  Ukraine;  this  made  the  territory  in  the  south  even  more  militarily 
important.  As  Kurt  Fischer  made  clear:  "As  Ukraine  (according  to  the  revolutionary 
strategy)  was  the  basis  for  the  extension  of  the  revolution  to  Hungary  and  from  there  to 
Western  Europe,  it  was  also  absolutely  vital  for  supplying  Bolshevik  Russia  with  grain, 
coal  and  iron.  The  offer  of  accessible  territory  for  the  overseas  enemies  of  Bolshevism 
in  southern  Russia,  with  a  German  force  of  occupation  was  a  great  danger  for  the 
s3o  Bolsheviks. 
Various  ideas  were  drawn  up  on  how  to  counter  the  Bolsheviks  in  the  region; 
some  were  more  practical  than  others.  As  already  mentioned,  many  of  the  German 
settlements  and  villages  were  in  this  region  and  for  the  German  forces  this  seemed  to 
offer  a  golden  opportunity.  The  German  Military  Fieldpost  No  201  reported  to  the 
German  Consulate  in  Odessa  on  20th  December  1918: 
The  idea  was  put  forward  of  forming  a  volunteer  army  from  the  sons  of 
colonists  in  the  southern  Ukraine  with  German  officers  and  non- 
commissioned  officers  who  voluntarily  would  remain  in  Ukraine.  The  plan 
'o  Ibid,  p.  76. 
54 failed  however,  partly  due  to  the  passivity  of  the  colonists  and  partly  due  to 
the  very  small  number  of  German  troops  willing  to  remain  in  Ukraine,  so 
that  the  plan  had  to  be  dispensed  with.  31 
It  would  appear  that  many  of  the  German  troops  were  singularly  lacking  in 
enthusiasm.  In  the  Foreign  Ministry,  the  manoeuvres  of  the  German  troops  in  the 
southern  Ukraine  were  regarded  with  suspicion.  In  a  Memorandum  dated  20  January 
1919,  an  official  at  the  Foreign  Ministry,  commented  on  the  Allies  and  their  plans: 
"They  are  seeking  to  occupy  and  hold  the  most  important  points  on  the  south  coast 
-  Odessa,  Nikolaev,  the  Crimea  and  Mariupol  -  and  to  urge  on  the  Don  Cossacks  and 
the  Volunteer  Army,  whom  they  have  supplied  with  munitions,  weapons  and  money 
against  the  Ukrainians.  For  us  it  is  my  present  conviction  that  in  the  present 
circumstances  a  cautious  waiting  policy  is  best 
.,, 
32  The  policy  of  `wait  and  see' 
continued. 
The  German  military  were  no  more  enthusiastic  about  a  full-scale  military 
intervention  in  Ukraine;  Major  von  Velsen,  the  German  military  attache  in  Kiev,  wrote 
to  the  Foreign  Ministry  that  he  did  not  foresee  another  German  military  campaign  in 
Ukraine  but  that:  "I  would  see  the  involvement  of  mixed  volunteer  detachments  in 
cooperating  with  the  Ukrainian  divisions  fighting  in  the  east  as  the  best  solution.  "33 
Those  German  troops  who  found  themselves  on  the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea  in 
early  1919  were  not  only  those  divisions,  which  had  been  in  Ukraine  itself.  In  the 
closing  months  of  1918  the  Germans  had  managed  to  withdraw  both  the  troops 
stationed  in  western  Turkey,  those  based  in  Asiatic  Turkey  and  also  troops  from  the 
Caucasus.  These  forces  now  found  themselves  crowded  into  the  harbours  of  the 
Ukrainian  Black  Sea  ports.  Germany  placed  in  command  of  all  operations  on  the  Black 
Sea  coast  Vice  Admiral  Hopman  of  the  German  navy.  It  was  his  task  to  maintain  order 
in  the  face  of  the  Bolshevik  advance  and  also  to  safely  withdraw  as  many  troops  and 
supplies  as  possible  to  the  Reich  by  the  long  sea  route  through  the  Black,  Aegean,  and 
Mediterranean  seas.  34 
On  the  12th  November  1918  the  Army  Group  Kiev  issued  the  order  to  evacuate 
the  Crimea.  Hopman  now  asked  for  the  Allies  to  send  a  representative  to  the  region  so 
that  all  German  troop  withdrawals  would  be  in  accordance  with  the  conditions  of  the 
31  PA  AA:  Büro  des  Staatsekretars.  Allgemeine  Angelegenheiten  [Ukraine].  (R14389).  Deutsche  Feldpost  201.  "=  PA  AA:  Büro  des  Staatsekretärs.  Allgemeine  Angelegenheiten  [Ukraine].  (R14390).  Aufzeichnung.  20  January  1919.  "  Ibid,  (Telegram  from  Major  von  Velsen  at  the  German  Embassy  in  Kiev,  22  January  1919).  "'  Fischer,  Deutsche  Truppen,  p.  78. 
55 Armistice.  The  Allies  replied  on  24th  November  that  a  British  cruiser  and  destroyer 
would  land  at  Sevastopol  in  order  to  oversee  all  troop  movements  on  behalf  of  the 
Allies.  Hopman  continued  to  appeal  to  the  Allies  to  allow  his  troops  in  Sevastopol  to  be 
allowed  to  fall  back  -  but  the  Allies  did  not  reply.  35 
The  Governor  of  Sevastopol,  Lieutenant-General  Baron  Waldersee,  appealed  to 
Hopman  that  the  unrest  among  the  troops  was  so  great  that  he  did  not  know  if  he  could 
maintain  order  any  further.  In  order  to  maintain  discipline  Hopman  allowed  a  mass 
meeting  of  all  troops  in  Sevastopol  to  take  place;  he  explained  the  reasons  for  the  delay 
in  evacuating  troops,  the  problems  with  the  Allies,  and  the  shortage  of  suitable  ships, 
and  he  encountered  full  support  and  understanding  on  the  part  of  the  soldiers.  36  In 
several  of  the  smaller  ports  the  German  troops  began  to  give  the  control  of  buildings 
and  harbour  installations  etc  over  to  officials  and  officers  of  Denikin's  Volunteer  Army. 
The  Germans  were  now  semi-official  allies  of  the  Russian  Whites. 
In  a  meeting  with  the  British  and  French  in  Sevastopol  it  was  agreed  that  German 
troops  would  be  withdrawn  from  the  Crimea  on  board  German  and  Austrian  ships  and 
carried  to  Odessa  and  Nikolaev.  37  From  Odessa  and  Nikolaev  they  were  to  be  carried 
further  by  train  to  Germany.  On  the  29th  November  1918  500  British  marines  landed  in 
Sevastopol  to  take  control  of  the  port  and  to  replace  the  German  troops  there.  38 
The  government  of  the  Crimea39  made  a  serious  allegation  against  the  Germans  to 
the  Allies.  According  to  them,  the  German  troops  leaving  the  Crimea  had  distributed 
weapons  and  supplies  amongst  the  population  and  had  been  guilty  of  pro-Bolshevik 
sympathies.  Admiral  Calthorpe,  the  Allied  commander  in  the  Black  Sea,  informed 
Hopman  that  he  would  hold  him  and  his  officers  personally  responsible  for  any  further 
infringements  of  the  conditions  of  the  Armistice.  Hopman  replied  that  the  German 
troops  were  the  force  protecting  the  area  against  Bolshevism  and  that  the  sailors with 
Bolshevik  sympathies  had  already  been  despatched  to  Germany.  Hopman  and  the 
German  officer  corps  then  realised  that  they  would  have  to  tread  very  carefully  and  be 
especially  cautious  of  the  French. 
With  the  withdrawal  of  German  forces  in  central  Ukraine,  an  overland 
transportation  to  Germany  was  out  of  the  question,  the  sea  route  was  the  only  solution. 
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39  The  Germans  had  established  a  government  for  Crimea  in  early  1918,  headed  by  a  Tatar  general. 
56 Hopman's  task  was  to  oversee  the  withdrawal  of  20,000  men  from  Odessa,  3000  from 
Poti  and  10,000  from  Turkey.  The  last  German  troops  in  the  Crimea  retreated  in 
December  1918  to  Nikolaev,  leaving  the  Crimea  to  the  Allies  and  the  White  Russians. 
Most  German  troops  were  concentrated  in  Nikolaev  and  it  was  both  here  and  in  other 
Black  Sea  ports  that  political  unrest  began  to  ferment: 
Thus  it  was  that  in  Nikolaev  a  `War  Revolutionary  Committee  of  the  Left 
Socialist  Revolutionary  Party  (Internationalists)'  and  the  `Communist  Party 
of  Ukraine  (Bolsheviks)'  was  formed.  In  leaflets  they  called  on  the  peasants 
and  workers  to  fight  with  their  weapons  against  `foreign  bayonets',  against 
`counter-revolutionary  bandits'  for  the  `Socialist  Federal  Soviet  Republic' 
(Russia).  The  Bolsheviks  hoped  in  this  way  to  draw  upon  the  fears  of  many 
peasants  that  the  arrival  of  the  Allies  would  mean  the  loss  of  their  lands, 
which  had  been  broken  up  from  the  large  estates  4° 
The  Bolsheviks  were  making  a  determined  effort  to  stir  up  the  local  population 
against  both  the  French  and  German  troops. 
In  Odessa  the  situation  came  to  a  head  with  the  landing  of  French  troops  in  late 
December  1918;  these  troops  along  with  sections  of  Deninkin's  Volunteer  Army, 
engaged  the  forces  of  the  Directory  in  a  battle.  The  Ukrainian  forces  were  driven  out  of 
Odessa  but  continued  to  surround  the  city.  The  French  landed  35,000  men  between 
December  and  March.  They  also  appointed  a  general  of  the  Volunteer  Army  as 
commander  of  the  city  -  General  Grishin-Alamazov.  The  Germans  had  remained 
neutral  during  these  developments  but  there  were  signs  of  friction  between  German  and 
French  troops  and  these  were  confirmed  in  reports  reaching  the  Foreign  Ministry  from 
Ukraine.  The  consuls  of  the  Netherlands,  Italy,  Brazil,  Greece  and  Norway  wrote  to  the 
British  representative  in  Nikolaev,  Captain  Royds,  that  the  worst  was  to  be  feared  if  the 
German  troops  were  withdrawn.  They  asked  that  a  ship  be  provided  to  transport  them 
also  in  the  event  of  a  German  withdrawal  . 
41  This  points  quite  clearly  to  what  an 
essential  role  the  German  army  was  providing  and  as  to  how  `neutral'  observers 
regarded  that.  Hopman  observed  the  strong  dislike  of  the  local  population  for  the  White 
army  and  their  refusal  to  pander  in  any  way  to  Ukrainian  nationalism.  Hopman 
40  [bid,  p.  94. 
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57 remarked  in  his  report  that  Lenin's  opinion  seemed  correct  that  the  Directory  and  its 
supporters  were  merely  a  prologue  for  Bolshevism  in  Ukraine.  42 
On  the  31st  December  1918,  Ataman  Grigoriev,  Commander  of  the  Directory's 
forces  in  the  south,  issued  an  ultimatum  to  the  German  troops.  In  the  ultimatum, 
Grigoriev  demanded  the  withdrawal  of  all  German  troops  by  foot,  within  4  days. 
According  to  Grigoriev  the  Germans  had  had  long  enough  to  leave  Ukraine  and  the 
patience  of  the  Ukrainian  people  had  now  come  to  an  end.  He  continued:  "After  four 
days,  every  German  soldier,  who  remains  where  his  troops  are  stationed  now,  will  be 
destroyed.  9A3  The  Germans  refused  to  answer  the  Ultimatum  and  instead  strengthened 
their  positions  around  Nikolaev  and  prepared  to  resist.  In  the  meantime  Vice  Admiral 
Hopman  telegraphed  Berlin  and  Kiev  to  notify  them  of  developments,  and  also 
enquired  from  the  Directory  if  Grigoriev  was  acting  under  their  orders.  44  Instead  of 
German  troops  having  their  first  conflict  with  the  Bolsheviks,  it  seemed  that  it  would  be 
against  the  Ukrainian  nationalists  instead. 
In  early  February,  news  reached  the  Black  Sea  coast  that  Kiev  had  fallen  to  the 
Bolsheviks  and  that  the  troops  of  the  Directory  had  fallen  back  in  disarray  to  Galicia. 
The  Bolsheviks  were  now  in  control  of  all  Ukraine  with  the  exception  of  the  coastal 
strip  and  Galicia.  Ataman  Grigoriev,  besieging  the  coastal  towns,  now  threw  in  his  lot 
with  the  Bolsheviks  and  so  the  German  forces  found  themselves  facing  an  ally  of  the 
Bolsheviks.  Tension  increased  between  the  French  and  Genpan  troops  and  the  French 
gave  orders  that  the  Germans  were  to  be  confined  to  barracks,  and  only  allowed  out 
when  the  French  agreed.  Later  the  French  moderated  the  conditions  and  the  German 
troops  were  confined  to  certain  parts  of  the  towns.  45 
The  Germans  were  particularly  concerned  about  the  German  settlements,  and  in 
January  1919  despatched  an  armoured  train  to  bring  back  German  colonists  to 
Nikolaev;  but  the  plan  failed  because  not  enough  German  colonists  were  prepared  to 
leave  their  farms  and  place  themselves  under  the  protection  of  the  German  forces.  A 
German  battalion  was  placed  along  the  rail  line  from  Odessa  to  Nikolaev  in  order  to 
protect  German  settlements  in  the  area.  A  very  real  danger,  from  the  French  point  of 
view,  appeared  in  March  1919,  when  the  Bolsheviks,  aware  that  many  German  troops 
were  battle  weary  and  wanted  to  return  to  Germany,  suggested  that  if  the  Germans 
42  Fischer,  Deutsche  Truppen,  p.  106. 
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58 surrendered  their  weapons  and  supplies  to  them  they  would  guarantee  them  safe 
passage  overland  to  Germany.  The  Bolsheviks  also  told  the  Germans  that  the  French 
had  no  intention  of  ever  returning  them  to  Germany  and  that  it  was  merely  a  ruse  in 
order  to  get  them  to  fight  France's  war.  This  propaganda  was  quite  successful  with  the 
Germans  and  the  French  later  allegeging  that  Nikolaev  had  been  lost  because  of  the 
Germans. 
On  February  10`h  Nikolaev  was  attacked  by  the  Bolsheviks.  There  were  100 
French  and  1,500  Greek  troops  in  the  town  but  it  was  also  the  base  of  the  15TII 
Landwehr  Division  of  the  German  army.  The  French  ordered  the  Germans  to  defend 
the  town  against  the  Bolsheviks,  with  50  guns  and  100  machine  guns.  The  Germans 
succeeded  in  repulsing  the  Bolshevik  attacks.  46 
Ukraine  was  a  powder  keg  of  nationalities  and  Odessa  was  even  more  so:  "The 
town  was,  as  Denikin  later  put  it  "a  political  Babel".  The  (Ukrainian  nationalist) 
Directory  had  just  taken  over  (as  Hetman  Skoropadskyi's  authority  broke  up),  but  not 
even  a  fifth  of  the  people  were  Ukrainian  (the  rest  were  Russian  or  Jewish).  "47  The 
French  themselves  were  extremely  reluctant  to  fight  the  Bolsheviks  and  one  French 
officer  remarked:  "Having  kept  his  head  at  Verdun  and  the  Marne  no  French  soldier 
would  agree  to  losing  it  on  the  Russian  fields.  s48  The  French  were  to  prove  the  truth  of 
this  statement  several  times  during  the  Ukrainian  campaign  but  would  tend  to  throw  the 
blame  on  to  the  German  troops.  Some  historians  have  recognised  the  total  unsuitability 
of  these  French  troops  for  the  job,  after  all  they  were  intervening  in  someone  else's  war 
after  4  years  in  `the  war  to  end  all  wars': 
When  they  came  under  attack,  and  especially  in  Kherson  and  Nikolaev  the 
local  populations  had  joined  the  Bolsheviks  in  firing  on  them,  many  of  the 
French  troops  had  refused  to  fight  and  the  Greeks  had  in  turn  blamed  their 
losses  on  the  French.  These  incidents,  plus  the  subsequent  mutiny  of  a 
sizable  number  of  the  sailors  of  the  French  squadron,  were  among  the  many 
factors  which  had  to  be  taken  into  consideration  in  deciding  whether  to 
remain  in  Odessa  or  not.  Although  the  French  Command  probably  overrated 
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59 the  Bolsheviks'  strength,  it  did  appreciate  the  inferior  condition  of  its  troops 
and  their  unwillingness  to  fight  a  Russian  war.  49 
The  failure  of  the  French  fighting  forces  encouraged  Grigoriev's  forces  and  they 
began  to  turn  their  attention  to  the  Germans. 
The  Allied  attitude  to  the  Ukrainian  nationalists  and  the  Directory  continued  to  be 
influenced  by  the  `German  Factor'.  At  the  very  time  that  the  nationalists  were  fighting 
for  their  lives  in  Ukraine,  the  Peace  Conference  had  started  in  Paris.  The  representatives 
of  Ukraine  were  not  treated  kindly  at  the  Conference.  W.  E.  D  Allen  remarked: 
Furthermore,  so  soon  after  the  recent  hard  struggle  with  Germany,  the 
representatives  of  the  Allies  were  not  inclined  to  regard  with  favour  envoys 
from  the  de  facto  succession  states  of  the  Russian  Empire,  the  governments 
of  which  had  owed  their  origin  to  German  diplomacy  and  German  bayonets 
(...  )  After  having  failed  to  raise  interest  in  the  fate  of  the  `oppressed 
nationalities'  of  the  Russian  Empire,  Margolin  (the  Ukrainian 
representative)  broached  the  question  of  the  fate  of  the  Jews,  but  here  too  he 
found  that  people  were  not  interested.  In  1919  it  was  well  remembered  that 
the  Jewish  population  of  Poland  and  Ukraine  had  been  on  the  side  of  the 
Germans  and  that  German  Jews  had  taken  upon  themselves  the  role  of 
intermediaries  between  the  German  High  Command  and  the  Bolsheviks.  50 
The  battle  being  fought  in  the  southern  Ukraine  was  Bolshevism  versus  the  Allies 
and  both  the  Ukrainians  and  Germans  were  secondary  players  with  very  few  rights  in 
the  game. 
A  far  from  complimentary  report  reached  Berlin  in  May  1919  from  Vice  Admiral 
Hopman  about  the  military  events  of  that  March.  He  reported  that  everywhere  the 
French  came  into  conflict  with  the  Bolsheviks  their  forces  fled.  The  report  claimed  that 
as  Grigoriev  and  the  Bolsheviks  attacked  Nikolaev,  the  French  fled  and  left  the  defence 
of  the  town  to  the  Germans.  On  3-5  March  Grigoriev  attacked  both  Nikolaev  and 
Kherson  but  his  forces  were  beaten  back  by  a  German  armoured  train.  The  report  goes 
on:  "(...  )  The  German  troops  and  approximately  55  civilians,  among  whom  were  the 
Consul  Stobbe  and  ten  citizens  of  the  Reich,  were  taken  in  safety  on  to  the  ships.  The 
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60 ships  with  the  refugees  from  Nikolaev  then  sailed  towards  Odessa.  After  a  short  time 
the  Bolsheviks  turned  towards  Odessa.  "st 
Vice  Admiral  Hopman  becoming  increasingly  concerned  about  his  men  and  the 
encroaching  Bolsheviks.  He  contacted  the  Admiralty  in  Berlin,  to  find  out  when  the 
forces  under  his  command  would  be  evacuated.  The  reply,  when  it  came,  was  not 
reassuring:  "Everything  possible  has  been  done  by  the  authorities  here  in  Germany  for 
weeks  to  evacuate  German  forces  from  the  Black  Sea  region.  The  Allies  have  until  now 
refused  to  do  anything,  so  the  blame  lies  with  the  foreign  governments.  "52  Finally  ships 
were  provided  to  remove  the  soldiers  from  Nikolaev,  but  so  great  was  the  distrust  of  the 
French,  that  many  German  soldiers  believed  the  Bolshevik  propaganda,  that  they  were 
in  reality  being  shipped  to  Morocco  to  take  part  in  forced  labour.  53 
From  a  deserter  from  Grigoriev's  forces,  Hopman  and  the  Allies  discovered  that 
already  officers  of  the  Red  Army  were  active  and  attached  to  Grigoriev's  army  and 
staff.  He  also  informed  them  that  the  Ukrainian  Soviet  government  in  Kharkov  had  a 
group  of  German  Spartacists  working  on  propaganda  against  the  German  units  in 
Odessa  and  the  other  coastal  towns.  54 
On  10th  March  1919  the  evacuation  by  sea  of  the  7th  Landwehr  Division  from 
Odessa  and  the  15th  Landwehr  Division  from  Nikolaev  began.  In  Nikolaev  the  bands  of 
Grigoriev  entered  the  burning  suburbs  while  the  Germans  were  still  embarking.  55 
The  French  commander  in  Odessa  received  the  order  from  Paris  to  evacuate  the 
city.  This  signified  the  end  of  Allied  direct  intervention  in  Ukraine.  Although  the 
British  would  continue  their  links  with  General  Denikin's  Volunteer  Army,  the 
evacuation  of  Odessa  was  the  last  involvement  of  the  French  in  Ukraine.  On  22  March 
the  last  German  troops  together  with  German  consular  staff  left  Odessa  on  board  the 
hospital  ship  `Jerusalem'  and  sailed  for  Germany  via  Istanbul.  The  last  German  forces 
had  finally  left  Ukraine.  The  evacuation  of  Odessa  was  a  military  and  human  tragedy. 
Many  civilians  and  refugees  from  the  Bolsheviks  committed  suicide,  when  it  became 
clear  that  they  would  be  left  to  the  mercies  of  the  Red  Army.  The  evacuation  of  Odessa 
was  one  of  the  greatest  disasters  of  the  Russian  Civil  War.  In  the  course  of  the  Civil 
War  there  were  numerous  instances  of  panic  and  confusion  when  the  responsible 
"  BA:  Waffenstillstandskommission  1918/19  [09.04].  Truppen  am  Schwarzen  Meer,  Nummer  98.  Abschrift  A14970,18  May 
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61 authorities  mismanaged  their  tasks.  None  was  worse  than  the  French  organisation  of  the 
evacuation  of  Odessa.  Primary  responsibility  for  the  Odessa  debacle  belongs  to  the 
French.  They  embarked  on  an  ambitious  scheme  without  clear  goals.  German  forces 
had  been  instruments  in  this  French  game  of  great  power  politics. 
What  was  the  opinion  of  the  German  military  after  this,  the  first  of  its  `Disasters 
in  the  East',  the  second  being  in  1943?  General  Groener,  the  commander  of  the 
Reichswehr  in  1919  and  who  had  himself  been  commander  in  Ukraine  in  1918,  wrote 
to  Hindenburg  in  1923  expressing  his  opinion  of  both  communism  and  of  the 
experiences  drawn  from  the  campaigns  of  1918/19:  "Marxism,  which  today  is  attacked 
so  much  for  reasons  of  party  politics,  is  finished.  Its  place  has  been  taken  by 
Communism,  the  fight  against  it  is  at  the  moment  the  most  important  task.  The  fight 
against  Communism  is  facilitated  if  it  is  undertaken  in  alliance  with  Socialism,  because 
basically  there  are,  as  in  Russia,  no  more  bitter  enemies  than  Socialists  and 
Communists.  s56  Groener's  opinions  were,  in  my  opinion,  moulded  not  only  by  the 
struggle  in  Gennany  itself  between  the  new  Social  Democrat  government,  whose  chief 
ally  Groener  was,  and  the  Spartacists,  but  also  the  struggle  in  Ukraine  between  the 
Directory  (a  mainly  Socialist  government)  and  the  Bolsheviks,  which  he  had  witnessed. 
The  experience  in  Ukraine  was  to  convince  the  Germans  that  this  should  be  the 
last  time  that  their  military  should  act  as  an  adjunct  of  the  Allies  and  it  was  not  to 
happen  again.  However,  many  German  officers  now  began  to  put  their  faith  in  General 
Denikin  and  the  Whites  as  the  only  force  which  was  capable  of  defeating  the 
Bolsheviks.  Even  after  the  debacle  in  Ukraine,  much  official  opinion  in  Germany  was 
still  convinced  that  the  Bolsheviks  would  not  remain  in  power  for  long.  A  report  to 
Berlin,  from  Von  Mack  (an  official  of  the  Reichs  Wirtschaftsamt)  detailing  events  with 
the  German  military  in  Ukraine  ended  by  analysing  the  future:  "Despite  that,  nobody 
can  doubt  that  the  Bolsheviks  will  not  remain  in  power  in  Russia  for  long.  Because  of 
the  widely  practised  passivity  of  the  Russian  people  Bolshevism  can  remain  in  power 
longer  than  in  a  western  European  country  (...  )  In  my  opinion  the  closest  relationship 
with  this  future  Russia  is  in  the  interests  of  the  Reich.  "57  The  irony  in  much  of  this  sea 
of  shifting  alliances  is  that  the  Russian  Whites  and  particularly  Denikin  considered 
36  F.  L.  Carstcn,  Reichswehr  and  Politics.  1918-1933  (Oxford,  1966),  p.  292.  "BA:  Waffenstillstandskommission  1918/19  [09.04].  Truppen  am  Schwarzen  Meer,  Nummer  98.  Abschrift  A14970.18  May 
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62 Ukrainian  nationalism  as  an  `unthinkable  device'  created  by  the  Germans  during  the 
First  World  War  to  undermine  Russia's  strength.  58 
In  view  of  the  distrust  with  which  they  were  regarded  by  both  the  White  Russians 
and  the  Allies,  it  is  surprising  that  the  German  troops  in  Ukraine  operated  so  effectively 
from  November  1918  to  March  1919.  It  is  not  surprising  that  if  the  French 
interventionary  troops  were  war  weary,  that  the  German  forces  were  even  more  so, 
some  having  been  in  Ukraine  since  March  1918. 
Lenin  was  still  hoping  for  the  revolution  in  Germany  but  things  turned  sour  when 
his  emissary  Karl  Radek  was  arrested  in  Berlin  in  March  1919.  On  29  March  1919  a 
telegram  informed  the  Foreign  Ministry  in  Berlin,  that  10  Germans  had  been  taken 
hostage  by  the  new  Soviet  government  in  Ukraine,  because  of  Radek's  arrest  and  would 
be  executed  if  anything  happened  to  him.  59  This  was  to  be  probably  the  nadir  of 
Germany's  relationship  with  Soviet  Russia  and  Soviet  Ukraine.  The  experience  of 
Germany's  military  involvement  in  Ukraine  in  1918/19  would  cure  even  the  German 
military  of  any  further  wish  for  military  intervention  in  Ukraine  for  the  remainder  of  the 
Russian  Civil  War. 
The  German  army  had  first  become  involved  in  Ukraine  in  the  course  of  the  First 
World  War  with  clear  imperial  military  and  political  goals.  With  the  ending  of  that  war 
the  picture  became  much  more  unclear  and  several  leading  questions  need  to  be  asked. 
The  German  military  intervention  could  be  claimed  to  have  been  a  disaster.  It  had 
neither  supplied  the  materials  needed  for  the  German  war  effort,  nor  had  it  led  to  a 
major  change  in  the  situation  on  the  Western  Front,  as  Hindenburg  and  Ludendorff  had 
hoped  in  early  1918.  The  German  intention  to  try  and  hold  on  to  some  of  their  influence 
and  prestige  in  Ukraine  after  1918  also  failed.  Contrary  to  the  wishes  of  General 
Groener  and  Count  Brockdorff-Rantzau,  the  Foreign  Minister,  the  Germans  had  had  to 
play  very  much  second  fiddle  to  the  Allies.  This  was  only  natural  as  Germany  had  just 
been  defeated  in  a  4-year  war;  the  bitterness  and  scale  of  losses  of  which  had  never 
been  seen  in  human  history. 
The  naive  strivings  of  the  German  Supreme  Command  to  win  back  power  and 
influence  via  their  involvement  in  Ukraine  seem  now  to  have  simplistic  in  the  extreme. 
In  November  1918  the  Germans  had  been  in  a  position  of  military  strength  in  Ukraine, 
51  Lincoln,  Red  Victory,  p.  317. 
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63 although  with  their  defeat  in  the  World  War  their  forces  would  gradually  evaporate 
during  the  following  months.  It  was  they  who  could  have  decided  whether  the  Hetman 
or  the  Directory  remained  in  power,  and  whether  the  Bolshevik  armies  could  have 
advanced  on  Kiev  and  Kharkov  months  before  they,  in  fact,  did.  The  majority  of 
German  troops  in  Ukraine  simply  wanted,  however,  to  return  to  the  Fatherland.  For 
them  the  war  in  Europe  was  over  and  the  grand  designs  of  London,  Paris,  and  Berlin 
were  as  nothing  compared  to  their  loss  of  morale  and  war  weariness. 
In  the  German  reports  reaching  Berlin  in  the  course  of  early  1919  there  was 
tremendous  distrust  and  resentment  of  the  Allies.  Some  German  agents  and  officers  in 
Ukraine  hoped  for  some  form  of  rapprochement  with  the  Russian  Whites,  and 
particularly  General  Denikin,  and  then  the  formation  of  some  form  of  German-Russian 
alliance  against  Britain  and  France60.  This  plan  fell  on  stony  ground  however,  as 
Denikin  as  a  former  Tsarist  general,  blamed  the  Germans  not  only  as  the  destroyers  of 
the  Russian  Empire,  but  also  the  encouragers  of  the  nationalists,  and  particularly  of  the 
Ukrainian  nationalists. 
Some  German  officers  even  set  up  a  spy  ring  on  the  Ukrainian  coast  in  late  1919, 
and  made  constant  reports  to  Berlin  about  the  activities  of  the  Russian  Whites  61  It  is 
quite  clear  that  for  the  German  officers  in  particular,  the  French  came  closely  behind 
the  Bolsheviks  in  terms  of  hostility. 
The  majority  of  German  opinion  was  glad  to  end  its  engagement  with  Ukraine  in 
1919.  Germany  as  a  defeated  power  had  far  too  many  other  issues  to  be  involved 
with.  The  exceptions  were  a  small  group  of  right  wing  thinkers,  such  as  Paul 
Rohrbach,  who  had  always  regarded  Ukraine  as  vital  to  Germany's  interests  in  the 
east.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  the  early  months  of  1919  Germany  was  still 
labouring  under  a  British  naval  blockade  and  starvation  was  still  widespread  in  the 
cities.  There  was  also  an  attempt  at  a  Soviet  style  revolution  and  the  country's 
representatives  were  still  trying  to  negotiate  for  terms  at  the  Versailles  Conference.  It 
60  PA  AA:  Büro  des  Staatsekrettrs.  Allgemeine  Angelegenheiten  [Ukraine]  (R14394)  116.  A  memorandum  from  Müller,  the  legal 
representative  of  the  'White  Ruthenian  Delegation'  in  Warsaw  refers  to  the  growing  antagonism  of  the  Russians  towards  France 
and  the  increasing  sympathy  for  Germany.  lie  believed  that  many  German  officers  were  prepared  to  reach  an  accommodation  with 
the  Russian  Whites  and  to  move  towards  a  Russian-German  alliance. 
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established,  with  the  Catholic  Archdeacon  in  Sevastopol,  Schupert,  involved,  along  with  several  leading  members  of  the  Tartar 
community.  They  reported  to  a  German  official  in  the  local  administration,  who  in  turn  passed  on  reports  to  the  Foreign  Ministry  in 
Berlin.  The  main  aim  of  the  espionage  was  to  determine  the  political  views  of  Denikin's  officers  and  to  encourage  a  pro-German 
orientation.  They  were  not  paid  by  Berlin  and  the  group  was  a  very  ad  hoc  affair. 
64 is  not  surprising  that  under  such  circumstances  both  the  German  public  and  the 
German  Foreign  Ministry  had  no  stomach  for  further  military  adventures  in  Ukraine. 
The  French  retreat  from  Odessa  had  ended  the  possibility  of  further  German 
military  involvement  there.  The  British,  totally  exasperated  with  the  French 
involvement  in  Ukraine,  decided  to  support  the  Russian  Whites  indirectly  and  not  to 
send  any  further  forces  to  Ukraine.  It  also  reinforced  their  concept  of  Ukraine  as  `Little 
Russia',  which  was  exactly  the  policy  of  Denikin  and  the  Whites.  On  June  11  1919  the 
Foreign  Secretary  Lord  Curzon  wrote  to  Lord  Balfour:  "We  have  always  maintained 
that  we  could  not  regard  Ukraine  independently  of  Russia,  and  that  General  Denikin's 
Government  was  the  only  one  in  South  Russia  worthy  of  support.  Ukraine,  when  it  is 
reconquered,  should  properly  fall  within  General  Denikin's  sphere  of  influence  and 
consequently  under  our  control"62 
This  would  be  the  policy  of  the  Entente  throughout  1919  but  the  Germans  after 
their  experience  in  Ukraine  would  remain  far  more  cautious.  It  did  seem  in  the  summer 
of  1919  that  Denikin's  forces  were  marching  from  victory  to  victory,  and  with  the  fall 
of  Kiev  in  September  that  the  days  of  the  Bolsheviks  were  numbered.  For  Germany 
however,  the  debacle  of  1918/19  was  a  salutary  one  and  it  would  refrain  from  any 
further  involvement  in  Ukraine. 
62  Brinkley,  The  VolunteerArmy,  p.  144. 
65 CHAPTER  5 
TIIE  GERMAN  FOREIGN  MINISTRY  AND  UKRAINE 
When  the  SPD  government  under  Scheidemann  came  to  power  in  January  1919, 
the  Foreign  Ministry  began  to  exercise  more  influence  than  it  had  since  the  end  of  the 
war  in  November.  The  German  Foreign  Ministry  (Auswärtiges  Amt  -  AA)  played  under 
Bismarck  a  central  role  in  the  Imperial  administration.  It  was  overshadowed  during  the 
military  `dictatorship'  of  Hindenburg  and  Ludendorff.  It  recovered  its  influence  under 
the  Republic.  The  Foreign  Minister  appointed  in  December  1918,  Count  Ulrich 
Brockdorff-Rantzau,  wanted  to  gather  together  the  various  aspects  of  German  foreign 
policy  under  the  Foreign  Ministry.  The  Army  headquarters  was  transferred  to  Kolberg 
in  order  to  control  events  in  the  east  and  this  created  a  problem  for  the  government  in 
Berlin.  Together  with  this  there  was  the  problem  of  the  efforts  of  White  Russian 
generals  in  the  anti-Bolshevik  forces  to  influence  foreign  policy.  A  network  of  official, 
semi-official,  and  personal  ties  developed  between  German  and  White  Russian  forces 
and  this  made  the  planning  of  foreign  policy  difficult. 
The  result  of  events  in  Germany  was  that  no  single  party  had  an  absolute  majority 
of  the  vote  and  coalition  governments  became  common.  This  was  to  affect  the  conduct 
of  foreign  policy  after  1918.  There  was  pressure  from  the  Left  and  Centre  parties,  from 
some  of  the  industrialists  who  wanted  a  foreign  policy  more  responsive  to  Germany's 
international  trade,  and  also  from  some  officials  within  the  Foreign  Ministry  who 
wanted  reform  of  the  AA,  for  realignment  in  international  relations. 
The  Schüler  reforms  of  the  AA  in  1920  realised  many  of  these  hopes.  The 
consular  and  diplomatic  services  were  merged  and  the  AA  was  reorganised  into 
departments  dealing  with  various  regions.  Department  IV  (Abteilung  IV)  dealt  with 
Russia  and  Ukraine.  The  merging  of  political  and  economic  affairs  ensured  that 
economic  issues  received  far  more  emphasis  and  became  an  integral  part  of  foreign 
policy.  '  The  AA  had  to  ensure  the  support  of  the  parties  comprising  the  government. 
There  were  regular  meetings  between  the  Foreign  Minister  and  the  foreign  affairs 
experts  of  the  government  parties. 
The  foreign  policy  of  the  Republic  needed  to  secure  the  support  of  the  Reichstag 
at  all  times  and  although  the  President  (Ebert)  had  the  power  to  appoint  diplomats  and 
1  John  I  Tiden,  Germany  and  Europe  1919-1939,  (New  York:  Longman,  1993),  p.  33. 
66 sign  treaties,  he  tended  to  avoid  conflict  with  the  AA.  Some  older  diplomats  were  not 
happy  with  the  Republic  but  they  remained  loyal  to  the  State.  One  of  the  AA's  main 
aims  was  to  `revise'  the  terms  of  the  Versailles  Treaty.  Other  ministries  also  influenced 
foreign  policy  particularly  the  Reich  Economic  Ministry  and  the  Ministry  of  Finance. 
Because  of  the  importance  of  economic  recovery  to  Germany,  the  important  new 
markets  in  Eastern  Europe  led  to  much  policy  making  involving  Russia  and  Eastern 
Europe  being  coordinated  by  the  Economics  Ministry. 
Soviet  Ukraine  in  1920  was  a  land  of  26  million  people  and  contained  the  most 
important  coal  and  iron  deposits  in  the  European  part  of  the  former  Russian  Empire.  It 
was  vital  for  Germany  to  cultivate  good  relations  with  her  but  when  would  Germany  be 
ready  to  recognise  Soviet  Ukraine? 
The  governments,  which  were  in  power  from  1919  to  1923,  were  chiefly 
interested  in  working  with  the  Entente  on  foreign  policy.  The  first  glimpse  of  German 
thinking  on  Ukraine  comes  from  the  report  of  Colin  Ross,  attached  to  the  AA,  and 
based  in  Kiev,  during  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1918,  concerning  the  situation  in 
Ukraine  during  the  German  occupation  in  1918.2  In  his  opinion  the  roots  of  the 
nationalist  movement  were  not  buried  very  deep,  and  the  situation  in  the  country  was  so 
chaotic  that  any  government,  which  could  promise  to  restore  order  would  be  popular. 
The  Bolshevik  propaganda  had  done  its  work  however,  and  all  forms  of  authority  were 
distrusted  by  the  Ukrainian  people.  Ross  described  the  agricultural  riches  of  Ukraine 
but  commented  that  the  peasants  were  unwilling  to  sell  anything  because  of  the 
uncertain  situation  and  the  loss  in  value  of  the  currency.  He  believed  that  the  only  way 
in  which  Germany  would  gain  its  supplies  was  in  co-operation  with  the  large 
landowners,  and  that  the  peasants  were  already  resisting  the  German  troops.  According 
to  Ross's  account  the  Germans  were  held  in  good  regard  by  the  intellectuals  and  the 
middle  class,  especially  Russian  officers,  and  Ross  believed  that  more  than  1,000 
(Russian  officers)  had  been  executed  by  the  Bolsheviks  in  Kiev  prior  to  the  German 
intervention.  He  also  went  on  to  state  that  the  other  classes  of  Ukrainian  society  were 
also  sympathetic  to  the  Germans,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the  industrial  workers, 
who  he  regarded  as  being  tainted  with  Bolshevism.  3 
The  German  troops  in  Ukraine  were  apparently  being  approached  by  the 
supporters  of  various  political  factions,  from  monarchists  to  socialists  and  seeking  to 
2  BA:  Stellvertreter  des  Reichskanzlers  (13),  Bd  IV.  Film  45062. 
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67 influence  them.  This  would  indeed  be  a  feature  of  German-Ukrainian  relations  in  the 
years  ahead  with  many  differing  groups  seeking  to  have  the  ear  of  the  Foreign  Ministry. 
Ross  warned  of  trying  to  replace  the  Rada  with  a  more  pliable  administration  as  this 
would  lead  to  the  Germans  being  regarded  as  `conquerors  '  by  the  Ukrainians.  Ross 
continued:  "All  the  conditions  are  there  in  order  to  bring  pro-German  influence  to  bear 
on  the  population  (...  )  The  present  Ukrainian  government  is  nothing  more  than  a 
collection  of  political  adventurers,  who  have  completely  unrealistic  aims.  Germany  is in 
the  position  to  dictate  to  this  bunch  and  to  come  out  of  the  affair  not  too  badly.  "4 
In  October  1918  a  memorandum  of  the  AA  set  out  the  then  current  thinking  on 
the  situation  in  Ukraine.  It  appeared  that  the  AA  was  having  second  thoughts  about  the 
Hetmanate  and  its  role  in  Ukraine.  It  criticised  the  ending  of  the  free  press,  the  arrest  of 
Ukrainian  nationalists  and  a  policy  supporting  the  large  landowners  who  (according  to 
the  memorandum)  were  the  main  supporters  of  Russification  and  pro-Russian  feeling  in 
Ukraine.  The  Germans  had  allowed  the  Hetmanate  to  block  any  policy  of  land  reform, 
and  the  memorandum  was  critical  of  this,  seeing  it  as  the  alpha  and  omega  of  policy  in 
Ukraine.  The  AA  view  was  that  the  Army's  policies  in  Ukraine  were  leading  to  anti- 
German  sentiment  and  the  memorandum  continued: 
To  summarise  all  these  facts,  the  present  situation  in  Ukraine  is  as  follows: 
the  Germans  have  the  support  of  the  Jews,  and  the  Polish  and  Great  Russian 
landowners,  because  they  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  Germans  will  prevent 
the  land  reforms  and  other  measures  being  carried  out.  In  the  matter  of 
Ukrainian  independence  the  Germans  are  regarded  as  being  against  the 
Entente  who  are  considered  as  the  archenemies  of  Ukraine.  The  whole 
Ukrainian  people  is  turning  against  the  Germans  because  it  is  of  the  opinion 
that  the  policies  of  the  Hetman's  government  stem  from  the  Germans  (...  ) 
This  is  the  beginning  of  the  political  consequences  of  the  false  policy  of  the 
German  Supreme  Command  in  Ukraine  (...  )  The  Ukrainian  circles  who  were 
sympathetic  to  the  Germans  are  as  a  result  of  all  the  above  disorientated  and 
full  of  distrust.  The  Ukrainians  before  were  under  the  Russian  yoke,  which 
was  brutal,  but  disorganised  and  ineffective.  Now  however  they  have  the 
feeling  that  they  have  gone  out  of  the  frying  pan  into  the  fire.  The 
organisation  of  their  lives  is  now  with  the  help  of  the  Germans  more 
Ibid. 
68 stringent  than  ever  (...  )  The  many  enemies  of  Ukrainian  statehood,  the  Poles, 
the  Jews,  the  Russians,  and  the  agents  of  the  Entente  have  been  attempting 
to  create  bad  feeling  between  Germany  and  Ukraine  and  one  must  admit  that 
they  have  to  a  large  extent  succeeded.  5 
The  memorandum  went  on  to  state  that  Ukraine,  which  was  the  economic 
penetration  point  for  the  whole  East,  had  become  a  minefield  for  the  Germans.  It 
recommended  land  reform,  the  free  development  of  political  parties,  and  the 
establishment  of  a  constituent  assembly.  It  also  warned  about  the  influence  of  the  pro- 
Russian  elements  on  the  German  Supreme  Command  in  Ukraine,  and  pointed  out  that 
whereas  the  Ukrainians  were  predominantly  an  agricultural  people,  that  the  pro-Russian 
Officers  had  their  roots  and  their  support  mainly  amongst  the  aristocracy.  6 
Some  of  the  warnings  were  about  to  become  true  and  in  November  1918  with  the 
defeat  of  Germany  the  collapse  of  German  power  in  Ukraine  began. 
The  new  Ukrainian  government  -  the  Directory  -  wanted  good  foreign  relations 
and  accordingly  supported  the  concept  of  opening  diplomatic  negotiations  with  Soviet 
Russia  but  the  Bolsheviks  were  not  interested,  and  were  waiting  for  the  slow 
withdrawal  of  German  troops  from  Ukraine.  Doubts  persisted  over  the  viability  of 
Ukrainian  independence  and  the  Königsberger  Zeitung  reported  this  on  1st  February 
1919:  "The  foreign  policy  situation  in  Ukraine  is  completely  dependant  on  the  internal 
consolidation  of  the  state  -  this  consolidation  does  not  seem  to  be  as  yet  on  a  secure 
footing.  The  union  of  the  West  Ukrainian  Republic  with  Ukraine  on  3rd  January  has 
strengthened  the  Galician  influence  in  Kiev  extraordinarily.  The  Galician  influence  is 
one  explanation  for  the  sharp  turn  in  policy  of  the  Kiev  government  against  the 
Russians  and  the  Russian  language.  "7 
As  the  Revolution  gained  ground  in  Berlin,  and  the  conduct  of  foreign  relations 
became  more  difficult,  many  agreements  were  entered  into  between  the  Directory  and 
the  German  troops  on  the  ground  in  Ukraine.  There  were  also  agreements  between  the 
Germans  and  the  Soviet  forces  in  the  east,  as  has  already  been  referred  to.  All  of  this 
was  deeply  resented  by  the  Entente,  who  neither  wanted  Bolshevik  penetration  of 
Ukraine,  nor  a  nationalist  regime  in  Kiev.  The  policy  of  the  French  was  clear,  support 
Ibid. 
6  Ibid.  The  Memorandum  is  by  an  unnamed  official  in  the  Auswärtiges  Amt  (Ukrainian  Section).  It  was  a  warning  to  Germany  that 
Ukrainian  nationalism  was  a  volatile  quantity  and  that  the  policy  of  being  too  closely  involved  with  the  Iletmanate's  main 
supporters  -  the  pro  Russian  aristocracy  and  landowners  -  could  lead  to  future  problems  for  Germany. 
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69 for  the  White  forces  of  General  Denikin  and  the  restoration  of  the  Russian  Empire.  As  a 
result  of  German  troops  remaining  in  Ukraine  and  acting  at  the  behest  of  the  Entente, 
strong  diplomatic  strains  appeared  in  the  relationship  between  the  Directory  and  the 
German  government.  The  German  Ambassador  in  Kiev,  Count  von  Berchem,  wrote  to 
the  Foreign  Ministry  on  14  December  1918  stating  that  he  would  begin  de  facto 
relations  with  the  Directory  and  if  possible  attempt  to  gain  the  same  conditions  as 
Germany  had  previously  obtained  from  the  Hetman's  government,  and  even  to  continue 
the  economic  clauses  of  the  previous  agreements  with  that  government.  8  This  suggested 
either  considerable  arrogance  or  naivete  on  the  part  of  Berchem,  as  the  economic 
agreements  between  the  Hetmanate  and  Germany  were  those  of  a  satellite  state  with  its 
occupier.  It  followed  that  the  Directory  would  not  sanction  such  agreements  so 
favourable  to  Germany. 
The  relations  between  Germany  and  Poland  were  to  play  a  vital  role  in  Germany's 
perception  of  Ukraine.  Already  in  December  1918  it  was  clear  that  Germany  would 
lose  territory  to  Poland  in  the  east,  and  for  Germany  Poland  was  to  become  the  chief 
antagonist  in  Eastern  Europe.  The  Foreign  Ministry  was  faced  with  the  conflicting 
demands  of  the  Directory  and  the  Entente.  The  Directory  called  for  total  German 
military  withdrawal  from  Ukraine,  whereas  the  Entente  wanted  German  intervention 
against  the  Bolsheviks.  The  position  adopted  at  that  time  by  the  AA  was  to  become  the 
prevailing  one  during  the  period  of  the  Russian  Civil  War.  A  memorandum  from  Solf 
(Chief  Secretary  of  the  AA)  dated  30  December  1918  stated:  "Politically  we  must  be 
very  careful  and  draw  back,  as  long  as  the  fate  of  Ukraine  is  uncertain.  Should  the 
country  succeed  in  achieving  its  independence  that  would  be  excellent  for  us, 
particularly  because  of  the  counterweight  of  Ukraine  to  Poland.  "9  Count  von  Berchem 
recommended  the  withdrawal  of  all  German  diplomats  from  Ukraine  because  of  the 
total  chaos.  Solf,  the  Chief  Secretary  of  the  AA,  wrote  to  Berchem  expressing  his 
caution  about  the  withdrawal  of  German  diplomats.  Solf  believed  that  the  closure  of  the 
embassy  would  give  the  impression  that  Germany  was  abandoning  Ukraine  to  the 
Bolsheviks,  or  at  least  withdrawing  or  limiting  diplomatic  recognition  of  the  Ukrainian 
government.  "So  long  as  the  situation  hangs  in  the  balance  this  is  not  to  be  desired. 
This  should  only  come  about  when  the  Ukrainians  themselves  can  be  convinced  that, 
without  doubt,  extraterritoriality  would  no  longer  be  respected  or  that  the  government 
PA  AA:  Büro  des  Staatsekretürs.  Allgemeine  Angelegenheiten  (Ukraine).  (R14388).  s.  136. 
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70 was  not  in  a  position  to  provide  any  credible  defence  of  security.  s10  This  was  a  rather 
dubious  definition  of  the  Foreign  Ministry's  view  of  Ukrainian  independence. 
As  the  year  1919  progressed  the  desperation  of  the  Directory  became  more 
marked  and  they  began  to  appeal  to  the  Germans  for  military  assistance  against  the 
Bolsheviks.  The  Directory  had  grasped  that  without  some  form  of  external  assistance  its 
days  were  numbered,  and  as  the  Entente  were  not  in  favour  of  an  independent  Ukraine, 
the  Germans  seemed  the  only  source  of  intervention.  Such  attempts  proved  to  be 
fruitless  however,  and  by  February  a  Soviet  government  was  in  power  in  Kiev. 
Lenin  had  decided  to  grant  the  new  Ukrainian  Soviet  government  a  level  of 
independence  in  its  foreign  policy  in  order  to  gain  international  recognition  for  Soviet 
Ukraine.  Lenin  appointed  Christian  Rakovsky  as  Commissar  for  Foreign  Affairs  of 
Soviet  Ukraine,  and  he  was  at  the  same  time  Chairman  of  the  Soviet  of  People's 
Commissars  of  Ukraine  and  member  of  the  Politburo  of  the  Ukrainian  Central 
Committee.  Throughout  the  Civil  War  Rakovsky's  main  task  was  to  strengthen  Soviet 
authority  in  Ukraine  and  to  impose  his  own  government  and  order.  In  March  1919  the 
constitution  of  the  Ukrainian  SSR  was  ratified  by  the  Second  Congress  of  the  Ukrainian 
Soviets.  It  established  close  economic  and  military  union  between  Soviet  Ukraine  and 
Soviet  Russia. 
Germany  did  not  officially  recognise  the  new  Soviet  regime  in  Kharkov  and  to 
complicate  matters  further,  Radek  (the  representative  of  the  Russian  Soviet 
government)  had  just  been  arrested  in  Berlin.  A  group  of  German,  Austrian,  and 
Hungarian  Spartacists  were  also  keen  to  occupy  the  German  consulate  in  Kiev  and  set 
up  some  type  of  diplomatic  mission  for  what  they  perceived  as  the  future 
`revolutionary'  Germany  which  would  surely  emerge  with  the  wave  of  unrest 
convulsing  Europe.  For  the  moment  they  were  held  in  check  by  Rakovsky  and  the 
Bolsheviks,  keen  for  diplomatic  and  trade  relations  with  Germany. 
On  3  April  1919  the  newspaper  Severnaya  Kommuna  reported  that  Rakovsky  had 
visited  the  German  consulate  and  asked  the  consular  staff  if  they  were  accredited.  He 
went  on  to  state  that  the  position  of  the  Soviet  Ukrainian  government  was  that  they 
were  not,  and  that  certain  privileges  would  be  withdrawn  from  them.  Rakovsky  stated, 
as  it  was  not  clear  whether  they  were  recognised  by  their  government  as  diplomatic 
representatives,  and  as  it  was  unclear  whether  citizens  of  Soviet  Ukraine  had  reciprocal 
10  Ibid. 
71 rights  in  Germany  or  not,  that  he  would  give  them  the  opportunity  to  use  the  telegraph 
to  ascertain  the  position  from  the  German  government  as  to  whether  Berlin  recognised 
the  Soviet  government  of  Ukraine  or  not.  He  also  wished  them  to  ascertain  from  the 
German  government,  whether  it  was  possible  to  send  a  Ukrainian  consul  to  Germany.  11 
The  situation  escalated  further  and  the  Ukrainian  paper  Svobodnaoe  Slovo 
reported  that  at  the  end  of  April  1919  Rakovsky  visited  all  foreign  consulates  and 
delivered  an  ultimatum.  Unless  their  governments  recognised  the  Soviet  Ukrainian 
government  within  10  days  all  consular  staff  would  be  deported  from  Ukraine.  After 
the  10  days  had  elapsed  the  consulates  only  received  a  confirmation  from  their 
governments  that  the  ultimatum  had  been  received.  The  Ukrainian  Bolsheviks 
subsequently  carried  out  searches  of  the  consulates.  12 
Germany  was  clearly  pursuing  the  agenda  set  by  the  Entente  and  refusing  to 
recognise  Soviet  rule  in  Ukraine.  In  Germany  there  were  signs  of  a  hardening  of 
attitudes  towards  the  Bolsheviks  by  the  German  Right  and  particularly  those  involved 
with  military  adventurism  and  intervention  in  Russia  and  Ukraine.  The  German 
newspaper  Republik  reported  on  3  April  1919  that  a  Russian  White  Guard  was  being  set 
up  in  Germany:  "The  volunteers  are  not  by  any  means  prisoners  of  war  from  the  camps 
but  come  mostly  from  Ukraine  where,  before  the  advance  of  the  Bolsheviks,  they 
joined  the  German  troops  retreating  from  Ukraine.  There  are  many  former  Tsarist 
Officers  amongst  them  and  adjutants  of  Kornilov  and  Denikin  whose  purpose  is  clearly 
the  destruction  of  the  Soviet  government.  "13  The  SPD  government  watched  uneasily,  as 
both  the  Entente  and  the  German  Right  applied  pressure  in  an  anti-Soviet  direction. 
The  Directory,  in  the  meantime,  was  appealing  to  the  Peace  Conference  in  Paris 
for  recognition.  On  12  March  1919  the  Ukrainian  Press  Service  reported  that  the 
Ukrainians  based  their  appeal  on  their  historic  existence  as  a  nation  and  claimed  that 
they  had  been  involved  in  the  struggle  for  freedom  for  centuries.  14  The  Entente 
however  continued  to  turn  a  deaf  ear  to  their  claims  and  maintained  their  policy  of 
supporting  the  Whites,  and  their  aim  of  one  indivisible  Russia 
General  Groener,  the  Chief  of  Staff,  contacted  the  War  Ministry  on  the  9th  May 
1919  and  gave  his  opinions  on  Germany's  links  with  the  anti-Bolshevik  forces  in 
11  BA:  Informationsstelle  der  Reichsregierung.  Presseberichte  zur  politischen  und  wirtschaftlichen  Lage  in  der  Ukraine.  209 
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72 Russia  and  Ukraine.  Groener  stated  that  after  1918  the  initial  contacts  between  the 
Germans  and  the  White  Cossacks  in  southeast  Russia  had  come  to  nothing.  The 
Supreme  Command  had  also  asked  the  War  Ministry  if  Russian  prisoners  of  war  in 
Germany  could  be  pressed  into  service  against  the  Bolsheviks,  but  had  received  no  firm 
reply  from  the  Ministry.  The  letter  ended  with  the  addendum  that  the  War  Ministry  had 
stated  that  there  was  to  be  no  question  of  Russian  prisoners  being  used  in  this  way.  '5 
Once  again  the  German  government  was  acting  cautiously  and  refusing  to  become 
involved  in  any  adventure  in  Ukraine. 
Relations  with  the  Russian  Soviet  government  were  at  this  period  very  strained 
and  one  of  the  chief  causes  was  the  actions  of  the  German  troops  and  `volunteers  I  in 
the  Baltic  States,  where  they  had  intervened  in  a  decisive  way  to  support  anti-Bolshevik 
governments  in  Latvia  and  Lithuania.  There  may  well  have  been  the  fear  in  Moscow 
that  Germany  had  similar  plans  for  Ukraine.  Chicherin,  the  Russian  Soviet  Commissar 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  in  a  series  of  articles  entitled  'Seven  Years  of  Soviet  Foreign 
Policy'  characterised  1919  as:  "The  period  when  Scheidemann  was  in  power,  could 
only  be  described  as  a  period  when  the  German  government  was  in  a  state  of  war  with 
us,  and  the  permission  of  the  German  government  for  the  troop  formations  of  Von  der 
Goltz,  Bermondt,  and  the  `Iron  Division'  to  form  was  only  the  continuation  of  a  policy 
which,  already  in  the  period  of  Brest-Litovsk  had  been  the  actual  policy  of  Ludendorff, 
Tirpitz  and  the  like.  "16  The  German  government,  for  its  part,  claimed  that  it  was  unable 
to  control  the  actions  of  the  Freikorps  in  the  Baltic  and  Gustav  Noske,  the  Defence 
Minister,  wrote: 
Alas,  the  poor  government  was  expected  to  have  perfect  control  of 
everything  in  Germany,  while  large  parts  of  the  country  were  like  a 
madhouse.  How  could  we  be  expected  to  manage  our  business  affairs  in  the 
Baltic  properly  when  machine  guns  were  being  fired  all  around  us?  While  I 
was  absorbed  with  my  work  at  Dahlem  (organising  the  recapture  of  Berlin 
from  the  Spartacists),  I  could  not  concern  myself  with  all  the  little 
Wallensteins,  who  recruited  men  and  led  them  to  the  east.  So  it  went  on  for 
months.  '7 
13  BA:  Reichskanzlciakte.  AA  09.01.  (5073)  89. 
16  Morst  Günther  Linke,  Deutsch-sowjetische  Beziehungen  bis  Rapallo.  (Cologne:  Verlag  Wissenschaft  und  Politik,  1970),  p.  82. 
Phillip  Scheidcman  was  appointed  German  Chancellor  in  February  1919.  Ile  resigned  as  Chancellor  on  June  20  1919.  17  Gustav  Noske,  Von  Kiel  bis  Kapp  (Berlin,  1920),  pp.  177-8. 
73 Rakovsky  and  Lenin  decided  to  appoint  the  arrested  Radek  ambassador  of  Soviet 
Ukraine  in  Germany.  In  the  interim  Rakovsky  arrested  and  imprisoned  several  German 
consular  officials  and  businessmen.  The  German  government  protested  strongly  and 
alleged  that  Radek  was  not  being  held  on  political  grounds  but  rather  for  various 
criminal  infringements.  When  the  Prussian  Justice  Ministry  informed  the  Foreign 
Ministry  that  the  courts  would  probably  dismiss  the  charges  against  Radek,  the  AA 
telegraphed  Moscow  to  state  that  the  charges  against  Radek  were  being  lifted  and  that 
he  would  be  deported  to  Russia  on  condition  that  the  German  hostages  in  Ukraine  were 
released,  and  when  the  Soviet  government  gave  a  firm  undertaking  that  Radek  would 
not  attempt  to  return  to  Germany.  The  Soviet  government  refused  to  accept  the 
limitation  on  Radek's  right  to  travel.  He  was  released  from  custody  and  placed  under 
house  arrest.  The  affair  dragged  on  until  January  1920  when  Radek  finally  left 
Germany.  The  affair  would  poison  relations  between  Germany  and  Soviet  Ukraine. 
Early  in  April  1919  a  new  Soviet  Republic  was  proclaimed  in  Munich.  Lenin,  in  a 
speech  to  the  central  council  of  the  trade  unions,  referred  to  the  mutiny  of  French  troops 
in  Odessa  and  to  the  Soviet  republics  in  central  Europe  as  proof  that  Bolshevism's 
victory  on  an  international  scale  was  completely  secure.  Lenin  was  inspired  by  the 
Versailles  treaty  to  discover  I  an  immense  revolutionary  movement'  in  Germany.  18 
Chicherin  greeted  the  new  Soviet  Republic  in  Bavaria  in  a  message  published  in 
Izvestiya:  "We  may  rest  assured  that  the  day  is  not  far  off  when  the  revolutionary 
socialist  Entente  will  join  forces  with  us  and  will  give  support  to  the  Bavarian  republic 
against  any  attack.  Every  blow  aimed  at  you  is  aimed  at  us.  In  absolute  unity  we  carry 
on  our  revolutionary  struggle  for  the  well-being  of  all  workers  and  exploited  peoples.  "19 
None  of  this  was  designed  to  allay  the  fears  of  the  German  government  that  the 
Bolsheviks  were  planning  the  export  of  their  creed  to  Germany,  and  led  to  a  freezing 
diplomatic  climate  between  the  two  countries.  It  seemed  to  the  Bolsheviks  that  the  time 
had  indeed  come  for  revolution  throughout  Europe.  Their  optimism  had  peaked  too 
soon.  On  1  May  1919  the  Bavarian  Soviet  Republic  collapsed,  in  June  an  attempted 
communist  uprising  in  Vienna  was  crushed,  and  in  August  the  Hungarian  Soviet 
Republic  was  overthrown  due  to  the  intervention  of  Romanian  troops  backed  by  the 
Entente. 
11  Lenin,  Sochineniya,  Volume  xxiv,  p.  381. 
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74 These  defeats  left  Soviet  Russia  cut  off  from  the  world  and  the  fate  of  Ukraine 
was  similar.  By  summer  1919  the  White  forces  of  General  Denikin  advancing  from  the 
south  took  Kiev,  and  the  government  of  Rakovsky  was  overthrown  and  a  White 
military  regime  under  Denikin  established.  Germany  now  had  to  deal  with  a  very 
different  government  in  Ukraine.  At  the  same  time  the  other  White  armies  led  by 
Yudenich  outside  Petrograd,  and  Kolchak  in  Siberia,  were  threatening  the  very 
existence  of  Soviet  Russia.  Once  again  Ukraine  had  been  severed  from  "Russia"  but 
this  time  by  a  force  convinced  of  the  fact  that  it  alone  represented  the  spirit  of  the  old 
Russia. 
On  20  June  1919,  a  new  cabinet  under  the  SPD  Chancellor  Gustav  Bauer  was 
formed,  consisting  of  members  of  the  Centre  Party,  Bavarian  Peoples  Party,  and  of 
course,  the  SPD.  The  new  Foreign  Minister  was  Hermann  Müller.  In  a  speech  before 
the  National  Assembly  on  23  July,  Müller  set  out  his  policy  on  relations  with  Soviet 
Russia:  "It  is  pointless  to  try  and  prophesy  Russia's  future  development.  For  years  the 
imminent  collapse  of  Soviet  power  has  been  foreseen.  We  must  grasp  the  fact  that  in 
the  centre  of  Russian  life,  particularly  in  Moscow,  Lenin  still  rules.  "20  In  the  course  of 
September  1919  discussions  took  place  between  a  representative  of  the  Soviet  Russian 
government,  a  certain  Herr  Kopp  and  the  Economics  Minister,  Schmidt,  and  the 
Foreign  Minister,  Müller.  The  subject  of  discussion  was  the  opening  of  trade  links  with 
the  RFSSR.  The  Germans  were  very  keen  to  reopen  links  with  Russia,  egged  on  by  the 
coal  and  steel  industries  but  the  Entente  intervened.  The  Allied  Supreme  Council,  on  9 
October,  issued  a  note  calling  on  the  German  government  to  participate  fully  in  the 
Allied  blockade  of  Russia.  This  note  stated:  "The  hostility  of  the  Bolsheviks  to  all 
governments  and  the  programme  of  international  revolution  that  they  issue  is  a  grave 
danger  to  the  international  security  of  all  powers.  Every  strengthening  of  the  powers  of 
resistance  of  the  Bolsheviks  increases  this  danger  and  it  is  to  be  desired  that  all  peoples 
who  seek  to  establish  peace  and  social  order,  unite  to  fight  this  danger.  '21 
The  White  regime  of  Denikin  in  Ukraine  was  to  be  short-lived,  ruling  the  country 
less  than  6  months  in  all,  but  the  diplomatic  and  military  developments  during  this 
period  were  to  prove  illuminating  for  the  future.  There  were  three  forces  in  Ukraine  in 
the  summer  of  1919,  indeed  four  if  the  anarchist  forces  under  Makhno  were  included  - 
the  Whites  who  controlled  most  of  Ukraine  -  the  nationalists  under  Petliura  in  the 
20  Linke,  Deutsch-sowjetische  Beziehungen  bis  Rapallo,  p.  83. 
21  Ibid,  p.  85. 
75 western  part  of  Ukraine,  and  the  Red  Army  which  had  withdrawn  beyond  the  Russian 
frontier.  The  Whites,  especially  Denikin,  refused  offers  to  cooperate  with  the 
nationalists  against  the  Bolsheviks,  as  long  as  Petliura  insisted  on  an  independent 
Ukraine.  They  also  convinced  the  Entente  to  reject  Ukrainian  appeals  for  recognition  at 
the  Paris  Peace  Conference.  The  nationalist  forces  found  themselves  attacked  by  both 
the  Whites  and  the  Reds  simultaneously.  The  Ukrainian  forces  were  ravaged  by  a 
typhus  epidemic  in  the  autumn  of  1919,  and  casualties  were  high,  with  the  result  that 
the  army of  the  Directory  disintegrated  as  an  effective  fighting  unit.  22 
On  6  November  1919,  General  Tarnovsky,  who  commanded  the  Galician  forces 
in  the  nationalist  army,  placed  his  troops  under  the  command  of  General  Denikin  and 
the  Whites,  with  an  agreement  that  his  forces  would  not  participate  in  any  attacks  on 
other  Ukrainians.  Petliura  and  the  Directory  lacking  any  effective  military  power,  took 
refuge  in  Poland  where  they  began  to  negotiate  with  Pilsudski  and  the  Polish 
government.  Subtelny  regards  late  1919  as  the  effective  end  of  the  nationalist  struggle 
in  Ukraine  but  that  would  be  premature  as  Petliura  and  the  nationalists  were  to  reappear 
in  1920  with  the  assistance  of  the  Polish  army.  Subtelny  has  analysed  the  failure  of  the 
nationalist  movement  as  follows: 
"Confronted  with  overwhelmingly  powerful  enemies,  both  the  East  and  the 
West  Ukrainians  were  unable  to  gain  the  recognition  and  aid  of  the 
victorious  Entente  powers.  Among  the  reasons  why  the  Entente  -  which 
was  quite  forthcoming  with  military  and  diplomatic  support  for  the  anti- 
Bolshevik  Whites  and  numerous  new  East  European  nation  states  -  turned 
its  back  on  the  Ukrainians  were  the  following:  ignorance  of  actual 
conditions  in  Ukraine,  the  energetic  and  effective  anti-Ukrainian 
propaganda  of  the  Whites  and  Poles,  the  association  of  the  Rada  and  the 
Hetmanate  with  the  Germans,  and  the  leftist  tendencies  of  the  Directory.  "23 
Allied  naval  units  participated  in  the  defence  of  Odessa  by  the  Whites  against  a 
Ukrainian  attack  during  September  1919,  and  at  the  same  time  a  new  rash  of  rumours 
were  started  to  the  effect  that  the  French  were  going  to  intervene  on  Petliura's  behalf. 
To  some  extent  such  rumours  were  a  product  of  the  fact  that  the  White  Russian 
ambassador  Maklakov  continued  to  seek  French  mediation  in  the  Ukrainian  question, 
not  only  to  prevent  further  clashes  with  the  Whites,  but  also  to  avoid  having  this 
"  Isodore  Nahewsky,  History  of  the  Modern  Ukrainian  State  1917-1923  (Munich:  Ukrainian  Free  Universtity,  1966),  p.  200.  23  Orest  Subtelny,  The  Ukraine.  A  History.  (Toronto:  Toronto  University  Press,  1994),  p.  379. 
76 question  stand  in  the  way  of  possible  cooperation  between  Denikin  and  Poland.  The 
question  of  the  relationship  between  Denikin  and  Poland  was  to  be  a  central  one,  and 
one  especially  important  to  Germany,  as  Poland  was  perceived  as  the  principal  enemy 
in  the  east. 
During  November  1919  the  Russian  White  representatives  in  Poland  reported  that 
the  Polish  government  was  anti-Russian  and  uncooperative.  They  reported  that  an 
alliance  with  Poland  would  only  be  possible  if  Russia  renounced  its  claims  to 
Belorussia  and  Western  Ukraine  as  far  as  the  Dnepr.  The  report  also  stated  that  an 
alliance  between  Poland  and  the  Russian  Whites  would  not  be  sincere  or  long  lasting 
because  Poland  opposed  the  restoration  of  Russia,  and  proposed  instead  to  aid  in  the 
establishment  of  "all  the  little  independent  states"  which  had  grown  up  in  neighbouring 
territories.  24  Pilsudski's  view  was  indicated  by  his  rejection  of  the  provisional  border 
suggested  in  November  by  the  Peace  Conference  -  later  known  as  the  Curzon  line. 
Pilsudski  saw  the  new  border  as  denying  to  Poland  territories,  which  he  wanted  to 
incorporate  into  the  Polish  state,  and  he  wished  to  maintain  the  independence  of  the 
Belorussian  and  Ukrainian  borderlands  under  Polish  influence  and  protection.  5 
On  18  December  1919  an  official  of  the  Foreign  Ministry  in  Berlin,  Von  Blücher, 
placed  his  thoughts  on  the  Ukrainian  situation  on  paper: 
The  Ukrainian  state  has  totally  collapsed.  The  Directory  has  dissolved  itself 
and  part  of  the  cabinet  has  gone  over  to  the  Bolsheviks,  the  rest  have  fled  to 
Poland.  Petliura  himself  is  to  be  found  in  Warsaw.  There  he  makes  great 
promises  to  the  Polish  government  about  an  attack  by  Poland  to  support 
Ukraine  (...  )  Herr  Stepanovski  is  of  the  opinion  that  Ukraine  can  now  only 
be  helped  by  a  joint  intervention  by  England  and  Germany.  I  made  it  clear  to 
him  that  Germany  cannot  be  drawn  into  any  adventures.  26 
The  efforts  of  the  Whites  to  increase  their  influence  and  to  establish  full-scale 
diplomatic  relations  were  obvious  in  Germany  itself.  Information  on  the  foundation  of  a 
Russian-German  Society  by  Russian  Tsarist  exiles  in  Berlin  was  sent  to  the  AA  in  early 
1920,  together  with  an  invitation  to  the  minister  to  attend.  The  society  had  been  formed 
on  1  December  1919,  and  had  as  its  aims  the  improvement  of  relations  between 
_'  Ibid. 
_'  Adiuntura  Generalna  Naczelnego  Wodza,  T.  7,  t.  2,  k.  102-103,  s.  3.  (Joseph  Pilsudski  Institute,  New  York).  Cited  in  Janusz  Cisek 
(editor),  Sgsiedzl  wobec  wojny  1920  roku.  Wybdr  dokumenldw  (London:  Polska  Fundacja  Kulturalna,  1990),  pp.  159-160. 
26  PA  AA:  Büro  des  StaatsekretArs.  Allgemcine  Anglegenheiten  [Ukraine].  (R14395)  134,  Stepanovski  was  an  influential  Ukrainian 
publisher,  who  had  constant  links  with  the  Auswärtiges  Amt.  Ile  was  the  publisher  of  a  Ukrainian  magazine,  which  appeared  in 
Berne  called  'L'Ukraine'. 
77 Germany  and  Russia.  It  did  not  clearly  enunciate  an  anti-Bolshevik  policy  but  it  was 
quite  clear  from  the  terminology  used  that  this  was  its  specific  aim:  "The  Russian- 
German  Society,  whose  establishment  displays  no  aggressive  tendencies  towards  any 
state  or  any  collection  of  states,  wishes  to  include  all  shades  of  political  opinion.  Its 
political  task  is  the  reintroduction  of  ordered  relations  in  Russia.  With  this  aim  in  view 
all  internal  political  differences  must  be  overcome".  27  The  Society  also  founded  a 
newspaper  and  tried  to  influence  German  society,  and  particularly  the  German 
government  towards  supporting  the  anti-Bolshevik  movement,  and  the  White  regime  in 
Ukraine  and  southern  Russia.  28 
Also,  in  December  1919,  the  AA  received  a  report  from  one  of  its  officials, 
Johannes  Schleuning,  who  had  been  based  in  Ukraine  and  southern  Russia  during  the 
autumn  and  winter  of  1919.  Johannes  Schleuning's  report  reached  the  AA  on  1 
December  1919  and  is  an  interesting  insight  into  the  opinion  of  officials  of  the  AA 
towards  Denikin's  regime,  and  on  Germany's  foreign  policy  in  Ukraine.  Schleuning 
wrote  that  Denikin's  foreign  policy  was  officially  friendly  towards  Britain  and  France, 
and  that  British  military  missions  were  based  in  all  the  major  towns  in  the  region 
controlled  by  Denikin.  The  Entente  had  total  control  over  all  movement  both  in  and  out 
of  the  region.  According  to  Schleuning,  the  White  Officers  were  particularly  resentful 
of  the  French,  and  held  them  responsible  for  the  evacuation  of  Odessa,  and  Sevastopol 
the  previous  spring,  and  the  subsequent  abandonment  of  the  Russian  population  there  to 
the  Bolsheviks.  Denikin's  staff  was  also  angry  with  the  British,  because  of  what  they 
perceived  as  the  British  encouragement  of  nationalist  aspirations  in  Georgia  and 
Azerbaijan.  Schleuning  also  made  clear  however,  that  Denikin  was  totally  dependant  on 
the  British  for  the  supply  of  weapons,  and  that  the  British  had  given  Denikin  a 
guarantee  of  support  for  the  policy  of  `One  indivisible  Russia',  which  was  the 
cornerstone  of  his  policy. 
The  Russians,  Schleuning  wrote,  were  now  keen  to  develop  good  relations  with 
Germany,  after  many  years  of  bad  relations.  Amongst  Denikin's  General  Staff  there 
was  much  talk  of  a  future  alliance  with  Germany: 
One  does  not  speak  of  an  alliance  with  Germany  in  secret  but  with  reckless 
openness.  Organisations  have  even  been  formed  whose  task  is  the  formation 
of  an  alliance.  Orators  travel  throughout  the  land,  who  speak  openly  of  the 
"ßA;  Reichskanzlerei  Akte.  Russland,  131/20. 
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78 necessity  of  an  alliance  with  Germany  and  claim  that  the  policies  of  the 
Entente  towards  Russia  have  thrown  the  country  into  chaos,  and  that  in  the 
future,  England  especially,  would  do  everything  possible  to  prevent  the 
formation  of  Russia  within  its  previous  frontiers.  This  feeling  is  unanimous 
and  the  Germans  have  done  nothing  to  encourage  it,  it  flows  from  the  soul 
of  the  Russian  people. 
Schleuning  also  claimed  that  the  democratic  and  social  democratic  parties,  which  had 
been  opposed  to  Germany  under  the  Kaiser  (as  they  regarded  it  as  a  reactionary 
militaristic  state),  now  felt  drawn  towards  the  new  German  Republic.  The  Slavophiles, 
who  he  believed,  had  felt  a  danger  for  all  Slavs  in  Germany's  great  power  status  during 
the  war,  no  longer  perceived  the  German  Republic  as  a  threat  but  as  an  ally,  who  was 
also  in  a  perilous  situation,  because  of  the  danger  of  Bolshevism  within  Germany  and 
the  provisions  of  the  Versailles  settlement.  Schleuning  saw  the  Slavophiles  and  the 
conservative  Russian  forces  looking  to  Germany  for  assistance  in  the  task  of  rebuilding 
Russia,  because  of  Germany's  highly  educated  workforce  and  her  ability  in  all  fields  of 
technology  and  industry.  He  referred  to  many  leading  Russian  politicians,  who  were 
convinced  supporters  of  a  rapprochement  with  Germany  and  claimed  to  have  attended 
rallies,  where  the  crowds  were  told  that  England  was  Russia's  enemy  and  that  only  the 
defeated  Germany  could  be  her  friend.  29 
Schleuning  continued  to  report  that  the  White  Russian  press  was  completely 
controlled  by  the  British  and  continually  alleged  that  Germany  was  supporting  the 
Bolsheviks  with  munitions,  Germany  was  sending  military  instructors  to  Moscow  and 
that  Germany  was  supporting  Petliura  and  the  Ukrainian  nationalists  with  weapons  and 
money.  It  was  the  chief  aim  of  this  propaganda  to  demonstrate  that  Germany  was 
Russia's  main  enemy: 
The  demand  to  know  the  truth  about  Germany  and  her  attitude  towards 
Russia  is  so  great  that  the  time  is  ripe  for  Germany  to  begin  a  programme  of 
enlightenment  in  South  Russia  (...  )  I  have  been  overcome  by  the  deep 
conviction  in  South  Russia  that  the  idea  of  the  formation  of  one,  large  and 
indivisible  Russia  will  prevail  (...  )  The  separated  parts  of  Russia  will  be 
brought  together  with  certain  privileges,  which  the  regional  conditions  and 
national  wishes  demand.  A  Ukraine,  such  as  Petliura  and  his  associates 
29PA  AA:  Büro  des  Staatsekretärs.  Russland.  Innere  Politik,  Parlements-  und  Parteiwesen.  (R84255)19-21.  Duplicate  A  30922. 
79 demand  is  a  chimera  and  is  recognised  as  such  by  all  who  have  studied 
Russians  economy,  history,  language  and  religion,  which  is  the  same  for 
both  Russians  and  Ukrainians.  It  must  be  Germany's  task  to  recognise  the 
state  aim,  which  Denikin  has  set,  and  to  support  it  with  all  means  (...  ) 
Worthwhile  negotiations  must  take  place  over  the  means  of  forming  an 
alliance  with  Germany  between  us  and  Denikin  or  his  representatives  (...  ) 
The  trade  relations  with  Russia  must  now  as  soon  as  possible  begin  (...  )  We 
should  under  no  circumstances  wait  until  the  Entente  gives  its  `placet'  to 
these  trading  links.  We  must  engage  ourselves  with  the  question  for  on  its 
outcome  hangs  our  future.  30 
Schleuning's  opinions  reflected  those  of  some  in  the  AA  and  indeed  in  the 
government  that  Germany  now  throw  in  its  lot  with  the  Whites  and  reject  any  claims 
for  Ukrainian  independence. 
The  Entente,  in  the  interim,  kept  up  their  policy  of  pressuring  Soviet  Russia  and 
supporting  the  Whites  as  much  as  possible.  At  the  beginning  of  October  1919  a  request 
was  made  by  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  Entente  for  the  German  government  take  part 
in  the  blockade  of  Soviet  Russia.  The  German  government,  while  "fully  conscious  of 
the  great  danger  threatening  the  culture  and  economic  life  of  all  peoples  by  the  spread 
of  Bolshevism",  thought  that  the  blockade  would  be  ineffective  and  argued  that  it 
would  not  take  part  as  it  had  no  common  frontier  with  Russia.  The  Entente  did  not  press 
the  demand.  Britain  (for  one)  was  beginning  to  have  second  thoughts  about  supporting 
the  Whites,  particularly  as  Denikin's  forces  began  to  suffer  a  series  of  defeats  in  late 
1919. 
Krasin,  the  Bolshevik  commissar,  began  to  notice  the  change  in  mood  in  October 
1919  and  wrote  in  a  private  letter: 
The  prospect  of  carrying  on  the  war  indefinitely  will  not  appeal  to  the  Powers, 
and  if  Denikin  has  not  settled  our  hash  by  the  beginning  of  winter,  which  is 
hardly  likely,  then  England  for  one  would  deem  it  acceptable  in  her  own 
interests  to  overpower  the  Bolsheviks  in  the  domain  of  politics  by  coming  to 
some  agreement  and  entering  into  peaceful  relations  with  Soviet  Russia. 
30  Ibid. 
80 Perhaps  this  plan  of  conquering  Bolshevik  Russia  would  have  more  chance  of 
success  than  the  fruitless  military  campaigns  of  the  last  two  years.  31 
It  was  becoming  clear  that  the  Entente  were  reassessing  their  policies  towards 
both  Soviet  Russia  and  Ukraine.  There  was  also  the  feeling  in  the  new  British  policy 
that  the  `one  and  indivisible  Russia'  might  not  be  in  the  interests  of  the  British  Empire 
and  that  perhaps  a  divided  Russia,  which  was  more  likely  under  the  Bolsheviks  was 
more  desirable. 
As  the  tide  began  to  turn  militarily  against  the  Whites  and  the  Bolsheviks  inflicted 
defeat  after  defeat,  the  question  of  German  support  for  an  independent  Ukraine  became 
urgent  once  again.  It  was  becoming  evident  that  the  Entente  might  be  ready  to  support 
Polish  efforts  to  establish  an  independent  Ukraine.  On  5  January  1920,  Major  Kundt, 
the  military  attache  at  the  German  embassy  in  Vienna,  telegraphed  the  AA  in  Berlin: 
From  Germany  they  expect  moral  and  financial  support  for  their  plans.  The 
formation  of  an  eastern  Ukrainian  border  state  under  the  political  leadership 
of  the  Entente  and  dependant  on  them  is  not  in  the  interest  of  Germany, 
which  can  only  support  a  German  orientated  independent  Ukraine.  The 
efforts  of  Dr  B  and  Herr  M  would  therefore  be  against  German  interests  and 
would  offer  the  possibility  that  German  support  would  be  dependant  on  an 
independent  Ukraine  being  within  the  Great  Russian  realm.  32 
The  two  figures  mentioned  were  Ukrainians  who  wanted  some  form  of  support 
from  Germany  for  an  Allied  backed  Ukraine,  but  none  was  forthcoming.  Some  German 
attempts  to  win  influence  with  the  Whites  and  to  increase  German  influence  in  Ukraine 
verged  on  the  fantastic.  Amongst  these  was  the  case  of  Hans  von  Homeyer,  a  German 
Ukrainian,  who  organised  a  German  espionage  network  in  the  Crimea  and  Ukraine  in 
the  midst  of  Denikin's  army.  On  23  February  1920  von  Homeyer  sent  a  report  to  the 
AA  detailing  his  efforts  on  behalf  of  the  Reich  in  Ukraine.  He  began  by  outlining  how 
he  had  set  up  a  spy  ring  in  the  southern  Ukraine  and  Crimea  in  late  1919: 
The  importance  of  this  network  grows  in  importance  because  of  the  fact 
that  in  the  named  area  the  rest  of  Russian  intelligence  sat,  which  proved  to 
be  the  most  difficult  for  a  pro-German  orientation.  The  whole  apparatus  is 
based  on  the  greatest  of  trust  for  me  and  works  without  a  pfennig  of  pay, 
"  EJ  I.  Carr,  The  Bolshevik  Revolution,  1917-1923.  Volume  3  (London,  1953),  p.  156.  32  PA  AA:  Büro  des  StaatsckretArs.  Russland.  Allgemeine  Angelegenheiten  [Ukraine].  (R14395)  63. 
81 apart  from  meaningless  private  donations.  It  consists  of  164  people  who  are 
engaged  solely  in  carrying  out  my  directives  and  that  does  not  include  the 
many  others  who  carry  out  my  directives  indirectly.  With  the  retreat  of  the 
Volunteer  Army  to  the  Crimea  we  established  a  political  centre  in 
Simferopol,  which  today  one  and  a  half  months  later  has  regional  sections  in 
Sevastopol,  Yalta,  Feodosia,  Kertsch,  Karasubasar,  Dzankaj,  Eupatoria,  and 
Novorossisk  and  countless  political  agents  right  up  to  Denikin's 
headquarters...  33 
Von  Homeyer  felt  that  Denikin  was  hostile  to  Germany  but  that  Wrangel  was  more 
positive  and  saw  Wrangel  as  Russia's  main  hope.  He  listed  the  members  of  the 
`Political  Centre'  in  Simferopol  including  German  landowners  and  Kipczatski,  the 
chief  of  the  Tartar  Church  and  Schupert  the  Catholic  deacon  in  Simferopol.  34 
This  report  was  followed  by  a  letter  to  the  AA  requesting  the  `Political  Centre'  to 
be  made  official:  "Under  the  leadership  of  Herr  von  Homeyer,  these  men  have 
succeeded  in  giving  Russian  policy  a  direction  which  should  lead  to  a  harmony  of 
relations  between  Germany  and  Russia,  despite  English  resistance  and  the  shortage  of 
all  material  support"35  The  AA  did  not  acknowledge  von  Homeyer's  request  but  at  the 
same  time  did  not  do  anything  to  discourage  his  activities.  His  report  also  demonstrates 
that  the  German  community  in  Ukraine  was  involved  in  the  attempt  to  win  over  the 
Whites  to  a  pro-German  orientation. 
In  December  1919  the  White  army of  Denikin  was  forced  to  withdraw  from  most 
of  Ukraine  and  Soviet  forces  entered  Kiev  once  again.  On  21  December  1919,  the  Third 
Ukrainian  Soviet  government  was  formed.  The  Soviet  government  would  remain  in 
power  until  the  summer  of  1920,  when  it  would  be  swept  away  by  the  Polish-Soviet 
war. 
The  final  defeat  of  the  Whites  in  Ukraine  suggested  strongly  to  the  Entente  that 
the  White  cause  was  lost  and  a  fundamental  change  in  their  policy  set  in.  This  change  in 
Allied  policy  would  alter  the  policy  of  Germany  also  towards  Soviet  Ukraine.  On  16 
January  1920,  the  Allied  Supreme  Council,  meeting  in  Paris,  declared  the  blockade  of 
Soviet  Russia  at  an  end.  The  Supreme  Council  went  on  to  adopt  a  resolution  providing 
33  PA  AA:  Büro  des  Staatsekretärs.  Russland.  Innere  Politik,  Parlaments-  und  Parteiwescn.  (R84255),  s.  8. 
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82 for  "an  exchange  of  goods  on  the  basis  of  reciprocity  between  the  Russian  people  and 
Allied  and  neutral  countries".  As  Stephen  White  commented  in  Britain  and  the 
Bolshevik  Revolution:  "It  was  insisted  that  this  did  not  mean  a  change  in  the  policy  of 
the  Allied  governments  towards  the  Soviet  government;  but  it  was  difficult,  on  the  face 
of  it,  to  regard  the  Entente  decision  as  anything  other  than  a  complete  reversal  of  the 
policy  which  they  had  previously  pursued  towards  the  Bolshevik  authorities.  A  policy 
of  peace  and  commerce,  it  appeared,  was  now  to  succeed  the  hostile  confrontation  of 
the  immediate  post-revolutionary  years.  "36 
The  lifting  of  the  blockade  was  an  event  of  great  symbolic  importance;  it  was 
greeted  in  Soviet  Russia  as  a  declaration  of  the  ending  of  the  war  with  the  western 
powers.  Petliura  and  the  representatives  of  the  Ukrainian  Peoples  Republic  were  alone 
against  the  Bolsheviks,  with  scarcely  any  military  force  behind  them.  There  was  no 
alternative  but  to  turn  to  the  only  power  in  the  region  able  to  intervene  directly  in 
Ukraine  -  Poland.  The  price  consisted  of  a  renunciation  of  the  Western  Ukraine,  and 
was  carried  out  by  means  of  a  unilateral  declaration  of  the  government  of  the  UNR  in 
December  1919,  and  in  formal  terms  by  means  of  the  political  agreement  with  Poland 
in  April  1920.  In  Germany,  Freiherr  Ago  von  Maltzan,  the  official  at  the  AA 
responsible  for  Russian  and  Ukrainian  affairs,  argued  that  the  defeat  of  the  White 
armies  was  imminent  and  that  further  help  from  the  Entente  was  not  to  be  expected. 
Germany  would  have  to  come  to  terms  with  Soviet  Russia  or  with  a  regime,  which 
would  succeed  it.  Maltzan  argued  that  Russia  was  already  abandoning  its  hard  line 
approach  to  Germany  and  the  other  capitalist  states,  and  that  Britain  had  already 
recognised  this  and  was  changing  its  policies  towards  Russia.  There  was  also  pressure, 
he  said,  from  German  firms  and  interest  groups  to  avail  of  the  same  opportunities  in 
Russia  and  Ukraine  as  the  British,  if  the  government  failed  to  act  decisively  then  these 
interest  groups  would  find  their  own  way  of  dealing  with  the  Bolsheviks.  Finally,  von 
Maltzan  argued  that  there  existed  the  necessity  of  securing  raw  materials  necessary  for 
the  German  economy  in  Russia  and  to  find  an  outlet  in  Russia  for  the  excess  population 
in  Germany.  37 
The  Foreign  Minister  (Müller)  stated  before  the  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  of  the 
Reichsrat  on  16  February  1920  that  Germany  should  reopen  diplomatic  relations  with 
Russia  in  a  cautious  way  and  should  begin  with  the  question  of  prisoners  of  war.  The 
36  Stephen  White,  Britain  and  the  Bolshevik  Revolution.  (New  York:  I  lolmes  &  Meier,  1979),  p.  3. 
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83 major  argument  was,  as  had  been  put  by  Maltzan,  that  Britain  had  already  stolen  the 
lead  and  that  other  nations  could  deprive  Germany  of  its  trade  role  in  the  east.  This 
argument  was  strengthened  by  a  report  sent  to  the  President  and  the  Foreign  Minister 
on  17  February  1920.  The  report  was  drawn  up  by  the  Director-General  of  AEG, 
Rathenau,  and  Deutsch,  the  banker  Alexander,  from  the  German  Orient  Bank,  and  the 
former  Chief  Secretary  in  the  Economics  Ministry,  Dr  August  Müller.  The  chief  point 
of  the  report  was  that  a  country  like  Russia  would  not  take  forever  to  recover  from  the 
ravages  of  revolution  and  civil  war  and  that  Germany  would  have  to  ensure  its  share  of 
the  raw  materials  from  the  country.  38 
Germany's  chief  enemy  in  the  east  remained  Poland,  and  in  early  1920  it 
gradually  became  obvious  that  Pilsudski  was  forming  a  military  and  political  alliance 
with  Petliura  and  the  remnants  of  the  Ukrainian  nationalists.  Pilsudski  clearly  envisaged 
a  Ukraine  under  Polish  control  and  influence  and  even  dreamed  of  creating  the  `Greater 
Poland'  of  the  Middle  Ages  stretching  to  the  banks  of  the  Dneper,  with  Ukraine  as  a 
vassal  state.  Petliura,  for  his  part,  recognised  that  a  last  desperate  gamble  for  Ukrainian 
independence  was  necessary,  and  the  only  remaining  source  of  external  support  was 
Poland. 
For  Poland  the  Russian  Civil  War  was  a  golden  opportunity  to  both  weaken 
Russia  and  to  gain  considerable  influence  in  Ukraine: 
Pilsudski  did  not  wish  for  a  quick  defeat  of  Denikin  but  for  a  prolonged  war 
between  the  Whites  and  the  Reds  that  would  weaken  both  of  them  and  give 
Poland  time  to  strengthen  its  own  forces  for  any  future  war.  According  to 
General  Tadeusz  Kutrzeba,  it  was  clear  to  Pilsudski  that  the  lesser  of  the  two 
Russian  evils  was  Denikin's  defeat.  A  Polish  war  against  the  Bolsheviks 
without  Denikin  would  be  a  war  about  Poland.  In  Pilsudski's  judgement, 
even  if  Denikin  submitted  to  the  Entente,  and  agreed  to  an  independent 
Poland,  he  would  not  accept  extending  the  Polish  border  beyond  the  Bug.  39 
Germany  watched  uneasily  in  April  1920  as  the  first  signs  of  the  approaching 
Soviet-Polish  war  appeared.  The  military  convention  between  the  Ukrainians  and  the 
Poles  was  signed  in  April.  It  provided  for  combined  operations,  for  the  subjection  to 
Polish  command  of  all  Ukrainian  forces  up  to  the  Dnepr,  for  the  provisioning  of  the 
3*  Linke,  Deutsch-sowjetische  Beziehungen,  pp.  93-94. 
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84 Polish  army  on  Ukrainian  soil  by  the  Ukrainians,  for  the  arming  of  the  Ukrainian  army 
by  the  Poles,  and  for  the  eventual  withdrawal  of  all  Polish  forces.  A  few  days  later, 
Polish  and  Ukrainian  forces  crossed  the  Ukrainian  frontier  and  marched  on  Kiev.  They 
met  little  resistance  and  the  Red  Army  fell  back  before  them.  Within  less  than  two 
weeks,  the  Polish  army  entered  Kiev  and  declared  the  establishment  of  the  Ukrainian 
People's  Republic,  with  Petliura  at  its  head.  It  was  the  15th  regime  in  Kiev  since 
February  1917.  A  Ukrainian  nationalist  regime  had  triumphed,  albeit  under  Polish 
control. 
The  French,  in  particular,  had  supported  Poland  100%  in  its  drive  into  Ukraine 
and  supplied  officers,  who  advised  the  Polish  forces  during  the  campaign.  In  Moscow, 
Lenin  was  under  no  illusions  as  to  the  real  reason  for  the  invasion  of  Ukraine  and  the 
whole  war.  In  a  speech  delivered  in  October  1920  he  drew  parallels  between  the  treaties 
of  Versailles  and  Brest-Litovsk  and  the  treatment  meted  out  by  the  Entente  to  Germany 
and  Russia: 
I  believe  that  the  present  Polish  war  is  the  last  attempt  on  Soviet 
Russia  by  the  Entente  (...  )  You  know  that  the  Allied  imperialists  -  France, 
England,  America  and  Japan  -  after  defeating  Germany,  forced  the  Germans 
to  sign  the  Versailles  treaty,  a  treaty  even  more  brutal  than  the  notorious 
Brest  treaty  about  which  everyone  cried  so  much.  One  reason  this  monstrous 
peace  is  maintained  is  that  Poland  splits  Germany  into  2  parts  (...  )  The 
Versailles  treaty  has  made  Poland  a  buffer  state,  a  state  designed  to 
safeguard  Germany  from  Soviet  communism,  and  which  the  Entente  regards 
as  an  instrument  to  be  used  against  the  Bolsheviks.  That  is  why,  when  the 
war  against  Poland  broke  out  (...  )  it  proved  to  be  a  war  against  the  Entente 
more  than  did  the  earlier  (interventionary)  wars.  4° 
On  4  May  1920,  a  secret  report  from  a  German  agent  in  Helsinki,  reached  the 
Undersecretary  of  State,  Albert,  in  the  Reichs  Chancellery,  that  Marshal  Mannerheim 
of  Finland  had  arrived  in  Berlin,  and  that  his  visit  was  connected  with  the  Polish 
campaign  in  Ukraine.  The  report  suggested  that  the  Entente  at  the  Conference  of  San 
Remo  had  come  to  the  conclusion  that  economic  links  between  the  Border  States  and 
Germany  were  to  be  encouraged  in  order  to  strengthen  the  belt  separating  Germany  and 
Russia: 
40  Lenin,  Sochineniya,  xxvi,  pp.  15-16. 
85 The  plan  is  to  include  Lithuania,  Latvia  and  Estonia  and  Finland  in  this 
scheme.  The  plan  appears  even  more  necessary  now  that  Brussilov  has 
collected  a  strong  Soviet  army  near  Mogilev  to  engage  in  a  counter-attack 
against  Poland  at  the  end  of  May.  Mannerheim  and  General  Malcolm  are 
said  to  have  discussed  the  possibility  of  former  Russian  troop  detachments, 
which  are  currently  in  Germany,  along  with  German  detachments,  who  will 
not  allow  themselves  to  be  demobilised  being  used  in  the  scheme.  Whereas 
the  English  want  these  troops  to  be  sent  to  the  Polish  and  Lithuanian  front, 
Ukraine  on  the  other  hand,  wishes  these  troops  to  be  labelled  `German 
Defence'  and  to  be  sent  to  Ukraine  to  assist  the  German  colonists  there. 
Among  the  plans  there  is  the  possibility  of  the  formation  of  a  German- 
Ukrainian  Freikorps.  Some  interested  circles  have  recently  begun  to 
speculate  about  Germany's  role  in  all  of  this.  I  have  repeated  that  it  is  not 
the  view  of  the  German  government  that  Germany  should  take  part  in  a 
military  campaign  against  Soviet  Russia.  Germany  has  also  had  enough 
costly  and  bad  experiences  with  the  von  der  Goltz  and  Bermondt  affairs  not 
to  get  involved  in  such  an  adventure.  4' 
The  report  indicated  the  still  cautious  approach  of  the  German  government  and  the 
refusal  to  be  drawn  into  the  types  of  situations  as  had  occurred  in  the  Baltic  in  1919. 
There  could  be  no  doubt  that  the  Polish  backed  Petliura  regime  would  be  a  dictatorship, 
and  far  from  the  ideals  of  most  Ukrainian  intellectuals  and  nationalists.  From  Vienna, 
where  he  was  in  exile,  the  veteran  Ukrainian  nationalist  Vynnychenko  appealed  to  the 
German  and  Italian  communists  and  revolutionary  socialists  not  to  recognise  the  new 
regime  in  Kiev.  He  particularly  appealed  to  these  parties  to  do  everything  possible  to 
hinder  the  sending  of  Ukrainian  prisoners  of  war  in  their  countries  to  Poland  and 
Romania,  where  they  would  be  used  to  fight  the  Russian  and  Ukrainian  Soviet  armies  42 
This  appeal  did  not  fall  on  deaf  ears  and  to  many  German  socialists  the  Petliura  regime 
was  a  return  to  the  evil  days  of  the  Hetmanate,  with  Polish  bayonets  supporting  it  rather 
than  German  ones.  At  the  same  time  the  White  army  in  the  Crimea  under  its  new 
commander  Count  Wrangel  was  gearing  up  to  intervene  in  the  war  on  the  side  of 
Poland  and  Petliura.  Wrangel  had  concluded  that  the  old  policy  of  `one  indivisible 
Russia'  would  not  work,  and  was  prepared  to  cooperate  with  the  Ukrainian  nationalists. 
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86 On  4  March  1920  the  German  representative  in  Sevastopol,  Otto  Schalbert,  contacted 
the  AA  to  report  that  pro-German  feeling  in  the  White  army  was  growing,  and  that 
Wrangel  hoped  for  better  relations  with  Germany  and  for  Germany  to  use  its  influence 
on  the  Bolsheviks  and  Petliura.  43  Wrangel  hoped  to  recover  the  waning  influence  of  the 
Whites  in  Western  Europe  by  appealing  to  Germany  as  a  mediator. 
In  Berlin  the  newspaper  of  the  SPD,  Vorwärts,  published  an  article  on  23  April 
1920,  which  referred  to  Petliura  as  a  dictator  and  called  on  the  government,  and 
particularly  the  SPD,  not  to  lend  any  encouragement  or  support  to  the  anti-Bolshevik 
war  in  Ukraine.  The  article  led  to  furious  protests  from  Ukrainian  nationalists  based  in 
Germany  and  they  demanded  that  the  SPD  as  a  fellow  socialist  party  withdraw  the 
reference  to  Petliura  as  a  dictator.  44  There  is  no  evidence  that  the  SPD  did  so. 
The  government  in  Berlin  was  under  pressure  from  many  sections  of  the  Left 
(mainly  the  SPD)  not  to  support  the  Polish-Ukrainian  venture;  whereas  the  Right  was 
also  opposed  to  intervention  on  the  grounds  that  Petliura's  friend  was  Germany's 
enemy.  Reventlow,  a  leading  German  nationalist,  published  an  article  in  the  paper  of 
the  German  National  Party,  Die  Tageszeitung,  demanding  a  campaign  against  "the  real 
enemies  of  the  working  class,  against  the  Entente,  which  has  bound  the  proletariat  in 
chains  of  slavery".  Reventlow  later  claimed  that  he  had  tried  to  win  over  leading 
German  politicians  tothe  idea  of  military  cooperation  with  Soviet  Russia  against 
Poland.  45 
The  true  attitude  of  a  German  diplomat  was  expressed  in  a  telegram  from  von 
Dirksen  at  the  German  embassy  in  Warsaw  to  Blücher  at  the  Auswärtiges  Amt  on  28 
May  1920:  "Over  all  pertaining  to  the  east  a  quiet  waiting  is  the  best,  also  as  regards  the 
border  states  a  cautious  approach  is  called  for.  In  any  case  any  negotiation  with  Lenin  is 
ruled  out  while  the  anti-Bolshevik  flag  is  carried  aloft.  9s46 
Victor  Kopp,  the  semi-official  diplomatic  representative  of  the  Soviet 
government,  was  at  this  time  in  Berlin  and  making  contact  with  German  armament 
firms  and  trying  to  interest  them  in  the  production  of  weapons  for  Russia.  Any  contact 
with  the  German  government  was  however,  out  of  the  question.  The  commander  of  the 
German  Army,  Seeckt,  had  six  months  previously  stated:  "I  refuse  to  support  Poland 
even  in  the  face  of  the  danger  that  she  may  be  swallowed  up.  On  the  contrary  I  count  on 
43  Ibid. 
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87 that:  and  even  if  we  cannot  at  the  moment  help  Russia  to  re-establish  her  former 
imperial  frontiers,  we  certainly  should  not  hinder  her.  ,  47 
A  crucial  change  in  German  thinking  on  foreign  policy  was  brought  about  by  the 
Kapp  putsch  in  March  1920.  The  putsch  was  led  by  the  military  representatives  of  the 
old  regime,  and  the  Freikorps  detachments,  which  marched  on  Berlin,  were  the  same 
troops  who  had  been  fighting  the  Bolsheviks  in  the  Baltic  in  1919.  As  E.  H.  Carr 
commented: 
They  were  irreconcilable  anti-Bolsheviks  who  still  believed  in  a  restoration 
in  Russia  as  the  necessary  prelude  to  a  reconstitution  of  the  German-Russian 
alliance.  The  attitude  of  the  new  Reichswehr  was  quite  different.  Its  clever 
leaders  had  not  only  come  to  accept  the  Weimar  Republic  as  a  suitable 
facade  behind  which  they  could  work  for  the  recovery  of  German  military 
power;  they  were  also  prepared  to  accept  Bolshevism  in  Russia  as  a 
potential  partner  to  promote  this  end.  The  Kapp  putsch  ended  in  the 
relegation  to  the  lunatic  fringe  of  German  politics  of  those  who  still 
believed  in  the  crusade  against  Bolshevism,  and  the  emergence  of  military 
leaders  who  were  ready  to  do  business  with  Soviet  Russia  as  an  equal 
power.  48 
This  was,  of  course,  to  alter  the  whole  perspective  regarding  Ukraine.  Official  Germany 
would  distance  itself  from  Petliura  and  the  nationalists,  and  increasingly  regard 
Rakovsky  and  the  Ukrainian  Bolsheviks  as  the  de  facto  government  of  Ukraine. 
Von  Dirksen,  the  German  ambassador  in  Warsaw,  contacted  the  AA  on  28  May 
1920,  to  enquire  about  what  was  happening  in  Ukraine.  He  complained  that  very  little 
information  was  available  in  Warsaw  but  could  confirm  that  several  representatives  of 
the  Russian  Whites  were  in  Warsaw  seeking  to  negotiate  with  the  Poles,  and  the 
Ukrainians.  It  was  von  Dirksen's  opinion  that  the  Poles  were  quite  happy  to  have  the 
White  Russians  on  board,  and  were  planning  imperialist  dreams  regarding  Soviet 
Russia:  "Oh  yes,  one  has  a  good  appetite  here  in  Warsaw.  Their  quiet  dream  is  the 
division  of  Russia  into  small  states  and  the  whole  thing  under  Polish  control,  what  do 
the  Berlin  Russians  say  to  that?  "49  From  the  tone  of  his  report  it  was  evident  that  he  had 
little  time  for  the  Polish  aspirations.  In  June  and  July  1920  the  Red  Army  struck  several 
Carr,  E.  I  i,  77ie  Bolshevik  Revolution.  1917-1923.  Volume  3,  p.  323. 
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88 decisive  counter-blows  against  the  Polish  and  Ukrainian  forces,  and  the  Poles  retreated 
from  Ukraine  along  with  the  discredited  Petliura,  leaving  only  some  Ukrainian  partisan 
bands  to  harry  the  victorious  Bolsheviks.  Many  historians  have  seen  this  as  the  end  of 
the  struggle  for  Ukrainian  independence  and  militarily  it  certainly  was  S0.50  The  Red 
Army  followed  the  Polish/Ukrainian  forces  into  Poland,  and  indeed  to  the  very  gates  of 
Warsaw.  The  German  response  to  this  series  of  events  was  a  widespread  rejoicing  that 
the  Poles  had  been  defeated,  and  the  fate  of  Ukraine  seemed  very  much  secondary. 
Once  again,  it  appeared  that  Germany's  enmity  with  Poland  was  to  be  the  major  factor 
in  forming  her  foreign  policy  on  Eastern  Europe. 
The  Soviet  representative  in  Berlin,  Kopp,  gave  an  assurance  that  the  Red  Army 
would  not  cross  the  German  frontier.  On  22  July,  he  forwarded  a  proposal  from  Simons 
(the  German  Foreign  Minister)  to  Chicherin  that  normal  diplomatic  relations  be 
resumed.  s'  On  2  August,  he  arranged  for  a  representative  of  the  German  government  to 
be  attached  to  the  Soviet  IV  Army,  to  settle  any  incidents  on  the  frontier.  On  the  other 
hand,  Ludendorff  offered  to  lead  an  army  of  liberation  into  Poland,  on  condition  that 
Poznania  be  returned  to  Germany. 
Lenin  defined  the  situation  at  the  time  rather  well  in  a  speech  at  the  8th  Congress 
of  Soviets  of  the  RSFSR  in  December  1920: 
Under  such  circumstances,  Germany  naturally  is  inclined  towards  an 
alliance  with  Russia.  When  the  Russian  troops  were  approaching  Warsaw, 
the  whole  of  Germany  was  seething.  The  desire  of  Germany,  which  is 
strangled,  but  which  has  a  chance  to  start  up  some  of  her  gigantic 
productive  forces,  for  a  union  with  Russia  has  produced  something  of  a 
political  mix-up  in  Germany.  The  German  Black  Hundreds  are  inclined  to 
be  sympathetic  with  the  Bolsheviks  and  Spartacists.  This  can  be  easily 
understood,  for  it  grows  out  of  economic  conditions,  and  it  also  creates  for 
us  the  basis  of  our  entire  economic  position  and  our  foreign  policy.  52 
There  were  even  reports  of  thousands  of  German  volunteers  wishing  to  join  the  Red 
Army  in  order  to  fight  Poland  and  overturn  the  Versailles  Treaty. 
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settlement  for  Germany  avenged. 
89 On  16  July  1920,  Margolin,  the  representative  of  the  UNR  government  in  Britain, 
wrote  to  the  Foreign  Minister  of  the  Ukrainian  Peoples  Republic  about  Germany's 
perceptions  of  Ukrainian  independence.  Margolin  noted  that  Petliura's  alliance  with 
Poland  had  led  to  the  alienation  of  the  British  Left,  but  that  the  effect  in  Germany  was 
even  more  negative: 
From  the  first  hour  on,  all  the  German  parties,  the  government  and  the 
whole  public  have  adopted  a  wholly  negative  orientation  towards  Ukraine, 
because  they  believe  that  the  Polish-Ukrainian  military  alliance  is  a  part  of 
France's  anti-German  policies  in  Eastern  Europe. 
Margolin  went  on  to  state  that  he  saw  the  efforts  of  the  Ukrainian  missions  abroad 
as  pointless  in  view  of  the  terrible  strategic  situation  in  Ukraine,  and  that  he  did  not 
believe  that  the  Allied  Conference  at  Spa  would  listen  to  the  case  of  the  Ukrainians.  53 
It  seemed  that  Ukraine  was  in  a  hopeless  situation,  for  although  it  might  be 
viewed  by  the  Germans  as  being  a  pawn  in  France's  power  game,  it  was  viewed  by  the 
British  unsympathetically  for  the  opposite  reason.  The  German  ambassador  in  London 
informed  Berlin,  on  4  November  1920,  that  there  was  little  sympathy  in  Britain  for 
Ukraine  because  the  independent  Ukraine  was  still  regarded  as  a  German  imperialist 
creation,  whereas  there  was  a  lot  of  sympathy  for  a  lot  of  the  other  former  states  of  the 
Russian  Empire.  54  The  shadow  of  the  Hetmanate  was  still  long  in  1920,  and  this 
influenced  both  British  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  French  thinking  on  Ukraine. 
The  Soviet  armies  were  repulsed  by  the  Poles  in  the  course  of  September  1920, 
and  shortly  afterwards,  the  Bolsheviks  and  Poles  concluded  an  armistice.  The  Soviet- 
Polish  war  was  over. 
With  the  end  of  the  war  in  late  1920,  the  Soviet  government  of  Rakovsky  was 
firmly  ensconced  in  Kharkov,  although  still  not  recognised  by  Germany  or  the  Entente. 
Petliura  and  the  remnants  of  the  Directory  were  in  exile  in  Poland,  and  still  trying  to 
influence  German  policy  but  it  was  clear  by  the  autumn  of  1920  that  the  attempt  to  win 
Ukrainian  independence  had  failed,  but  Germany  was  unwilling  to  recognise  Soviet 
Ukraine.  The  AA  continued  to  receive  pleas  of  support  from  the  diplomatic 
representatives  of  the  Ukrainian  Peoples  Republic,  which  Germany  still  recognised  as 
the  successor  government  to  the  Directory  of  1919. 
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90 On  21  September  1920,  Makarenko,  the  diplomatic  representative  of  the  UNR, 
sent  the  Foreign  Minister  of  Germany  an  unctuous  letter  of  thanks  full  of  pro-German 
sentiments: 
The  Ukrainian  people,  represented  by  their  honourable  leader,  has  long  ago 
expressed  its  thanks  to  the  German  Reich  for  all  its  active  help  in  the 
liberation  from  the  centuries  long  yoke,  and  also  their  wishes  that  the 
Ukrainian  people  and  the  German  people  remain  in  the  closest  association55 
Matters  were  further  complicated  by  the  fact  that  there  was  still  a  sum  of  400 
Million  gold  Marks  in  Berlin,  held  in  trust  by  the  German  government.  The  money  had 
been  the  property  of  the  Hetman'  s  government  in  1918,  and  the  diplomatic  view  of  the 
German  government  was  that  the  money  could  only  be  given  to  the  legitimate  de  jure 
government  of  Ukraine.  Both  Rakovsky's  government  in  Kharkov,  and  the  exiled 
Petliuran  regime  in  Warsaw  claimed  the  money  as  theirs.  On  31  October  1920, 
Makarenko  wrote  to  the  German  Foreign  Minister  from  Vienna,  and  protested  that  his 
government  had  been  compared  in  a  report  of  the  AA  as  only  one  of  many  seeking  the 
400  Million  Marks.  56 
After  the  fall  of  the  Hetmanate,  Skoropadskyi  resided  in  Berlin,  together  with  his 
entourage,  until  the  end  of  1920.  He  sought  to  influence  the  German  Foreign  Ministry, 
and  also  to  gain  control  of  the  400  Million  Marks  in  the  Reichsbank,  which  had  been 
credited  to  "the  Ukrainian  government"  for  grain  deliveries  in  1918.  Skoropadskyi  was 
occasionally  consulted  by  the  German  authorities  in  order  to  ascertain  what  the 
situation  was  in  Ukraine,  and  for  a  time  was  considered  as  a  possible  Ukrainian  leader. 
Skoropadskyi  was  rejected  however  by  the  Ukrainian  "National  Centre"  in  Vienna,  led 
by  his  former  Foreign  Minister,  Dmitro  Doroshenko.  Also,  the  Germans  realised  that 
his  main  object  in  Berlin  was  securing  control  of  the  Ukrainian  funds  in  the  Reichsbank 
and  they  lost  interest  in  him  in  the  course  of  1919.  He  only  returned  to  prominence  with 
the  rise  of  the  "monarchist"  movement  in  1921.  sß 
Here  it  is  necessary  to  enter  the  murky  and  extremely  complex  world  of  Ukrainian 
nationalist  exiles  in  Berlin.  Vienna  was  the  centre  of  Ukrainian  emigre  activity  before 
and  after  the  First  World  War,  but  because  of  Germany's  central  involvement  in 
Ukrainian  affairs  during  1917  and  1918,  and  also  because  of  its  apparent  support  for  the 
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91 Ukrainian  nationalist  cause,  more  Ukrainian  activists  drifted  towards  Berlin  from  1918 
onwards.  In  late  1918  the  representatives  of  Petliura's  government  in  Kiev,  led  by  the 
Galician  scholar  Roman  Smal-Stocki,  arrived  in  Berlin  and  took  control  of  the 
Ukrainian  embassy.  Smal-Stocki  developed  a  relationship  with  the  Auswärtiges  Anzt, 
and  visited  Wipert  von  Blücher,  an  official  from  the  Eastern  Section  of  the  ministry,  to 
report  on  developments  in  Ukraine  and  to  protect  Ukrainian  interests  against  the 
supporters  of  the  Russian  White  generals  in  Berlin.  He  also  attempted  to  gain  control  of 
the  funds  in  the  Reichsbank  but  the  Germans  doubted  the  stability  of  his  government. 
He  constantly  tried  to  present  his  government  as  the  last  line  of  defence  against 
Bolshevism,  which  he  also  told  British  diplomats  in  Berlin;  but  this  did  not  gain  him 
much  support  from  the  Foreign  Ministry  who  listened  to  him  politely  but  did  not  act.  58 
The  alliance  of  Petliura  with  Poland  in  1920  meant  a  rapid  cooling  in  the 
relationship  of  his  government  and  of  his  diplomats  in  Berlin  with  the  German 
authorities.  Germany  had  hoped  that  an  independent  Ukraine  would  be  a  counterweight 
to  both  Russia  and  Poland.  Smal-Stocki  attempted  to  explain  the  alliance  as  merely  a 
tactical  manoeuvre,  but  the  Germans  were  not  impressed.  The  Foreign  Ministry  also 
rejected  Petliura's  request  for  military  advisers  from  the  Reichswehr  in  the  summer  of 
1920.  It  is  certainly  true  that  the  Polish  alliance  was  a  major  factor  in  this  decision.  In 
late  November  1920,  with  the  defeat  of  Petliura  in  Ukraine  and  the  exile  of  his 
government  in  Poland,  the  Ukrainian  embassy  in  Berlin  was  formally  closed.  Smal- 
Stocki  continued  to  occupy  the  building  however,  in  the  name  of  the  Ukrainian  Peoples 
Republic,  until  he  was  forcibly  removed  by  the  Berlin  police  in  November  1922.59  It 
was  an  ignominious  end  for  Petliura's  chief  representative  in  the  German  capital. 
The  Germans  were  aware  that  Smal-Stocki  had  also  been  conducting  negotiations 
with  the  British,  and  also  that  Petliura's  representative  in  London,  Arnold  Margolin, 
had  been  trying  to  get  British  support  for  the  Ukrainian  nationalist  cause  there.  None  of 
this  impressed  them,  and  the  alliance  with  Poland  was  the  final  straw.  It  was  clearly  not 
in  the  interests  of  Germany  to  co-operate  in  any  way  with  forces  which  it  deemed  to  be 
unreliable  and,  furthermore,  actively  pursuing  alliances  with  Germany's  enemies. 
The  Daily  Telegraph  gave  a  rather  colourful  description  of  the  situation  in 
Ukraine  on  29  October  1920: 
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92 To  sum  up,  Ukraine  reminds  one  of  those  cakes  with  numerous  multi- 
coloured  layers  of  different  materials  superimposed.  Red,  Ukrainian 
Nationalist  and  simply  peasant,  they  are  all  there,  fighting  each  other  all 
over  the  country  in  ever-varying  combinations.  The  latest  news  (...  )  is  that 
Lenin  and  some  of  his  colleagues,  despairing  of  their  rule  in  Ukraine,  are 
ready  to  give  it  a  full  measure  of  independence,  on  condition  that  an  alliance 
is  concluded  with  the  Bolsheviks  against  external  enemies.  60 
It  is  certainly  true  that  Soviet  rule  in  Ukraine  was  not  finally  secured  until  1922, 
as  Makhno  and  the  Anarchists  remained  active  in  the  south,  and  partisans  supporting 
Petliura  harried  the  Red  Army  in  the  west.  Polish  military  intelligence  supported  White 
Russian  and  nationalist  forays  into  Soviet  Ukraine  until  late  autumn  1921.  In  May 
1921,  Boris  Savinkov  prepared  a  plan  for  a  rising  in  Ukraine,  and  in  June  he  established 
the  Union  for  the  Defence  of  Fatherland  and  Freedom  in  Warsaw.  It  envisaged  the 
separation  of  Ukraine  from  Russia.  Savinkov's  co-operation  with  Petliura  is  dealt  with 
elsewhere  in  this  study.  All  of  these  attempts  to  destabilise  the  Soviet  regime  in 
Kharkov  (mostly  launched  from  Polish  territory),  assured  that  the  Auswärtiges  Atilt  was 
in  no  haste  to  recognise  Soviet  Ukrainian  diplomats  in  Berlin,  or  to  hand  control  of  the 
embassy  building  to  Rakovsky's  government.  Only  Rapallo,  and  the  final  consolidation 
of  Soviet  power  in  Ukraine  changed  the  diplomatic  equation. 
The  Daily  Telegraph's  report  on  Lenin's  approach  to  Ukraine  was  also  partially 
true  but  there  was  no  question  of  independence,  instead  a  form  of  federation  would  be 
the  Soviet  solution.  Russian  leaders  moved  in  1920  to  tighten  state  relationships 
between  Russia  and  Ukraine.  At  the  Fourth  All-Ukrainian  Congress  of  Soviets  in  May 
1920,  a  position  was  adopted  favouring  the  closest  possible  ties  between  the  two  Soviet 
republics  and  acting  as  if  the  two  were  already  joined  in  a  federal  union.  In  a  resolution 
of  June  19  1920,  the  Russian  Central  Executive  Committee  authorised  the  Ukrainian 
government  to  appoint  thirty  representatives  from  Ukraine  to  join  as  members  of  the 
Russian  Central  Executive  Committee.  Subsequently,  in  December  1920,  a  Treaty  of 
Alliance  between  the  UkSSR  and  the  RSFSR  was  concluded.  The  independence  and 
sovereignty  of  both  sides  was  recognised  but  a  close  military  and  economic  alliance 
was  formed.  The  alliance  unified  seven  Russian  and  Ukrainian  commissariats;  military 
and  maritime  affairs,  foreign  trade,  finance,  labour,  and  communications,  the  councils 
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93 of  national  economy  and  posts  and  telegraph.  The  heads  of  the  unified  commissariats 
were  to  sit  as  members  of  the  Russian  Council  of  People's  Commissars  and  were  to 
report  to  it.  It  became  clear  that  the  work  of  the  commissariats  was  to  be  directed  and 
controlled  by  the  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee.  61 
The  Treaty  of  Alliance  left  under  Ukrainian  jurisdiction  four  areas  -  foreign 
affairs,  agriculture,  justice  and  education.  Russian  leaders  wanted  to  maintain  the 
appearance  of  independence  for  Ukraine,  and  a  foreign  ministry  with  embassies  abroad 
helped.  The  Ukrainian  Commissariat  of  Foreign  Affairs  was  headed  by  Rakovsky,  and 
he  stated  his  opinions  in  December  1920: 
The  tendency  of  Socialistic  revolution  is  political  and  economic 
centralisation,  provisionally  taking  the  form  of  international  federation.  Of 
course,  the  creation  of  this  federation  cannot  be  effected  by  the  stroke  of  the 
pen,  but  is  the  result  of  a  more  or  less  extended  process  of  elimination  of 
particularism,  provincialism,  democratic  and  national  bourgeois 
prejudices.  62 
Rakovsky's  government  once  again  demanded  recognition  from  Germany  as  both 
the  de  facto  and  the  de  jure  government  of  Ukraine.  A  memorandum  of  the  AA  on  19 
November  1920  from  an  official  named  von  Kopp,  supported  the  policy  of  no  change: 
"A  recognition  of  Soviet  Ukraine,  that  means  the  government  of  Rakovsky,  would 
demand  a  departure  for  us  from  our  position  of  caution  and  is  not  called  for  at  present 
(...  )  Also  the  troops  of  Pavlenko  and  the  government  of  Petliura  are  still  present  in  a 
part  of  Ukrainian  territory.  ,  63  As  long  as  there  was  the  slightest  possibility  of 
Rakovsky's  regime  being  overthrown,  Germany  would  not  commit  itself.  Von  Dirksen 
in  Warsaw  advised  the  AA  on  21  October  1920,  that  Germany  should  not  alienate  the 
sympathies  of  the  Russian  Whites  because  it  was  still  uncertain  how  long  the 
Bolsheviks  would  remain  in  power.  He  also  argued  that  Germany  should  remain 
involved  in  what  he  termed  `the  South  Russian  game'.  64  The  underlying  theme  was 
caution  and  a  wait  until  the  final  victor  in  Ukraine  became  clear.  In  the  meantime  only  a 
minority  like  the  geopoliticist  Paul  Rohrbach  continued  to  argue  the  case  for  Ukrainian 
independence. 
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94 On  2  December  1920,  in  a  memorandum  an  official  of  the  AA  recounted  his 
conversation  with  Smal-Stocki,  the  representative  of  Petliura  in  Berlin.  Smal-Stocki 
complained  bitterly  that  an  ungrateful  Western  and  Central  Europe  had  left  the 
Ukrainian  nationalists  to  their  fate,  and  that  now  the  last  barrier  against  Bolshevism  had 
been  removed.  The  supporters  of  Petliura  had  held  the  flag  of  anti-Bolshevism  high  for 
too  long  and  the  moment  had  come  for  others  to  take  up  the  challenge.  65  There  is  no 
evidence  to  suggest  that  the  Germans  would  take  up  the  challenge  and  this  was  the 
beginning  of  the  end  for  diplomatic  relations  between  Germany  and  the  Ukrainian 
nationalists. 
On  27  October  1920,  the  German  ambassador  in  London  contacted  Maltzan  of  the 
AA  to  inform  him  that  Margolin,  the  diplomatic  representative  of  the  Ukrainian  Peoples 
Republic  in  London,  had  been  to  visit  him.  In  the  course  of  the  report  the  ambassador 
stated  his  opinions  on  diplomatic  relations  between  Germany  and  Soviet  Ukraine: 
The  basis  for  an  ordered  economic  relationship  between  Germany  and 
Ukraine  is  the  creation  of  legal  relations.  The  present  situation  without  any 
treaty  is  impractical,  because  everything  depends  on  good  will,  beside 
which  certain  distrust  can  be  concealed.  Even  though  as  a  result  of  the  close 
co-operation  of  Russia  and  Ukraine,  many  aspects  of  economic  life  in 
Ukraine  are  decided  in  Moscow,  yet  this  huge  and  rich  economic  area  is 
essentially  independent  in  its  possibilities,  and  grows  increasingly  jealous 
over  its  rights.  66 
Obviously,  the  German  ambassador  was  of  the  belief  that  relations  between 
Germany  and  Ukraine  needed  to  be  placed  on  an  official  basis,  rather  than  acting  via 
Moscow.  This  was  because  the  Ukrainian  Soviet  government  was  quite  jealous  of  its 
powers  and  especially  regarding  external  relations. 
By  May  1921  the  situation  was  still  not  clarified  regarding  Germany's  relations 
with  the  UkSSR,  and  in  a  memorandum  from  Von  Maltzan  the  AA  pointed  out  the 
ridiculous  situation.  The  Petliura  regime,  which  was  still  in  Poland,  was  not  being 
recognised  by  Germany  but  its  representatives  had  seized  the  old  Ukrainian  embassy  in 
1919.  The  embassy  had  no  diplomatic  powers,  in  the  eyes  of  the  AA,  for  the 
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95 government  it  purported  to  represent  was  not  de  jure  and  also  controlled  no  territory  in 
Ukraine  itself.  67 
The  continued  possibility  of  war  between  Poland  and  Germany  was  referred  to  in 
a  report  from  von  Dirksen  in  Warsaw  on  28  May  1921.  He  reported  that  Soviet  troops 
were  collecting  along  the  Romanian  and  Polish  frontiers,  and  it  was  his  opinion  that  if 
war  did  break  out  the  Bolshevik  army  would  immediately  enter  Poland.  68 
On  24  June  1921  the  German  Republic  formally  recognised  the  government  of 
Soviet  Ukraine  in  Kharkov  as  the  de  jure  government  of  Ukraine.  69  The  Soviet 
Ukrainian  government  now  demanded  the  return  of  the  Ukrainian  embassy  buildings  in 
Berlin,  and  of  course  the  400  Million  gold  Marks.  70  With  the  embassy  building  they 
were  successful,  but  the  struggle  over  the  money  continued  for  years.  The  Germans 
were  careful  however  to  continue  to  keep  their  lines  of  communication  with  the 
Ukrainian  nationalists  open. 
The  AA  sent  a  telegram  to  the  German  ambassador  in  Warsaw  on  12  September 
1921,  requesting  him  to  enquire  from  Smal-Stocki,  who  had  now  become  the  UNR 
diplomatic  representative  in  Poland,  what  Petliura's  plans  were  in  Ukraine.  Smal  Stocki 
was  en  route  to  visit  Petliura.  The  closeness  of  the  relationship  was  something  quite 
strange,  as  for  example  on  5  November  1921,  when  Von  Dirksen  in  Warsaw  reported 
on  a  peasant  nationalist  uprising  in  Ukraine  and  went  on  to  allege  that  Smal-Stocki  had 
already  warned  him  of  this  in  September.  7  So  it  is  clear  that  despite  the  newfound 
acceptance  of  the  Soviet  regime  in  Ukraine,  even  at  this  stage,  Germany  was 
maintaining  a  cautious  approach  to  the  nationalists.  These  contacts  would  bear  full  fruit 
after  1933  and  the  beginning  of  the  Third  Reich  and,  indeed,  relations  with 
Skoropadskyi  and  the  monarchists  became  closer  after  1921. 
In  Germany  key  industrialists  such  as  Felix  Deutsch  and  Hugo  Stinnes  were 
arguing  for  better  German-Soviet  economic  relations,  because  even  under  the  NEP 
policies  of  Lenin  there  was  a  Soviet  monopoly  of  foreign  trade.  These  pressures 
increased  in  late  1921  and  early  1922,  when  the  World  Economic  Conference  at  Genoa 
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96 created  the  prospect  that  Germany  would  be  forced  to  accept  a  limited  share  of  Russia's 
and  Ukraine's  business  as  a  member  of  Britain's  projected  international  consortium.  72 
The  consequence  was  the  Treaty  of  Rapallo  signed  in  1922,  creating  solid 
links  between  Germany  and  Soviet  Russia  and,  of  course,  Soviet  Ukraine.  The  treaty 
also  contained  articles  on  military  co-operation  between  the  Reichswehr  and  the  Red 
Army.  The  German-Soviet  agreement  did  not  commit  German  foreign  policy  to  an 
excessive  reliance  on  Soviet  Russia;  but  the  German  nationalists,  the  military,  and 
heavy  industry  made  sure  that  the  link  with  Russia  was  maintained.  Its  signing  (and  the 
recognition  of  Soviet  Ukraine)  sealed  the  fate  of  the  Ukrainian  nationalists  in  Germany 
for  another  11  years,  until  a  new  regime  in  Berlin  would  again  play  the  Ukrainian  card. 
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UKRAINE  AND  GERMAN  ECONOMIC  POLICY 
In  November  1918  a  shattered  and  demoralised  Germany  still  represented  a 
considerable  economic  force  in  Europe.  The  productive  potential  of  German  industry  in 
1918  was  nothing  like  as  limited  as  it  would  be  in  1945.  The  war  had  not  touched 
German  soil,  and  there  had  been  no  air  war  over  German  cities,  with  the  end  result  most 
German  factories  and  industries  were  in  a  position  to  begin  manufacturing,  once  the 
conditions  of  peace  returned.  The  problems  were:  the  conditions  attached  by  the  Allies 
regarding  the  payment  of  reparations,  and  that  German  industry  lacked  raw  materials 
and  also  lacked  markets  for  its  products.  The  German  colonies  were  removed  from  the 
Reich,  and  obviously  most  of  Western  Europe  now  depended  on  France  and  Britain  and 
were  in  no  mood  to  do  business  with  Germany.  Many  German  industrialists  began  to 
look  east,  first  to  Ukraine  and  then  secondly  to  Russia. 
There  was  a  clear  division  between  the  interests  of  some  industrial  sectors  and 
others.  The  main  sectors  with  an  interest  in  Ukraine  were  the  traditional  heavy 
industries  of  coal  mining,  mineral  smelting  and  shipbuilding.  These  were  led  by  firms 
such  as  Krupps  and  Thyssen.  '  These  companies  had  been  happy  with  the  economic 
situation  in  Ukraine  prior  to  November  1918,  and  had  no  desire  to  see  Ukraine  lost  as 
an  economic  market.  There  are  indications  that  German  economic  policy  towards 
Ukraine  during  the  war  continued  to  have  an  influence.  An  example  of  this  is  the 
telegram  sent  by  Undersecretary  of  State  von  dem  Bussche  to  the  German  ambassador 
in  Kiev,  Mumm,  on  April  30,1918.  He  wanted  Ukraine  to  not  only  fulfil  the  economic 
obligations  to  Germany  stipulated  in  the  Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  but  its  economy  was  to 
be  closely  linked  to  that  of  Germany  in  the  future.  Bussche  envisaged  an  important  role 
for  German  capital  and  skilled  labour  in  Ukraine's  economic  growth.  This  was  to  be 
marked  by  the  establishment  of  an  advanced  transportation  network,  further 
development  of  its  industrial  potential  and  the  modernisation  of  agricultural 
production.  2 
At  the  beginning  of  the  Hetmanate,  fifteen  leading  industrial  leaders  from 
Germany  met  at  Stahlhoff  near  Düsseldorf  to  discuss  how  to  establish  economic  and 
'Fischer,  Grif  nach  der  Weltmacht;  Die  Kriegszielpolitik  des  kaiserlichen  Deutschland,  1914-1918  (Düsseldorf,  1961).  2  Oleh  S.  Fedeyshyn,  Germany's  Drive  to  the  East  and  the  Ukrainian  Revolution,  1917-1918  (New  Brunswick,  New  Jersey:  1969), 
p.  191. 
98 financial  domination  of  Ukraine.  On  June  4,  a  conference  of  government  officials  and 
representatives  of  companies  such  as  Krupp,  Stinnes,  Warburg,  and  Die  Deutsche  Bank 
took  place  in  Berlin  and  decided  to  form  two  financial  syndicates,  one  for  Ukraine,  and 
one  for  Russia.  3  There  was  also  a  plan  to  establish  airlines  between  Germany  and 
Turkey  via  Ukraine  but  nothing  came  of  it  because  of  the  war.  4  A  limited  airline  service 
was  set  up  in  1919,  but  came  to  nothing  because  of  the  fighting  in  Ukraine.  On  19 
January  1920,  the  German  firm  Deutsche  Luftreederei  (German  Air  Navigation)  wrote 
to  the  Foreign  Ministry  in  connection  with  the  construction  of  an  aerodrome  in  Ukraine: 
In  accordance  with  the  Ukrainian  Finance  Commission  in  Berlin,  and  its 
plans  to  improve  air  transport  with  Ukraine,  we  have  sent  Herr  Karl 
Klinkermann  the  aerodrome  manager  and  the  engineer  Robert  Jtlling  to 
Kamenets-Podolski  in  order  to  build  an  aerodrome  there.  Aller  the  capture 
of  Kamenets  by  the  opponents  of  the  Petliura  government,  we  have  received 
no  further  news  from  these  men.  The  Ukrainian  Finance  Commission  cannot 
tell  us  anything  about  this  as  they  themselves  have  lost  communication  with 
Ukraine.  5 
This  did  not  augur  well  for  trade  relations  with  Ukraine,  but  it  is  true  that  the  Civil 
War  was  still  raging,  and  the  Soviet-Polish  war  was  about  to  begin. 
Although  the  regime  changed  in  late  1918,  these  same  industrialists  dominated 
economic  policy  in  the  new  republic,  and  many  of  the  government  bureaucrats  involved 
in  these  plans  now  served  the  new  government.  The  block  to  these  schemes  becoming 
reality  was  the  presence  of  a  Soviet  government  in  Kharkov.  However,  if  there  was  an 
independent  Ukraine,  or  even  a  White  Russian  regime,  then  there  would  be  every 
possibility  of  implementing  long  term  economic  plans. 
Big  business,  and  particularly  heavy  industry,  played  a  major  role  in  German 
governments  at  the  time  -  and  even  in  the  government  headed  by  the  SPD.  This  can  be 
gauged  by  the  fact  that  the  early  phases  of  Germany's  reparations  policy  were  chiefly 
determined  by  the  entrepreneurs  and  big  banks.  They  insisted  on  the  closest  possible 
interpretation  of  Wilson's  Fourteen  Points  in  the  interest  of  limiting  Germany's 
liabilities,  and  in  order  to  maintain  at  least  the  economic  power  base  of  the  German 
state. 
'  Ibid,  p.  193. 
Ibid. 
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99 Hiden  makes  the  point  that  much  of  German  foreign  policy  in  the  early  years  of 
the  Weimar  Republic  was  driven  by  economic  factors: 
Finally,  not  too  much  time  will  be  given  to  the  point  that  in  modern  states 
many  parts  of  the  specialised  administrative  apparatus  influence  foreign 
policy.  Obvious  examples  in  Germany  were  the  Reich  Economic  Ministry 
and  the  Ministry  of  Finance.  Because  of  the  enormous  importance  to  the 
Weimar  Republic  of  economic  recovery  and  the  complexity  of  international 
economic  agreements,  the  Economic  Ministry  was  certain  to  play  a  major 
role,  for  example,  particularly  in  policy-making  towards  Russia  and  East 
Europe  after  1919,  since  here  there  were  important  new  markets  to  be 
captured  and  developed.  6 
The  tense  situation  with  Poland  over  the  loss  of  former  German  territory,  and  the 
demands  of  the  Poles  for  compensation,  caused  a  major  problem  regarding  trade  and 
exports  in  the  east.  The  Allies  had  agreed  that  the  populations  of  German-settled  areas 
in  Poland  would  vote  in  plebiscites  on  whether  they  would  finally  become  part  of 
Poland  or  Germany.  This  led  to  serious  disturbances  in  Upper  Silesia  and  to  the 
disruption  of  transport  links  with  Ukraine.  7  A  cursory  view  of  the  map  of  Ukraine  will 
reveal  that  most  rail  lines,  and  the  railway  was  in  1918/19  the  most  important  method 
of  industrial  transport,  ran  from  Germany  through  post  1918  Polish  territory.  There  was 
however  one  major  rail  line  running  north  to  the  East  Prussian  city  of  Königsberg  on 
the  Baltic  Sea,  from  where  Ukrainian  produce  could  be  exported  to  Germany  proper. 
Thus  it  was  no  accident  that  the  major  industries  pressing  for  continued  trade  with 
Ukraine  were  the  coal  mining  industry  in  Silesia,  and  the  shipping  interests  in 
Königsberg.  8  Those  interested  in  Ukraine  were  not  surprisingly  those  industries  lying  in 
the  east  of  the  Reich,  and  who  traditionally  had  traded  with  the  former  Russian  Empire 
and  the  Border  States.  However,  it  would  be  false  to  suggest  that  firms  such  as  Krupps, 
with  their  manufacturing  base  in  the  Ruhr  in  western  Germany,  were  not  also  very 
interested  in  Ukraine,  and  what  they  regarded  as  its  vast  potential  market.  The  problem 
was  with  whom  must  they  deal.  Who  was  the  legitimate  government  of  Ukraine  -  and 
what  was  the  attitude  of  the  government  in  Berlin  towards  these  contacts? 
61{iden,  Germany  and  Europe,  1919-1933,  p.  35.  These  ministries  were  the  Reichswirtschaftsministerium  and  the  Reichsfinanzamt. 
Wipert  Blücher,  Deutschlands  Weg  nach  Rapallo  (Wiesbaden,  1951),  p.  110. 
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100 In  February  1919  the  Directory  was  still  in  control  in  Kiev,  although  shortly  the 
city  would  fall  to  the  Bolshevik  forces.  The  Economics  Ministry  in  Berlin 
(Reichswirtschaftsministerium)  received  a  report  from  one  of  its  representatives  in 
Kiev,  Grunow,  setting  out  ideas  on  transport  to  and  from  Ukraine,  and  on  the  economic 
perspectives  for  Germany  there.  He  suggested  that  a  Ukrainian  embassy  be  established 
as  soon  as  possible,  and  also  that  relations  with  Poland  could  be  improved  by  means  of 
this  embassy,  because  although  Poland  and  Ukraine  had  their  differences  in  some 
spheres,  they  also  had  common  economic  interests.  The  representative  also  believed 
that  through  such  representation,  an  agreement  of  some  sort  (a  treaty  perhaps)  could  be 
signed  between  Germany  and  Poland,  which  would  help  to  iron  out  some  of  their 
outstanding  problems.  It  is  worth  bearing  in  mind  that  at  this  stage  Poland  and  Germany 
were  in  a  state  of  almost  armed  conflict. 
Grunow  appealed  for  the  Army  Command  to  organise  the  withdrawal  of  all 
German  railway  wagons  and  trains  from  the  rail  line  Prostken-Goloby,  and  the  outlying 
lines  -  because  the  Poles  were  using  the  shortage  of  railway  engines  and  wagons  as  a 
stick  to  beat  the  Germans  with.  The  Foreign  Ministry  was  requested  to  do  everything 
possible  to  begin  negotiations  for  Ukrainian  representation  in  Berlin,  and  the  relevant 
Prussian  and  German  authorities  would  attend  the  negotiations: 
In  the  course  of  the  discussion  Dr  Treuenfels  suggested  that  the  question  of 
the  export  of  Upper  Silesian  coal  to  Ukraine  in  German  wagons  through 
Sosnowitz  be  negotiated.  From  the  Prussian  side  it  appears  vital  that  in  any 
future  agreement  it  be  clearly  set  out  that  the  Poles  should,  at  the  unloading 
of  the  coal  in  Sosnowitz,  return  the  same  amount  of  empty  wagons  to 
Prussia  as  they  receive.  10 
It  is  also  interesting  to  note  to  whom  copies  of  this  report  were  sent,  to  C.  Schiller 
of  the  Transitkontor  Express  in  Kiev,  and  also  to  the  representative  of  the  Ukrainian 
Rail  Ministry,  Dr  Treuenfels,  former  representative  of  the  Kriegskohlengesellschaft 
A.  G.  (War  Coal  Company),  and  representative  of  the  Ukrainian  Trade  Ministry  for  Coal 
Purchase  in  Germany,  and  Theodor  Schott,  an  industrialist  in  Russia  and  representative 
of  the  Reichswirtschaftsamt  (Economics  Department)  in  Kharkov.  All  of  this  suggests  a 
large  network  of  people  and  organisations  involved  in  the  supply  of  coal,  and  in  trade 
The  State  of  Prussia  within  the  Weimar  Republic.  Federal  States  continued  to  exist  during  the  Republic.  1°  BA:  Reichswirtschaftsministerium.  Eiandels  -  und  Wirtschaftspolitik.  (601),  1169.  Aktenvermerk,  4  February  1919  from 
Representative  Grunow. 
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that  the  strained  relations  between  Poland  and  Germany  at  this  time  were  already 
causing  extensive  problems  for  the  economic  relationship  between  Germany  and 
Ukraine. 
Here  it  is  worth  noting  that  a  major  factor  in  German  economic  thinking  towards 
Ukraine  during  the  years  preceding  1922  was  the  fear  that  the  large  Ukrainian  market 
would  be  lost  to  the  Poles,  the  British,  or  the  French.  The  Directory's  economic 
agreement  with  the  French,  and  the  Polish-Ukrainian  alliance  in  1920,  heightened  these 
fears.  If  Poland  or  France  penetrated  the  Ukrainian  and  Russian  markets,  then  Germany 
would  be  truly  constrained,  labouring  under  the  reparations,  without  colonies,  and 
barred  from  Western  European  markets. 
What  was  the  economic  situation  in  Ukraine  in  early  1919?  The  worst  damage  of 
the  Civil  War  had  not  yet  occurred.  Although  the  Anarchist  Movement  led  by  such 
figures  as  Nestor  Makhno  had  already  begun  to  show  its  hand,  there  was  also  in 
Ukraine  a  rich  tradition  of  peasant  co-operatives  and  credit  co-operatives.  In  June  1919 
at  the  Co-operative  Conference,  a  fringe  conference  of  the  Versailles  Peace  Conference, 
M.  Issayevych,  the  representative  of  the  Central  Organisation  of  Ukrainian  Co- 
operatives,  gave  a  glowing  account  of  the  situation  in  Ukraine: 
In  the  villages  Credit  Unions  and  Co-operative  banks  are  being  formed  to 
help  the  people.  Every  peasant  who  has  some  money  places  it  in  the  bank.  In 
this  way  the  villages  can  organise  their  own  credit.  The  war  brought  a  lot  of 
money  to  the  peasants,  on  the  one  hand  because  of  their  supplies  of  cattle  to 
the  army,  and  on  the  other  hand  because  of  the  alcohol  ban.  The  large 
estates  saw  their  expenses  reduced  and  could  afford  to  invest  more  money  in 
the  peasants  own  Credit  Co-operatives.  One  can  understand  the  phenomenal 
growth  in  the  number  of  Co-operatives  in  Ukraine  after  the  Revolution  when 
one  compares  the  figures  for  the  co-operatives  for  1914  with  those  of  1918, 
and  sees  that  in  1914  there  were  10  such  co-operatives  in  the  whole  of 
Russia,  of  which  7  were  in  Ukraine,  and  at  the  end  of  1918  there  were  250, 
and  no  fewer  than  15,000  co-operatives  of  all  kinds.  " 
"  BA:  Reichswirtschaftsministerium.  Beziehung  zur  Ukraine.  (601),  1389/19.  Report  of  the  Delegate  from  the  Central  Organisation 
of  the  Ukrainian  Co-operatives,  M. Issayevych  to  the  Co-operative  Conference  in  Paris.  June  1919. 
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Imperial  army.  This  glowing  account  of  the  agricultural  sector  of  Ukraine  probably 
refers  to  the  period  before  the  Bolsheviks  began  to  implement  War  Communism  in 
Ukraine.  The  policies  of  the  co-operatives  were  fairly  close  to  those  of  the  Ukrainian 
Directory,  and  one  can  only  wonder  how  fruitful  the  agricultural  sector  of  Ukraine 
would  have  become,  were  it  not  for  the  intervention  of  the  Bolsheviks  and  the  Civil 
War. 
The  food  shortages  at  this  time  in  Soviet  Russia  were  terrible,  and  cities  such  as 
Moscow  and  Petrograd  had  slid  into  a  state  of  near  famine.  Ukraine  now  assumed  for 
the  Bolsheviks  even  more  importance.  With  the  Soviet  conquest  of  Ukraine  in  February 
1919,  the  principles  of  War  Communism  began  to  be  introduced  in  Ukraine.  The 
Supply  Commissariat  (Narkornprod)  acquired  powers  to  obtain  and  distribute  food;  and 
they  began,  with  the  help  of  workers'  detachments  and  the  Cheka  (secret  police),  to 
seize  stocks  of  food  held  by  alleged  hoarders  throughout  Ukraine.  The  campaign 
against  the  so-called  rich  peasants  (kulaks)  also  intensified  and  Lenin  and  Rakovsky 
saw  this  as  vital  for  spreading  Soviet  power  into  the  villages.  The  class  war  was  to  be 
bitterly  fought  in  the  villages  and  many  kulaks  had  land,  equipment,  and  livestock,  as 
well  as  `surplus  grain'  confiscated.  Gradually,  the  compulsory  deliveries  of  food  were 
systematised  and  given  the  name  of  prodrazverstka.  The  state  demanded  all  that  the 
peasant  had,  above  a  minimum  requirement  for  him  and  his  family.  The  peasants 
resisted  and  in  Ukraine  turned  to  the  anarchists  or  began  to  form  their  own  defence 
forces.  The  peasants  turned  much  of  their  hatred  against  the  towns,  from  where  they 
saw  their  tormentors  come.  Gradually,  in  the  course  of  1919,  Ukraine  began  to 
resemble  Soviet  Russia  more  and  more.  For  the  Germans,  hoping  for  Ukrainian 
foodstuffs,  and  also  for  increased  trade  with  Ukraine,  all  of  this  was  a  disaster. 
In  the  midst  of  the  chaos  of  the  Bolshevik  occupation  of  Kiev,  the  administrator 
of  the  Raw  Materials  Centre,  Frau  Rausch,  reported  her  impressions  to  the  Economics 
Ministry  in  Berlin.  Frau  Rausch  had  been  in  Kiev  until  12th  April  1919  when,  because 
of  the  breakdown  of  trade  and  Bolshevik  hostility,  she  and  several  other  German 
officials  reported  to  Berlin: 
Trade  and  transport  have  come  to  a  complete  halt.  All  around  Kiev  there  has 
been  lasting  peasant  uprisings  against  the  Bolsheviks.  Some  groups  have 
been  fighting  each  other  as  well  as  the  Bolsheviks  (...  )  The  feeling  is  against 
103 the  Entente  and  is  once  again  friendly  to  us,  with  several  exceptions.  In  Kiev 
there  was,  apart  from  the  Bolsheviks,  a  Spartacus  group,  which  had  formed 
itself  out  of  German,  Czech,  Hungarian  and  many  Jewish  elements,  and 
which  terrorised  the  Germans.  This  group  is  supposed  to  have  been  finally 
overthrown  by  the  Bolsheviks  and  so  it  is  possible  that  Herr  Thielmann  has 
been  set  free.  Kleinov  has  liquidated  the  affairs  of  the  Raw  Materials  Centre 
with  the  exception  of  the  Tobacco  Centre.  From  other  positions  the  Wool 
Department  (7  members)  and  Herr  Florian  from  the  Metal  Department  are 
still  working;  and  they  want  to  return  later.  12 
The  overall  feeling  is  of  an  economic  mission  winding  down,  and  this  was  indeed  the 
case  in  Soviet  Ukraine  in  1919.  There  is  still  the  reference  here  of  anti-Entente  feeling 
and  this  would  appear  in  all  the  German  reports  and  correspondence  of  1919  and  1920. 
The  French,  in  the  meantime,  who  still  considered  Ukraine  to  be  in  their  zone  of 
influence,  had  entered  into  an  economic  agreement  with  the  Directory  which  would 
have  had  the  effect  of  turning  Ukraine  into  a  French  economic  colony.  This  of  course, 
was  resented  by  the  Germans,  and  led  to  a  cooling  of  relations  between  the  Directory 
and  Germany.  On  8  April  1919  the  Danish  paper  Folkets  Dagblad  Politiken  published 
an  interview  with  the  Soviet  Ukrainian  leader  Rakovsky,  which  he  had  given  the  paper 
in  February  1919  in  Kharkov.  Rakovsky  spoke  there  of  the  Directory  being  the  creation 
of  the  Entente,  and  listed  the  economic  agreement  with  France  as  being  one  of  its  worst 
acts: 
A  short  while  ago  the  Directory  signed  an  agreement  with  France,  which 
gave  France  the  concession  on  all  Ukrainian  railways  for  50  years.  So  the 
whole  economic  life  of  Ukraine  would  have  been  ruled  by  French  capital.  13 
The  Soviet  Ukrainian  government  would  use  this  agreement  as  a  strong 
propaganda  weapon  to  suggest  that  the  nationalists  were  the  agents  of  the  Entente  in 
Ukraine,  and  were  prepared  to  hand  over  its  rich  economic  resources  in  exchange  for 
military  assistance. 
German  heavy  industry  was  no  stranger  to  political  machinations,  and  they  acted 
in  several  spectacular  ways  in  the  course  of  1919.  In  the  absence  of  official  funding 
from  Berlin,  the  army  was  financed  by  German  heavy  industry.  They  believed  in  the 
BA:  Reichswirtschaftsministerium.  Handels  -  und  Wirtschaftspolitik.  (601),  1169.  Report  of  Frau  Rausch. 
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unimpressed  by  the  more  cautious  approach  of  the  government. 
Although  nothing  as  dramatic  as  this  was  to  take  place  in  Ukraine,  there  were 
clear  indications  that  German  heavy  industry  was  still  interested  in  having  a  major  stake 
in  the  region.  On  7  September  1919,  the  Ministry  of  Economics  was  informed  that  the 
Upper  Silesian  coal  industry  was  interested  in  the  development  of  closer  relations 
between  Germany  and  the  Ukrainian  government.  This  could  either  refer  to  the  Petliura 
nationalist  regime,  the  Whites  or  the  Soviet  regime,  but  judging  from  the  politics  of 
German  heavy  industry  in  1919  it  is  more  likely  to  apply  to  the  nationalist  government, 
then  fighting  a  desperate  rearguard  action  to  recover  Ukraine  from  the  Bolsheviks: 
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  Upper  Silesian  coal  industry;  the  efforts  of  the 
Ukrainian  government  to  lay  the  basis  for  a  closer  relationship  with  the 
German  government  are  being  viewed  with  great  interest.  Already  before 
the  war,  the  relations  between  the  Upper  Silesian  coal  industry  and  Ukraine 
were  very  close.  It  was  especially  the  iron  ore,  which  for  years  came  to 
Upper  Silesia  (...  )  The  closing  off  of  the  Ukrainian  ore  is  very  much  to  be 
regretted  because  the  iron  ore  from  Krivoi  Rog  is  one  of  the  most  valuable.  14 
As  mentioned  before,  the  iron  ore  deposits  in  Ukraine  were  the  largest  in  the  world  at 
that  time,  and  German  industry  was  very  interested  in  gaining  access  to  them.  This  was 
especially  important  because  the  Ruhr  was  under  French  occupation,  and  the  Saarland 
had  been  lost  to  France.  Thus,  the  only  viable  source  of  iron  ore  for  German  industry 
was  Ukraine. 
One  of  the  other  concerns  of  the  German  authorities  was  the  question  of  German 
property  and  goods,  which  still  remained  in  Ukraine  after  the  German  withdrawal  in 
December  1918;  this  was  to  cause  serious  problems  with  the  Ukrainian  Soviet 
authorities,  but  even  in  1919  there  was  evidence  that  the  Soviet  government  in  Ukraine 
was  prepared  to  make  deals  with  the  Germans  (and  vice  versa).  The  problem  was 
compounded  however,  by  the  fact  that  there  was  no  diplomatic  relationship  between 
Soviet  Russia  (or  Soviet  Ukraine)  and  Germany.  Germany  was  still  carrying  out  the 
policy  of  the  Allies  of  diplomatically  isolating  Soviet  Russia  and  Soviet  Ukraine,  and 
supporting  the  blockade.  On  2  May  1919,  a  report  reached  the  Office  of  Economic 
Affairs  (Reichwirtschaftsamt)  from  the  War  Ministry,  that  an  economic  agreement  had 
"DA:  Reichswirtschaftsministerium.  Presseberichte  zur  politischen  und  wirtschaftlichen  Lage  in  der  Ukraine.  (209)  57473. 
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and  representatives  of  the  Soviet  government  (presumably  the  Ukrainian): 
After  the  rupture  of  diplomatic  relations  between  Germany  and  Russia  an 
official  settlement  of  affairs  under  the  present  circumstances  is  not  possible. 
The  issue  was  raised  however  if  it  would  be  possible  to  leave  to  the 
initiative  of  the  private  individualistic  sector  to  save  the  wares  and  raw 
materials.  This  would  be  done  by  the  named  firms  being  allowed  to  import 
these  goods  from  Russia  without  any  difficulties.  16 
Indeed  several  German  businessmen  in  Ukraine,  or  more  usually  Ukrainians  of 
German  extraction,  offered  their  services  to  act  as  go-betweens  with  the  Soviet 
authorities  there,  and  to  offer  their  expertise  and  knowledge  of  Ukraine  to  German 
business. 
A  Bank  for  Trade  and  Industry  had  been  founded  by  the  Germans  in  Ukraine  and 
in  May  1919,  one  of  the  leading  members  of  the  business  community  in  Ukraine,  Josef 
Fonfe,  had  offered  the  German  Office  of  Economic  Affairs  to  act  as  an  intermediary, 
and  to  improve  trade  and  exports  between  the  two  countries.  This  person  was  also  very 
involved  in  running  a  major  tinning  factory  in  Kiev  and  other  foodstuffs  factories  in 
both  Warsaw  and  Kiev.  One  of  the  firms  founded  by  Fonfe  was  the  purchasing  centre 
of  the  War  Supplies  Office  for  all  goods  coming  from  the  east.  '?  It  is  worth  noting  that 
even  in  May  1919,  a  German  economic  ministry  still  carried  the  prefix  `war'.  The 
dispute  over  the  goods  of  German  companies  remaining  in  Ukraine  continued 
throughout  1919.  With  the  Soviet  conquest  of  Kiev  most  German  officials  and 
ministries  were  withdrawn,  and  the  individual  German  and  German-Ukrainian 
businessmen  now  came  into  their  own.  On  26  June  the  Reichswirtschaftsamt  was 
advised  that  those  German  businessmen  remaining  in  Ukraine  could  continue  to  inform 
Berlin  by  telegraph  of  what  was  happening.  The  Foreign  Ministry  advised  caution 
however,  if  any  of  these  businessmen  tried  to  conduct  negotiations  through  either 
Rakovsky,  or  another  Ukrainian  minister  Ego:  "The  latter  in  this  situation  would  not 
"  This  body  was  established  by  the  Reichswirtschaftsamt  to  settle  outstanding  financial  issues  resulting  from  the  war  on  the  Black 
Sea  between  the  Germans  and  Soviets.  There  are  few  references  to  it  but  it  seems  to  have  consisted  of  German  civil  servants  and 
Soviet  Ukrainian  officials. 
16  BA:  Reichswirtschaftsministerium.  Wirtschaftsangelegenheiten  mit  der  Ukraine.  (2418),  31.01.  Telegram  from  the  War  Ministry. 
Berlin.  2  May  1919. 
1'  BA:  Reichswirtschaftsamt.  Wirtschaftsangelegenheiten  mit  der  Ukraine.  (2418),  31.01.  Telegram  to  the  Bank  fur  I  landel  und 
Industrie,  Berlin. 
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the  Foreign  Ministry  was  not  convinced  that  the  Soviet  Ukrainian  government  was  to 
be  trusted  in  business  affairs.  In  this  respect  they  may  have  been  correct,  for  the  Soviet 
government  of  Ukraine  was  still  in  its  revolutionary  phase,  and  believed  that  the 
capitalist  governments  would  soon  be  swept  away  by  the  forces  of  revolution  in 
Europe. 
As  mentioned  above,  German  industry  was  behind  several  attempts  to  liquidate 
Bolshevism  once  and  for  all,  and  things  came  to  a  head  with  the  Kapp  putsch  in  1920 
where,  although  most  of  German  industry  adopted  a  position  of  neutrality,  some 
industries  went  so  far  as  to  support  the  attempt  to  supplant  democracy  in  Germany  with 
a  form  of  military  dictatorship.  An  industrial  group,  based  around  the  figures  of  Stinnes 
and  Hugenburg,  now  entered  politics  in  the  Weimar  Republic  directly,  and  many  large 
and  middle  scale  industrialists  joined  the  DNVP  (German  National  Peoples  Party)  or 
the  DVP  (German  Peoples  Party);  on  6  June  1920  some  were  even  elected  as  members 
of  Parliament  for  these  parties  and  took  their  seats  in  the  Reichstag.  Throughout  the 
1920s,  in  coalition  governments,  which  would  frequently  include  their  members,  the 
industrialists  pushed  through  foreign  and  economic  policy  -  often  with  opposition  from 
the  SPD. 
In  Soviet  Russia,  and  the  part  of  Ukraine  occupied  by  the  Bolsheviks,  foreign 
trade  had  virtually  collapsed,  due  not  only  to  the  conditions  of  `War  Communism'  but 
also  to  the  blockade  which  was  being  imposed  by  the  Allies  all  around  the  Soviet  area. 
The  economic  chaos  in  Soviet  Ukraine  is  best  defined  by  Alec  Nove's  description  of 
`War  Communism'  in  Soviet  Russia  in  1919: 
Kritsman  called  the  resultant  confusion  `the  most  complete  form  of 
proletarian  natural-anarchistic  economy'.  Anarchistic  because  of  conflicts 
between  different  administrative  instances,  and  because  of  lack  of  any 
coherent  plan.  Anarchistic  too  because  of  the  `shock'  (udarnyi)  of 
campaigning  methods,  by  which  the  authorities  rushed  from  bottleneck  to 
bottleneck,  creating  new  shortages  while  seeking  feverishly  to  deal  with 
others.  He  claimed  that  it  was  `heroic'.  He  knew  and  said  that  it  was 
chaotic. 
"  BA:  Reichswirtschaftsamt.  Wirtschaftsangelegenheiten  mit  der  Ukraine.  (2418),  31.01.  Report  from  the  Auswtrtigcs  Amt. 
Berlin.  26  June  1919. 
19  Alec  Nove,  An  Economic  History  of  the  USSR,  (London,  1969),  p.  70. 
107 In  the  course  of  1919,  the  political  situation  altered  several  times  in  Ukraine  in  the 
summer  Denikin's  White  Russian  Forces  captured  Kiev,  and  for  a  time  it  looked  as  if 
Ukraine  would  become  the  centre  of  a  White  Russian  administration  which  would  go 
on  to  rule  all  Russia.  In  October  1918  Colin  Ross  (a  German  agent  in  Ukraine)  had  sent 
a  report  on  all  aspects  of  Ukraine  to  the  Reichs  Chancellory  in  Berlin,  and  although  this 
was  still  during  the  period  of  German  occupation,  many  of  the  economic  factors 
involved  still  held  true  in  October  1919  (and  indeed  into  1920). 
One  of  the  greatest  problems  for  trade  between  the  Central  Powers  and 
Ukraine  is  the  full  devaluation  of  the  currency.  The  financial  situation  of  the 
country  is  fully  chaotic.  The  currencies  of  various  governments  circulate  in 
the  country  and  these  currencies  are  not  stable  and  have  no  securities  and  the 
currency  of  the  present  government  is  also  worthless,  as  it  is  not  backed  up 
by  taxation  or  by  any  receipts.  As  a  result  the  rouble  has  sunk  to  a  tenth  of 
its  value.  The  prices  are  fantastic  in  the  same  way.  Everyone  right  down  to 
the  street  cleaners  and  the  vagabonds  and  de-commissioned  soldiers  work 
only  for  valuables;  and  the  slightest  form  of  physical  labour  e.  g.  the 
unloading  of  rail  wagons  is  paid  between  30  and  50  Roubles  per  day.  20 
These  were  in  the  relatively  stable  conditions  of  late  1918;  by  the  time  that 
Denikin's  White  armies  entered  Kiev  in  the  summer  of  1919,  Ukraine  was  already  well 
on  the  way  to  the  situation  which  would  lead  to  chaos  in  the  agricultural  sector.  This 
was  heavily  compounded  by  the  anarchism  rampant  in  the  countryside,  which  meant 
that  rail  lines  were  not  safe  for  the  transport  of  goods,  and  the  foodstuffs  upon  which 
the  Ukrainian  economy  relied,  were  also  not  being  supplied,  or  were  being  plundered 
by  marauding  armies.  For  German  industry  and  importers  the  question  was,  of  course, 
who  to  do  business  with;  the  Bolsheviks  under  Rakovsky,  the  nationalists  led  by 
Petliura,  or  the  White  government  of  Denikin.  There  were  tentative  attempts  to 
establish  economic  links  with  the  White  government  in  Kiev;  but  by  November  1919 
the  White  forces  were  in  retreat  and  the  Soviet  forces  recaptured  Kiev.  The  Germans 
were  now  faced  with  doing  business  with  the  Soviet  regime  to  which  there  seemed  to 
be  no  alternative. 
Already  in  July  1919  the  Soviet  regime  in  Kharkov  was  approaching  the  Germans 
in  order  to  establish  links.  Arthur  Moos,  the  Liquidator  for  the  Central  Railway  Office 
20  PA  AA:  Stellvertreter  des  Reichskanzlers.  Ukraine,  Report  of  Colin  Ross.  Bd  4  (29). 
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with  the  news  that  Rakovsky  was  interested  in  having  closer  links  with  Germany  and 
was  forming  trade  commissions  in  order  to  deal  with  it.  Moos  had  been  asked  by  the 
Ukrainian  government  to  open  negotiations  with  the  German  government  on  the 
issue.  21  Skoropadskyi,  the  former  Hetman  of  Ukraine,  gave  the  Germans  his  opinion  on 
future  contacts  and  on  the  work  required  to  rebuild  Ukraine.  A  telegram  from  Vienna  to 
the  Foreign  Ministry  outlined  what  Skoropadskyi  had  been  saying  to  German  officials. 
He  fully  understood  that  Germany  was  not  in  a  position  to  do  anything  militarily  or 
financially  about  Ukraine: 
It  can  however,  make  its  political  ideas  known  about  the  future  relationship 
with  Russia  and  Ukraine,  which  will  form  the  western  part  of  the  future 
Russian  Federation,  and  inform  them  if  the  German  government  will  take 
part  in  the  work  of  reconstruction  in  which  he  is  thinking  of  playing  a  part, 
or  whether  they  regard  their  role  in  Ukraine  as  being  finally  played  out.  22 
Skoropadskyi's  ideas  would  seem  to  suggest  a  White  victory  in  the  Civil  War,  or 
some  form  of  nationalist  regime  in  Kiev,  but  it  was  clear  that  he  believed  that  Germany 
still  had  an  economic  role  to  play. 
The  Allied  blockade  of  Russia  had  a  major  effect  on  all  trading  links  with  the 
Soviet  Ukraine,  or  at  least  that  part  of  it  occupied  by  the  Bolsheviks;  but  in  January 
1920  the  Allies  finally  accepted  that  the  `pariah'  state  could  no  longer  be  economically 
isolated.  On  16  January  the  Allied  Supreme  Council  lifted  the  blockade  of  Soviet 
Russia.  No  nation  was  prepared  to  supply  the  necessary  funding  for  fighting  the 
Bolsheviks.  The  Supreme  Council  adopted  a  resolution  providing  for  "an  exchange  of 
goods  on  the  basis  of  reciprocity  between  the  Russian  people  and  Allied  and  neutral 
countries".  Commerce  was  to  be  allowed  to  rule  rather  than  armed  intervention  but  as 
Stephen  White  points  out,  the  change  was  more  apparent  than  real:  23 
Other  than  formally,  in  fact,  there  had  been  little  change  in  British  or  Allied 
policy;  for  what  the  Supreme  Council's  decisions  represented  was  not  so 
much  the  adoption  of  a  new  and  no  longer  anti-Bolshevik  strategy,  but 
rather  the  selection  of  a  new  and,  it  appeared,  more  promising  tactic  by 
which  that  strategy  might  be  pursued.  This  new  tactic,  in  the  words  of  a 
21  PA  AA:  Büro  des  Staatsekrettirs.  Allgemeine  Angelegenheiten  [Ukraine].  (R14394).  68.  Bericht,  9  July  1919.  22  PA  AA:  Büro  des  Staastsekretar.  Allgemeine  Angelegenheiten  [Ukraine].  (R14392).  120.  Telegram,  10  July  1919.  23  Stephen  White,  Britain  and  the  Bolshevik  Revolution,  p.  3. 
109 Foreign  Office  memorandum,  was  designed  to  provide  an  "opportunity  of 
testing  the  theory  frequently  advanced  of  late  that  the  lifting  of  the  blockade 
would  do  more  to  oust  or  modify  Bolshevism  than  armed  intervention  ever 
accomplished.  "24 
In  November  1920  General  Wrangel's  forces,  the  last  great  hope  of  the  White 
cause,  were  defeated  and  driven  from  the  Crimea.  It  had  already  been  felt  for  months  in 
Germany  that  the  Soviet  regime  in  Kharkov  was  the  only  one  that  could  be  negotiated 
with,  and  Wrangel's  fall  merely  confirmed  this. 
The  old  rivalries  with  Britain  and  France  would  continue;  and  in  a  spirit  of  post- 
Versailles  revanchism,  the  German  Foreign  Ministry  closely  watched  all  economic 
agreements  with  Soviet  Ukraine.  The  representative  of  the  nationalist  Petliura  regime  in 
London,  Margolin,  had  contacted  the  British  with  regard  to  their  relations  with  his 
government  and  Soviet  Ukraine.  He  reported  his  conversation  with  the  British  to  the 
German  embassy,  which  contacted  Berlin.  Margolin  was  of  the  opinion  that  Ukraine 
had  nothing  to  expect  from  France,  and  that  its  two  natural  trading  partners  were 
Germany  and  Britain,  on  the  grounds  that: 
Ukraine  needs  machines  of  all  kinds  from  Germany,  which  can  be 
exchanged  for  raw  materials,  and  especially  engineers  are  also  needed,  and 
the  role  of  England  is  vital  for  she  controls  the  Black  Sea  and  all  the  routes 
to  Ukraine. 
Margolin  had  told  the  British  that  the  Germans  should  be  allowed  to  be  the 
dominant  power  in  the  Baltic  States,  whereas  Britain  should  protect  Ukraine.  He  did  not 
mean  that  Germany  would  be  excluded  from  Ukraine,  on  the  contrary  Ukraine 
estimated  that  it  would  meet  most  of  its  industrial  requirements  in  Germany,  and 
furthermore  with  the  support  of  Britain.  He  was  received  by  Lord  Hardinge  on  October 
21st,  who  asked  if  the  Soviet  government  would  recognise  the  independence  of  Ukraine 
if  the  Entente  also  did.  25 
This  was  obviously  the  opinion  of  the  Ukrainian  nationalists  and  also  of  the 
Germans  on  the  economic  links  between  their  countries.  The  Soviet  regime  in  Kharkov 
was  also  keen  to  begin  trade  links  with  Germany;  as  the  Allied  trade  blockade  was 
_`  PRO:  Birse  Memorandum,  21  January  1920,  Foreign  Office  Papers.  371/4032/172292. 
2S  PA  AA:  Büro  des  Staatsekretärs.  Russland  (R39505K).  90.  Aufzeichnung.  Deutsche  Gesandschaft,  26  October  1920. 
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Soviet  Ukraine. 
When  the  Soviet  government  was  firmly  established  in  Ukraine,  after  the  ending 
of  the  Soviet-Polish  War  and  the  Treaty  of  Riga,  the  German  government  and  industry 
were  finally  ready  to  begin  economic  negotiations  with  Moscow  and  Kharkov.  It  is 
significant  that  the  first  Soviet  economic  delegation  to  Berlin,  in  the  early  months  of 
1922,  included  Rakovsky.  The  leader  of  the  delegation  was,  of  course,  the  Soviet  expert 
on  Germany,  Karl  Radek,  but  the  other  members  were  Krasin  and  Rakovsky.  Maltzan 
from  the  AA  arranged  for  Radek  to  meet  the  industrialist  Hugo  Stinnes,  who  had  also 
been  involved  in  the  planning  of  German  economic  war  aims  in  Ukraine  in  191826 
Thus  it  can  be  seen  that  some  of  the  economic  themes  of  the  period  1918-1920  would 
emerge  again  after  the  consolidation  of  Soviet  power  in  Ukraine,  and  Rakovsky  was  at 
the  heart  of  them.  Germany  had  found  a  new  partner  with  whom  to  do  business  in  the 
East.  Germany  became  an  equal  trade  partner  with  Soviet  Ukraine,  and  the  relationship 
would  blossom  after  Rapallo. 
26  E.  1  1.  Carr,  The  Bolshevik  Revolution,  1917-1923.  Volume  3,  p.  369. 
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PAUL  ROHRBACH  AND  THE  IDEAS  OF  TIIE  UKRAINOPIIILES 
"History  proves  that  the  German  people  owes  its  existence 
solely  to  its  determination  to  fight  in  the  East  and  to  obtain 
laud  by  military  conquest.  In  general  terms  laud  in  Europe  is 
only  to  be  obtained  at  the  expense  of  Russia.  The  German 
Reich  must  therefore  follow  in  the  footsteps  of  the  Teutonic 
Knights  in  order  to  guarantee  the  nation  its  daily  bread 
through  occupation  of  Russian  territory.  "  (Meier  Kampf)1 
These  words  written  in  1924  by  Adolf  Hitler  bear  a  strong  resemblance  to  ideas 
expressed  by  Paul  Rohrbach  less  than  ten  years  before  and  which  he  continued  to 
express  in  the  early  years  of  the  Weimar  Republic.  Indeed  Rohrbach  would  live  to  see 
Hitler  come  to  power  and,  although  he  had  many  differences  with  the  Nazis,  he  was 
very  much  a  radical  thinker  of  the  German  Right.  Hitler  and  the  Nazis  drew  their  ideas, 
and  indeed  some  of  their  ideology,  from  a  wide  collection  of  German  and  French 
writers  and  thinkers.  Rohrbach's  importance  is  that  he  was  the  major  German  figure 
concerned  with  Ukraine,  along  with  others  such  as  Arthur  Dix,  and  various  members  of 
the  Pan  German  League.  Rohrbach  was  to  write  several  books  (particularly  during 
World  War  I),  which  found  tremendous  resonance  within  political  and  intellectual 
circles  in  Germany  at  the  time. 
Although  now  almost  forgotten  in  Germany,  his  ideas  carried  considerable  weight 
during  World  War  I  and  in  the  early  years  of  the  Weimar  Republic.  By  late  1918 
Rohrbach  had  lost  much  of  his  influence,  but  his  ideas  continued  to  play  a  role  for  some 
on  the  German  Right.  He  was  broadly  sympathetic  to  the  Ukrainian  nationalists, 
whereas  the  attitude  of  the  Foreign  Ministry  and  `official'  Germany  was  far  more 
cautious.  He  is  also  important  in  that  he  left  a  body  of  work,  whereas  many  of  his 
contemporaries  have  faded  into  obscurity.  German  war  aims  in  World  War  I  were 
essentially  based  on  nothing  but  the  traditional  realpolitik  or  sheer  imperialism, 
whereas  those  of  World  War  II  were  ostensibly  based  on  racial,  Social-Darwinist  and 
Lebensraum  theories.  It  is  also  true  that  many  of  the  far-reaching  plans  for  territorial 
1  Adolf  f  litler,  Mein  Kampf  (London:  Hutchinson,  1969),  p.  128. 
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of  historians  such  as  Fritz  Fischer,  and  have  only  become  known  to  historians  since  that 
time.  It  is  certain  however,  that  Rohrbach's  works  would  have  been  known  to  Hitler, 
and  in  particular  to  Rosenberg,  and  in  my  opinion  led  in  no  small  way  to  the 
development  of  early  National  Socialist  Weltanschauung  on  the  East. 
Paul  Rohrbach  was  born  in  1869  in  Livland  (modern  Latvia)  and  he  died  in  1956. 
He  studied  theology,  history  and  geography  in  Berlin,  and  in  1894  he  became  a  German 
citizen.  He  always  considered  himself  a  Balt.  As  George  Fischer  noted,  there  was  a 
distinction  between  the  educated  middle-class  Russian  Germans  from  St.  Pctersburg  and 
Moscow  and  the  irredentist  Balts,  many  of  who  became  German  nationalists  in 
Germany.  2  Rohrbach  recalled:  "Our  consciousness  of  being  German  was  so  strong  that 
we  did  not  understand  why  people  at  first  considered  us  `Russians'  in  Germany.  "3  A 
contemporary  of  Rohrbach's,  and  also  a  Balt,  was  Alfred  Rosenberg,  the  framer  of  the 
Nuremberg  Articles,  and  one  of  the  earliest  members  of  the  Nazi  party.  However, 
Rohrbach  did  not  display  anti-Semitism  in  any  form;  but,  in  common  with  the  Nazis,  he 
was  bitterly  opposed  to  both  the  Poles  and  the  Bolsheviks. 
Robert  C.  Williams  pointed  out  the  dilemma  faced  by  the  Baltic  Germans  in  their 
relationship  with  Germany  and  Russia: 
Thus  the  process  of  assimilation,  of  `becoming  German',  could  mean  either 
hostility  or  attraction  towards  Russia,  depending  on  the  German 
environment.  For  Germany  itself,  as  Thomas  Mann  suggested,  was  a  land  in 
the  middle,  neither  Eastern  nor  Western,  torn  as  to  its  identity  and  its  future. 
In  this  sense  the  Balts  found  in  Germany  no  solution  to  their  problems  of 
identity  but  a  mirror  of  their  own  dilemma.  Yet  in  the  end  they  did  have  a 
choice,  as  Shubart  noted,  because  of  their  German  culture,  as  to  the  message 
they  would  convey  and  the  Germans  they  would  seek  out.  4 
From  1901  he  became  the  editor  of  Friedrich  Naumann's  weekly  magazines  Ililfe 
and  Zeit.  In  1903  he  became  Imperial  Commissioner  for  Settlement  in  German 
Southwest  Africa.  During  World  War  I  he  was  the  most  widely  read  commentator  on 
colonial  and  foreign  policy  theses  in  Germany.  His  most  famous  books  were  Der 
deutsche  Gedanke  in  der  Welt  (The  German  Idea  in  the  World)  published  in  1912  (with 
2  George  Fischer,  Soviet  Opposition  to  Stalin:  A  Case  Study  In  World  War  11,  (Cambridge,  Mass￿  1952),  pp.  76-77. 
3  Paul  Rohrbach,  Um  des  Teufels  Handschri(fl.  (1!  amburg,  1953),  p.  9. 
Williams,  Culture  in  Exile,  Russian  Emigres  in  Germany,  p.  369. 
113 a  later  edition  in  1920),  and  Die  Geschichte  der  Menschheit  (The  History  of  Humanity) 
published  in  1914 
Even  the  titles  of  the  books  indicate  the  sweep  of  ideas  with  which  Rohrbach  was 
concerned.  He  developed,  in  a  synthesis  of  Christianity  and  Politics,  a  theory  of 
German  cultural  imperialism.  He  was  opposed  to  annexation  in  Europe,  and  was  much 
more  attracted  to  the  concept  of  the  German  cultural  mission  being  fulfilled  through 
economic  spheres  of  influence.  During  the  First  World  War,  Rohrbach  was  working  in 
the  Central  Office  for  Foreign  Affairs,  where  he  was  very  active  producing  war 
propaganda.  Rohrbach  was  a  believer  in  the  support  and  expansion  of  the  German  idea 
in  the  world.  He  did  not  share  some  of  the  ideas  on  territorial  expansion  of  the 
Alldeutsche. 
Rohrbach's  form  of  German  Protestant  faith  influenced  his  ideas  considerably, 
and  with  concepts  such  as  'To  colonise  is  to  missionise,  Rohrbach  thought  of  cultural 
contributions,  which,  he  saw  as  an  aspect  of  the  German  `Cultural  Mission'.  The 
spreading  of  German  ideas  was  for  Rohrbach  not  only  in  the  interest  of  the  German 
people,  but  also  a  major  contribution  by  Germany  to  the  whole  of  humanity.  Thus  he 
believed,  during  World  War  I,  that  Germany  should  liberate  those  European  peoples 
being  held  down  by  England  and  its  ideas,  and  to  assist  the  smaller  nations  to  develop 
their  own  cultural  and  intellectual  resources.  One  can  understand  how  this  would  have 
had  significance  vis  a  vis  Russia  and  Ukraine. 
Even  after  the  war  Rohrbach  continued  to  believe  in  his  theory  of  `Manifest 
Destiny',  and  he  sought  to  expound  his  ideas  further;  but  in  the  atmosphere  of  the  early 
Weimar  Republic  they  found  no  real  following,  and  it  was  only  in  völkisch  and  extreme 
right  wing  circles  that  his  ideas  were  taken  seriously  in  the  20s.  Although  Rohrbach 
was  not  a  Nazi,  many  of  the  Nazi  aims  in  Eastern  Europe  were  in  effect  his  also. 
In  the  foreword  of  his  book  Russland  und  Wir  (Russia  and  Us),  published  in  1915, 
Rohrbach  had  written  of:  "the  threat  to  Germany  and  European  culture  from  the  eastern 
barbarism".  5  In  1920  the  barbarism  from  the  east  was  to  his  mind  similar,  though  it 
might  carry  a  different  name  -  Bolshevism.  One  can  see  a  straightforward  continuity  in 
his  ideas  from  the  height  of  World  War  Ito  the  end  of  the  Russian  Civil  War  -  and  long 
after  it.  The  basic  ingredients  of  the  melange  were;  fear  of  Russia,  protection  for 
Germany's  eastern  frontier,  markets  for  German  products,  the  cultural  mission  of 
Paul  Rohrbach,  Russland  und  Wir  (Stuttgart,  1915),  p.  4. 
114 Germany,  and  the  role  of  Ukraine  as  a  counterbalance  to  Poland.  All  of  these  ideas 
would  of  course  have  circulated  among  the  German  right,  and  would  have  been  known 
to  Hitler  and  his  disciples.  Rohrbach's  concepts  of  the  German  cultural  mission,  and  on 
the  eastern  barbarism  of  Bolshevism  may  be  noted  in  Mein  Kampf,  where  the  author 
wrote  of  the  likely  collapse  of  the  Russian  state.  This  echoed  Rohrbach's  view  that  the 
former  empire  would  disintegrate  into  its  constituent  parts,  especially  in  the  Baltic  and 
Ukraine,  and  that  this  was  something,  which  Germany  should  encourage. 
Whatever  the  likelihood  of  a  Bolshevik  collapse  in  1924,  when  Hitler's  words 
were  written,  it  was  far  more  likely  in  1919  and  1920  at  the  peak  of  the  Russian  Civil 
War.  Nothing,  it  appeared,  would  stop  the  dismemberment  of  the  former  Russian 
Empire,  and  Rohrbach  and  others  would  ensure  that  Germany  was  prepared. 
Rohrbach  had  been  interested  in  Ukraine  since  long  before  World  War  1,  but  the 
events  in  Ukraine  in  1918  and  1919  allowed  him  to  put-  some  of  his  theories  into 
practice.  With  the  German  occupation  of  Ukraine  in  1918,  it  seemed  to  Rohrbach  that 
many  of  his  cherished  nostrums  could  be  realised.  He  duly  established  a  German- 
Ukrainian  Society  to  promote  understanding  and  friendship  between  the  two  peoples, 
and  became  a  supporter  of  the  Hetman,  and  later  of  the  Directory.  He  was  to  remain  a 
supporter  of  Ukrainian  nationalism  all  his  life,  and  would  endeavour  to  bring  the  two 
countries  closer  together,  always  in  the  interests  of  Germany. 
During  the  period  of  the  German  supported  Hetmanate,  in  May  1918,  when  the 
German  Foreign  Ministry  required  representatives  to  be  sent  to  Ukraine  who  were 
trusted  by  the  Ukrainians,  Rohrbach  was  selected  as  one  of  them.  The  other  was  Axel 
Schmidt.  The  two  Germans  were  not  impressed  with  the  Hetman,  and  criticised  both 
the  Hetmanate  and  Germany's  policy  in  Ukraine.  Rohrbach  produced  a  twenty-three 
page  "Rohrbach  Report",  which  was  submitted  by  the  German  Ambassador  in  Ukraine 
to  the  Chancellor.  The  report  contained  the  following  statement: 
The  present  Hetman's  cabinet  is  of  Great  Russian  orientation  and  is 
endeavouring  to  lead  Ukraine  back  to  Moscow.  It  simply  cannot  be 
trusted,  since  it  is  composed  mainly  of  the  Kadets.  These  people  have 
clearly  shown  themselves  as  enemies  of  Ukraine  not  only  during  the 
Tsarist  regime  but  since  the  Revolution  as  we]  1.6 
6  Fcdyshyn.  Germany's  Drive  to  the  East  and  the  Ukrainian  Revolution 
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115 The  German  ambassador  in  Kiev,  Mumm,  gave  his  opinion  of  Rohrbach's  report, 
and  outlined  his  views,  which  he  regarded  as  similar  to  Rohrbach's: 
As  far  as  Dr.  Rohrbach's  practical  proposals  are  concerned,  they  are 
essentially  identical  with  the  position  I  have  already  adopted.  In  a  few  days, 
I  expect  to  have  the  opportunity  of  stating  officially  that  the  German 
government  will  continue  its  support  of  the  idea  of  an  independent, 
democratic,  Ukraine.  I  shall  urge  the  new  Ukrainian  government  to  carry 
out  an  immediate  and  thoroughgoing  agrarian  reform  as  well  as  the 
establishment  of  a  national  Ukrainian  education  system.  7 
In  a  new  edition  of  his  book,  Der  deutsche  Gedanke  in  der  Well  (1920),  he  wrote 
of  his  ideas  on  Ukraine,  and  some  of  the  other  Border  States  of  the  former  Russian 
Empire.  For  Rohrbach,  in  the  context  of  the  Russian  Civil  War,  the  most  important  fact 
was  that  the  former  Russian  Empire  had  ceased  to  exist.  He  went  on  to  argue  that 
neither  Finland,  nor  Poland,  nor  the  Baltic  States,  nor  Ukraine,  would  remain  with 
Russia  in  the  long  term.  It  was  vital  for  Germany  to  accept  the  reality  of  this  situation 
and  to  change  its  foreign  policy,  and  its  economic  policy,  accordingly.  He  believed  that 
Germany's  position  in  relation  to  Ukraine  was  a  far  more  favourable  one  than  that  of 
the  Entente,  and  he  went  on  to  write  that  the  biggest  fear  of  the  Entente  was  that 
Germany  and  Russia  would  find  each  other  some  day.  Thus  it  is  clear  that  Rohrbach 
shared  the  opinion,  prevalent  in  the  German  officer  class  for  example,  that  the  Allies 
were  petrified  of  a  German-Russian  rapprochement.  He  also  believed  (as  did  Lenin) 
that  a  Russia  without  Ukraine  would  be  a  poor  land  indeed,  especially  if  also  cut  off 
from  petroleum  deposits  in  the  Caucasus.  Rohrbach  continued: 
The  most  powerful  among  the  Border  peoples  are  the  Ukrainians.  With  40 
million  people  they  occupy  a  country  one  and  a  half  times  the  size  of 
Germany.  They  are  linguistically,  physically  and  intellectually  separated 
from  Russia  and  today  no  longer  politically  forced  together  with  them.  A 
forced  attempt  at  union  will  not  quench  the  national  individuality  of  the 
Ukrainians.  The  second  enemy  of  the  Ukrainian  is  the  Pole.  8  Because  of  the 
Polish  campaign  of  robbery  and  oppression,  strengthened  and  encouraged 
by  the  Entente,  the  German  and  Ukrainian  peoples  are  natural  allies.  None 
of  the  changes  brought  about  by  the  World  War  in  Eastern  Europe  is  so 
'  Ibid. 
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116 important  for  us  as  the  independence  of  Ukraine.  It  is  the  fact,  which  makes 
it  impossible  in  the  end,  for  us  to  be  encircled  and  attacked  with 
overwhelming  strength  from  West  and  East  at  the  same  time.  An 
understanding  of  the  Ukrainian  problem  is  essential  for  the  understanding  of 
a  major  aspect  of  Europe's  future.  Failures  of  perception  that  arc  made  here 
are  mistakes  of  the  political  intellect.  As  President  of  the  German-Ukrainian 
Society  I  have  taken  it  upon  myself,  since  the  days  of  the  signing  of  peace 
between  Ukraine  and  Germany,  to  work  for  the  coming  together  of  the 
Ukrainian  and  German  national  interests.  Also  for  Ukraine,  German  is  the 
language  of  communication  with  Europe,  and  neither  English  nor  French 
are  in  a  position  to  compete.  The  English  and  the  French  will  remain  as 
aliens  to  the  Ukrainians,  just  as  the  Russians,  and  their  policy  of 
exploitation,  will  not  make  them  any  more  popular.  9 
He  went  on  to  write,  that  for  Germany  a  study  of  the  Slavonic  world  would  pay 
tremendous  dividends,  and  was  as  important  as  a  study  of  the  Orient,  or  East  Asia,  and 
would  bear  twice  as  much  fruit.  It  was  necessary  for  Germany,  he  believed,  to  spread 
its  culture,  its  national  idea;  and  to  do  that  it  was  only  necessary  to  seize  the  initiative 
and  to  negotiate. 
It  can  be  seen  at  once  the  attraction  that  an  independent  Ukraine  would  have  had 
for  Rohrbach;  and  the  period  of  most  promise  were  the  years  1918-1920,  when  it 
seemed  that  Ukraine  would  indeed  achieve  its  independence,  and  become  a  major 
player  on  the  stage  of  Eastern  Europe. 
Arthur  Dix  was  a  contemporary  and  fellow  thinker  of  Rohrbach.  He  was  born  in 
1875,  and  died  in  1935  in  Germany.  Dix  was  an  economist  and  journalist,  a  leading 
member  of  the  National  Liberals,  and  the  German  Peoples  Party  (DVP).  In  the 
Nationalliberale  Korrespondenz'°  on  16  February  1918  Dix  wrote  of  the  importance  of 
Ukraine,  in  an  economic  sense,  for  Germany.  "What  is  Russia  to  us?  "  he  asked.  His 
answer  was  that  Moscow  and  St  Petersburg  were  relatively  unimportant  compared  to 
the  eastern  part  of  Mitteleuropa,  namely  Ukraine.  His  argument  was  that  Ukraine  was 
of  far  more  economic  importance  than  far  off  northern  Russia: 
9  Paul  Rohrbach,  Der  deutsche  Gedanke  in  der  Welt  (Berlin,  1920).,  p.  143. 
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117 Ukraine  will  be  of  even  more  economic  importance  when  she  develops  her 
own  independence  and  no  longer  has  to  work  to  hold  the  finances  of  Russia 
in  check.  And  Ukraine  will  develop  its  independence,  not  for  any  Utopian 
reasons  but  purely  for  reasons  of  realpolitik  (...  )  Ukraine,  soon  to  be  rich,  in 
the  future  is  for  us  far  more  important  as  a  supplier  and  as  a  market, 
especially  when  the  whole  cultural  development  begins  to  improve,  which  it 
will  as  soon  as  the  land  is  liberated  from  the  influence  of  Moscow  and  St 
Petersburg.  In  order  to  counteract  the  resentment  of  the  Poles  it  must  be  our 
policy  to  strengthen  Ukraine  and  Lithuania.  I' 
Dix  argued  that  Ukraine  had  always  been  threatened  by  Polish  aggression,  and 
that  the  role  of  Germany  must  be  to  become  an  ally  of  Ukraine.  He  regarded  the 
disintegration  of  Russia  as  being  unstoppable,  and  argued  that  it  would  continue  apace. 
Like  Rohrbach,  he  argued  for  Germany  not  to  be  excluded  from  these  developments  in 
Ukraine,  and  that  Germany  had  to  take  responsibility  there.  He  continued:  "The 
solution  to  the  Eastern  problem  does  not  lie  in  Moscow  or  St  Petersburg,  and  not  in 
economically  destitute  Russia,  it  lies  far  more  ip  the  bordering  areas,  which  have  the 
potential  to  be  significant  areas  of  world  economic  production,  it  would  not  be  a  good 
idea  to  destroy  the  old  pots  without  forming  new  vessels.  "12 
The  difference  in  emphasis  between  Dix  and  Rohrbach  is  perhaps  deceptive. 
Whereas  Dix's  arguments  are  based  more  on  economics  and  hard  rcalpolitik, 
Rohrbach's  seem  to  be  grounded  more  in  the  spheres  of  culture  and  nationalism.  It  is 
also  significant  that  Dix  mentions  the  Poles  as  being  the  chief  enemy  of  Ukraine,  and 
suggests  a  German-Ukrainian  alliance  against  them;  Rohrbach  also  believed  that  the 
Poles  stood  between  Ukraine  and  nationhood.  This  was  the  case  in  East  Galicia,  but  in 
the  rest  of  Ukraine  had  no  basis  except  in  historical  terms.  It  was  much  more  a  product 
of  German  resentment  against  Poland  for  the  Polish  Corridor,  and  the  Polish  seizure  of 
land,  which  the  Germans  considered  German  in  1918.  One  sees  here  the  beginnings  of 
the  Eastern  Pentagram,  a  concept  in  historical  terms  of  the  relation  between  Germany, 
Russia,  France,  Poland  and  Ukraine.  This  envisages  the  relationship  as  an  alliance 
between  France  and  Poland  on  one  side,  and  Germany  and  Ukraine  on  the  opposite, 
with  Russia  at  the  apex  waiting  for  its  opportunity.  This  was  the  thinking  of  many 
involved  in  framing  German  foreign  policy  in  the  early  20s,  that  an  alliance  with 
"  BA:  Arthur  Dix  Akten,  (90.  Di.  2),  381.  Nationalliberale  Korrespondcnz.  Nummer  2.13d  12.  February  16,1919. 
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absorption  of  Ukraine  into  the  Russian  orbit  in  1921,  and  the  alliance  between  the 
Ukrainian  nationalists  and  the  Poles  in  1920  somewhat  upset  the  plan. 
Apart  from  the  German-Ukrainian  Society,  Rohrbach  was  also  a  leading  light  in 
the  Ukrainian  Studies  Institute  in  Berlin.  The  affairs  of  the  Institute  lie  outside  the 
scope  of  this  thesis,  as  it  was  only  founded  in  1926,  but  it  is  noteworthy  that  its,  first 
Director  was  the  former  Ukrainian  Foreign  Minister,  D.  Doroshenko.  It  is  no 
coincidence  that  the  Institute  was  financed  by  the  German  Reich  after  1934.  Thus,  we 
can  see  the  link  between  Rohrbach's  writings  in  1918/20,  and  the  later  policies  of  the 
German  Reich  vis  a  vis  Ukraine.  He  laid  out  a  system  of  ideas  on  Germany's 
`civilising'  role  in  the  East,  and  also  on  the  political  and  economic  importance  of 
Ukraine  to  Germany  -  these  ideas  were  to  become  the  new  orthodoxy  in  Germany  after 
1933. 
On  1s`  March  1919,  Rohrbach  wrote  to  the  Foreign  Minister,  Count  Brockdorf- 
Rantzau,  announcing  a  new  journal  called  Ukraine  being  published  by  his  German- 
Ukrainian  Society,  and  made  several  comments  on  German  foreign  policy  in  Ukraine. 
The  journal,  Rohrbach  wrote,  would  contain  several  criticisms  of  German  policy  up 
until  that  date,  and  particularly  military  policy,  but  he  felt  these  criticisms  were 
justified.  He  appealed  for  a  proper  German  representation  in  Ukraine,  in  order  to  avoid 
misunderstandings  in  future: 
The  idea  that  Ukraine  in  a  political  and  national  sense  has  no  individual 
future  is,  for  anybody  who  knows  the  true  state  of  relations,  a  ridiculous 
one.  A  German  policy  which  would  allow  itself  to  be  led  by  this  viewpoint, 
would  bring  down  destruction  upon  itself  (...  )  The  relationships  are  that, 
Germany  as  regards  the  Ukrainian  question,  needs  to  do  nothing  other  than 
quietly  and  carefully  cultivate  the  Ukrainians,  in  so  far  as  the  present 
circumstances  permit;  and  to  give  the  Ukrainians  the  impression  that 
Germany  is interested  in  them  in  the  long  term.  13 
Rohrbach  went  on  to  draw  a  parallel  between  the  situations  in  Ukraine  and 
Armenia,  and  argued  that  the  reason  why  the  Armenians  were  successfully  defeating 
the  Bolshevik  armies  in  the  Caucasus  was  that  they  had  German  diplomatic  support. 
The  national  will  of  Ukraine  to  be  free  of  Russia  must  be  encouraged,  he  believed. 
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Ukrainians"  continued  Rohrbach,  and  finally  appealed  to  the  Foreign  Minister  to 
intervene  decisively  in  the  situation.  '4 
The  irony  is,  that  the  swinging  between  the  Russians  and  Ukrainians  was  indeed 
to  be  the  foreign  policy  of  Germany  from  1919  to  1921,  and  the  other  factor  was  that 
Brockdorff-Rantzau  had  far  more  important  issues  to  be  concentrating  on  in  March 
1919  than  Ukraine.  One  such  was  the  Peace  Terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  which 
Germany  was  being  asked  to  accept  unconditionally. 
The  journal  attached  (that  of  23  November  1918  Nr  3)  contains  references,  which 
seem  quite  left  wing  in  tone.  The  issue  is  mainly  concerned  with  the  meeting  of  the 
Ukrainian  National  Assembly  in  Kiev,  and  is  virtually  a  verbatim  report  of  the 
statements  issued  by  that  body,  in  overthrowing  the  Fietman's  government,  and 
appointing  the  Directory  as  the  government  of  Ukraine.  The  report  speaks  of 
overthrowing  the  reactionary  governments  in  Western  Europe,  and  welcomes  the 
coming  to  power  in  Europe  of  democratic  and  peoples'  governments.  It  goes  on  to 
attack  the  old  government  of  Ukraine,  and  the  landowners,  who  were  its  major 
supporters: 
However,  groups  of  large  landlords  are  forming  in  order  to  protect  the  old 
cabinet.  These  people  have  no  support  within  the  democracy  and,  as  a 
result  of  traditions  of  old  Russian  absolutism,  they  are  alien  to  every 
people's  democracy,  and  to  the  traditions  of  Ukrainian  statehood;  they 
organise  every  hindrance  possible  in  order  to  block  the  path  of  Ukraine  to 
a  healthy  democratic  development  into  statehood.  '5 
From  the  language  contained  in  the  report  it  is  clear  that  the  German-Ukrainian 
Society,  at  least,  welcomed  and  supported  the  demands  of  the  Directory;  and  it  comes 
as  some  surprise  to  see  Rohrbach's  group  supporting  what  was,  in  effect,  a  Social 
Democratic  government  in  Ukraine.  This  would  lead  one  to  assume  that  Rohrbach  was 
quite  liberal  and,  indeed,  progressive  in  his  views.  Such  an  interpretation  would  be  too 
simplistic  however,  as  one  must  first  gain  a  perspective  of  the  alternative  choices  as 
viewed  by  Rohrbach  in  1918.  It  was  clear  to  both  the  German  Supreme  Command,  and 
to  Rohrbach,  that  the  Hetman's  government  would  not  survive;  and  the  alternatives 
"  Ibid. 
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elements,  or  the  Bolsheviks.  There  was  clearly  no  choice  about  the  options.  It  can 
safely  be  alleged  that,  although  Rohrbach  was  in  every  sense  a  German  patriot,  and 
always  placed  the  needs  of  the  Reich  first,  he  also  genuinely  supported  the  Ukrainians 
and  the  ideals  of  Ukrainian  independence.  An  example  of  this  is  a  letter,  which  he  sent 
to  Arthur  Dix  on  10  September  1918,  with  regard  to  an  exchange  of  articles  between 
them.  Apparently  Dix  had  also  established  a  journal  on  Ukraine,  although  Rohrbach 
does  not  mention  the  title.  The  journal  established  by  Dix  seemed  to  be  in  several 
languages  (German,  Russian  and  Ukrainian),  and  Rohrbach  appealed  for  more 
sensitivity  regarding  the  Ukrainian  language.  Dix  had,  apparently,  not  placed  Ukrainian 
as  the  first  language  in  the  publication,  and  Rohrbach  set  out  his  ideas  on  the  subject: 
In  my  opinion  the  following  order  of  languages  would  be  best  -  first 
Ukrainian,  then  German  as  the  language  of  the  political  ally,  then  Russian. 
At  the  moment  there  is  a  magazine  Oko,  which  is  supposed  to  be  a 
Ukrainian  propaganda  sheet;  but  is  in  reality  a  magazine  attacking,  and 
making  fun,  of  the  Ukrainians,  because  of  the  fact  that  Russian  is  the  main 
language  and  Ukrainian  is  in  second  place.  Perhaps  then,  you  can  be  so  kind 
as  to  tell  me,  if  your  magazine  internally,  and  externally,  will  take  a  clear 
Ukrainian  position.  Part  of  that,  would  be  the  rejection  of  all  Moscowphilia, 
and  support  for  the  lasting  independence  and  sovereignty  of  Ukraine.  If  that 
is  the  case,  then  I  am  prepared  to  cooperate  with  you.  16 
Rohrbach  laid  out  his  position  clearly  -  no  cooperation  with  Moscow  at  any  cost. 
In  Rohrbach's  case  his  Russophobia  was  in  no  way  confined  to  the  Bolsheviks;  indeed, 
from  his  writings  before  1917,  it  is  obvious  that  he  was  just  as  opposed  to  the  Russian 
Empire,  and  that  his  views  of  Soviet  Russia  were  merely  an  extension  of  those  which 
he  already  held  on  Tsarist  Russia. 
By  1920  Rohrbach  was  involved  with  Axel  Schmidt  in  publishing  Die  Ukraine,  a 
quarterly  journal  describing  itself  as  dealing  with  German-Ukrainian  economic, 
political,  and  cultural  policies,  and  the  official  organ  of  the  German-Ukrainian  Society. 
Axel  Schmidt  recommended  the  independence  of  Ukraine  as  the  only  means  of  limiting 
16  BA:  Arthur  Dix  Akten  (90  Di.  2)  381.  Letter  from  Rohrbach  to  Dix,  10  September,  1918. 
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connection  in  the  years  of  World  War  I  and  the  period  preceding  it.  17 
In  the  journal,  one  encounters  the  familiar  themes  of  economics,  culture,  and 
Germany's  mission  in  the  East,  being  emphasised  and  interwoven.  The  journal  contains 
a  report  on  the  publication  oflavestiya  in  Kiev,  where  the  Bolshevik  publication  claims 
that  the  independent  Ukraine  was  dead,  and  that  only  the  Red  Soviet  Ukraine  lived.  The 
reply  from  Die  Ukraine  was:  "Away  with  all  enemies.  Russians  and  Poles.  Our  mother 
Ukraine  will  live!  "18  Once  again  the  traditional  enemies  of  Ukraine  were  listed,  the 
Poles,  Bolsheviks  and  Russian  Whites  and,  of  course,  it  followed  that  Germany  was  the 
true  friend  of  Ukraine.  The  next  article  dealt  with  Britain's  changing  policy  towards 
Ukraine,  and  alleged  that  England  was  coming  around  to  the  view  of  supporting 
independent  states  along  the  Black  Sea  and,  that  as  it  had  already  supported  Georgia, 
that  Ukraine  would  be  the  next  country  to  be  recognised.  19 
The  magazine  also  contained  a  report  from  Vienna  on  Vynnychcnko,  the 
Ukrainian  socialist,  and  earlier  leader  of  the  Rada,  who  subsequently  joined  the 
Bolsheviks.  Vynnychenko  had  managed  to  leave  Soviet  Ukraine,  after  having  become 
disillusioned  with  the  Soviet  government  there,  although  he  himself  held  cabinet  rank 
in  it.  The  article  about  Vynnychenko  is  written  by  Axel  Schmidt,  and  it  is  quite 
apparent  that  it  contains  the  views  of  the  German  Right,  or  at  least  sections  of  it,  on 
Ukraine: 
The  policy  of  Greater  Russia  towards  the  other  peoples  of  the  former  Tsarist 
Russia,  especially  Ukraine,  is  the  old  policy  of  `the  one  and  indivisible 
Russia'.  Where  is  there  a  state,  which  treats  public  opinion  so  cynically? 
Verbally  the  right  to  self-determination  of  the  peoples  is  openly  accepted.  In 
reality  however,  the  `one  and  indivisible'  Moscow  centralisation  carries  out 
the  exploitation  and  the  suppression  of  the  peripheral  areas.  It  is  not 
surprising  therefore,  that  not  only  communism,  in  its  Muscovite  form,  is 
discredited  with  the  people,  but  also  socialism  has  lost  its  allure.  20 
Here  is  seen  what  would  be  expected  to  be  the  more  natural  ideology  of  a 
reactionary  German  -a  rejection  of  communism,  and  socialism.  Indeed,  it  is  important 
to  make  clear  that,  although  most  Ukrainian  nationalists  regarded  themselves  as 
"Axel  Schmidt,  Das  Ziel  Russlands:  Mit  einem  ökonomisch-politischen  Kapitel  von  O.  I  lerman  (Stuttgart,  1916) 
BA:  Reichsarbeitsministerium.  Wirtschaftliche  Beziehung  zur  Ukraine  (1620),  39.01.  Die  Ukraine,  October  1920.  No  10,  s.  1-20.  19  Ibid. 
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122 socialists  until  1922,  in  the  years  following,  when  it  seemed  that  Soviet  power  had 
triumphed  in  Ukraine,  many  turned  away  towards  more  right  wing  nationalist  ideas; 
and  saw  the  nationalist  right  as  the  force  in  Germany  which  would  rescue  their  country 
from  the  clutches  of  Russia.  By  contrast,  the  socialist  ideals  of  Vynnychenko  and 
Petliura,  seemed  to  have  failed  to  dislodge  the  Bolsheviks,  and  the  Social  Democrat 
government  in  Berlin  was  regarded  as  having  been  too  disinterested. 
Die  Ukraine  continued  with  a  financial  report  on  Ukraine.  This  was  at  a  time 
when  big  business,  especially  the  steel  and  coal  industries,  were  playing  a  large  role  in 
the  framing  of  foreign  policy  in  Germany,  and  the  journal  considered  it  important  to 
appeal  to  their  interests.  Die  Ukraine  declared  the  intention  of  the  Ukrainian  Nationalist 
government  to  try  and  reconstruct  Ukraine  after  6  years  of  war;  and  stressed  the 
damage  caused  in  different  parts  of  the  country,  by  both  Denikin's  White  forces,  and 
the  Bolsheviks.  The  creation  of  a  new  Ukrainian  currency  is  outlined.  The  Ukrainian 
Nationalist  government  had  stressed  the  importance  of  foreign  aid  in  order  to  put  the 
country  on  its  feet  again.  21  Finally,  the  journal  applies  its  attention  to  a  new  book  about 
Germany,  written  in  the  Ukrainian  language,  with  contributions  from  Rohrbach 
(amongst  others): 
This  book  will  inform  the  Ukrainian  people  about  the  German  land,  about 
German  work,  and  German  culture,  and  strengthen  and  deepen  the 
intercourse  begun  between  the  two  peoples  after  the  Treaty  of  Brest- 
Litovsk.  For  though  Germany  may  have  made  many  mistakes  in  its 
Ukrainian  policy  (...  )  it  should  not  be  forgotten,  that  it  was  firstly  the 
German  victory  over  Tsarist  Russia,  which  gave  the  Ukrainian  nationalist 
movement  the  opportunity  to  bring  its  old  ideal  of  statehood  closer  to 
fulfilment.  With  the  ill  luck,  which  the  Versailles  Treaty  has  brought  to  both 
the  German  and  Ukrainian  peoples,  it  is  doubly  important  to  protect 
ourselves  against  an  unfriendly  environment.  22 
The  themes  of  common  defeat,  and  the  treachery  of  the  Allies,  appears  again,  and 
the  article  continued  with  the  argument  that,  although  Germany  may  have  been  cut  off 
from  its  former  colonies,  and  although  the  Allies  may  have  been  blocking  Germany's 
access  to  other  markets  in  the  world,  that  it  was  necessary  for  Germany  to  look  to  the 
east  -  for  its  salvation,  and  for  the  great  untapped  market  of  Ukraine:  "Industrial 
"  Ibid.  22  Ibid. 
123 Germany  and  Ukraine,  rich  in  raw  materials  (food,  cattle,  iron,  wool  and  leather)  are 
called  upon  to  support  each  other.  ,  23  The  article  finally  claimed  that  the  book  would 
teach  German  politicians,  industrialists,  and  traders  more  about  the  little  known  land 
-  Ukraine. 
Rohrbach  and  his  colleagues,  especially  Axel  Schmidt,  began  with  the  viewpoint 
that  Ukraine  was  always  in  the  position  to  achieve  statehood  as  a  fully-fledged 
sovereign  state.  They  were  also  of  the  opinion;  of  course  that  Ukraine  would  act  as  a 
barrier  state  and  protection  for  Germany  against  the  Russian  colossus,  which,  though 
weakened  by  the  war,  was  only  waiting  for  its  moment  of  revenge.  From  this  basic 
concept  Rohrbach  and  Schmidt  developed  their  policies  on  Ukraine  in  1918.  They  did 
not,  in  any  way,  criticise  the  German  military  intervention  in  1918  and,  indeed,  in  many 
ways  welcomed  it  as  the  fulfilment  of  their  plans.  Their  only  criticism  was  with 
subsequent  German  policy. 
They  regarded  support  for  the  Hetman  as  having  been  a  major  mistake  on  the  part 
of  Germany  -  because  his  supporters;  the  large  landowners,  were  riddled  with  the  Great 
Russian  idea,  and  they  regarded  the  socialist  nationalists  as  better  potential  allies.  By 
supporting  Skoropadskyi,  the  Germans  had  alienated  themselves  from  the  Ukrainian 
peasantry,  and  left  the  way  open  to  the  Bolsheviks. 
23  Ibid 
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THE  PERIOD  OF  HOSTILITY. 
POLAND  AND  UKRAINE,  NOVEMBER  1918"JANUAIZY  1920 
Frequently  it  is  alleged  by  Polish  historians,  such  as  Zbigniew  Karpus  and 
Barbara  Stoczewska,  l  and  particularly  during  the  1990s,  that  Poland  and  Ukraine  were 
allies  in  their  joint  struggle  against  the  Bolsheviks.  This  is  far  from  true  and  the  history 
of  Ukrainian-Polish  relations  during  this  period  can  be  divided  into  three  separate 
phases.  There  is  the  initial  period  after  the  establishment  of  the  Polish  Second  Republic 
and  the  concurrent  formation  of  the  Directory  in  Ukraine  and  the  first  Soviet  invasion 
of  Ukraine,  which  was  a  period  of  considerable  hostility  between  the  two  countries. 
Then  there  is  the  short  rapprochement  from  January  1920  until  the  Soviet-Polish 
armistice  in  the  autumn  of  1921,  and  finally  a  period  of  recrimination  and  distrust  from 
the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Riga  until  late  1922. 
The  establishment  of  the  Second  Polish  Republic  left  the  country  with  insecure 
frontiers  on  all  sides.  The  final  arbiter  of  some  of  these  disputes  would  be  the  Peace 
Conference  in  Paris  but  the  eastern  frontier  with  Ukraine  was  the  most  uncertain,  and 
the  writ  of  the  Entente  powers  did  not  run  there.  Matters  were  further  deeply 
complicated  by  the  fact  that  East  Galicia  had  declared  itself  independent  and  had  joined 
Ukraine.  This  implied  that  the  Ukrainian  nationalist  government  in  Kiev  recognised 
East  Galician  independence,  and  as  such  could  be  regarded  as  an  ally  of  the  Galicians. 
The  Directory  in  Kiev  did  indeed  recognise  East  Galicia  as  part  of  its  territory,  but  had 
no  desire  to  declare  war  on  Poland  and,  even  if  it  had  wanted  to,  had  not  the  military  or 
economic  resources  to  support  such  a  struggle.  For  the  Directory  the  main  enemy  was 
Soviet  Russia,  followed  as  a  close  second  by  the  White  forces  of  General  Denikin. 
Furthermore,  the  Ukrainians  were  desperate  for  the  support  of  Britain  and  France  and 
knew  that  any  anti-Polish  campaign  would  be  regarded  with  deep  suspicion  by  Poland's 
ally  France. 
The  Poles  however  had  no  reservations  about  hostile  manoeuvres  and  propaganda 
against  the  Ukrainians.  From  the  viewpoint  of  the  government  in  Warsaw,  the 
Directory  was  aiding  and  abetting  the  Galicians  and  as  such  was  a  threat  to  Polish 
sovereignty. 
Barbara  Stoczewska,  Litwa,  Bialortd.  Ukraina  w  mysli  politycnej  Leona  Wasilewskiego  (Krakow:  Ksicgarnia  Akadcmicka,  1998) 
125 The  first  indication  of  Polish  attitudes  towards  the  new  Ukrainian  republic  is  in 
the  press  reports  from  the  Polish  newspapers  in  Kiev.  On  January  30  1919,  the  Polish 
press  in  Kiev  was  predicting  the  reconstruction  of  "historic  Poland  from  sea  to  sea",  a 
clear  reference  to  the  Polish  Commonwealth  of  the  17th  century,  which  stretched  from 
the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea.  2  This  suggests  resurgence  of  Polish  expansionism  and  not 
of  any  sympathy  for  Ukraine.  This  was  soon  compounded  by  a  torrent  of  black 
propaganda  against  the  Ukrainians.  The  main  objects  of  this  propaganda  were  the 
governments  of  the  Entente  powers,  and  the  charges  against  the  Ukrainians  were  that 
they  were  the  allies  and  instruments  of  both  the  Bolsheviks  and  the  Germans,  and  that 
they  were  responsible  for  the  most  terrible  anti-Semitic  outrages. 
In  the  summer  of  1919  the  Polish  Foreign  Ministry  (MSZ)  formed  a  press  agency 
in  London,  with  the  aim  of  disseminating  Polish  propaganda  both  from  the  ministry  and 
from  the  Polish  press.  The  agency  was  first  named  the  Polish  Press  Bureau  but  by 
October  was  renamed  the  Eastern  European  News  Service,  which  was  probably 
intended  to  seem  a  more  objective  name.  The  bureau  covered  the  Ukrainian  nationalist 
struggle  against  the  Red  Army  and  Denikin,  as  well  as  the  war  in  East  Galicia.  On  June 
26th  1919  the  bureau  reported:  "According  to  Kurjer  Poranny  of  June  26,  the 
Ukrainian-Bolshevik  campaign  is  being  carried  out  under  German  direction,  and  at  the 
head  of  the  General  Staff  is  the  German  staff  officer  Lideker.  Many  German  officers 
command  units  in  the  Ukrainian  army  and  the  offensive  is  being  carried  out  with 
German  system  and  thoroughness.  s3  It  is  not  clear  if  this  refers  to  the  campaign  in 
Galicia,  but  in  all  the  reports  there  is  not  much  differentiation  between  the  forces  of  the 
Directory  and  the  Galicians.  This  may  be  because  the  main  element  of  the  Ukrainian 
army  was  the  Galicians.  On  June  27th  the  bureau  quoted  an  article  from  the  Polish 
paper  Dziennik  Powszechny:  "According  to  this  article  the  Ukrainians  three  times 
appealed  to  the  Bolsheviks  for  help  against  the  Poles  and,  finally,  an  agreement  was 
come  to  at  Kiev  by  which  Eastern  Ukraine  was  to  be  joined  to  Bolshevik  Russia  and,  in 
return,  the  Bolsheviks  were  to  cease  attacking  the  Western  Ukrainians  and  were  to  send 
help  against  Poland.  "4  German  involvement  was  again  raised  on  July  11th  in  a  report 
that  the  Germans  were  responsible  for  the  recent  ending  of  the  armistice  concluded 
between  the  Galicians  and  the  Poles  on  June  20th.  5  The  Ukrainian  Soviet  government 
2  Archiwum  Akt  Nowych,  Warsaw  '(hereafter  AAN)':  MSZ.  Dept  Politycmo-Ekonomiczny.  (7961  A),  x.  181. 
3  AAN:  MSZ.  Dept  Polityczno-Ekonomiczny  7635A.  s.  48. 
1  AAN:  MSZ.  Dept  Polityczno-Ekonomiczny  7635A,  s.  49. 
AAN:  MSZ.  Dept  Polityczno-Ekonomiczny  7635A,  s.  227. 
126 had  been  in  power  in  Kiev  since  the  spring  and  now  the  bureau  reported  on  atrocities 
being  carried  out  against  Poles  there.  According  to  the  reports  in  July  many  Poles  had 
been  arrested  and  the  arrests,  trials  and  executions  were  being  carried  out  under  the 
supervision  of  Germans.  6  This  may  refer  to  the  German  Sparticists  in  Kiev  but  it  is 
more  likely  to  be  an  allegation  that  Berlin  was  acting  as  an  ally  of  the  Bolsheviks.  It 
would  seem  that  the  Germans  were  active  in  both  East  Galicia  and  Ukraine,  according 
to  the  Polish  perspective. 
As  if  to  emphasise  this  point,  the  Prime  Minister  of  Poland,  Padcrcwski,  appeared 
before  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  on  June  5th  to  answer  central  questions  about 
Western  Ukraine  (East  Galicia)  in  an  exchange  with  Lloyd  George.  When  Lloyd 
George  asked  Paderewski  if  Polish  forces  were  still  advancing  in  the  Ukrainian  part  of 
Galicia,  the  Polish  leader  replied  that  there  were  two  Ukraines  and  only  one  Galicia. 
Paderewski  claimed  that  the  Ukrainians  were  under  the  influence  of  Germany.  He 
continued  that  the  population  of  Galicia  consisted  of  3,300,000  Ruthenians  and 
4,700,000  Poles.  7 
At  this  crucial  point  in  Ukrainian  history  the  Directory,  sensing  that  they  were 
losing  the  war  against  both  the  Red  Army  and  Denikin's  White  forces,  looked  to  Poland 
as  a  possible  ally.  On  May  27th  the  Directory  signed  a  secret  agreement  with 
Paderewski  in  Warsaw.  In  return  for  renouncing  all  claims  to  East  Galicia  and  Volhynia 
as  far  as  the  Styr  River,  Poland  agreed  to  recognise  an  independent  Ukraine.  8  The 
Galicians  were  outraged  and  forced  the  Directory  to  annul  the  agreement  but  it  showed 
the  cracks  in  the  Ukrainian  nationalist  movement,  which  would  widen  further  in  the 
following  year. 
The  stream  of  anti-Ukrainian  propaganda  from  the  Polish  Press  Bureau  continued 
in  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1919.  On  July  22nd  a  reported  speech  by  Dr.  Galecki,  the 
Polish  General  Delegate  to  East  Galicia,  referred  to  the  Ukrainian  leaders  as:  "Blind 
instruments  of  the  Germans,  who  are  the  enemies  not  only  of  Poland  but  of  all  Slavonic 
races.  s9  The  bureau  also  reported  on  Bolshevik  atrocities  against  the  Poles  in  Kiev  and 
the  surrounding  provinces,  that  many  thousands  had  been  arrested,  and  that  some  had 
6  ibid. 
7  Papers  Relating  to  the  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States.  The  Paris  Peace  Conference  1919.  Vol  V1,  p.  194. 
'  M.  Palij,  The  Ukrainian-Polish  Defensive  Alliance,  1919-1921.  An  Aspect  of  the  Ukrainian  Revolution  (Edmonton  CIUS: 
Edmonton,  1980),  p.  68. 
9  AAN:  MSZ.  Dept  Polityczno-Ekonomiczny  7635A,  s.  227. 
127 been  placed  in  concentration  camps  in  the  interior  of  Russia,  others  in  Darnica,  and  the 
rest  in  Kiev.  '° 
The  tide  of  war  began  to  change  in  Ukraine  and  both  the  nationalists  and  the 
Whites  began  to  force  the  Bolshevik  forces  back.  The  Galician  troops,  seeing  that  the 
war  in  East  Galicia  was  lost,  at  least  temporarily,  joined  Petliura  and  added  40,000  men 
to  his  army  and  enabled  him  to  march  on  Kiev.  On  30th  August  the  nationalist  army  re- 
entered  the  city  only  to  find  that  the  Whites  under  Denikin  were  also  occupying  the 
capital.  As  Denikin's  military  strength  was  far  greater  than  Petliura's  the  nationalists 
abandoned  the  city  the  following  day.  The  East  Galicians  were  well  aware  that  Petliura 
had  been  negotiating  with  Poland  and  agreed  to  join  Denikin's  army  on  the  condition 
that  they  would  not  be  engaged  in  any  action  against  Ukrainians.  "  Petliura,  in  turn, 
signed  an  armistice  with  Poland  on  September  Ist.  12  The  Ukrainians  had  divided  into 
two  camps,  one  hostile  to  Poland  the  other  neutral. 
The  Polish  Press  Bureau  continued  its  unrelenting  torrent  of  anti-Ukrainian 
propaganda  and  its  object  was  not  only  the  Galicians  but  Petliura  and  the  Directory 
also.  In  August  the  focus  switched  to  the  alleged  anti-Semitic  outrages  committed  by 
the  nationalist  forces.  On  August  7th  1919  a  state  telegram  was  sent  to  the  Polish  Press 
Bureau  from  Warsaw: 
A  graphic  account  of  the  Jewish  pogrom  which  took  place  in  Ploskirow  a 
town  in  Podolia  a  hundred  kilometres  to  the  east  of  Tarnopol  is  given  in  the 
Lemberg  paper  Slowo  Polskie  for  August  sixth.  When  early  this  year 
Ataman  Petliura's  troops  had  given  up  Kiev  to  the  Bolsheviks  without  firing 
a  shot,  they  began  to  retreat  to  the  west  organising  massacres  of  the  Jews  in 
every  larger  town  on  their  road.  On  the  second  day,  after  their  arrival  in 
Ploskirow,  shots  were  heard  in  the  early  morning  near  the  railway  station. 
The  Jews,  expecting  a  pogrom,  had  planned  a  Bolshevik  rising,  which 
failed,  and  about  noon  all  was  quiet.  The  organisers  of  the  Bolshevik  rising 
had  fled  from  the  town  and  the  Ukrainian  troops,  which  mostly  consisted  of 
Cossacks,  proceeded  to  take  revenge  on  the  Jews  who  remained.  Ataman 
Semesenko's  brigade  received  the  order  "Don't  waste  bullets.  Spare  nobody. 
Don't  plunder.  "  Cocaine  was  dealt  out  to  the  soldiers  and  at  two  o'clock 
10  AAN:  MSZ.  Dept  Polityczno-Ekonomiczny  7635A,  s.  377-378. 
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128 four  companies  fully  armed  started  for  the  town  (...  )  The  Cossacks  marched 
in  fours  and  sang  as  they  marched  and  when  they  reached  the  streets  of  the 
Jewish  quarter  they  were  told  off  in  small  groups  to  different  houses.  They 
entered  quietly,  after  which  spasmodic  weeping  and  groans  were  heard,  the 
soldiers  came  out  sprinkled  with  blood.  Their  officers  questioned  them. 
`Have  you  finished:  Yes.  All  of  them:  Yes.  All  right...  '  Jews  who  were 
wounded  and  left  for  dead  relate  that  when  the  Cossacks  entered  a  Jewish 
house  they  usually  found  the  family  assembled  around  the  table,  the  old  men 
in  their  Sabbath  dress  praying  before  lighted  candles,  all  sunk  in  a  kind  of 
fatalistic  resignation.  The  leading  Cossack  Ukrainian  said  `Say  goodbye  to 
each  other',  and  then  the  work  began.  If  money  was  offered  to  the  soldiers, 
they  said;  `We  want  your  lives  and  not  your  money.  '  Continually  came  the 
command  from  the  officers:  `With  the  bayonet.  '  A  Russian  Orthodox 
deacon  who  tried  to  stop  the  slaughter  was  at  once  murdered,  and  at  twilight 
the  work  was  finished  and  Ataman  Semesenko  entered  the  town  in 
triumphal  procession,  with  the  Ukrainian  standard  carried  before  him  and 
torch  bearers  to  light  his  way,  while  the  soldiers  cried:  `Little  father.  Little 
father.  Honour  to  him.  '  Then  plundering  began.  13 
This  detailed  description  of  a  pogrom  would  obviously  have  caused  deep 
revulsion  and  disgust  in  Britain  and  also  influenced  American  and  French  opinion.  I  do 
not  intend  to  enter  the  disputed  territory  of  the  history  of  pogroms  in  Ukraine  but  this 
example,  whether  factual  or  not,  is  interesting.  It  is  claimed  to  be  an  eyewitness  report, 
the  behaviour  of  the  troops  is  bestial  and  no  details  remain  excluded.  What  is  most 
pertinent  is  that  the  allegations  are  made  against  Petliura's  forces.  There  were  of  course 
numerous  pogroms  carried  out  in  Ukraine  during  this  period  and  some  were  the  work  of 
Petliura's  forces,  although  he  personally  forbad  it  and  later  claimed  no  responsibility 
for  what  happened.  14  It  was  one  of  the  major  propaganda  weapons  used  against  the 
Ukrainian  nationalists  and  played  a  large  part  in  the  alienation  of  liberal  opinion  in 
Western  Europe  from  the  nationalist  cause. 
In  a  response  to  a  report  on  pogroms  by  the  Committee  of  Assistance  to  Pogrom 
Victims  of  the  Russian  Red  Cross  in  Kiev,  Arnold  Margolin,  the  UNR  Deputy  Foreign 
'3AAN:  MSZ.  Dept  Polityczno-Ekonomiczny  7635A,  s.  380.1  am  giving  this  detailed  description  of  a  pogrom  contained  in  the 
Polish  propaganda  accounts,  in  order  to  give  an  impression  of  the  likely  impact  of  such  a  description  on  British  public  opinion.  "A.  Margolin,  Ukraina  t  politika  Antanty  (Berlin,  1921). 
129 Minister  wrote:  , 
In  this  report  it  is  pointed  out  that  under  the  Ukrainian  Central  Rada, 
under  Hetman  Skoropadskyi,  and  during  the  first  two  months  of  the  Directory,  there 
were  no  pogroms.  Pogroms  began  after  the  defeat  of  the  armies  of  the  Ukrainian 
Directory  by  the  Bolsheviki  (...  )"15  The  Poles  were  continually  using  charges  of 
committing  pogroms  against  the  Ukrainians  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  and 
elsewhere.  What  is  ironic  is  that  the  Jewish  press  reports,  widely  disseminated  in  the 
United  States  and  Britain,  suggest  that  the  Jews  in  Poland  and  in  East  Galicia  were 
accusing  the  Poles  of  carrying  out  pogroms  and  of  constant  harassment  of  Jewish 
communities.  16 
This  account  is  only  one  of  many  released  by  the  Polish  Press  Bureau  and  its 
successor  the  Eastern  European  News  Service.  Together  with  the  charges  of  pro- 
German  sympathies  and  of  collusion  with  the  Bolsheviks,  it  substantially  damaged  the 
reputation  of  the  Ukrainian  nationalists  and  lost  them  almost  totally  any  support  in  the 
Entente  countries.  This  was  the  primary  aim  of  Polish  propaganda.  The  lurid  reports  of 
pogroms  were  further  supported  by  accounts  of  massacres  carried  out  in  East  Galicia  on 
the  Polish  civilian  population,  and  particularly  on  landlords  and  priests.  To  the  Polish 
press  and  government  this  bore  all  the  hallmarks  of  Bolshevism'7,  and  when  the 
Ukrainians  were  not  dancing  to  Moscow's  tune  they  were  dancing  to  Berlin's. 
When  one  considers  that,  within  a  few  months  Petliura  would  be  the  gallant  ally 
of  Poland  this  is  quite  curious,  but  it  also  demolishes  the  theory  of  any  alliance,  or  even 
of  any  sympathy,  towards  the  Ukrainian  cause  existing  during  most  of  1919,  as  the  flow 
of  propaganda  from  the  government  controlled  news  agencies  indicted  not  only  East 
Galicians  of  atrocities  and  pro-German  sympathies  but  also  Petliura's  government. 
Despite  the  apparent  anti-Ukrainian  position  taken  by  both  the  Polish  press  and 
government  during  1919,  there  is  the  important  question  of  what  the  opinion  of 
Pilsudski  was.  Pilsudski's  role  as  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  army  and  leading 
statesman  was  central.  It  has  always  been  considered  that  Pilsudski  was  pro-Ukrainian 
and  the  architect  of  the  alliance  with  Petliura  in  1920.  What  were  his  views  during  most 
of  1919? 
For  most  of  1919  Pilsudski  considered  the  White  Russian  forces  to  be  his  major 
enemy  in  the  east.  Denikin's  policy  of  `one  and  indivisible  Russia'  was  regarded  as  far 
16  A.  Margolin,  The  Jews  of  Eastern  Europe.  (New  York,  1926),  pp.  126-28. 
16AAN:  MSZ.  Ambasada  RP  w  Berlinie  2411,2412,  k.  1.2414,2413. 
"Polish  reports  of  Bolshevik  and  Ukrainian  massacres  always  concentrated  on  attacks  on  priests,  nuns,  landowners  and  other 
figures  associated  with  the  Polish  state. 
130 more  threatening  to  the  Polish  state  than  the  Bolsheviks.  As  Denikin's  army  won  more 
and  more  victories  in  Ukraine  in  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1919,  Pilsudski  became 
more  alarmed.  Now  Poland  was  threatened  on  two  fronts,  by  the  war  of  independence 
in  East  Galicia  and  by  the  advancing  White  army.  The  major  cause  of  Polish  alarm  was 
that,  although  Denikin  recognised  Polish  sovereignty,  he  envisaged  it  as  extending  only 
as  far  as  Privislinsk  that  is  within  the  same  boundaries  as  Congress  Poland  in  1815,  and 
would  not  include  the  borderlands.  Pilsudski's  view  was  that  the  boundaries  of  the 
Polish  state  should  include  the  much  larger  area  prior  to  the  First  and  Second  Partitions, 
which  would  include  ethnographic  Lithuanian  and  Ukrainian  territories. 
Pilsudski's  interest  in  Ukraine  was  long  standing.  One  of  his  closest  colleagues 
reported  that  he  had  a  deep  knowledge  of  Polish-Ukrainian  relations  and  could  quote 
from  memory  long  passages  of  the  Hadziacz  agreement  of  1658.  He  believed  that  the 
partition  of  Poland  in  1667  marked  the  beginning  of  Poland's  decline  and  Russia's  rise 
as  a  great  power.  18  In  his  collected  writings  he  wrote  that  he  believed  that  the  Galician 
war  was  disastrous  for  both  sides.  He  believed  that  most  Ukrainian  socialists  -  most 
Ukrainian  nationalist  leaders  were  socialists  -  were  still  unwilling  to  take  orders  from 
Moscow,  despite  the  pro-Bolshevik  factions  within  both  the  Ukrainian  Social  Democrat 
and  Socialist  Revolutionary  parties.  Pilsudski  believed  that  the  Ukrainian  movement 
was  a  national  struggle  far  more  than  a  class  one.  19 
In  January  1919  Pilsudski  discussed  his  ideas  on  Ukraine  with  Lieutenant 
R.  C.  Foster  of  the  U.  S.  army  and  with  the  diplomatic  correspondent  of  the  Italian  paper 
Il  Secolo.  To  the  American  he  intimated  that  it  would  be  easier  to  negotiate  a  settlement 
with  the  Ukrainians  than  with  the  East  Galicians  and  to  the  Italian  he  expressed  his 
hope  for  an  understanding  with  the  Ukrainians:  "I  cannot  tell  you  how  the  future 
frontier  between  us  and  the  Ukrainians  will  be  drawn.  There  is  a  strong  trend  among  the 
Poles  to  incorporate  the  whole  of  East  Galicia  into  Poland  and  thus  establish  a  common 
frontier  with  Romania  in  order  to  have  a  connection  with  the  Black  Sea,  which  is 
desirable  for  economic  reasons.  I  think  that,  in  the  future,  an  understanding  between  us 
and  the  Ukrainians  will  be  reached.  s20 
There  was  a  fundamental  difference  in  perspective  in  Poland  in  1919  between 
Pilsudski  and  his  supporters  in  the  Polish  Socialist  Party  and  the  National  Democrats 
M.  K.  Dziewanowskii,  Joseph  Pilsudski:  A  European  Federalist,  1918-1922  (Stanford:  Stanford  University  Press,  1969),  p.  244. 
19  Ibid,  p.  245. 
20  Ibid,  p.  246. 
131 led  by  Dmowski.  For  Pilsudski  Russia  would  always  represent  the  main  danger  to 
Poland's  sovereignty  and  independence,  and  the  decline  of  Poland  as  a  great  power  was 
intrinsically  linked  with  the  rise  of  Russia.  An  essential  element  in  this  rise  was 
Russia's  acquisition  of  Ukraine. 
Already  in  January  1919  there  were  signs  that  certain  sections  of  the  government 
of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  were  seeking  Polish  support  for  their  war  effort.  On 
January  18th  Pilsudski  met  a  delegation  from  the  Ukrainian  nationalist  government  at 
the  Belvedere  Palace  in  Warsaw  and  discussed  Polish-Ukrainian  relations.  Pilsudski 
counselled  them  that  there  would  be  no  security  for  Ukraine  as  long  as  the  Bolsheviks 
and  Denikin  were  determined  to  destroy  it  and  that  Ukraine's  only  strength  would  lie  in 
a  union  with  Poland  21  To  emphasise  the  point  the  Polish  ambassador  to  the  nationalist 
government,  B.  Kutylowski  reported  to  Warsaw  from  Odessa  that  the  Ukrainians  had  no 
hope  of  defeating  the  Bolsheviks  unless  the  troops  were  withdrawn  from  Galicia  and 
that  in  order  to  do  that  the  struggle  against  Poland  would  have  to  end.  22  The  role  of  the 
Galician  troops  in  the  nationalist  army  was  essential,  and  it  can  be  understood  that 
while  these  forces  were  engaged  in  Galicia  itself  the  Ukrainian  struggle  in  East  Ukraine 
was  fatally  weakened.  This  was  Petliura's  dilemma,  to  make  peace  with  Poland  in  order 
to  free  his  forces  to  fight  Denikin  and  the  Bolsheviks,  or  by  making  peace  with  Poland 
to  alienate  his  Galician  troops  and  also  lose  the  support  of  the  government  of  Western 
Ukraine,  thus  dividing  the  nationalist  movement.  Polish  overtures  to  peace  must  be 
seen  in  this  perspective.  They  were  designed  to  withdraw  Kiev's  support  for  East 
Galicia  and  to  encourage  the  Ukrainians  to  continue  the  war  against  the  Russians,  both 
Red  and  White. 
By  July  the  Polish  forces  had  effectively  defeated  the  East  Galicians  driving  them 
across  the  frontier  and  into  Ukraine  proper,  where  they  were  to  play  a  major  part  in 
Petliura's  army.  The  nationalists  continued  to  be  pushed  back,  however,  first  by  the 
Red  Army  and  then  by  the  Whites.  Petliura's  situation  was  becoming  more  and  more 
desperate  in  the  summer  of  1919  and  in  August  he  made  a  secret  agreement  with 
Pilsudski. 
In  May  1919  Pilsudski  had  written  to  Prime  Minister  Paderewski  expressing  the 
view  that  Poland  was  completely  dependant  on  the  goodwill  of  the  Entente  and  that  the 
21  Przemyslaw  Hauser,  'The  Federal  Vision  in  the  Ideas  of  J.  Pilsudski  and  the  Attempt  to  Apply  it  1918.1921',  in  Polska  I  Ukraina, 
ed.  Z.  Karpus  et  al.  (Torun:  Michael  Copernicus  University  Press,  1997),  p.  127. 
u  Ibid. 
132 only  thing  preventing  an  outbreak  of  hostilities  with  Germany  was  that  goodwill.  It  was 
a  necessity  for  Poland  to  secure  a  federation  in  the  east  and  most  importantly  to  become 
the  leading  power  in  Eastern  Europe.  23  The  plan  was  to  include  the  vital  co-operation  of 
the  Lithuanians  and  the  Belorussians.  Unfortunately  for  Pilsudski,  the  Lithuanians  had 
no  idea  of  entering  a  Polish  federation  and  wanted  to  consolidate  their  own  sovereign 
state.  This  meant  that  Pilsudski's  grand  design  would  be  completely  dependant  on 
Ukraine. 
The  first  contacts  between  the  Poles  and  Ukrainians  began  as  ceasefire 
negotiations  in  Galicia  in  early  1919  and  mainly  concerned  the  problems  of  that  region. 
These  negotiations  were  often  at  the  behest  of  the  Entente  powers  and  frequently 
controlled  by  them.  Each  time  negotiations  collapsed  over  the  issue  of  the  borders  of 
East  Galicia.  When  they  started  again,  Poland  was  always  in  a  stronger  position  both 
militarily  and  politically.  There  were  several  attempts  to  secure  peace  with  Poland 
throughout  1919  by  Petliura,  but  these  attempts  became  more  desperate  as  the  military 
situation  worsened  for  the  Ukrainians  in  the  autumn  of  1919.  On  the  9th  September 
Petliura  proposed  military  and  political  co-operation.  A  delegation  from  the 
government  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  led  by  the  former  Minister  for 
Communications  Philipchuk  was  sent.  The  kernel  of  the  proposition,  which  the 
delegation  brought  from  Petliura,  was  that,  in  exchange  for  peace  and  possibly  future 
support,  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  would  renounce  East  Galicia.  Petliura,  with 
Kiev  lost  to  Denikin,  and  his  forces  without  ammunition  and  suffering  from  typhus, 
agreed  to  the  Polish  terms. 
The  Polish  propaganda  machine  now  turned  its  attention  towards  the  East 
Galicians  who  had  joined  Denikin's  army.  What  is  also  interesting  though  is  that  the 
whole  Ukrainian  cause  continued  to  be  undermined  by  this,  suggesting  that  the 
armistice  with  Petliura  was  not  wholly  accepted  by  the  Poles.  On  September  10`h,  the 
Polish  Press  Bureau  reported: 
Reports  from  Kiev,  which  has  lately  been  occupied  by  General  Denikin's 
troops,  state  that  the  East  Galician  force,  which  has  deserted  the  Ukrainian 
ataman  Petliura  and  gone  over  to  Denikin,  is  composed  of  former  Russian 
POWs  in  Germany  and  Austria  and  is  officered  exclusively  by  Germans. 
Kurjer  Poranny  of  today's  date  reports  that  the  character  and  discipline  of 
13  mid. 
133 these  troops  is  typically  German,  that  they  were  only  loosely  connected  with 
Petliura  and  get  their  instructions  and  orders  direct  from  Berlin.  They  have 
good  camping  arrangements,  good  artillery  and  German  discipline;  they 
formed  the  only  really  reliable  unit  in  Petliura's  army,  which  after  their 
desertion  must  inevitably  fall  to  pieces.  24 
A  further  report  on  September  17`h  stated  that  proof  of  Ukrainian  negotiations 
with  the  Bolsheviks  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Polish  military.  It  claimed  that  a  Hughes 
apparatus  had  been  captured  on  which  was  recorded  a  conversation  between 
Podkominskyi,  the  chief  of  the  Ukrainian  mission  at  Dubno,  and  Joffe,  the  Chief 
Inspector  of  Bolshevik  forces  in  Kiev.  From  the  conversation  it  could  be  deduced  that  a 
Ukrainian  delegation,  composed  of  three  people,  passed  through  the  Bolshevik  front  for 
the  purpose  of  entering  into  negotiations  with  the  Bolshevik  government  in  Kiev,  which 
was  to  supply  the  Ukrainian  army  with  ammunition.  The  delegation  was  supposedly 
given  full  powers  to  sign  an  agreement  by  the  Ukrainian  army  chiefs  and  with  their 
authority  acknowledged  Soviet  supremacy,  stating  that  the  sympathies  of  the  West 
Ukrainian  army  were  altogether  on  the  side  of  the  Bolsheviks.  25 
This  report  seems  full  of  contradictions.  There  is  no  evidence  that  the  Galicians 
were  sympathetic  towards  the  Bolsheviks,  though  the  Bolsheviks  hoped  that  they  might 
be.  When  they  could  not  fight  for  Ukrainian  independence,  the  Galicians  joined 
Denikin's  army  in  the  struggle  against  the  Reds.  Certainly,  by  the  end  of  1919  and  the 
apparent  defeat  of  the  Ukrainain  cause,  some  Galicians,  frustrated  by  the  lack  of 
Entente  support  for  the  independence  of  East  Galicia  and  Petliura's  alliance  with 
Poland,  did  begin  a  flirtation  with  the  Bolsheviks.  It  was  not  the  case  this  early  in  the 
war.  It  is just  another  aspect  of  Polish  anti-Ukrainian  propaganda  and  another  theme 
emerged  in  a  report  by  the  Polish  Press  Bureau  on  September  22"d:  "A  document  has 
come  into  the  hands  of  General  Bredoff  by  which  the  Germans  agreed  to  send  the 
Ukrainian  army  before  the  27th  August  a  certain  number  of  aeroplanes.  Bredoff  also 
asserts  that  the  Ukrainian  missions  abroad  are  in  German  pay,  including  the 
representative  of  Ukraine  in  Paris.  s26 
This  was  not  only  an  attack  on  the  Ukrainian  forces  but  also  on  the  diplomatic 
representation  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic,  and  therefore  of  Petliura  and  his 
24  AAN:  MSZ.  Dept  Polityczno-Ekonomiczny  7635A,  s.  507-508. 
"AAN:  MSZ.  Dept  Polityczno-Ekonomiczny  7635",  s.  546-547. 
26  AAN  :  MSZ.  Dept  Polityczno-Ekonomiczny  7635",  s.  593. 
134 government.  The  allegation  against  the  diplomat  in  Paris  was  particularly  sharp  as  this 
was  the  person  arguing  the  case  for  an  independent  Ukraine  at  the  Peace  Conference. 
General  Bredoff  was  Denikin's  governor  in  Kiev  and  it  demonstrates  that  the  Poles 
were  prepared  to  join  forces  with  the  Russian  Whites,  at  least  for  propaganda  purposes, 
against  the  Ukrainians.  These  charges  played  on  the  Entente  fears  that  an  independent 
Ukraine  was  a  German  idea  and  strengthened  the  French  in  particular  in  their  anti- 
Ukrainian  position.  There  is  no  attempt  here  by  the  Poles  to  exonerate  Petliura  and  his 
government  from  the  charges  laid  against  the  Ukrainians  in  general.  The  Polish  position 
seemed  to  be  that  Petliura  was  held  to  be,  at  worst,  a  collaborator  with  the  pro-German 
and  pro-Bolshevik  views  of  both  the  Galicians  and  the  other  Ukrainians  and,  at  best,  a 
powerless  marionette  in  the  hands  of  others.  This  latter  view  emerges  in  a  report  by  the 
East  European  News  Service  on  October  17`h,  which  stated: 
So  that  Denikin  is  quite  well  able  to  deal  with  them  and  his  object  is  to 
capture  the  two  atamans27  with  their  ministers  and  officials,  which  would 
put  an  end  to  the  so-called  Ukrainian  republics.  Though  Petliura  formally 
keeps  to  the  armistice  concluded  with  the  Poles  he  has  but  little  power  and 
Petrushevych's28  troops  are  hostile  to  Poland.  The  Ukrainian  peasants  are 
tired  of  the  atamans  and  do  not  wish  for  Ukrainian  state.  29  a  separate 
On  November  12th  the  Eastern  European  News  Service  reported  that  Petliura  had 
fled  after  Denikin's  forces  had  captured  his  staff,  and  Poland's  stance  on  Denikin's 
regime  receives  an  interesting  interpretation  in  a  report  on  November  13th.  The  report 
states  that  Polish  enterprise  is  taking  a  prominent  role  in  what  it  refers  to  as  "South 
Russia"  with  a  Polish  bank  in  Kharkov  and  several  other  enterprises  in  Ukraine.  It 
describes  how  a  Polish  economic  mission  to  Russia  under  the  direction  of 
M.  Ivanowski,  the  former  Minister  of  Labour  in  Poland,  has  succeeded  in  coming  to  a 
preliminary  agreement  with  Denikin's  government.  30  There  are  certain  parallels  here 
with  the  attempt  by  the  Germans  to  form  economic  links  with  Denikin's  regime,  and  of 
course  this  policy  would  have  found  much  favour  with  the  Entente  powers  who  were  all 
for  supporting  Denikin.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  Denikin's  position  seemed 
defensible  and  the  Poles  were  jostling  for  position  in  the  economic  opportunity,  which 
27  Petliura  and  Petrushevych 
21  Petrushevych  was  the  Head  of  State  of  the  Western  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  (ZUNR),  i.  e.  East  Galicia. 
29  AAN:  MSZ.  Dept  Polityczno-Ekonomiczny  7635A,  s.  854. 
70  Ibid. 
135 Ukraine  offered.  None  of  this  however,  suggests  any  support  or,  indeed,  sympathy  for 
the  aims  of  an  independent  Ukraine. 
Finally,  the  agency  reported  the  total  collapse  of  Petliura's  army  and  of  his 
political  hopes:  "November  21st,  Warsaw.  Petliura's  army  is  broken  up.  The  Galician 
regiments  have  come  over  to  the  Poles  and  the  Dnepr  Cossacks  have  joined  Denikin. 
Twenty-nine  of  Petliura's  staff  have  come  to  Lemberg  (...  )  as  well  as  the  secretary  of 
the  Ukrainian  government  Holubovych.  Amongst  the  fugitives  was  the  German  Captain 
Klein,  who  is  at  present  a  high  dignitary  under  Petliura.  i31  Even  in  Petliura's  moment 
of  defeat  Polish  propaganda  continued  to  emphasise  his  German  connections.  None  of 
the  above  suggests  a  Poland  in  league  with,  or  even  remotely  supportive  of,  the  struggle 
for  an  independent  Ukraine,  and  although  Pilsudski  may  have  been  personally 
sympathetic,  the  government's  mouthpiece  certainly  was  not.  Again  it  must  be  stated 
that  this  propaganda  was  intended  for  the  Entente  states,  and  was  meant  to  undermine 
the  position  of  the  Ukrainian  delegation  at  Versailles,  and  its  minister  in  London;  so  it 
is  even  more  surprising  that  within  a  few  months  the  Ukrainians  would  be  called 
Poland's  gallant  allies. 
At  this  time  Poland  was  uncertain  whether  Denikin  and  the  Whites  would  be 
victorious  in  Ukraine.  This  turn  of  events  would  be  anathema  to  Pilsudski,  who 
believed  that  a  Soviet  victory  would  be  the  lesser  evil  for  Poland.  The  Germans  were 
also  of  the  opinion  that  Denikin  would  win  and,  despite  desperate  pleas  for  aid  from 
Petliura,  were  relying  on  a  White  victory.  The  Poles  were  aware  that  the  representatives 
of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  were  seeking  German  support,  and  they  redoubled 
their  propaganda  effort  to  undermine  the  Ukrainian  cause  and  cast  the  nationalists  as 
German  pawns.  The  most  serious  allegation  against  Germany  was  that  a  German  plane 
had  been  captured  in  Silesia;  on  the  plane  were  40  million  marks,  which  the  Germans 
had  been  carrying  to  the  Ukrainians,  thereby,  encouraging  them  to  continue  the 
struggle.  32  There  is  no  evidence  of  such  outright  support  from  the  Germans  and,  indeed, 
at  this  period  the  German  Foreign  Ministry  was  heavily  discouraging  any  form  of  aid 
for  the  Ukrainians. 
At  this  crucial  juncture  in  the  Civil  War  -  the  autumn  of  1919  -  Pilsudski  showed 
his  hand  regarding  Ukraine.  Denikin  was  prepared  to  have  peace  with  Poland  and  made 
efforts  to  form  a  joint  anti-Bolshevik  front.  Pilsudski  insisted  on  Russian  renunciation 
"  AAN:  MSZ.  Dept  Polityczno-Ekonomiczny  7635A,  s.  894-  895. 
32  AAN:  MSZ.  Dept  Polityczno-Ekonomiczny  7635A,  s.  600. 
136 of  Belorussia  and  Ukraine  as  far  as  the  Dnepr.  He  also  rejected  the  proposed  frontier 
drawn  up  by  the  Peace  Conference  -  the  Curzon  Line  -  as  it  excluded  territory,  which 
he  considered  to  be  within  the  Polish  sphere  of  influence.  It  was  now  clear  that  there 
would  be  no  co-operation  between  the  Poles  and  the  Whites.  Each  had  a  very  different 
agenda. 
Both  Germany  and  Poland  regarded  the  Ukrainian  cause  as  lost  in  the  last  three 
months  of  1919.  Petliura  was  without  resources,  his  army  defeated  and  stricken  with 
typhus.  33  His  diplomats  had  harried  both  Germany  and  the  Entente  powers  for  support 
and  recognition  but  without  success.  By  sheer  force  of  geography  and  military  strategy 
he  was  at  the  mercy  of  Poland.  The  price  of  an  armistice,  or  any  minimum  support, 
would  be  to  divorce  his  cause  and  his  government  from  that  of  the  East  Galicians. 
Petliura  could  see  that  the  Galicians  had  been  defeated  by  the  Poles;  and  if  he  was  to 
salvage  anything  from  the  wreck  of  Ukrainian  aspirations  he  would  need  to  make  peace 
with  Poland.  He  crossed  the  Galician  frontier  in  December  1919  and  placed  himself  and 
his  ministers  at  the  mercy  of  the  Poles.  It  was  the  end  of  the  second  part  of  the 
Ukrainian  war  of  independence,  but  certainly  not  the  last  act.  If  it  was  any  consolation 
to  Petliura,  Denikin  was  also  defeated  in  December  and  Bolshevik  forces  once  again 
entered  Kiev.  On  the  21st  December  a  new  Soviet  Ukrainian  government  was  formed, 
but  its  period  in  office  would  be  short. 
On  5th  December  1919  Petliura  took  refuge  in  Poland,  but  before  leaving  he  made 
General  Omelianovich-Pavlenko  commander  of  the  Ukrainian  army,  and  Isaac  Mazepa 
acting  head  of  the  government  in  Khmelnik.  The  Ukrainian  army  acted  as  a  partisan 
group  in  the  winter  of  1919-20  harassing  the  Soviet  forces. 
In  January  1920  Ukraine  was  for  the  most  part  under  Soviet  control.  Soviet  Russia 
presented  peace  proposals  to  Poland  which  were  as  follows: 
1.  Russia  recognises  without  reservation  the  independence  and  sovereignty  of 
Poland,  basing  this  on  the  principle  that  each  nation  has  the  right  to  decide  its 
own  destiny,  and  all  relations  with  Poland  will  be  based  on  this  recognition. 
2.  The  Red  Army  will  not  cross  the  present  front  line. 
3.  The  Soviet  government  has  not  concluded  any  agreement  or  treaty  with 
Germany  or  any  other  country,  directly  or  indirectly,  harmful  to  Poland.  34 
33  Isodore  Nahawesky,  History  of  the  Modern  Ukrainian  State  1917-1923  (Munich:  Ukrainian  Free  University,  1966),  p.  200. 
34  Y.  Markhlevsky,  Voina  I  Mir  mezdhu  Burzhuaznol  Pol  'shol  I  Proletarskol  Rossiel  (Moscow,  1921),  pp.  12-15. 
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recognised  without  reservation  the  right  of  Poland  to  exist  as  an  independent  state. 
Many  Poles  were  also  tired  of  constant  war  since  1914.  The  National  Democrats 
favoured  the  acceptance  of  the  Bolshevik  proposals.  The  other  states  in  the  region, 
which  had  formerly  been  part  of  the  Russian  Empire  -  Finland,  Latvia,  Lithuania  and 
Estonia,  favoured  peace.  Their  delegates  met  the  Polish  delegation  in  Helsinki  and 
firmly  argued  for  peace. 
Pilsudski  would  not  countenance  peace  with  Russia.  He  was  convinced  that  the 
Bolsheviks  were  merely  playing  for  time  and  would  eventually  attack  Poland.  His  fears 
were  strengthened  by  intelligence  reports  from  the  front  indicating  that  the  Red  Army 
was  increasing  the  number  of  troops  on  the  Ukrainian  front.  The  Bolsheviks  also 
distrusted  Poland  and  they  observed  that  Polish  forces  were  being  strengthened  on  the 
Ukrainian  and  Belorussian  fronts.  Pilsudski  wanted  a  strong  victory  over  Russia,  which 
would  consolidate  Poland's  position  as  the  leading  power  in  Central  Europe  and  extend 
its  boundaries  considerably  to  the  east.  The  Bolsheviks  were  still  uncertain  about 
Wrangel's  White  forces  in  the  Crimea  and  so  would  not  be  able  to  position  all  their 
armies  on  the  Ukrainian  front.  The  moment  seemed  opportune  to  attack  and  fulfil 
Poland's  ancient  dream  of  reclaiming  Lithuania  and  Ukraine.  However,  in  order  to 
disguise  the  war  as  being  something  other  than  an  imperialistic  one,  Pilsudski  required 
an  ally.  Petliura  seemed  the  obvious  choice.  He  was  already  in  Poland  and  was  still  the 
head  of  the  nationalist  government  based  in  Khmelnik.  In  Ukraine  his  partisan  units 
were  active  and  there  were  anti-Soviet  uprisings  in  some  parts  of  the  country.  Petliura 
was  still  regarded  by  many  Ukrainians  as  their  national  leader  and  it  was  possible  that 
he  could  play  a  major  role  in  leading  an  anti-Soviet  national  revolt,  and  encourage  the 
Ukrainians  to  support  a  Polish-Ukrainian  army.  Also,  there  were  many  Ukrainian 
prisoners  of  war  in  Poland  and  several  divisions  could  be  formed  from  them. 
The  two  major  factors  militating  against  any  agreement  were  the  opposition  of  the 
National  Democrats  and  the  division  amongst  the  Ukrainians.  Roman  Dmowski,  the 
leader  of  the  National  Democrats  was  also  the  chairman  of  the  Polish  National 
Committee,  which  represented  Poland  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference.  In  June  1919 
Dmowski  expressed  his  views  on  Ukraine  in  a  memorandum  issued  by  the  committee, 
which  argued  that  territories  which  had  been  a  part  of  the  Polish  Commonwealth  before 
the  partitions  with  a  mixed  population  should  be  included  in  the  territory  of  the  Polish 
138 state.  He  was  absolutely  opposed  to  the  creation  of  new  independent  states  in  the 
region,  arguing  that  it  would  only  emphasise  their  non-Polish  character  and  encourage 
the  Entente  powers  to  offer  them  to  Russia.  35  He  was  concerned  that  East  Galicia  could 
be  included  and  could  eventually  be  united  with  a  Russian  federal  state.  The  National 
Democrats  had  considerable  power  in  the  Sejm  and  also  in  the  counsels  of  the  Entente 
powers. 
The  second  problem  was  that  the  leader  of  the  East  Galicians  (Western 
Ukrainians),  Dr  Petrushevych,  was  implacably  opposed  to  any  agreement  with  Poland 
and  had  already  split  with  Petliura  on  the  issue  of  the  armistice  with  Poland.  He  was  in 
Vienna,  along  with  other  members  of  the  government  of  the  People's  Republic  of 
Western  Ukraine,  and  appealing  to  all  Ukrainians  not  to  support  any  form  of  agreement 
with  Poland.  He  was  particularly  influential  in  Germany  and  Czechoslovakia,  both  of 
whose  governments  were  suspicious  of  Polish  plans  for  aggrandisement  in  Eastern 
Europe.  Petushevych  also  had  the  support  of  many  leading  members  of  the  Ukrainian 
Left  and  in  particular  the  veteran  socialist  and  nationalist  Vynnychenko,  who  regarded 
Pilsudski's  plans  with  great  suspicion  and  appealed  to  the  Ukrainian  People's 
Republic's  government  not  to  enter  into  any  form  of  agreement  with  Poland. 
Petrushevych  was  also  sending  agents  into  East  Galicia  to  encourage  sabotage  and 
other  forms  of  resistance  against  the  occupying  Polish  forces. 
Finally,  the  Entente  powers  were  also  opposed  to  any  form  of  agreement  between 
Ukraine  and  Poland.  Britain,  in  particular,  was  concerned  about  Polish  ambitions  in  the 
east  and  did  not  want  to  see  the  formation  of  a  new  Polish  empire.  France  was  more 
sympathetic  towards  Pilsudski's  ambitions  but  chiefly  as  a  weapon  with  which  to  strike 
the  Bolsheviks.  Both  countries  however  were  opposed  to  the  concept  of  an  independent 
Ukraine  and  still  clung  to  the  idea  of  a  reconstituted  Russia.  This  was  despite  the  fact 
that  the  Whites  were  clearly  losing  the  Civil  War  and  Wrangel  was  the  only  remaining 
White  leader  in  the  field.  Bolshevik  peace  offers  were  received  well  in  Britain,  and  the 
British  government  now  wanted  peace  in  Eastern  Europe  and  the  resumption  of  trade 
with  Russia.  Anything,  which  would  disturb  the  equilibrium,  was  not  welcome.  36 
On  2  December  1919  Petliura  had  accepted  the  Polish-Ukrainian  frontier  as  being 
on  the  Zbruch  and  Horych  rivers.  The  East  Galicians  had  refused  to  recognise  the 
agreement,  and  it  became  obvious  that  any  future  agreement  would  have  to  be  made 
R  . 
Dmowski,  Polityka  polska  i  odbudowanie  panstwa  (Warsaw,  1925),  p.  463-77. 
M  Documents  on  British  Foreign  Policy,  1919-1939:  1"  Series,  iii  (1949),  pp.  803-5. 
139 between  Poland  and  the  Eastern  Ukrainians  alone.  From  January  onwards  Pilsudski 
sought  to  persuade  Petliura  to  enter  a  military  alliance  and  thus  for  Poland  to  recognise 
the  claims  of  Ukrainian  nationalists.  The  lack  of  a  single  Ukrainian  national 
government  controlling  both  the  Polish  and  Russian  `fronts'  was  a  major  barrier  on  the 
road  to  any  agreement.  It  was  a  historical  tragedy  for  the  Ukrainians  that  East  Galicia, 
which  was  the  most  advanced  region  politically,  socially  and  culturally,  was  unable  to 
take  part  in  the  struggle  with  Russia  in  1920. 
Soviet  Russia  began  to  suspect  that  Pilsudski  had  no  intention  of  making  peace 
and  was  bent  on  some  sort  of  campaign  in  Ukraine.  Soviet  agents  had  also  probably 
informed  Moscow  of  the  ongoing  negotiations  between  Pilsudski  and  Pctliura. 
Accordingly,  early  in  January  1920,  the  Soviet  high  command  created  a  new  front,  the 
southwestern,  and  three  armies  -  the  twelfth,  thirteenth  and  fourteenth,  were  diverted  to 
protect  Kiev  from  possible  Polish  attack.  37  From  Berlin  Litvinov  sent  news  that  Poland 
was  preparing  for  general  mobilisation;  and  Marshal  Foch  and  several  other  anti- 
Bolshevik  leaders  were  expected  in  Warsaw,  where  they  would  organise  a  new  White 
army  to  attack  Russia. 
The  withdrawal  of  the  White  army  in  Ukraine  left  a  military  vacuum  and  in  late 
December  and  early  January  the  Polish  army  advanced  to  form  a  new  front  based  on  the 
Uszyca  River,  Proskourov,  Starokonstantinov  and  the  Sluch  River.  The  Poles  opened  a 
direct  rail  line  from  Warsaw  to  Kamenets-Podolski  and  reinforced  the  army.  38  Pilsudski 
hoped  to  place  newly  occupied  territory  under  Ukrainian  administration  and  planned  to 
move  Petliura  and  his  government  from  Kamenets-Podolski  to  Vinnitsa.  The  French 
government  also  decided  to  supply  Poland  with  military  supplies  in  order  to  attack  the 
Bolsheviks.  The  stage  was  set  for  the  coming  conflict;  only  an  agreement  with  Petliura 
barred  the  way. 
Petliura's  attitude  at  this  time  seems  to  have  been  somewhat  contradictory,  at 
times  very  optimistic  about  any  future  venture  with  Poland,  and  at  times  extremely 
pessimistic.  These  are  borne  out  by  two  letters  he  sent  between  December  1919  and 
January  1920.  The  first  was  written  on  December  18th  1919  and  sent  to  Margolin,  the 
representative  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  in  Britain: 
"Adiutantura  Generalna  Naczelnego  Wodza,  T.  21,  t.  1,  mnps.  ,  niepag.,  s.  3.  Cited  in  Sqsiedzi  wobec  woJny  1920  roku,  pp.  146-7. 
11  See  Appendix  4. 
140 We  have  in  Germany  50,000  prisoners.  If  England  would  not  prevent  the 
transportation  of  these  prisoners  at  least  into  Poland,  where  we  hope  to 
begin  organising  them,  adding  to  these  the  prisoners  in  Poland  and  in 
Rumania  too,  we  could  after  2  or  3  months  enter  Ukraine  with  this  army  and 
begin  to  establish  order  and  peace  in  our  country.  I  should  think  that  the 
confidence  that  I  have  enjoyed  up  until  now  among  our  population  would 
guarantee  the  possibility  of  this  organised  power  and  gain  for  it  success.  39 
This  suggests  a  leader  full  of  confidence  and  totally  prepared  to  enter  a  military 
campaign  and  re-enter  his  country  with  every  possibility  of  success.  However,  the  letter 
sent  to  Count  Tyszkiewicz,  the  UNR  representative  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference,  on 
January  19th  1920,  presents  a  very  different  scenario: 
The  role  of  a  prophet  is  difficult.  Nevertheless,  I  should  imagine  that  the 
Bolsheviks  are  not  a  weak  enemy.  In  the  recent  operations  against  Denikin 
they  had  38  divisions  at  their  disposal.  The  Poles  will  have  to  fight  the 
Bolsheviks  on  the  Ukrainian  territory,  where  the  former  have  not  won 
sympathy  owing  to  their  occupation  policy.  On  the  contrary,  they  have 
mobilised  against  them  the  peasants,  who  are  indignant  at  the  requisitions 
and  the  strong  measures  of  the  Polish  troops.  Furthermore,  the  Jewish 
population  regards  the  Poles  with  high  disfavour.  The  Bolsheviks  could, 
therefore  make  use  of  these  feelings  and  then  the  Polish  army  would  be  in 
the  same  dangerous  position  in  Ukraine  as  the  Germans  were  in  their  time.  4° 
This  proved  to  be  a  very  prophetic  pronouncement  indeed  and  events  followed 
almost  as  Petliura  had  predicted,  but  it  also  shows  that  Petliura  was  racked  with  doubt 
about  a  joint  campaign  with  Poland.  The  letter  continued,  pointing  out  Petliura's 
reservations  about  the  Poles  and  what  role  the  Ukrainians  were  playing: 
The  same  milieu  of  the  Polish  population  and  of  the  Polish  General  Staff  are 
not  warlike;  but  we  do  not  know  here  whether  the  minister  Patek  was  given 
in  Paris  the  mandate  of  the  Entente  to  re-establish  order  in  Eastern  Europe. 
It  is  necessary  to  warn  the  Entente  against  repeating  disastrous  experiments. 
I  do  not  know  whether  or  not  you  have  had  a  meeting  with  Patek  on  this 
question;  but  I  should  consider  the  undertaking  of  a  new  demarche  in  his 
"AAN:  MSZ.  Ambasada  RP  w  Londynie  427,  s.  24. 
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141 direction  as  a  very  necessary  step,  pointing  out  that  the  Eastern  problem 
cannot  be  solved  without  Ukraine.  4' 
The  letter  was  subsequently  published  in  the  Ukrainian  nationalist  journal  The 
Ukraine.  42  Here  Petliura  is  demonstrating  a  determined  resistance  to  the  notion  that  he 
and  the  Ukrainians  are  merely  to  be  pawns  in  the  greater  game  being  played  by  Poland. 
It  indicates  that  distrust  was  not  limited  to  the  Poles  and,  after  the  events  of  1919,  it 
would  be  surprising  if  Petliura  did  not  harbour  doubts  about  Poland.  The  publication  of 
the  letter  further  suggests  that  he  wanted  the  Entente  powers  to  be  aware  that  the 
Ukrainian  cause  was  not  merely  a  side  issue.  However,  within  three  months  Petliura 
would  enter  a  military  alliance  with  Poland  and  the  period  of  hostility  between  Poland 
and  Ukraine  would  formally  end.  It  would  be  a  marriage  with  an  unstable  beginning 
and  an  unhappy  end. 
AAN:  MSZ.  Ambasada  RP  w  Londynie  427,  s.  28. 
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142 CHAPTER  9 
THE  ALLIANCE  AND  TIIE  SOVIET-POLISH  WAR, 
JANUARY-SEPTEMBER  1920 
The  situation  of  the  Directory  in  the  winter  and  spring  of  1919-1920  was  a 
confused  and  complex  one.  Petliura,  who  was  the  Supreme  Commander  of  Ukrainian 
forces,  was  in  Poland,  Mazepa,  the  Prime  Minister,  and  the  rest  of  his  ministers  were  in 
Ukrainian  territory  occupied  by  the  Polish  army;  and  other  important  members  of  the 
Directory  were  in  Western  Europe  seeking  aid  from  the  Entente  powers.  Almost  alone, 
Petliura  signed  a  major  treaty  with  Poland  on  April  21,1920.  Before  examining  the 
agreement  itself,  it  is  necessary  to  question  whether  Petliura  was  authorised  to  act 
independently  of  the  rest  of  his  government  -  and  to  what  extent  he  was  pressuriscd  by 
the  Poles,  considering  that  he  was  in  effect  a  refugee  in  Poland. 
In  November  1919  two  major  members  of  the  Directory  -  Shvets  and  Makarenko 
-  went  to  Western  Europe.  In  an  act  passed  by  the  Directory  on  November  15  1919  it 
was  agreed  that  there  was  to  be  a  separation  of  powers  between  them  and  Petliura. 
Point  four  of  the  act  stated  that  the  function  of  Shvets  and  Makarenko  was  "the 
conclusion  of  preliminary  agreements  and  political-military  treaties  with  other  states  in 
the  name  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic".  Point  three  of  the  act  gave  them  the 
powers  of  exercising  the  final  control  over  the  acts  of  all  official  bodies  of  the 
Ukrainian  People's  Republic  abroad.  Petliura's  role  was  seen  as  remaining  in  Ukraine 
and  carrying  on  the  military  struggle  there  in  the  name  of  the  Directory.  Professor  Serhi 
Shelukhin  in  his  work  Varshavi  Dohovir  mizh  Poliakami  i  S.  Petliuriou  (Prague,  1926), 
took  the  view  that  any  agreement  entered  into  by  Petliura  was  not  binding  on  the  other 
members  of  the  Directory,  because  they  had  not  been  consulted.  The  treaty  would  cause 
deep  division  within  the  Ukrainian  nationalist  movement;  not  just  between  the 
Galicians  and  the  Eastern  Ukrainians,  but  also  between  Petliura  and  those  Ukrainians 
deeply  opposed  to  any  pro-Polish  orientation. 
Before  examining  those  divisions  and  their  consequences  a  reading  of  the  treaty 
itself  is  required.  The  treaty  was  signed  in  Warsaw  and  was  later  referred  to  as  the 
Warsaw  Treaty  or  the  Warsaw  Agreement.  Jan  Dombski  of  the  Polish  Foreign  Ministry 
143 signed  on  behalf  of  Poland,  and  Liviskyi  signed  on  behalf  of  the  Ukrainian  People's 
Republic.  ' 
One  of  the  main  reasons  for  Petliura  signing  the  treaty  was  the  desire  to  obtain 
French  assistance  against  the  Bolsheviks.  During  the  winter  of  1919  and  the  spring  of 
1920,  a  French  deputy,  M.  de  Gailhard-Bancel,  had  made  several  speeches  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  supporting  Ukrainian  independence.  These  speeches  had  received 
the  support  of  the  right  and  the  centre  but  they  had  not  altered  French  government 
policy.  2  Petliura  had  also  appealed  to  the  Allied  Supreme  Council  on  January  22,1920, 
asking  for  a  lifting  of  the  blockade  of  Ukraine  to  allow  the  shipment  of  medical 
supplies.  The  Supreme  Council  had  not  even  replied.  3  It  probably  seemed  to  Pctliura 
that  the  only  hope  of  gaining  French  support  was  by  becoming  the  ally  of  Poland, 
France's  closest  partner  in  Eastern  Europe.  The  opposition  to  the  treaty  from  other 
Ukrainian  nationalists,  and  from  later  Ukrainian  historians,  was  bitter.  An  example  of 
this  is  John  S.  Reshetar's  "The  Ukrainian  Revolution,  1917-1920.  A  Study  in 
Nationalism"  (New  York,  1972),  where  Reshetar  states: 
This  treaty  was  in  complete  violation  of  the  centuries-old  animosity,  which 
prevailed  between  the  Poles  and  Ukrainians,  and  Petliura  in  consenting  to  it 
issued  his  own  political  death  warrant.  In  his  fear  of  Russian  imperialism  he 
surrendered  himself  to  a  people  whose  extremists  have  been  equally 
imperialistic  in  their  demands  for  a  Poland,  which  would  dominate  the  area 
between  the  Baltic  and  Black  Seas.  During  the  negotiations  the  Poles  did  not 
hesitate  to  remind  the  Ukrainians  that  they  were  not  dealing  with  equals, 
since  the  latter  possessed  neither  territory  nor  stabilite  du  gouvernn:  ent.  4  " 
This  view  that  Petliura  had  been  cajoled,  tricked,  or  seduced  into  signing  the 
treaty  with  Poland  became  the  dominant  one  among  Ukrainian  emigre  historians  and 
indeed  among  the  nationalists  of  his  own  day.  It  is  only  recently  being  revised.  The 
questions  of  whether  Petliura  fully  realised  what  he  was  doing,  and  what  the  treaty 
itself  meant  for  the  Ukrainian  nationalists  need  to  be  addressed  first  before  returning  to 
examine  its  consequences. 
The  evidence  from  Petliura  himself  is  contradictory.  Reference  has  already  been 
made  to  two  letters,  which  he  sent  to  his  own  diplomats  abroad,  one  highly  supportive 
1  See  Appendix  1. 
2  Reshetar,  The  Ukrainian  Revolution,  p.  300. 
Ibid. 
4  Reshetar,  The  Ukrainian  Revolution,  p.  303. 
144 of  the  treaty  and  optimistic  about  its  results,  the  other  far  more  reflective,  pessimistic 
and  prophetic.  Petliura  knew  that  any  agreement  with  Poland  would  totally  alienate  not 
only  the  Galicians  but  also  large  sections  of  the  Ukrainian  nationalist  movement, 
especially  the  left.  He  was  however  in  a  political  and  military  cul-de-sac.  Without 
Polish  assistance,  and  possibly  the  support  of  France  as  a  result,  all  hope  of  an 
independent  Ukraine  would  be  lost. 
It  can  be  argued,  of  course,  that  he  was  totally  at  the  mercy  of  the  Poles.  He 
himself  was  a  refugee  in  Poland,  most  of  the  Directory  was  based  in  Polish-occupied 
territory  and  many  of  his  potential  army  were  in  Polish  prison  camps.  There  was  also 
the  problem  of  military  logistics.  He  no  longer  commanded  an  army,  even  though 
partisan  activity  was  continuing  in  Ukraine,  and  Poland  had  the  only  army  in  Eastern 
Europe  capable  of  smashing  the  Red  Army.  The  period  from  January  to  April  1920  was 
an  agonising  one  for  Petliura,  as  he  desperately  sought  a  way  out  of  his  dilemma.  He 
knew  that  any  agreement  with  Poland  would  be  one  where  the  Poles  dictated  the  terms, 
and  that  they  would  drive  a  hard  bargain. 
The  talks  had  been  underway  for  some  months.  There  had  been  preliminary 
agreements  between  Petliura  and  the  Polish  government  several  times  in  the  course  of 
1919;  it  was  however  only  after  his  total  defeat  by  the  Bolsheviks,  and  his  residence  in 
Warsaw,  that  the  situation  changed.  Formal  negotiations  for  a  treaty  of  alliance  were 
started  on  March  11,1920.  Representing  Ukraine  was  the  head  of  the  Ukrainian 
Diplomatic  Mission  and  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Andrei  Liviskyi.  He  was  a  Social 
Democrat  lawyer  and  one  of  Petliura's  strongest  supporters.  General  Danilchuk,  a 
military  expert,  assisted  him.  On  the  Polish  side  were  two  diplomats,  August  Zaleski 
and  Roman  Knoll.  The  ensuing  talks  were  long  and  bitter,  and  it  is  not  surprising  that 
this  was  the  case.  The  Ukrainians  were  being  asked  to  permanently  renounce  East 
Galicia  and  to  accept  a  Polish  frontier  prior  to  1772.  Compromise  on  some  of  the  issues 
would  be  extremely  difficult  for  both  sides. 
The  Polish  historian  M.  K.  Dziewanowski  in  his  biography  of  Pilsudski  took  the 
opposite  view  to  Reshetar  and  argued  that  both  sides  were  restrained  by  the  demands  of 
their  respective  political  situations,  and  that  the  Poles  tried  to  compromise  with  the 
Ukrainians: 
Both  sides  realised  what  was  at  stake.  Pilsudski  realised  that  the  fate  of  his 
East  European  plans  were  largely  dependant  on  the  success  or  failure  of  the 
145 planned  Ukrainian  venture.  Petliura  knew  that  without  Polish  help  he  was 
lost;  but  he  also  knew  that  to  obtain  this  help  he  would  have  to  make 
substantial  political  concessions  to  the  Poles  in  East  Galicia.  He  was  aware, 
too,  that  any  alliance  between  a  group  of  Ukrainian  nationalists  and  Poland 
must  result  in  some  gains  that  would  bolster  his  position  as  a  national  leader. 
Without  these  benefits,  a  Polish  alliance  would  destroy  him  and  his  cause. 
Consequently,  the  Ukrainian  delegates  fought  hard  for  some  sort  of 
compromise  in  the  East  Galicia  issue,  although  they  realised  that  they 
possessed  very  limited  bargaining  power  and  that  Pilsudski  had  very  little 
leeway  in  the  matter  in  view  of  the  state  of  Polish  public  opinion.  5 
There  was  considerable  opposition  to  any  Polish-Ukrainian  agreement  -  and  not 
only  from  the  Ukrainians.  As  late  as  February  1920  a  police  report  from  Vienna  to  the 
Austrian  Foreign  Ministry  gave  a  long  list  of  Ukrainian  ministers  and  diplomats 
resident  in  the  city,  and  the  various  hotels  in  which  they  were  lodged.  The  report  went 
on  to  state  that  although  there  were  two  main  groups  among  the  exiled  Ukrainians,  a 
pro-Soviet  group  hoping  for  an  autonomous  Ukraine  and  a  group  supporting  outright 
Ukrainian  independence,  both  groups  were  vehemently  opposed  to  any  agreement  with 
Poland.  6 
The  Warsaw  Treaty  was  regarded  by  other  Ukrainian  nationalist  leaders,  such  as 
Hrushevskyi  and  Vynnychenko,  as  evidence  that  Petliura  had  abandoned  socialism  in 
favour  of  a  reactionary  type  of  nationalism,  which  would  only  serve  his  own  interests. 
Vynnychenko,  who  was  in  Vienna  and  about  to  return  to  Soviet  Ukraine  to  make  his 
peace  with  the  regime  in  Kharkhov,  launched  a  vicious  propaganda  attack  against 
Petliura  and  the  Poles.  He  labelled  Petliura  as:  "a  pernicious  and  filthy  gladiator-slave 
of  the  Entente"  and  "an  unhealthily  ambitious  maniac,  soaked  up  to  his  ears  in  the 
blood  of  pogromised  Jewry,  politically  illiterate,  willing  to  accept  all  reaction  in  order 
to  preserve  his  power.  s7  Furthermore,  it  must  be  remembered  that  Vynnychenko 
commanded  considerable  respect  on  the  left  throughout  Europe.  He  had  many  contacts, 
particularly  in  the  German  and  Austrian  Social  Democrat  parties  and  to  a  lesser  extent 
in  the  French  Socialist  Party  and  the  British  Labour  Party.  On  April  22  1920,  he  issued 
an  open  letter  to  the  communists  and  socialists  of  Western  Europe  and  America,  stating 
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146 that  Petliura's  government  and  its  diplomatic  missions  were  illegal.  He  contended  that 
the  Directory  had  been  nonexistent  since  February  1919,  and  that  the  Directory's  failure 
to  control  Ukrainian  territory  deprived  it  of  the  right  to  call  itself  a  de  facto 
government.  He  went  on  to  state  that  Ukraine  could  only  be  liberated  by  a  world 
revolution,  which  would  establish  a  world  federation  of  Soviet  socialist  republics.  8 
This  was  especially  damaging  criticism  from  the  former  leader  of  the  Directory, 
and  severely  weakened  the  legitimacy  of  Petliura's  government  and  of  the  Warsaw 
Treaty  in  the  eyes  of  the  Western  European  left,  including  the  Social  Democrat 
government  in  Germany.  Of  course,  it  must  be  pointed  out  that  Vynnychenko  returned 
to  Soviet  Ukraine,  firmly  of  the  belief  that  Lenin  and  the  Soviet  government  would 
respect  Ukrainian  national  identity  and  autonomy,  and  within  a  matter  of  months  was  in 
exile  in  Western  Europe,  completely  disillusioned  with  the  Soviet  experiment.  So  it 
could  be  legitimately  stated  that  whereas  Petliura  may  have  been  deceived  by  the  Poles, 
Vynnychenko  was  equally  taken  in  by  the  Bolsheviks. 
For  the  supporters  of  Pilsudski,  the  Warsaw  Agreement  was  a  basic  breakthrough 
in  the  relations  between  Poland  and  Ukraine  -a  continuation  of  the  policy  of  the 
Hadiach  Treaty  in  the  17th  century  -  and  the  first  step  on  the  road  to  the  recreation  of 
the  Polish  Commonwealth.  Indeed  this  is  the  view  of  many  contemporary  Polish 
historians  and  politicians.  Writing  in  1969,  Dziewanowski  concluded: 
From  a  perspective  of  almost  half  a  century,  the  Pilsudski-Petliura 
agreement  appears  as  an  important  milestone,  a  continuation  of  the  policy 
initiated  by  the  union  of  Hadiach.  The  pact  represented  the  attempt  to 
transcend  the  bitterness  created  by  the  struggle  in  East  Galicia  and  reconcile 
two  neighbouring  Slavic  peoples.  It  was  an  attempt  to  set  an  example  to  the 
other  nations  of  Eastern  Europe  and  to  prove  that  cooperation,  not 
contention,  should  be  the  hallmark  of  the  future.  9 
This  was  by  no  means  the  view  of  all  Poles  at  the  time  however,  and  the 
agreement  was  heavily  attacked  by  many  journalists  and  politicians.  They  were  of  the 
opinion  that  the  agreement  would  provoke  Russia,  and  was  therefore  a  serious  mistake. 
Many  in  Poland  had  serious  misgivings  about  a  full-scale  war  against  Soviet  Russia, 
Volodimir  Vynnychenko,  Politichni  Listi.  (Vienna,  1920),  p.  142. 
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147 especially  one  where  Poland's  only  ally  was  its  erstwhile  enemy,  and  where  much 
public  opinion  in  Western  Europe  was  not  sympathetic. 
Along  with  the  main  treaty  a  military  agreement  was  signed  on  April  24.  The 
agreement  stipulated  that  there  would  be  joint  military  operations  under  Polish 
command  east  of  the  existing  Polish-Soviet  frontier.  Polish  military  operations  would 
end  at  the  Dnepr.  1°  This  indicates  that  Pilsudski  did  not  intend  to  liberate  all  of  Ukraine, 
but  merely  the  Right  Bank.  The  Poles  promised  not  to  divide  the  Ukrainian  forces  into 
any  more,  small,  isolated  units  than  was  necessary  for  operational  purposes  and  agreed 
to  merge  them  as  soon  as  possible.  The  Ukrainians  promised  to  supply  the  Polish  forces 
in  Ukraine  with  meat,  fats,  grain,  fruits,  sugar,  oats,  hay,  straw,  and  other  commodities 
as  well  as  horses  and  transport.  These  supplies  were  to  be  requisitioned  from  the 
peasants  in  return  for  a  receipt.  The  Polish  Command  was  also  to  establish  the  rate  of 
exchange  between  the  Polish  and  Ukrainian  currencies,  and  set  it  initially  at  ten  to  one 
in  favour  of  Poland,  but  later  it  was  changed  to  five  to  one. 
The  Poles  were  also  to  operate  the  Ukrainian  railways.  Petliura  would  organise 
his  own  civil  and  military  organisation;  but  Polish  police  and  troops  were  to  protect  the 
rear,  and  Polish  liaison  officers  were  to  be  attached  to  the  Ukrainian  civil 
administration.  Following  the  completion  of  the  military  operation,  the  evacuation  of 
Polish  forces  was  to  begin  with  the  proposal  of  one  of  the  signatories,  but  the  technical 
administration  of  the  evacuation  was  to  be  based  on  a  mutual  agreement  between  the 
Polish  and  Ukrainian  Commands.  "  The  Poles  agreed  to  arm  and  equip  only  three 
Ukrainian  divisions.  Reshetar  commented  that  this  limited  the  number  of  Petliura's 
forces  because  he  would  be  unlikely  to  obtain  aid  elsewhere,  and  that  altogether  it  was 
a  humiliating  military  convention  for  the  Ukrainians.  12  Like  the  main  treaty  the 
convention  was  to  be  kept  secret,  and  only  the  Polish  text  was  to  be  considered 
authentic.  The  Polish  timescale  of  any  Polish  military  withdrawal  from  Ukraine  was 
also  vague,  and  would  be  very  dependant  on  Polish  policy.  One  can  immediately 
understand  how  many  Ukrainians  were  suspicious  of  Polish  motives. 
The  Soviet  government  was  aware  of  the  prospect  of  imminent  hostilities  on  the 
western  frontier  and  began  to  make  proposals  for  joint  action  against  Poland  to  the 
German  government.  In  April  and  May  1920,  the  Soviet  government  considered  the 
1°  Archiwum  Og6lne,  druk.  Cited  in  Janusz  Cisek,  (ed),  Sgstedzl  wobec  woJny  1920  roku,  (London:  Polska  Fundacja  Kulturalna, 
1990),  pp.  165-169. 
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148 possibility  of  a  total  reorientation  of  foreign  policy,  away  from  an  agreement  with 
Britain  and  towards  an  agreement  with  Germany,  as  they  believed  that  the  Entente, 
particularly  Britain,  were  behind  the  Polish  offensive.  This  is,  of  course,  reflected  in 
Germany's  stance  towards  the  Ukrainian  nationalists.  Soviet  overtures  were  not 
responded  to,  as  it  was  not  seen  to  be  German  policy.  Berlin  was  concerned  about 
antagonising  the  French  by  attacking  Poland,  and  was  watching  the  British  position 
carefully.  The  Soviet  government  soon  realised  that  the  British  were  not  behind  the 
Pilsudski-Petliura  agreement,  and  ended  their  overtures  towards  the  Germans. 
On  25  April  1920  the  Soviet-Polish  War  began  with  a  joint  Polish-Ukrainian 
attack  on  the  Red  Army.  On  the  Soviet  side  there  were  two  armies;  XII  Army  to  the 
south  of  the  Pripet  River  and  the  XIV  Army  further  south.  According  to  Soviet  sources 
there  were  83,000  troops  but  that  28,000  only  were  prepared  for  combat.  On  the  Polish 
side  there  were  three  armies;  II  Army  commanded  by  General  Listowski,  III  Army 
commanded  by  General  Smigly-Rydz,  and  the  VI  Army  commanded  by  General 
Iwaszkiewicz.  Some  historians  claimed  that  the  Poles  had  300,000  troops13 
The  Ukrainians  had  two  infantry  divisions;  2nd  commanded  by  General 
Udovychenko  and  6th  commanded  by  General  Bezruchko.  They  were  formed  from 
Ukrainian  prisoners  of  war  and  from  volunteers.  There  were  556  officers  and  3348 
soldiers.  There  were  also  the  forces  of  General  Pavlenko,  which  consisted  of  about 
6000  troops.  His  troops  had  completed  a  march  behind  Soviet  lines  and  reached 
Mohylev  in  spring  1920.14 
Both  Pilsudski  and  Petliura  issued  proclamations  to  the  Ukrainian  people  as 
the  offensive  began.  15 
The  style  of  the  proclamation  was  typical  Pilsudski  -  florid,  heroic,  and  with  a 
touch  of  chivalry.  16  Pilsudski,  of  course,  had  been  raised  with  the  traditions  of  Polish 
aristocratic  heroism,  and  although  the  language  of  the  proclamation  may  now  seem 
incredibly  dated,  in  1920  in  Poland  it  would  have  seemed  quite  natural. 
Petliura  for  his  part  issued  his  own  proclamation.  He  referred  to  the  three-year 
struggle  for  freedom  for  the  Ukrainian  nation,  but  although  Ukrainian  forces  had 
liberated  Kiev  there  had  been  disagreement  between  the  East  Ukrainians  and  the 
"  Palij,  The  Ukrainian-Polish  Defensive  Alliance,  p.  100.  Pilsudski  in  his  account  of  the  year  1920,  Rok  1920,  claimed  that  the 
Polish  strength  was  50  percent  lower  than  in  the  reports.  This  would  suggest  that  there  were  probably  around  150,000  Polish  troops. 
ibid. 
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149 Galicians  and  the  Galician  army  had  betrayed  the  struggle  and  joined  the  enemy.  Now, 
he  announced,  the  situation  had  changed: 
The  Polish  nation,  represented  by  the  Head  of  State  and  Commander  in 
Chief  Jozef  Pilsudski,  and  by  the  Government,  has  respected  the  Ukrainian 
right  to  create  a  free  Republic  and  has  recognised  the  independent  state. 
There  is  an  Agreement  between  the  Ukrainian  and  Polish  Governments  and 
eventually  Polish  and  Ukrainian  forces  will  enter  Ukraine  as  allies  to  fight 
the  common  enemy.  After  fighting  the  Bolsheviks  the  Polish  units  will 
return  to  their  homeland. 
Sons  of  Ukraine  mobilised  in  the  army  will  be  the  real  defenders  of  our 
state  and  freedom.  17 
The  issue  of  Polish  military  withdrawal  would  be  a  sensitive  one  and  one  where 
Polish  and  Ukrainian  interpretations  differ  considerably.  Reshetar  argued  that  Pilsudski 
could  occupy  Ukraine  for  as  long  a  period  as  he  wished.  18  Indeed  this  was  the  suspicion 
of  Vynnychenko  and  many  other  Ukrainian  nationalists,  particularly  the  Galicians,  that 
the  whole  campaign  was  a  thinly  veiled  war  of  Polish  imperialist  expansion.  The  Polish 
general  staff  argued  that  it  would  take  about  twelve  weeks  to  organise  six  regular 
Ukrainian  divisions,  and  that  once  they  had  been  formed  the  Poles  would  withdraw 
their  forces  from  Ukrainian  territory  and  transfer  them  to  the  north-eastern  sector  of  the 
front.  19  This  is  the  view  of  Polish  historians,  that  the  Polish  invasion  of  Ukraine  would 
be  a  temporary  phenomenon,  merely  the  helping  hand  of  a  trusted  friend  and  ally. 
How  dependable  an  ally  was  Petliura  for  Poland?  Whatever  the  views  of 
Vynnychenko  and  the  Galicians,  for  many  observers  in  the  spring  of  1920  Petliura 
symbolised  the  best  hope  of  obtaining  Ukrainian  independence.  The  Warsaw 
correspondent  of  The  Times  wrote  on  April  15,1920:  "Whatever  may  be  said  about 
Petliura,  he  has  more  influence  in  the  Ukraine  than  any  other  person,  and  he  is  capable 
of  making  it  a  very  uncomfortable  place  for  anyone  else  (...  )  It  is  significant  that  neither 
the  Bolshevists  nor  Denikin  were  able  to  get  a  very  secure  hold  on  the  country  or 
recruit  troops  there.  s20  There  was  also  evidence  in  the  spring  of  1920  of  a  renewed 
campaign  of  resistance  against  the  Soviet  regime  by  the  nationalist  forces  within 
"  Ibid. 
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150 Ukraine.  21  Although  these  forces  were  labelled  `bandits'  by  the  Bolsheviks,  and  though 
they  were  in  effect  partisans,  they  were  still  allied  to  Petliura  and  the  Directory.  The 
anti-Semitic  outrages  committed  by  some  of  these  groups  would  later  be  charged  to 
Petliura's  account,  although  he  had  almost  no  control  over  their  actions.  Both  the 
Bolsheviks  and  the  Entente  expected  an  invasion  of  Ukraine  in  April  1920,  and  they  did 
not  have  long  to  wait. 
There  was  considerable  opposition  in  Poland  to  the  Warsaw  Treaty.  Both  the 
Sejm  and  the  press  warned  the  government  about  the  dangers  of  the  policy.  The  Left  in 
the  Sejm  supported  Pilsudski's  policy;  and  the  speech  of  the  Socialist  Party  leader, 
Daszynski  was  particularly  illuminating,  as  it  probably  illustrated  Pilsudski's  own 
thinking  on  the  issue.  Daszyriski  reminded  the  Sejm:  "The  Russian  revolution  had 
started  the  process  of  emancipation  of  the  oppressed  peoples  of  the  Russian  Empire.  It 
would  be  contrary  to  Poland's  political  interests,  as  well  as  her  moral  duty,  to  interfere 
with  the  trend  and  cooperate  with  Soviet  Russia  in  order  to  suppress  this  natural, 
logical,  and  progressive  movement,  as,  for  example,  the  National  Democrats  wanted  to 
do.  "  He  went  on  to  state  that  the  question  of  East  Galicia  should  not  hinder  the  Poles 
from  seeing  the  larger  problem.  Poland  would  be  strengthened  by  the  establishment  of 
independent  national  republics  on  her  eastern  borders,  especially  the  establishment  of  a 
free  Ukraine.  22  The  Socialist  Party  passed  a  resolution  at  the  Eighteenth  Congress  of  the 
Party  in  late  May  1920,  stating  that  while  the  Party  favoured  an  independent  Ukraine,  it 
opposed  any  attempt  at  pursuing  the  war  further.  23 
The  Bolsheviks  were  convinced  that  the  Polish-Ukrainian  alliance  was  a  policy 
thought  up  by  the  Entente  powers.  While  it  is  true  that  the  French  in  particular 
supported  the  policy,  the  policy  was  born  in  Warsaw  and  was  not  an  extension  of  the 
Russian  Civil  War  with  Poland  as  a  proxy  for  the  Entente.  Certainly,  once  it  became 
clear  that  an  invasion  of  Ukraine  was  imminent,  the  French  agreed  to  lend  their  support. 
The  British  were  extremely  cautious  and  regarded  the  campaign  as  the  beginning  of  a 
Polish  imperialistic  war  in  Eastern  Europe,  and  did  not  welcome  a  further  upheaval  in 
Eastern  Europe.  However,  the  British  government  pledged  to  defend  the  borders  of 
Poland  against  invasion.  24 
21  Palij,  The  Ukrainian-Polish  Defensive  Alliance,  p.  212. 
22  Dziewanowski,  Joseph  Pilsudski,  p.  279. 
23  Ibid.  p.  280. 
21  PRO:  Foreign  Office  Papers.  371/4058/207846.  Curzon  to  Chicherin,  11  July  1920. 
151 From  the  French  perspective  the  Russian  Civil  War  had  not  yet  ended,  and  in 
April  1920  Wrangel  had  assumed  command  of  the  White  Russian  forces  in  the  Crimea. 
Any  attack  on  the  Red  Army,  which  would  draw  forces  away  from  the  Crimea  and  thus 
assist  Wrangel,  was  to  be  welcomed.  France  was  Poland's  main  ally,  and  Poland  was 
dependant  on  France  for  supplies  of  military  equipment.  The  leader  of  the  French 
Military  Mission  in  Warsaw,  General  Henrys,  appeared  to  encourage  Pilsudski  to 
launch  an  attack  on  the  Bolsheviks.  There  is  also  some  evidence  to  suggest  that  the 
Poles  lured  Paris  with  the  promise  that  a  future  Ukrainian  economy  would  be  oriented 
towards  Poland,  and  would  need  French  investment  and  assistance.  25  There  had  also 
been  many  French  investments  in  Ukraine  prior  to  the  1917  revolution,  and  this  may 
have  been  another  factor  in  French  support.  This  newfound  French  support  for  an 
independent  Ukraine  seemed  to  bear  out  Petliura's  theory  that  an  alliance  with  Poland 
would  almost  automatically  mean  French  support. 
In  the  spring  of  1920  the  Bolsheviks  were  in  optimistic  mood.  All  of  the  White 
armies  of  Kolchak  and  Denikin  had  been  defeated,  and  there  only  remained  Wrangel's 
forces  in  the  Crimea  to  deal  with.  Furthermore,  the  arms  and  equipment,  which  the 
Entente  had  given  to  the  White  armies,  were  in  the  hands  of  the  Bolsheviks.  Peace 
treaties  had  been  signed  with  Estonia  and  Latvia.  The  only  possible  danger  lay  on  the 
Polish  front. 
On  April  25  1920,  the  Soviet-Polish  War  began  with  the  joint  forces  of  Poland 
and  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  entering  Ukraine.  The  Polish-Ukrainian  forces 
advanced  almost  without  resistance  from  the  Red  Army,  and  with  the  assistance  of 
Ukrainian  partisans.  Petliura  and  Pilsudski  followed  the  army  into  Ukraine.  The  Polish 
advance  was  swift  -Zhitomir  was  captured  on  April  26  and  the  army moved  on  towards 
Kiev.  The  Soviet  army  retreated  steadily,  but  in  an  orderly  manner.  Everywhere  the 
peasants  seemed  pleased  to  see  the  Polish  and  Ukrainian  forces,  and  partisans  harried 
the  retreating  Soviets. 
Within  Poland  the  doubters  expressed  their  concerns  about  Pilsudski's  campaign. 
One  of  these  had  been  the  National  Democratic  politician  Grabski.  On  27  April  1920, 
he  gave  an  interview  to  Gazeta  Warszawska,  where  he  issued  a  prophetic  warning 
about  the  war:  "Just  as  Poland  needs  Warsaw,  so  Ukraine  needs  Kiev;  but  to  have  Kiev 
in  permanent  possession,  it  would  be  necessary  to  go  far  beyond  the  Dnepr,  and  such  a 
_°  A  memorandum  of  the  Polish  Foreign  Ministry,  in  the  Ciechanowski  Deposit,  hoover  Library,  Stanford,  California.  Cited  in 
Dziewanowski,  Joseph  Pilsudski,  p.  281. 
152 march  would  threaten  Poland  with  a  defeat  like  Napoleon's  in  1812.  "  He  went  on  to 
warn  of  the  dangers  of  a  resentful  Russia  and  the  consequences  of  Ukrainian 
nationalism  for  Poland:  "It  is  better  to  be  a  neighbour  with  Russia  than  a  newly  created 
Ukraine,  because  we,  as  Poles,  have  more  rights  to  the  pre-partition  lands  lying  cast  of 
the  Zbruch  than  the  Russians.  Thanks  to  these  rights  we  would  have  an  easier  situation 
than  if  we  had  next  to  us  Ukraine  which,  on  the  basis  of  the  self-determination  of 
nations,  would  demand  rights  to  Eastern  Galicia.  ,  26  These  doubts  regarding  the 
campaign  were  swept  away  as  the  Polish-Ukrainian  forces  continued  to  advance  east. 
There  were  encouraging  signs  of  Ukrainian  resistance  to  the  Bolsheviks  -  partisan 
activity  increased  -  Trotsky  later  admitted  that  partisan  actions  significantly  facilitated 
and  accelerated  the  advance  of  the  Polish  troops.  27  The  other  major  setback  for  the 
Bolsheviks  was  the  mutiny  of  the  three  Galician  brigades  in  the  14th  Soviet  Army, 
which  Soviet  military  historians  saw  as  being  a  decisive  event:  "The  mutiny  of  the  two 
Galician  brigades  totally  broke  the  alignment  of  the  14th  Army  (...  )  Thus  the  mutiny  of 
the  two  Galician  brigades  practically  coincided  with  the  beginning  of  the  decisive 
advance  of  the  Poles  on  the  South-western  Front;  it  not  only  reduced  the  already 
weakened  forces  of  its  Polish  section,  but  proved  totally  disadvantageous  for  us  and 
advantageous  for  the  alignment  of  our  opponent.  s28  Palij  ascribes  this  defection  to 
mistreatment  at  the  hands  of  the  Cheka  and  the  commissars,  but  considering  that  the 
Poles  were  the  bitter  enemies  of  the  Galicians,  it  is  also  possible  that  there  was  a 
genuine  awakening  of  nationalist  fervour  with  the  prospect  of  a  Ukrainian  government 
being  in  power  in  Kiev,  even  a  Polish  backed  one  -  the  increase  in  partisan  activity 
would  also  point  to  this.  As  a  result  of  these  setbacks  the  Soviet  12th  Army  retreated  to 
the  east  of  Kiev  and  the  Polish-UNR  forces  entered  the  city  on  7  May. 
The  capture  of  Kiev  and  the  installation  of  the  government  of  the  Ukrainian 
People's  Republic  there  was  a  huge  psychological  boost  for  the  nationalists  and  an 
apparent  vindication  of  Petliura's  policy.  The  Polish  High  Command  made  efforts  to 
reassure  the  Ukrainians  that  it  was  not  an  army  of  occupation,  and  on  8  May  issued  a 
proclamation  to  the  Ukrainian  people: 
u  Kutzreba,  Wyprawa  Kyowska  p.  88. 
_'  LTrotsky,  Kak  vooruzhalas  revolutsila:  Na  voennol  rabote,  Vol  2  pt  2.  (Moscow,  1924),  cited  in  Palij.  The  Ukrainian-Polish 
Defensive  Alliance,  1919-1921,  p.  102. 
u  N.  E.  Kakurin  and  V.  A.  Melikov:  Voina  s  Belopolakaml  1920.  (Moscow,  1925),  cited  in  Palij,  The  Ukrainian-Polish  Defensive 
Alliance,  p.  103. 
153 It  is  in  the  Polish  interest  to  withdraw  our  troops  from  the  occupied 
territories  as  quickly  as  possible  and  to  establish  good  neighbourly  relations 
with  the  newly  created  Ukrainian  state,  as  in  this  way  a  significant  part  of 
our  eastern  border  will  be  secured  from  the  direct  danger  of  the  Bolshevik 
forces.  The  Polish  occupation  of  Ukraine  must  be  calculated  not  in  years, 
but  in  months  (...  )  The  fewer  the  frictions  and  clashes  with  the  Ukrainian 
authorities  during  the  period  of  co-operation,  the  easier  will  Poland  attain  its 
ultimate  aim.  29 
There  were  already  signs  of  strain  between  the  two  partners  however.  In  early 
May,  Pilsudski  went  on  a  tour  of  the  front  visiting  Zhitomir,  Kiev,  and  Vinnitsa.  In 
Vinnitsa  he  met  Petliura  and  the  Ukrainian  Prime  Minister,  Mazepa.  Pilsudski  promised 
to  support  Ukrainian  independence  and  to  release  East  Galician  POW's.  Pilsudski  told 
the  Ukrainians:  "I  want  you  to  acquire  experience  by  being  pushed  off  the  deck  and 
being  made  to  swim  in  deep  water.  "  Mazepa  objected  to  the  speech,  and  doubts  began 
to  form  in  his  mind  about  the  Polish-Ukrainian  alliance.  He  later  commented:  "After 
my  conversation  with  Pilsudski,  I  began  to  lean  toward  the  idea  that  our  representatives 
in  Warsaw  had  been  too  accommodating  in  their  negotiations  with  the  Poles,  and  that 
with  a  different  approach  the  Polish-Ukrainian  agreement  might  have  looked 
different 
.,, 
30  The  Central  Committee  of  the  Ukrainian  Social  Democratic  Party  also 
came  to  the  same  conclusion  and  instructed  Mazepa  to  resign  from  the  government  of 
the  UNR.  On  May  25,  Mazepa  resigned.  Thus  the  first  cracks  were  showing  in  the 
alliance,  but  while  the  victory  seemed  assured  they  did  not  widen. 
Some  of  the  reasons  for  Mazepa's  disillusionment  with  the  alliance  may  have 
stemmed  from  the  fact  that  the  Poles  had  insisted  in  the  Warsaw  Agreement,  that  two 
ministers  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  be  Poles.  Also  more  pointedly,  each  of 
these  ministries  controlled  very  important  areas  of  policy.  The  ministers  were, 
Stanislaw  Stempowski  (Minister  of  Agriculture),  and  Henryk  Jozewski  (Deputy 
Minister  of  Internal  Affairs).  These  appointments  were  strong  indicators  that  Warsaw 
would  remain  in  control,  and  that  the  interests  of  the  Polish  landowners  in  Right  Bank 
Ukraine  would  be  observed. 
During  the  course  of  the  campaign  other  indicators  emerged,  which  were  ominous 
for  the  future  of  the  UNR.  One  of  the  first  was  that  the  Galician  brigades,  which  had 
2'  Palij,  The  Ukrainian-Polish  Defensive  Alliance.  p.  104. 
30  I.  Mazepa,  Ukraina  v  ohnl  i  burl  revolulsil.  Vol  III  (Munich,  1950-51),  p.  24. 
154 deserted  the  Bolsheviks,  were  disarmed  and  interned  by  the  Poles.  One  of  the  brigade 
officers  later  wrote: 
Considering  it  our  sacred  duty  to  take  an  active  part  in  establishing  the 
Ukrainian  state,  we  came  over  to  this  side  in  order  to  enter,  with  arms  in 
hand,  the  ranks  of  the  Ukrainian  army.  We  stated  that  clearly  to  the  Polish 
authorities,  who,  in  spite  of  our  action  against  the  Bolsheviks,  disarmed  us 
and  then  interned  us  in  a  prisoner  of  war  camp.  We  also  stated  our  readiness 
to  enter  the  Ukrainian  army  through  a  separate  delegation  to  Petliura,  the 
commander  in  chief.  31 
The  three  brigades  were  all  interned  at  Tuchola  camp  in  Poland,  and  the  Polish 
press  described  them  as  defeated  Bolsheviks.  32 
What  Petliura's  response  was  to  this  is  not  recorded.  It  was  clear  that  the  Poles 
were  not  prepared  to  trust  the  Galicians.  Further  signs  of  the  Polish  policy  towards  the 
Ukrainians  emerged  with  the  treatment  of  the  Ukrainian  partisans  by  the  Polish  army. 
While  many  of  these  units  were  anarchic  and  loosely  allied  to  the  UNR  forces,  they 
were  a  valuable  military  ally  in  the  war  against  the  Red  Army  -  they  also  had  the 
support  of  the  peasantry,  and  could  rouse  the  country  against  the  Bolsheviks.  Makhno's 
forces  for  example,  had  already  proved  a  veritable  thorn  in  the  side  of  the  Soviet  forces. 
The  Polish  army  treated  the  partisans  not  as  potential  allies  but  as  potential  enemies. 
Throughout  the  Polish  occupied  area  of  Ukraine  the  partisans  were  disarmed.  In  one 
area  south  of  Bila  Tservka,  many  villages  were  controlled  by  15,000  partisans.  They 
were  friendly  to  the  Polish  troops  but  were  disarmed,  as  the  Poles  feared  that  they 
might  become  a  focus  of  resistance  against  requisitioning.  33  Palij  also  states  that  there 
was  a  very  slow  delivery  of  arms  by  the  Poles  to  the  UNR  troops,  and  the  arms  taken 
from  the  Galician  brigades  were  not  passed  on  at  all.  In  Palij's  opinion  the  presence  of 
the  UNR  forces  was  a  political  fig  leaf:  "Clearly  the  Polish  government  did  not  plan  to 
assist  the  UNR  government  in  building  up  a  strong  Ukrainian  army.  The  Polish 
command  simply  needed  the  presence  of  some  Ukrainian  troops  during  its  offensive  in 
Ukraine,  so  as  to  appease  the  population,  which  was  antagonistic  to  all  foreign  forces, 
and  thus  to  make  the  campaign  easier  for  the  Polish  troops.  s34  The  Poles  also  took 
'1  Palij,  The  Ukrainian-Polish  Defensive  Alliance,  p.  211. 
3,  Ibid. 
33  Ibid,  p.  112. 
N  Ibid,  p.  113. 
155 control  of  the  Ukrainian  railways,  contrary  to  the  Warsaw  Treaty,  and  anything  of  value 
was  removed  and  transported  to  Poland,  all  of  which  was  a  contravention  of  the  treaty. 
The  Polish  distrust  of  the  Ukrainians  proved  to  be  a  self-fulfilling  prophecy,  and 
soon  the  peasantry  began  to  resist  the  requisitioning,  and  the  initial  support  for  the 
Poles  began  to  fade.  On  May  4,1920,  three  days  before  the  fall  of  Kiev,  Vynnychenko 
issued  an  open  letter  to  the  world  warning  that:  "The  `aid'  of  Poland  and  her  aristocrats 
is  the  kiss  of  Judas  and  with  this  kiss  the  Ukrainian  nation  is  being  surrendered  to  a  new 
Golgotha.  "35 
In  the  interim  a  new  cabinet  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  was  formed  in 
Kiev  on  May  25.  The  new  Prime  Minister  was  Viacheslav  Prokopovich,  and  Andrei 
Liviskyi  as  vice  premier  and  Minister  for  Justice.  Mazepa  agreed  to  join  the  new 
government  as  Minister  of  Agriculture,  but  only  after  the  transfer  of  Stempowski,  the 
Polish  appointee,  to  the  health  ministry.  On  June  3,  the  cabinet  issued  a  call  for  the 
assembling  of  a  parliament. 
The  period  of  the  UNR  administration  in  Ukraine  is  viewed  very  differently  by 
Polish  and  Ukrainian  historians.  Palij  interprets  the  Polish  actions  as  clear  evidence  that 
Polish  intentions  were  always  suspect.  Dziewanowski,  on  the  other  hand,  attempts  to 
explain  Polish  actions  in  a  different  light.  He  admits  that  Polish  actions  were  somewhat 
suspect,  but  claims  that  the  local  Polish  army  officers  did  not  follow  the  orders  of  the 
Commander  in  Chief.  He  also  quotes  a  diplomatic  report  from  an  American  observer 
who  commented  on  the  Polish  actions: 
The  Poles  have  expressed  their  intention  not  to  remain  in  occupation  of  the 
Ukraine  a  moment  longer  than  is  necessary  to  assure  the  proper  organisation 
of  the  country.  Such  intentions  are  not  always  possible  to  fulfil  (...  )  I  was 
told  that  the  Poles  would  have  already  turned  over  the  actual  administration 
of  certain  parts  of  the  Ukrainian  railways,  but  the  Ukrainian  administration 
was  not  ready  to  receive  them  (...  )  To  prevent  the  descent  of  speculators 
upon  a  country  where  the  valuta  (currency)  question  is  so  acute  as  in  the 
Ukraine,  and  also  to  discourage  the  return  of  Polish  landowners,  who  might 
31  Vynnychenko.  Politichni  Llstil,  p.  22. 
156 complicate  the  agrarian  situation,  the  Polish-Ukrainian  frontier  is  to  remain 
closed  for  an  indefinite  period.  36 
Dziewanowski  argues  that  the  Poles  were  not  responsible  for  the  mistakes  made 
during  this  period  and  that  the  new  government  did  not  have  very  much  time  to  take 
root;  therefore  that  a  period  of  adjustment,  with  its  concomitant  disorganisation,  was 
inevitable.  Ukrainian  commentators  have  not  been  as  charitable.  Palij  however,  does 
accept  that  Pilsudski's  intentions  were  honourable  and  that  it  was  due  to  other  Polish 
officers  and  officials  that  they  were  not  adhered  to.  Dziewanowski  agrees  with  this 
interpretation. 
In  Poland  the  capture  of  Kiev,  and  the  installation  of  the  UNR  government  there, 
meant  that  Pilsudski's  position  was  strengthened  considerably.  Opposition  to  the 
campaign  from  the  National  Democrats  and  the  Right  evaporated,  and  on  Pilsudski's 
return  to  Warsaw  he  was  treated  as  a  conquering  hero.  The  Sejm  sent  him  a 
congratulatory  telegram,  and  his  exploits  were  praised  by  those  who  had  criticised  him 
bitterly  only  a  few  weeks  before. 
In  Paris  news  of  the  victories  were  well  received.  Even  the  news  about  the  new 
UNR  government  was  well  received  by  the  French  authorities.  37  This  was  quite  a 
significant  change  in  French  policy,  as,  France  had  been  continually  opposed  to  the 
concept  of  an  independent  Ukraine.  In  the  Crimea,  Wrangel  observed  the  situation  in 
Ukraine  and  began  to  consider  the  possibility  of  a  White-Polish  alliance;  the  stumbling 
block  was  Ukrainian  independence.  Whereas  Wrangel  was  more  open  to  some  form  of 
federal  solution  in  the  former  Russian  Empire  than  Denikin  had  been,  he  was  still  not 
prepared  to  cooperate  with  Petliura.  Not  until  September  1920  did  he  send  a 
representative  to  Warsaw  to  consider  talks.  French  support  for  the  Poles  was  a  major 
factor  in  this,  along  with  the  realisation  that  the  Entente  were  abandoning  the  `one  and 
indivisible  Russia'  policy.  The  British  had  accepted  that  the  White  cause  was  lost,  and 
opinion  in  Britain  was  deeply  divided  over  the  Soviet-Polish  war.  Conservative  opinion 
generally  favoured  the  Poles,  the  Left  was  implacably  opposed,  and  Lloyd  George 
regarded  the  Polish  war  aims  with  deep  cynicism.  However,  as  long  as  the  Poles  were 
winning,  the  British  would  not  get  involved. 
36  Report  of  J.  C.  White  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  Warsaw,  May  15,1920;  USNA,  860E.  00/35.  Citcd  in  Dziewanowski,  Joseph 
Pilsudskl,  p.  292. 
37  Dziewanowski,  Joseph  Pilsudskl,  p.  293. 
157 The  entire  situation  was  to  change  dramatically  with  the  Soviet  counterattack.  The 
Bolsheviks  could  observe  that  the  Ukrainians  were  not  lending  the  Polish  forces  as 
much  assistance  as  they  had  expected.  Polish  lines  of  communication  were  also 
stretched.  The  Red  Army  had  been  considerably  strengthened  by  the  return  to  its  ranks 
of  former  Tsarist  officers,  who  now  rallied  to  the  Russian  standard  against  the  hated 
Poles.  Trotsky  and  the  Bolsheviks  proclaimed  the  message  that  the  motherland  was  in 
danger,  as  she  had  been  many  times  in  the  past,  from  the  Polish  menace.  Not  for  the  last 
time  in  Soviet  history,  Russian  nationalism  proved  to  be  an  effective  recruiting 
sergeant.  Petliura's  appeals  to  the  Ukrainian  people  to  join  the  forces  of  the  UNR  had 
only  resulted  in  a  few  thousand  volunteers.  So  the  forces  of  the  new  republic  were  very 
limited,  and  the  Polish  requisitioning  had  not  been  as  successful  as  originally 
envisaged. 
In  early  June,  Budienny's  Red  Cavalry  attacked  the  Polish  lines  south  of  Kiev.  On 
June  5,  the  Polish  lines  near  Zhitomir  were  broken.  The  Soviet  forces  then  tried  to 
surround  Kiev,  but  the  Polish-Ukrainian  forces  managed  to  break  through  and  to  retreat 
to  the  west.  Petliura's  government  had  only  been  in  power  in  Kiev  for  four  weeks.  The 
Polish-Ukrainian  forces  retreated  rapidly,  and  while  attempting  to  defend  their  rear, 
were  forced  to  abandon  Ukraine.  On  July  3,  a  month  after  the  offensive  had  begun, 
Soviet  forces  crossed  the  river  Horyn  in  Western  Volhynia,  and  moved  towards  Poland. 
Pilsudski's  gamble  had  failed. 
Polish  and  Ukrainian  commentators  differ  on  the  reasons  why  the  Ukrainian 
campaign  of  1920  failed,  but  a  major  reason  must  have  been  the  fear  of  the  Ukrainian 
peasantry  that  a  Polish  occupation  would  mean  the  return  of  the  Polish  landowners  in 
Right  Bank  Ukraine.  The  appointment  of  a  Pole  to  the  agriculture  portfolio  in  the  UNR 
government,  confirmed  the  suspicions  of  many  that  the  new  regime  would  restore  the 
land  to  the  Polish  landlords.  Also,  the  UNR  government  had  not  issued  any  guarantees 
that  the  land  would  remain  in  the  hands  of  the  peasants.  Bolshevik  propaganda  played 
effectively  on  these  fears,  and  was  a  major  reason  why  the  Ukrainian  peasantry  did  not 
support  the  new  regime  to  the  extent  that  they  could  have. 
The  hasty  retreat  of  the  Polish-Ukrainian  forces  into  ethnographic  Poland  brought 
about  a  political  crisis  in  Poland.  Pilsudski's  policy  was  regarded  as  fatally  flawed  and 
the  government  fell.  The  National  Democrats,  who  had  opposed  the  campaign  from  the 
outset,  were  now  in  the  ascendant.  On  24  June  1920,  a  new  government,  led  by  the  arch 
158 critic  of  the  Ukrainian  venture,  Grabski,  came  to  power.  Poland  itself  was  now  in 
danger,  with  Soviet  forces  crossing  the  frontier.  On  1  July,  all  power  was  ceded  by  the 
Sejm  to  a  State  Defence  Council,  who  were  authorised  to  make  all  decisions  regarding 
war  and  peace.  The  Council  consisted  of  18  members  -  Pilsudski,  the  marshal  of  the 
Sejm,  3  ministers,  three  generals,  and  ten  representatives  of  the  main  parties.  Events 
moved  on  rapidly,  and  on  3  July,  Pilsudski  issued  two  proclamations  in  the  name  of  the 
council.  The  first  called  on  all  Polish  men  to  enlist  to  save  Poland  from  Russian 
invasion.  The  second  called  on  all  soldiers  to  be  brave  defending  their  fatherland.  On  5 
July,  the  council  appealed  for  assistance  to  the  Allied  Supreme  Council  at  Spa.  The 
British  now  forced  the  Poles  to  come  to  some  agreement  with  the  Bolsheviks,  and  to 
cease  hostilities  as  soon  as  possible.  Grabski,  who  had  wanted  no  war  with  the 
Bolsheviks,  signed  an  agreement  with  the  Entente  on  10  July,  agreeing  to  a  ceasefire 
and  to  peace  negotiations  with  the  Bolsheviks.  Under  the  terms  of  the  agreement,  Polish 
forces  were  to  withdraw  to  a  line  decided  by  the  Supreme  Council  on  8  December 
1919.38  If  the  Bolsheviks  did  not  agree  to  the  negotiations,  the  Entente  would  send 
Poland  military  aid.  A  bitter  argument  broke  out  between  Left  and  Right  in  Poland, 
with  many  recriminations  against  Pilsudski  and  his  policy  in  Ukraine. 
Grabski's  government  fell,  and  on  24  July  a  new  government  under  Witos,  the 
Peasant  Party  leader,  with  Daszynski,  the  Socialist  Party  leader  as  deputy,  assumed 
power.  This  government  would  support  Pilsudski's  military  and  foreign  policy.  The 
situation  was  critical,  as  the  Red  Army,  commanded  by  Tukhachevskii  in  the  north,  and 
Budienny  in  the  south,  had  entered  ethnographic  Poland  in  late  July.  Approximately 
178,500  Polish  and  Ukrainian  troops  faced  a  Soviet  force  of  177,900  men.  It  is 
interesting  to  note  that  even  at  this  critical  time,  Wrangel,  whose  forces  were  moving 
on  to  the  offensive  in  the  Crimea,  made  no  overtures  to  the  Ukrainians  for  joint  action. 
Polish  negotiators  were  despatched  to  Minsk  on  14  August,  to  parley  with  the 
Bolsheviks,  but  Lenin  and  Trotsky  were  convinced  that  the  Red  Army  had  the  upper 
hand  and  that  a  Soviet  Poland  would  soon  be  a  reality.  The  Bolshevik  terms  were 
extreme  -  the  Polish  ethnographic  frontier  would  be  recognised,  but  the  Polish  army 
would  be  limited  to  50,000  men.  Also  a  civilian  workers  militia  would  be  organised  of 
200,000  men,  to  be  controlled  by  the  Polish  and  Russian  labour  organisations.  This 
31  PRO:  Foreign  Office  Papers  371/4058/208802,  Curzon  to  Chicherin,  20  July  1920. 
159 would  be  in  effect  a  Red  Guard  within  Poland.  9  It  was  obvious  that  Poland  could  not 
accept  such  terms,  and  in  the  interim  the  Soviet  forces  advanced  deeper  into  Poland. 
The  troops  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  fought  in  southern  Poland,  near 
Zamo§6  against  Budienny's  cavalry,  and  played  a  central  part  in  the  struggle  for  that 
town.  On  15  August  1920,  the  decisive  Battle  of  Warsaw  took  place,  which  Polish 
historians  have  ever  since  referred  to  as  `The  Miracle  on  the  Vistula'.  The  Red  Army 
was  defeated  and  began  the  long  and  disorganised  retreat  back  to  Soviet  territory.  The 
Ukrainians  assisted  the  Poles  in  defeating  Budienny  in  the  south,  and  soon  all  Soviet 
forces  had  left  ethnographic  Poland,  hotly  pursued  by  the  Poles  and  Ukrainians.  A 
further  Soviet  defeat  followed  in  September,  at  the  Battle  of  the  Niemen.  The  UNR 
forces  under  General  Omelianovich-Pavlenko  pursued  the  retreating  Soviets  in  the 
south  and  crossed  the  Dniester  on  14  September,  and  attacked  the  14th  Army.  Aller 
four  days  of  fighting,  the  Bolsheviks  were  defeated  and  pushed  back  100  kilometres. 
On  18  September,  the  UNR  troops  formed  a  line  along  the  river  Zbruch.  The  policy  of 
the  UNR  forces  was  to  link  up  with  Ukrainian  partisans,  and  on  21  September  they 
crossed  the  Zbruch.  Both  sides  knew  in  October  that  an  armistice  was  imminent,  and 
fighting  intensified  as  both  the  Bolsheviks  and  the  UNR  forces  tried  to  capture  territory 
before  the  cease-fire  40  When  the  armistice  agreement  was  signed  on  12  October,  with 
effect  from  18  October,  the  Polish  army  sent  units  to  the  Ukrainian  lines  to  indicate  that 
it  was  a  Polish  front. 
While  the  Ukrainians  were  still  fighting  the  Bolsheviks  with  their  Polish  allies, 
the  Poles  were  deciding  on  a  delegation  to  attend  the  armistice  agreement  talks.  The 
Council  of  State  instructed  the  delegation  to  fix  an  eastern  frontier  for  Poland,  and  to 
"provide  for  a  fair  harmonisation  of  the  vital  interests  of  both  parties.  "41  Dziewanowski 
states  that  the  delegation  was  instructed  to  press  for  an  independent  Ukraine,  which  was 
to  be  confederated  with  Poland.  The  Soviet  army  was  to  withdraw  east  of  the  1772 
frontier,  and  the  troops  of  the  UNR  were  to  re-enter  Ukraine.  Dziewanowski  continues; 
"Warsaw  realised,  however,  that  it  would  be  extremely  difficult  to  achieve  these 
objectives  without  prolonging  the  war.  Consequently,  the  Polish  negotiators  were  not  to 
insist  on  these  conditions  in  the  face  of  determined  opposition  from  the  Soviet 
"Peace  Proposals  Submitted  by  the  Russian  Delegation  at  the  First  Plenary  Session  of  the  Russian-Ukrainian-Polish  Peace 
Conference  at  Minsk,  17  August,  1920.  -  Soviet  Documents  on  Foreign  Policy.  (Edited  by  Jane  Degras).  Volume  1,1917-1924. 
(London,  New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  1951),  p.  223. 
Palij,  The  Ukrainian-Polish  Defensive  Alliance,  p.  136. 
Dziewanowski,  Joseph  Pilsudskl,  p.  323. 
160 delegates.  The  Polish  delegation  was  thus  left  free  to  decide  what  could  actually  be 
achieved  without  either  prolonging  the  armed  struggle  unduly  or  breaking  off 
negotiations.  "42  Palij  and  other  Ukrainian  historians  have  a  point  in  declaring  that  this 
was  hardly  in  the  spirit  of  the  Warsaw  Treaty,  and  a  curious  way  of  treating  an  ally  still 
active  in  the  field. 
Petliura  and  the  rest  of  the  government  of  the  UNR  were  at  this  time  based  in 
Tarn6w,  in  southern  Poland,  to  where  they  had  retreated  after  the  Soviet  advance  in 
July.  Petliura  was  deeply  concerned  that  the  government  of  the  UNR  be  represented  in 
any  armistice  talks.  The  membership  of  the  Polish  delegation  would  be  crucial.  The 
delegation  was  divided  between  those  who  supported  Pilsudski,  chiefly  Leon 
Wasilewski,  and  those  who  supported  the  National  Democrats.  The  main  representative 
of  the  latter  was  Stanislaw  Grabski,  the  long  time  opponent  of  Ukrainian  independence. 
The  delegation  was  led  by  Jan  Dgbski,  Vice-Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  a  leading 
member  of  the  Peasant  Party.  The  neutral  venue  of  Riga,  in  Latvia,  was  chosen  as  the 
site  for  the  peace  talks,  and  they  opened  on  September  21,1920. 
Typically  of  the  Whites,  it  was  only  now,  with  the  end  of  the  war  in  sight,  that 
Wrangel  dispatched  his  representative,  General  Makhrov  to  Warsaw.  Makhrov 
approached  the  Russian  Political  Council,  a  Russian  socialist  organisation  led  by  Boris 
Savinkov,  who  was  trying  to  organise  Russian  troops  to  fight  the  Bolsheviks  in  Poland. 
Savinkov  told  Makhrov  that  an  agreement  with  the  government  of  the  UNR  was 
imperative,  whether  or  not  Poland  continued  the  war.  His  view  was  that  Petliura  was 
desperate  for  an  agreement  with  Wrangel,  and  did  not  want  to  be  isolated.  Obviously 
Petliura  could  deduce  that  Polish  and  Ukrainian  interests  were  about  to  part  once  again. 
Pilsudski  told  Makhrov  that  he  had  no  time  for  the  reactionary  generals  but  looked 
forward  to  a  third,  democratic,  Russia.  Makhrov  went  on  to  send  Wrangel  a  report 
urging  him  to  approve  Savinkov's  project  on  the  formation  of  a  Russian  3rd  Army,  and 
to  begin  negotiations  with  Petliura.  Wrangel  responded  by  accepting  the  formation  of 
the  3rd  army  but  was  silent  on  the  issue  of  a  Ukrainian  alliance.  Savinkov  announced 
that  he  would  no  longer  wait  for  Wrangel's  decision  on  talks  with  Petliura,  and  would 
reach  agreement  with  Petliura  alone.  Thus  at  a  time  when  the  Bolsheviks  were  at  their 
weakest,  the  Whites  still  hesitated  about  forming  a  Ukrainian  alliance.  Wrangel  only 
42  Dziewanowski,  Joseph  Pilsudskl,  p.  323.  Report  of  Adam  Tamowski  of  September  25.1953. 
161 authorised  talks  with  Petliura  in  November  1920,  when  his  defeated  forces  were  being 
evacuated  from  Crimea.  43 
On  September  28,  at  Riga,  Joffe,  the  leader  of  the  Soviet  delegation,  presented  a 
draft  of  the  preliminary  peace  proposals.  The  document  asked  for  Polish  recognition  of 
the  Soviet  republics  of  Ukraine  and  Belorussia.  It  also  stated  that  neither  party  would 
permit  organisations  or  persons,  which  aimed  to  overthrow  the  government  of  the  other 
party,  to  remain  on  its  territory.  This  was  clearly  aimed  at  the  UNR  government  among 
others.  For  the  Bolsheviks  control  of  Ukraine  was  vital.  Joffe  said  that  the  Soviet 
government  was  not  prepared  to  compromise  on  the  issue  of  Ukraine. 
The  preliminary  treaty  was  signed  on  October  12.  Joffe  wanted  the  text  to  read 
that  Poland  bordered  on  Russia.  Dgbski  rejected  this,  and  stated  that  Poland  bordered 
on  Ukraine  and  Belorussia.  Joffe  allowed  this  to  remain,  the  Bolsheviks  needed  a  peace 
agreement  at  all  costs,  and  especially  as  Soviet  forces  were  needed  to  fight  Wrangel  in 
Crimea.  However,  these  two  republics  would  be  Soviet  republics,  and  the  Polish 
delegation  had  effectively  denied  the  claims  of  the  UNR.  Dqbski,  in  his  closing  address 
attempted  to  claim  that  the  Poles  had  tried  their  best  to  recognise  the  principle  of  self- 
determination,  because  they  had  insisted  on  the  recognition  of  Ukrainian  and 
Belorussian  independence.  44 
Ukrainian  historians  have  not  been  as  charitable  in  their  interpretation  of  the 
Polish  delegates'  actions.  Palij  comments: 
According  to  the  fourth  article  of  the  Treaty  of  Warsaw,  the  Polish 
government  had  agreed  'not  to  conclude  any  international  agreement 
directed  against  Ukraine'.  But  it  did  not  consult  the  UNR  government 
before  accepting  the  Soviet  Russian  proposal  to  negotiate  an  armistice  and  a 
preliminary  peace.  While  Ukrainian  troops  continued  fighting  the 
Bolsheviks  alongside  Polish  troops,  the  Polish  delegation  after  twenty 
minutes  of  negotiations,  recognised  the  credentials  of  the  representatives  of 
the  fictitious  Soviet  Ukrainian  Republic.  By  this  one  act  the  delegation 
reversed  the  Polish  policy  towards  Ukraine  and  ignored  both  the  Treaty  of 
Warsaw  and  Ukrainian  loyalty  to  Poland.  45 
"'  Anna  Procyk,  Russian  Nationalism  and  Ukraine.  (Toronto:  Toronto  University  Press,  1995),  p.  161. 
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162 One  of  the  key  factors  may  have  been  that  Grabski  was  a  leading  member  of  the 
delegation,  and  in  the  struggle  between  the  Pilsudski  supporters  on  the  delegation  and 
Grabski,  his  view  triumphed.  Certainly  communications  between  Riga  and  Warsaw 
were  difficult,  and  the  delegation  had  been  given  quite  a  good  deal  of  leeway.  When 
Grabski  was  asked  by  a  correspondent  why  the  Polish  delegation  ignored  the  Warsaw 
Treaty,  his  reply  was  arrogant  in  the  extreme:  "it  was  merely  a  private  agreement 
between  Pilsudski  and  Petliura,  personal  friends,  it  was  not  ratified  by  the  Sejm  and 
therefore  was  not  obligatory  for  the  peace  delegation.  s46 
The  Polish  government  did  not  consult  the  UNR  government  over  the  peace 
negotiations.  When  the  UNR  government  asked  for  representation  at  the  negotiations, 
Prince  Sapieha,  the  Polish  Foreign  Minister,  referred  the  request  to  the  Soviet 
government.  His  secret  instructions  to  Polish  diplomats  were: 
In  our  negotiations  with  the  Bolsheviks  the  problem  of  Petliura  will  not  be 
taken  into  consideration  at  all.  Nevertheless,  today  I  sent  a  message  to 
Chicherin  informing  him  that  Petliura's  government  wishes  to  negotiate 
with  the  Russian  delegation  at  Riga.  This  proposal,  however,  should  not 
create  problems  for  the  departure  of  our  delegation,  even  if  Chicherin  rejects 
negotiations  with  Petliura,  which  I  think  is  certain.  47 
It  was  clear  that  the  Polish  delegation,  and  government,  had  its  own  agenda  with 
regard  to  Ukraine.  The  way  now  lay  open  for  the  Treaty  of  Riga,  and  the  end  of  the 
Polish-Ukrainian  alliance. 
"  Ibid,  p.  138. 
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163 CHAPTER  10 
EAST  GALICIA  AND  THE  STRIICC11  FOR 
UKRAINIAN  INIWI)FNDII:  N('14:,  1918-192I 
In  1918  the  province  of  East  Galicia  lay  in  the  Austro-IItºngarian  Empire  along 
mth  the  province  of'  Bukovyna  further  south  (see  the  attached  map).  at  (;,  ºIit"i,  t's 
.:  apital,  I,  cmherg  was  regarded  as  a  major  centre  of'  I1krainian  culture  and  scholarship, 
and  had  already  become  a  local  point  for  the  growing  (Ikrainian  nationalist  movement. 
I]ie  population  of  the  province  was  very  varied  -  the  hcºhrrlatioºn  of  the  towns.  and 
particularly  Lemberg  (known  in  Polish  as  Lwow,  and  in  I  Ukrainian  as  L  ON,  )  --  being 
mainly  Polish  and  Jewish,  and  that  of  the  countryside  and  the  smaller  towns  Ilutheni,  rn 
(as  the  Ukrainians  within  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire  were  then  termed).  I'he 
11krainians  constituted  by  far  the  majority  ol'thc  population  in  both  provinces. 
I'he  University  cat'  I.  cmherg  played  a  very  large  part  in  the  development  of 
I  Ikrainian  national  consciousness.  Its  members.  as  subjects  of'  the  empire  had  ,º  great 
deal  of  contact  with  the  German  and  Austrian  universities,  and  the  language  01' 
instruction  was  German  until  the  middle  ofthe  19th  century,  later  it  became  Polish.  It  is 
interesting  to  note  that  in  the  struggle  l  or  lJkrainian  independence  in  the  last  years  (,  1 
the  Soviet  I  Jnion.  Galicia,  once  again  played  a  major  role. 
TERYTCR'UM  ZACHODNIO-UKRAINSKIEJ 
REPUBLIKI  LUDOWEJ 
W1LL1  ,,  GI.,  ro...,  Ow 
owa  a"" 
77. 
- 
i 
4i` 
,.  ný  s 
t.  týt.  L.:  Lf 
Map  of  the  Western  t  kiaini.  fn  I'cnplcti  I:  cpubliLý  1/1  INK)  111  11)10.  In  I  udýý  ik  h1no.  ikti.  ý'/ffir  n  ;  ah, 
1Wv(  %fl  ctwi  Nauko%w  WSI'  Lrtkmw  I91)RI  p  "? 
164 In  an  essay  in  Nationalism  and  Empire.  The  Hapsburg  Empire  and  the  Soviet 
Union",  the  Canadian  historian  Paul  Magosci,  outlined  his  views  on  the  experience  of 
the  Galicians  within  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire.  Magosci  points  out  that 
geographically  and  demographically,  East  Galicia  is  a  very  small  part  of  the 
ethnographic  territory  of  Ukraine  and  that,  even  when  combined  with  northern 
I3ukovyna  and  Transcarpathia  (the  other  Ukrainian  provinces  within  the  Hapsburg 
Empire),  they  only  accounted  for  at  most  12%-15%  of  the  total  land  mass  and 
population  of  Ukraine.  He  goes  on  to  list  a  series  of  Austrian  concessions  to  Ukrainians 
in  Galicia,  which  dated  from  the  18th  century  onwards,  and  particularly  after  the 
1890's,  when  the  ethnic  and  cultural  divisions  within  the  empire  began  to  become 
critical.  Magosci  makes  clear  however,  that  in  East  Galicia  there  was  always  a  political 
balancing  act  being  played  by  the  Austrians  in  relation  to  the  competing  demands  of  the 
Poles  and  Ukrainians: 
This  is  not  to  say  that  Galicia's  Ukrainians  got  everything  they  wanted.  The 
province  was  never  divided  into  separate  Polish  and  Ukrainian  entities,  nor 
was  a  Ukrainian  university  ever  established,  two  of  the  group's  long- 
standing  demands.  Nor  did  Polish  domination  of  the  upper  and  middle  levels 
of  the  Galician  administration  ever  change.  Yet,  while  Galicia's  Ukrainians 
did  not  fare  terribly  well  in  comparison  with  Galicia's  Poles,  in  comparison 
with  their  national  brethren  across  the  border  in  the  Russian  Empire,  the 
contrast  could  not  have  been  greater.  2 
The  contrasts  between  the  two  Ukraines  would  prove  to  be  decisive  in  the  Civil 
War  period  and  fatally  divided  the  wider  struggle  for  Ukrainian  independence. 
Although  the  Hapsburgs  had  granted  the  Ukrainians  of  Eastern  Galicia  limited 
autonomy,  the  fall  of  the  empire  in  late  1918  brought  the  Ukrainians  face  to  face  with 
the  traditional  enemy  in  East  Galicia  -  the  Poles. 
Already  during  World  War  I,  there  was  evidence  of  a  German  plan,  and  of  its  ally 
Austria-Hungary,  to  detach  East  Galicia  from  the  more  Polish  area  of  West  Galica,  and 
grant  it  some  form  of  autonomy  within  the  Empire.  However,  this  was  an  extremely 
sensitive  issue,  in  view  of  the  aim  of  the  Central  Powers  to  gain  Polish  support  for  their 
war  effort,  and  to  placate  the  Polish  subjects  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire.  Thus,  a 
'Richard  Rudolph  and  David  Good  (editors),  Nationalism  and  Empire.  The  Hapsburg  Empire  and  the  Soviet  Union  (University  of 
Minnesota,  1992) 
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165 secret  agreement  on  the  formation  of  a  separate  Ukrainian  Crown  land  in  East  Galicia 
was  included  in  the  Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk,  on  February  29,1918.  This  committed 
Vienna  to  granting  extra  rights  to  its  Ukrainian  subjects.  The  agreement  stated: 
The  representatives  of  Ukraine  on  their  part  take  cognisance  of  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government's  decision  to  provide  the  Ukrainian  people  in 
Austria  with  additional  guarantees  for  further  national  and  cultural 
development  that  would  go  beyond  those  insured  by  the  present  laws.  The 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government  will  therefore  propose  to  the  State  Council 
(Reichsrat),  not  later  than  July  20,1918,  a  draft  of  a  bill  providing  that  the 
part  of  East  Galicia  with  a  Ukrainian  majority  be  detached  from  this  crown 
land  and  that  the  region  together  with  Bukovina  be  organised  into  a  special 
crown  land.  The  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  will  do  all  in  its  power  to 
insure  the  enactment  of  this  bill  into  law.  3 
However,  this  plan  was  dropped  in  the  face  of  stiff  opposition  from  the  Poles  in 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire  who,  together  with  the  Hungarians  regarded  any  form  of 
autonomy  for  the  Ukrainians  within  the  empire  as  very  threatening  to  their  position. 
The  suspicion  that  Germany  had  forced  Austria-Hungary  to  include  the  agreement  at 
Brest-Litovsk,  led  the  Poles  to  believe  that  Germany  was  not  only  pro-Ukrainian  but 
also  intended  to  add  East  Galicia  to  any  future  Ukrainian  state.  This  poisoned  relations 
between  Germany  and  the  new  Polish  Republic,  and  would  be  referred  to  as  proof  of 
Germany's  perfidy.  In  the  event,  although  Germany  generally  took  a  pro-Ukrainian 
position  in  Polish-Ukrainian  relations  during  the  Hetmanate,  Berlin  had  supported  the 
Austrian  position  in  withdrawing  the  agreement  signed  at  Brest.  s 
In  November  1918  the  collapse  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire  brought  into 
being  the  independent  state  of  Poland.  The  new  Polish  state  laid  claim  to  Eastern 
Galicia,  while  the  Ukrainians  finally  seized  the  opportunity  to  declare  an  independent 
republic.  East  Galicia  declared  itself  independent  on  November  1  1918,  as  the  Western 
Ukrainian  People's  Republic  (ZUNR).  The  parliament  of  the  new  state  was  the 
Ukrainian  National  Council  and  it  called  on  the  three  minority  nationalities  in  the  state 
(Polish,  German  and  Jewish)  to  send  representatives.  The  Polish  minority  refused  and 
Poland  declared  war  on  the  new  state.  Bukovyna  joined  the  ZUNR. 
3  Fedeyshyn,  Germany's  Drive  to  the  East  and  the  Ukrainian  Revolution,  1917-1918,  pp.  281-282. 
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166 It  was  always  the  policy  of  the  Ukrainians  in  the  new  republic  to  link  up  with  the 
Ukrainians  in  the  former  Russian  Ukraine.  A  preliminary  agreement  on  unification  was 
signed  at  Khvastiv  on  December  1  1918.  The  formal  unification  of  the  ZUNR  with  the 
Ukrainian  National  Republic  was  agreed  on  January  22  1919.  The  ZUNR  was  renamed 
the  Western  Area  of  the  Ukrainian  National  Republic.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  East 
Galicia  still  retained  its  own  government,  and  its  own  army  even  within  the  newly 
created  unitary  state. 
In  May  1919,  Poland  launched  its  military  offensive  against  the  East  Galicians. 
Troops  were  used  who  had  been  organised  in  France  and  were  supposed  to  be  used  in 
the  war  against  the  Bolsheviks.  The  Romanian  army  moved  from  Bukovyna  against  the 
Ukrainians  into  East  Galicia.  The  Galicians  looked  to  the  Entente  powers  for  support 
and  sent  a  delegation  to  the  Paris  Peace  Conference. 
The  major  diplomatic  and  political  perspective  of  the  Entente  was  that  the  chief 
aims  of  foreign  policy  in  Eastern  Europe  were  first  to  block  the  spread  of  Bolshevism 
and  second,  at  the  behest  of  France,  to  support  the  new  Polish  state  as  much  as  possible. 
France  wanted  a  strong  and  enlarged  Poland  at  the  expense  of  Ukraine  in  order  to  block 
any  revival  in  Germany's  power.  The  Entente  powers  also  had  adopted  the  policy  of 
reconstructing  the  Russian  Empire  and  therefore  any  claims  to  Ukrainian  independence 
whether  in  Galicia  or  elsewhere  were  an  obstacle.  Only  Poland  and  Finland  were  to  be 
excluded  from  the  new  Russia. 
In  view  of  the  actual  situation  in  Galicia  however,  the  Supreme  Council  of  the 
Conference  appointed  a  truce  commission  under  General  Barthelemy  of  France,  which 
was  sent  to  the  headquarters  of  the  Galician  army  in  order  to  mediate  with  the  Poles. 
The  President  of  West  Ukraine,  Petrushevych,  agreed  to  accept  the  commission  .6 
On 
February  28  1919,  the  commission  proposed  a  truce  agreement  but  the  Council  of  State 
Secretaries  of  Western  Ukraine  rejected  it  as  they  viewed  it  as  being  far  too  favourable 
towards  Poland.  Western  Ukraine  demanded  a  radical  change  in  the  proposed  borders 
between  Poland  and  Western  Ukraine.  The  Supreme  Council  of  the  Peace  Conference 
in  Paris  then  appointed  a  new  truce  commission  led  by  General  Botha.  The  government 
of  Western  Ukraine  then  entered  into  talks  with  the  truce  commission  and  accepted  its 
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167 truce  proposal.  Poland  immediately  rejected  the  proposal  and  proceeded  to  attack 
Western  Ukraine.  7 
In  the  middle  of  May  1919,  the  Polish  army  defeated  the  Galician  army  and  the 
Ukrainians  were  forced  to  retreat.  The  Western  Ukrainian  government  protested  to  the 
Peace  Conference,  and  the  Allied  Powers  demanded  that  Poland  cease  its  offensive. 
Poland  refused  to  follow  the  resolution  and  accused  Western  Ukraine  of  having 
launched  the  offensive. 
Despite  the  unification  of  the  ZUNR  with  the  rest  of  Ukraine,  West  Ukraine 
maintained  a  separate  foreign  ministry  and  its  own  diplomatic  missions  abroad.  This 
division  in  terms  of  foreign  policy  was  further  compounded  by  the  fact  that  the 
Directory  in  Ukraine  refused  to  go  to  war  against  Poland,  despite  the  war  being  fought 
against  the  Poles  in  East  Galicia. 
The  position  of  the  French  on  the  whole  issue  of  Ukrainian  independence,  and 
especially  on  the  issue  of  Galicia,  was  crucial  in  determining  the  outcome.  In  March 
1919  Marshal  Foch  had  told  the  Allied  Powers  in  Paris  what  he  considered  the  Polish 
situation  to  be.  According  to  Foch,  Poland  was  endangered  by  a  combination  of 
Bolsheviks,  Germans  and  Ukrainians;  and  the  fall  of  Lvov  to  the  Ukrainians  would 
mean  the  end  of  the  Polish  state.  Lloyd  George  disagreed  with  Foch's  appraisal  and  did 
not  view  Poland  as  having  the  right  to  control  Lvov.  8 
The  truce  commission  under  General  Botha  had  been  hearing  from  both  Polish 
and  Galician  delegations  in  Paris.  The  Poles  alleged  that  there  were  German  officers  in 
the  Galician  army.  The  Galicians  admitted  that  a  shortage  of  officers  had  led  to  their 
army  using  Czechs,  Croations,  Romanians,  and  Austrians  as  officers  but  not  Germans. 
After  the  Polish  offensive  in  Galicia  on  May  14  1919  the  Ukrainian  delegation  sent  a 
note  to  the  President  of  the  Peace  Conference  asking  if  the  conference  possessed  the 
will  and  the  ability  to  stop  the  Poles.  The  note  went  on  to  state  that  the  delegation 
would  regard  its  presence  in  Paris  as  useless  if  it  could  not  obtain  effective  support 
from  the  Allied  Powers.  On  21  May  the  Galician  delegation  met  the  representatives  of 
Britain,  France,  USA,  and  Italy  together  with  the  Truce  Commission.  Sidorenko,  the 
leader  of  the  delegation,  denounced  the  Poles  but  stated  that  the  Bolsheviks  were 
Ukraine's  major  enemy.  He  also  rejected  the  idea  of  union  with  Poland.  Paneyko, 
7  Reshetar,  The  Ukrainian  Revolution,  p.  277. 
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168 another  member  of  the  delegation,  assured  Lloyd  George  that  if  the  war  with  Poland 
ended,  and  then  Galician  forces  would  fight  against  the  Bolsheviks.  9 
The  delegates  from  both  West  Ukraine  and  Ukraine  met  with  the  French  premier 
Clemenceau  on  May  22,  who  informed  them  that  the  Supreme  Council  was  waiting  to 
hear  from  the  Poles  about  the  military  situation  in  Galicia.  It  became  apparent  to  the 
Ukrainians  that  the  Allied  Powers  would  not  stop  Poland.  There  was  a  fear  that  if  the 
government  of  Paderewski  collapsed  in  Poland,  the  alternative  would  be  a  Bolshevik 
regime.  General  Botha  of  the  Truce  Commission  and  Lloyd  George  were  both 
sympathetic  to  the  Galicians  and  realised  that  the  Poles  were  using  the  fear  of 
Bolshevism  to  cover  their  own  territorial  designs.  1°  On  May  23  the  Peace  Conference 
learned  that  the  Poles  had  captured  Striy  and  they  called  on  Paderewski  for  an 
explanation  but  he  did  not  reply  until  June  5.  The  Poles  in  the  interim  advanced 
eastwards  and  simultaneously  the  Galicians  were  given  an  ultimatum  by  the  Romanians 
to  evacuate  Kolomeia  and  Stanislaviv.  The  Galicians  abandoned  Stanislaviv  on  May  26 
and  chose  Chortkiv  as  the  new  temporary  capital  of  West  Ukraine. 
The  Galicians  next  decided  that  in  view  of  the  critical  military  situation  it  was 
necessary  to  appoint  an  overall  head  of  government  and  of  the  army.  Consequently  on 
June  9  the  President  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Council  of  East  Galicia,  Dr 
Petrushevych,  was  appointed  dictator. 
For  the  Bolshevik  forces  fighting  in  Ukraine  the  situation  in  East  Galicia  was  of 
considerable  military  importance.  The  commander  of  the  Soviet  forces  in  Ukraine, 
Antonov-Ovseenko,  wrote  to  Moscow  in  May  1919  giving  his  opinion  on  the  situation 
in  East  Galicia: 
The  Galicians  have  not  yet  been  liquidated  (...  )  The  Poles  threaten  from 
Kovel.  If  we  succeed  in  arranging  peace  with  the  Poles  and  Galicians  (...  ) 
we  will  still  be  able  to  give  aid  to  the  southern  front  (in  the  Don  Basin 
against  Denikin)  and  then  complete  the  push  to  Romania  and  make  contact 
with  Hungary.  Furthermore,  we  rely  on  Bessarabia  and  its  insurgents  whom 
we  are  organising  to  march  against  Romania,  with  support  from  Bulgaria 
and  Hungary.  Everything  depends  on  peace  with  Poland  and  Galicia.  " 
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169 In  early  May  the  Soviet  forces  had  reached  the  Galician  frontier.  The  Russians  did 
not  want  war  with  Western  Ukraine  and  they  began  negotiations  with  both  Poland  and 
the  Galicians.  In  Moscow  the  Sovnarkom  decided  to  deal  only  with  the  government  of 
Western  Ukraine  and  not  with  the  Directory,  which  had  been  forced  out  of  Ukraine  and 
taken  refuge  in  East  Galicia.  This  was  because  the  Bolsheviks  considered  the 
nationalists  in  Ukraine  to  be  a  defeated  force,  whereas  the  Galicians  still  had 
considerable  military  forces  at  their  disposal.  Accordingly,  Christian  Rakovsky,  the 
Commissar  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  Soviet  Ukraine,  sent  a  note  in  late  May  to  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Western  Ukrainian  Peoples  Republic  at  Stanislaviv: 
I  consider  it  necessary  to  declare,  in  the  name  of  the  workers-peasants' 
government  of  Ukraine,  that  the  question  of  political  organisation  of  East 
Galicia  is  a  matter  for  the  Galician  workers  and  peasants  themselves.  Taking 
into  account  that  they  have  been  taught  by  the  experience  of  Russian  and 
Ukrainian  revolutions  and  are  imbued  with  class-consciousness,  they  will 
realise  a  Soviet  government  with  their  own  efforts.  The  Ukrainian  Soviet 
Republic  declares  its  own  firm  desire  to  refrain  from  all  military  actions  on 
the  territory  of  the  Western  Ukrainian  National  Republic,  on  the  condition 
that  the  government  of  the  Western  Ukrainian  National  Republic  declares  its 
respect  for  the  wishes  of  the  working  classes  in  regard  to  cessation  of 
hostilities  against  the  Ukrainian  Socialist  Soviet  Republic  and  in  regard  to 
an  agreement  for  an  armistice,  as  well  as  for  the  determination  of  a  line  of 
demarcation  and  boundary  between  the  two  republics.  Upon  it  depends  the 
end  to  the  fratricidal  war,  which  aids  the  imperialistic  policy  of  the 
Romanian  monarchy  and  Polish  gentry.  The  Ukrainian  workers-peasants 
government  proposes  that  the  government  of  the  Western  Ukrainian 
National  Republic  agrees  to  the  cessation  of  hostilities  and  will  take  the 
necessary  measures  on  its  part.  12 
Antonov-Ovseenko  next  approached  the  command  of  the  Galician  army  to  open 
talks  on  a  truce,  but  was  informed  that  this  was  the  province  of  the  Galician 
government.  The  problem  for  the  government  of  West  Ukraine  was  essentially  whether 
to  marshal  its  resources  in  aid  of  the  government  of  Ukraine  and  to  defend  it  from 
1=  Ibid,  p.  185. 
170 Bolshevik  attack,  or  whether  to  leave  the  rest  of  Ukraine  to  its  fate  and  concentrate  on 
defending  Galicia  from  the  Poles. 
The  Polish  position,  particularly  from  the  viewpoint  of  Pilsudski,  was  the  creation 
of  a  "Greater  Poland"  encompassing  the  division  of  Lithuania  and  Belorussia,  and  the 
creation  of  a  Ukrainian  satellite  state  and  finally  the  incorporation  of  Galicia  into  the 
Polish  state. 
Following  the  major  Polish  offensive  in  May  1919,  the  government  of  West 
Ukraine  sent  a  note  to  the  Supreme  Council  in  Paris  on  May  30.  It  referred  to  its  sense 
of  betrayal  by  the  Allied  Powers  and  made  reference  to  various  hostilities  being 
carried  out  by  the  Poles  against  the  Ukrainian  population  in  East  Galicia.  It  also 
referred  to  the  Supreme  Council's  obsession  with  Bolshevism: 
As  for  Bolshevism,  it  did  not  exist  until  the  Polish  troops  arrived;  in  fact, 
in  the  entire  territory  which  was  administered  by  the  State  Secretariat  of 
the  West  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  exemplary  order  prevailed;  and  the 
population,  in  cities  and  in  villages,  behaved  properly  towards  the  wealthy 
classes,  (even  the  castles  and  large  landholdings  of  the  Polish  landowners 
were  not  touched)  as  well  as  towards  the  Jews.  The  Supreme  Council 
should  be  aware  of  this  from  the  various  Entente  missions,  which  our 
country  had  the  honour  to  entertain  during  the  last  seven  months.  The  vast 
means  of  petroleum  production  and  the  commercial  properties  in  the 
petroleum  fields  also  have  not  been  disturbed.  This  is  sufficient  proof  that 
the  Bolshevik  propaganda  is  incongruous  with  the  population  of  West 
Ukraine.  13 
The  note  went  on  to  call  for  the  stationing  of  Allied  troops  in  the  territory  of 
West  Ukraine  in  order  to  preserve  peace  until  the  issue  could  be  finally  settled  by  the 
Peace  Conference.  It  even  stated  that  in  the  event  of  this  being  impossible,  the 
Galicians  would  accept  the  stationing  of  Czech  troops  in  the  territory.  '4 
The  President  of  West  Ukraine,  Petrushevych,  persuaded  the  rest  of  the 
government  not  to  enter  any  talks  with  the  government  of  the  Soviet  Ukrainian 
Republic.  In  the  interim  the  Polish  forces  continued  to  push  the  Galician  forces 
eastwards  and  southeastwards. 
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171 On  June  3  1919,  with  the  Polish  press  reporting  a  string  of  victories,  the  Supreme 
Council  met  in  Paris  to  discuss  West  Ukraine.  The  French  ambassador  in  Warsaw  sent 
a  telegram  to  the  conference  stating  that  General  Pilsudski  had  told  him  that  the  aim  of 
the  Polish  advance  in  East  Galicia  was  to  link  up  with  the  Romanian  army  to  form  an 
anti-Bolshevik  front. 
On  June  5  the  Polish  Prime  Minister,  Paderewski,  appeared  before  the  conference 
and  answered  several  central  questions  about  West  Ukraine  in  an  exchange  with  Lloyd 
George.  When  the  British  Prime  Minister  asked  him  if  Polish  forces  were  still 
advancing  in  the  Ukrainian  part  of  Galicia,  the  Polish  leader  replied  that  there  were  two 
Ukraines  but  only  one  Galicia.  The  people  of  Galicia  pretended  to  be  Ukrainians,  he 
claimed,  because  of  the  similarity  between  their  language  and  that  of  the  real  Ukraine. 
They  were  also  under  the  influence  of  Germany  he  stated.  Paderewski  claimed  that  the 
population  of  Galicia  consisted  of  3,300,000  Ruthenians  (Ukrainians)  and  4,700,000 
Poles,  and  that  the  Ukrainians,  despite  the  Polish  efforts  at  a  truce,  had  attacked  the 
Polish  army  on  12th  May.  The  discussion  continued: 
Lloyd  George:  "Does  Poland  claim  the  whole  of  Galicia?  "  Padercwski: 
"Historically,  yes.  "  Lloyd  George:  "Do  they  claim  that  the  whole  of  Galicia 
should  be  annexed  by  them?  "  Paderewski:  "We  have  given  autonomy  to  this 
country.  We  claim  the  whole  of  Galicia.  We  claim  it  for  the  simple  reason 
that  it  is  absolutely  impossible  to  define  ethnographically  this  country, 
because  curiously  enough,  and  we  should  rather  be  proud  of  the  fact,  in  the 
centre  of  Galicia  there  is  more  of  a  Ukrainian  population  than  on  the  border. 
The  furthest  regions  of  Galicia  are  more  Polish  than  the  immediate 
surroundings  of  Lemberg.  There  isn't  a  neighbourhood  of  Lemberg  which 
contains  eighty  percent.  "  15 
Lloyd  George  then  attacked  Poland  for  its  annexationist  and  imperialistic 
ambitions.  Paderewski  responded  by  claiming  that  the  Poles  were  always  a  democratic 
nation  and  that:  "We  never  imposed  upon  the  people  different  customs,  and  the  proof 
of  it  is  this,  that  after  six  hundred  years  of  common  life  with  primitive  people,  like  the 
Lithuanians  and  the  Ruthenians,  even  the  Ukrainians,  these  people  are  still  existing  and 
even  with  our  assistance,  with  our  practical  help,  are  regaining  their  individual 
15  Papers  Relating  to  the  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States.  The  Paris  Peace  Conference  1919.  Vol  VI.  (Washington,  1943), 
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172 character.  ,  16  The  meeting  ended  without  any  decision  being  taken  on  the  fate  of  East 
Galicia. 
The  Supreme  Council  met  once  again  to  discuss  West  Ukraine  on  June  12.  When 
President  Wilson  suggested  that  a  line  be  established  between  Poland  and  Ukraine, 
Lloyd  George  replied  that  the  same  position  should  be  adopted  as  in  Silesia,  which  is 
that  a  plebiscite  be  held.  President  Wilson  responded  by  recommending  that  a  group  of 
experts  should  be  brought  together  to  set  up  a  plebiscite  area.  It  was  agreed  that  the 
Council  of  Foreign  Ministers  be  invited  to  discuss  this  with  the  experts  and  should 
advise  the  Supreme  Council  on  the  issue.  17 
It  has  to  be  stated  at  this  point  that  East  Galicia  in  1919  had  within  its  frontiers  a 
major  resource  -  oil.  Oil  production  in  1913  was  2,053,150  tons,  although  by  1916  it 
had  declined  to  900,000  tons.  In  1918  British  capital  invested  in  the  oil  industry  was 
10,125,000  francs.  French  capital  was  44,800,000  francs  and  Belgian  capital  was 
20,000,000  francs.  Polish  capital  was  10%  of  the  total.  Western  interests  were 
represented  by  the  Eastern  Continental  Petroleum  and  Mining  Syndicate  Ltd  and  by  the 
International  Committee  for  the  Protection  of  British,  French,  Belgian  and  Other  Allied 
Interests.  Two  British  members  of  the  Truce  Commission  were  connected  with  the  oil 
company  Premier  Oil  and  they  proposed  in  February  1919  that  both  Polish  and  Galician 
troops  withdraw  from  the  oil  fields,  and  that  they  be  placed  under  the  control  of  Polish 
police  and  a  local  Polish  administration.  The  oil  fields,  refineries  and  reserves  were  to 
be  placed  under  an  Allied  commission,  and  control  and  distribution  of  production  was 
to  be  carried  out  with  the  co-operation  of  Polish  and  Ukrainian  delegates.  18  The 
Galicians  controlled  the  oil  fields  and  they  entered  into  an  agreement  with  the  pre- 
communist  government  in  Hungary  to  buy  arms  for  oil.  The  agreement  was  ratified  by 
the  Bela  Kun  communist  government  in  March  1919.  West  Ukraine  also  signed  an 
agreement  with  Czechoslovakia  exchanging  oil  for  cash.  19 
In  March  1919,  the  International  Committee  decided  to  claim  its  oil.  The 
committee's  representative,  Litwiriski,  met  with  Pilsudski  in  Warsaw  and  demanded 
that  the  member  companies  of  the  International  Committee  take  control  of  the  oil 
facilities  that  belonged  to  them.  Pilsudski  demanded  that  the  committee  influence  the 
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173 British  Foreign  Office  to  give  Poland  military  equipment.  Both  Poland  and  West 
Ukraine  laid  claim  to  Lemberg  (Lvov)  and  the  oil  fields.  2° 
In  late  April  1919,  Lord  Acton,  the  British  ambassador  in  Berne,  reported  on 
proposals  made  by  Nicholas  Vasylko,  a  representative  of  the  West  Ukrainian 
government.  Vasylko  stated  that  West  Ukraine  insisted  on  independence  but  was 
prepared  to  give  the  Poles  oil  concessions  for  fifteen  years.  Vasylko  claimed  that  if  the 
Allies  rejected  the  Galician  claims  that  the  West  Ukraine  would  massacre  the  Poles.  21 
Pilsudski  told  Sir  Percy  Wyndham,  the  British  ambassador,  in  Warsaw  on  May  19,  that 
Poland  would  be  content  with  Lemberg  (Lvov)  and  the  oil  region  and  that  the  fate  of 
the  other  regions  could  be  decided  by  the  Peace  Conference.  22  Thus,  it  can  be  seen  that 
the  issue  of  oil,  (not  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  20th  century)  played  a  role  in 
the  decision  of  the  Allied  Powers  to  favour  Polish  claims.  Also,  the  Poles  while 
agreeable  to  some  parts  of  East  Galicia  becoming  parts  of  a  putative  Ukrainian  state, 
were  not  prepared  to  compromise  in  any  shape  of  form  on  the  issue  of  the  oil  fields.  23 
Conflict  could  be  the  only  result. 
It  was  at  this  crucial  stage  in  the  history  of  East  Galicia  that  the  nationalist 
government  of  Ukraine  intervened.  Petliura  had  realised  that  without  Polish  aid  the  fate 
of  the  nationalists  in  Ukraine  was  sealed.  Consequently  on  27  May  the  Directory  signed 
an  unofficial  agreement  with  Paderewski  in  Warsaw.  In  return  for  supporting  an 
independent  Ukraine,  the  Directory  renounced  all  claims  to  East  Galicia  and  Volhynia 
as  far  as  the  Styr  River.  The  agreement  was  finally  rejected  by  the  Directory  under 
pressure  from  the  Galicians  but  it  pointed  the  way  to  the  division  between  Galicia  and 
Ukraine,  which  would  come  to  a  head  in  April  1920.24 
The  Poles  were  engaged  in  following  a  policy,  which  would  involve  as  much 
Allied  support  as  possible.  Polish  sources  indicate  that  they  were  very  concerned  that 
the  British  in  particular,  would  deliver  East  Galicia  to  the  Russian  Whites  as  part  of  a 
new  Russian  state.  On  11  June  1919  Admiral  Kolchak  responded  to  the  leaders  of  the 
Allied  Powers  by  stating  that  the  future  Russian  Constituent  Assembly  should  make  all 
final  boundary  decisions.  British  and  American  officers  in  East  Galicia  reported  that 
to  lbid. 
21  Ibid. 
'2  Ibid. 
_1  Ibid. 
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174 Ukrainian  peasants  welcomed  Polish  troops  as  restorers  of  peace  and  order.  25  This  was 
a  claim  that  the  Polish  delegation  in  Paris  made  much  of.  Furthermore,  the  officers 
reported  that  unless  the  Polish  forces  were  allowed  to  reach  the  Zbruch  River,  (the 
frontier  between  East  Galicia  and  Soviet  Ukraine)  the  Bolsheviks  would  enter  East 
Galicia.  26  The  commander  of  the  West  Ukrainian  army  signed  an  armistice  with  the 
Poles  in  Lemberg  (Lvov)  on  16  June  in  view  of  the  advancing  threat  from  the  Red 
Army. 
In  London,  however,  the  Polish  Press  Bureau  (run  by  the  Polish  Foreign  Ministry) 
continued  to  issue  propaganda  statements,  describing  the  Galicians  as  the  pawns  of 
either  the  Bolsheviks  or  the  Germans.  On  June  27  1919,  the  Bureau  issued  the 
following  report: 
Dziennik  Powszechny  of  June  27  has  an  interesting  article  on  the  relations 
existing  between  the  Ukrainians  and  the  Russian  Bolsheviks.  According  to 
this  article  the  Ukrainians  three  times  appealed  to  the  Bolsheviks  for  help 
against  the  Poles  and  finally  an  agreement  was  come  to  at  Kiev,  by  which 
Eastern  Ukraine  was  to  be  joined  to  Bolshevik  Russia  and  in  return,  the 
Bolsheviks  were  to  cease  attacking  the  Western  Ukrainians  and  were  to  send 
help  against  Poland.  Trotsky  came  to  Kiev,  and  made  a  speech,  in  which  he 
declared  that  the  war  with  Poland  was  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the 
Bolsheviks,  and  that  they  must  spare  no  effort  to  bring  it  to  a  successful 
conclusion.  27 
On  July  5,  the  Polish  Press  Bureau  reported  that  the  Ukrainian  district 
commissioner  in  Buczacz,  52  kilometres  south  of  Tarnopol,  had  written  a  report  stating 
that  the  Ukrainian  peasants  were  deserting  from  the  Galician  army  and  returning  home, 
and  that  the  villagers  openly  stated  that  they  did  not  want  the  war  against  the  Poles  to 
continue,  and  that  the  costs  of  the  war  were  too  high.  28 
The  Commission  on  Polish  Affairs  suggested  on  17  June  that  Lemberg  (Lvov)  be 
made  a  free  city  and  that  East  Galicia  should  be  a  part  of  Poland.  The  commission  drew 
up  a  new  frontier,  which  would  leave  Lemberg  (Lvov)  and  the  oil  fields  in  Polish 
territory.  29 
25  Ibid. 
26  Ibid. 
27  AAN:  MSZ.  Dept  Polityczno-Ekonomiczny  7635A,  5.49. 
_8  Ibid. 
29  Mroczka,  Spdr  o  GalicJq  Wschodnlrß  pp.  166-167. 
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In  Paris  the  foreign  ministers  of  the  Allied  Powers  met  on  June  18  to  discuss  the 
fate  of  East  Galicia.  Balfour,  representing  Britain,  argued  that  all  the  military 
intelligence  pointed  to  the  danger  of  East  Galicia  being  overrun  by  the  Bolsheviks,  and 
he  suggested  a  solution,  which  would  satisfy  two  main  concerns  of  the  Allied  Powers. 
1.  Resisting  the  Bolshevik  invasion  of  West  Ukraine. 
2.  Protecting  the  future  interests  of  the  Ukrainian  majority  in  East 
Galicia.  30 
His  plan  was  the  appointment  of  a  High  Commissioner  for  East  Galicia  under  the 
League  of  Nations.  Balfour  stated: 
The  Poles,  on  the  other  hand,  must  be  informed  that  their  military 
occupation  of  East  Galicia  is  a  temporary  one,  and  can  only  be  allowed  to 
last  as  long  as  the  needs  of  common  defence  against  the  invading 
Bolshevism  renders  this  proceeding  necessary,  and  that  of  this  the  High 
Commission  must  be  the  judge.  The  Ruthenians  must  be  told  that,  though 
the  Poles  are  temporarily  in  occupation  of  their  country,  they  are  acting 
under  the  directions  of  the  League  of  Nations,  and  that  the  Ruthenians  will 
be  given  a  full  opportunity  of  determining  by  plebiscite  within  limits  to  be 
fixed  by  the  League  of  Nations,  what  their  future  status  is  to  be.  31 
This  proposal  was  finally  accepted  by  the  Supreme  Council.  On  June  25  the 
Supreme  Council  discussed  West  Ukraine.  One  major  alteration  to  Balfour's  original 
proposal  was  that  the  High  Commissioner  be  a  Pole,  and  answerable  to  the  Polish 
government  rather  than  the  League  of  Nations.  32  Following  this  agreement,  General 
Haller's  army  in  West  Ukraine,  which  was  a  part  of  the  Allied  army,  joined  with  the 
Polish  army  to  conquer  East  Galicia. 
The  Treaty  of  Versailles  was  signed  on  June  28  and  Article  87  stated  that  the 
frontiers  of  Poland  would  be  decided  by  the  Allied  Powers.  This  was  followed  in 
September  by  the  Treaty  of  St  Germain,  which  provided  that  Austria  ceded  her 
sovereignty  over  East  Galicia  to  the  Allied  Powers. 
On  July  11,  a  full  thirteen  days  after  the  signing  of  the  Versailles  Treaty,  the 
government  of  West  Ukraine  learned  of  its  fate  at  the  hands  of  the  Allied  Powers.  The 
Ukrainian  delegation  in  Paris  argued  that  the  Ukrainians  had  kept  their  faith  in  the 
70  Papers  Relating  to  the  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States.  The  Paris  Peace  Conference.  1919.  Vol  IV,  pp.  837-839. 
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176 Allied  Powers,  hoping  that  they  would  support  their  rights.  They  resented  being 
accused  by  the  Poles  of  being  pro-Soviet  and  accused  the  Supreme  Council  of: 
"delivering  the  Ukrainian  people  into  the  hands  of  its  historic  enemy  and  condemning 
the  Ukrainian  land  to  Polonisation.  "33  The  members  of  the  Ukrainian  Peoples'  Council, 
meeting  in  Vienna,  announced  that  the  area  between  the  San  and  Zbruch  rivers  was 
ethnically  and  historically  Ukrainian  and  demanded  the  withdrawal  of  Polish  forces.  34 
In  the  face  of  a  powerful  Polish  attack  the  Galician  forces  crossed  the  Zbruch  and 
entered  Ukraine.  Petliura's  forces  had  been  holding  a  narrow  strip  of  territory  along  the 
Zbruch  but  in  early  July  1919  the  Red  Army  attacked  and  captured  Proskiuriv  from  his 
army.  The  government  of  Soviet  Ukraine  appealed  to  Petrushevych  to  break  the 
alliance  with  Petliura  and  to  join  it  in  fighting  the  Poles  and  Romanians,  but  he  refused 
because  he  believed  that  ultimately  the  Allied  Powers  would  support  the  Galician 
cause.  The  arrival  of  the  Galician  army  was  crucial  for  Petliura's  campaign.  It  added 
40,000  men  to  his  weary  and  near  defeated  army  and  enabled  the  nationalists  to  march 
on  Kiev. 
As  the  nationalists  marched  on  Kiev  from  the  west,  Denikin's  White  Russian 
army  was  advancing  from  the  east.  Denikin  had  the  support  of  the  Allied  Powers,  and 
this  led  the  Foreign  Minister  of  the  Ukrainian  Peoples'  Republic,  Margolin,  and  a 
Galician  minister,  Dr  Paneyko,  to  meet  the  US  Secretary  of  State,  Lansing  in  Paris  on 
June  30.  Paneyko  expressed  the  hope  that  the  Polish  occupation  of  East  Galicia  would 
be  temporary,  and  Margolin  asked  for  technical  and  economic  assistance.  Margolin 
protested  about  the  Allied  position  of  recognising  Denikin  and  Kolchak  as  spokesmen 
for  Ukraine.  Lansing  stated  categorically  that  the  United  States  did  not  favour 
Ukrainian  independence,  although  it  favoured  some  form  of  autonomy.  He  also  made  it 
clear  that  Petliura  would  only  receive  aid  if  he  came  to  an  agreement  with  Denikin.  35 
In  the  interim,  the  Polish  Press  Bureau  (the  propaganda  centre  of  the  MSZ  in 
London)  reported  a  speech  delivered  by  Dr  Galecki,  the  Polish  General  Delegate  to 
East  Galicia,  to  the  people  of  the  province  on  July  22.  Galecki  stated  that  the  Ukrainian 
leaders  were  blind  instruments  of  the  Germans,  who  were  the  enemies  not  only  of 
Poland  but  also  of  all  Slavonic  races.  The  Germans  forgot  that  Poles  and  Ukrainians 
33  Reshetar,  The  Ukrainian  Revolution,  p.  283/4. 
N  Ibid. 
35  Margolin,  Ukraina  i  Politika  Antanty,  p.  161 
177 were  united  by  ties  of  blood.  36  These  statements,  apart  from  persuading  the  East 
Galician  population  to  remain  loyal  to  Poland,  were  also  clearly  designed  to  persuade 
the  French  and  British  that  the  East  Galicians  were  in  the  pay  of  Germany,  and  that  any 
putative  West  Ukrainian  state  would  create  a  German  bridgehead  in  Central  Europe. 
Reports  on  German  intrigue  in  East  Galicia  were  not  the  only  propaganda  tool, 
which  the  Poles  used,  however.  It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  massacres  and  outrages 
occurred  in  East  Galicia  during  the  summer  months  of  1919.  Polish  archives  are 
crammed  with  photographs  of  victims,  and  they  make  grim  viewing.  Many  of  these 
photographs  were  released  to  the  Western  European  press  to  demonstrate  Ukrainian 
atrocities  in  East  Galicia.  It  is  unclear  from  the  state  of  the  mutilated  bodies,  whether 
they  were  Poles  or  Ukrainians,  but  the  Poles  claimed  that  the  murders  were  carried  out 
by  the  Ukrainians.  The  Poles  also  claimed  that  the  targets  of  Ukrainian  death  squads 
were  often  priests,  landowners,  or  Galician  peasants,  who  refused  to  join  the  anti-Polish 
campaign.  Naturally,  the  Germans  were  once  again  held  responsible  for  organising  the 
outrages,  and  there  are  many  accounts  of  Ukrainians  being  led  by  German  or  Austrian 
officers.  In  August  1919,  the  Department  of  Information  of  the  Foreign  Ministry  in 
Warsaw,  issued  a  Report  on  Ukrainian  Cruelties  Committed  on  the  Polish  Population 
of  East  Galicia.  According  to  this  document: 
The  steady  intention  of  creating  such  a  situation  as  would  preclude  all 
understanding  between  the  Poles  and  the  Ukrainians,  induced  the  Germans 
to  use  the  passive  Ukrainian  masses  for  the  purposes  of  robbery  and 
violence,  for  the  shedding  of  innocent  blood,  for  the  violations,  not  only  of 
the  terms  of  the  Hague  Convention,  but  of  all  laws  of  human  ethics  and 
morality.  37 
Thus,  the  impression  was  created  that  the  cunning  and  sadistic  Teutonic  mind  was 
behind  all  these  gruesome  events.  In  the  Europe  of  1919,  where  tales  of  German 
outrage  in  Belgium  and  elsewhere,  were  still  fresh,  and  where  the  French,  in  particular, 
were  more  than  ready  to  believe  that  all  Germans  were  savages  and  barbarians,  such 
claims  were  a  potent  propaganda  weapon.  There  are  no  reports  in  the  German  archives, 
of  any  German  involvement  in  the  events  in  East  Galicia,  and  unlike  the  Baltic,  there 
were  no  Freikorps  or  other  irregular  German  forces  operating  in  East  Galicia.  There 
AAN:  MSZ.  Dept  Polityczno-Ekonomiczny  7635A,  s.  227. 
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178 may  have  been  individual  former  German  or  Austrian  officers  at  large,  but  there  is  no 
indication  whatsoever,  of  any  official  German  or  Austrian  involvement. 
The  scale  of  the  outrages  was  large,  and  did  cause  concern  amongst  organisations 
such  as  the  Red  Cross.  Nowhere,  of  course,  did  the  massacres  and  murders  cause  more 
outrage  than  in  Poland  itself.  Whole  files  in  the  Warsaw  archive  contain  protests 
directed  to  the  government,  and  particularly  to  the  Head  of  State  (Naczebnik  Paristwa), 
Pilsudski,  from  all  over  Poland  but  particularly  from  East  Galicia.  38  These  protests 
came  from  local  authorities,  parishes,  clubs,  cultural  associations,  universities,  schools, 
and  individual  citizens.  It  is  difficult  to  know  whether  this  was  an  orchestrated 
campaign,  directed  from  Warsaw,  or  a  genuine  grassroots  reaction.  Probably  it  was  the 
latter. 
One  example  of  this  is  an  appeal  to  the  Head  of  State,  from  the  "present  and 
former  academics  of  the  University  of  Lvov"  on  June  26,1919.  The  protest  contains  all 
the  typical  allegations  being  made  by  the  Polish  authorities  in  East  Galicia,  at  this  time. 
We  wish  to  protest  in  the  strongest  possible  terms,  against  the  actions  of  the 
Russian  Poles39,  who  with  the  support  of  the  Germans,  are  carrying  out  a 
brutal  extermination  of  the  Polish  civilian  population  here,  and  with  actions 
of  violence,  are  expropriating  the  property  and  capital  of  this  population. 
These  actions  are  an  affront  to  the  culture  of  the  Polish  population,  not  only 
in  terms  of  the  rights  of  the  people  but  also  of  its  welfare.  The  following 
facts  need  to  be  noted;  the  Ukrainians,  since  they  have  come  under  the 
control  of  the  Germans,  have  acted  against  the  Poles  from  Russia.  The 
connections  between  the  Ukrainians  and  the  Bolsheviks,  and  the  whole 
Bolshevik  movement,  have  assumed  a  central  place  in  developments.  40 
These  protests  against  the  Ukrainians  in  East  Galicia  (and  it  is  undoubtedly  true 
that  there  were  outrages,  although  the  Ukrainians  also  protested  against  Polish 
outrages)  were  used  as  a  pretext  by  the  Polish  government,  not  to  negotiate  with  the 
East  Galicians;  and  were  a  rich  source  of  anti-Ukrainian  propaganda  for  the 
consumption  of  the  Peace  Conference  in  Paris. 
31  AAN:  MSZ.  Dept  Polityczno-Ekonomiczny  9412A.  Gabinet  Ministra  208,1493A,  53364.5336B.  5336C,  5337,5338,5339, 
5340,5341,5341  ",  5341  B,  5342,5343,5345,5346,5350,5351,5352,5353,5354.  Kancelaria  Cywilna  Naczclnik  Panstwa  199, 
200,201. 
39  This  was  the  terminology  used  by  many  Poles,  when  referring  to  the  Ukrainians  in  East  Galicia. 
40  AAN:  Kancelaria  Cywilna  Naczelnika  Panstwa.  201,  s.  54.  The  reference  to  Poles  in  Russia,  is  probably  a  reference  to  Poles  in 
Right  Bank  Ukraine. 
179 The  joint  Ukrainian/Galician  forces  took  Kiev  on  30  August  1919  but  had  to 
retreat  the  following  day  because  Denikin  entered  the  city.  The  Galicians  had  already 
heard  of  Petliura's  overtures  to  the  Poles  and  his  intention  of  renouncing  East  Galicia. 
As  a  result  the  Galician  forces  agreed  to  join  Denikin's  army,  on  condition  that  they  did 
not  have  to  fight  against  Ukrainians.  On  1  September  Petliura  signed  an  armistice  with 
Poland.  This  was  the  final  split  between  the  East  Galicians  and  the  Ukrainians.  From 
this  date  forward  the  Galicians  had  to  fight  alone  militarily  and  politically. 
In  the  autumn  of  1919  the  Allied  Powers  seemed  to  favour  the  possibility  of 
uniting  East  Galicia  with  a  future  non-Bolshevik  Russian  state  but  as  the  Whites  were 
finally  defeated  they  turned  their  attention  to  the  possibility  of  Polish  rule.  The  Polish 
invasion  of  Ukraine  in  May  1920,  and  the  alliance  between  Poland  and  Petliura,  led  to  a 
strengthening  of  Allied,  and  particularly  French,  support  for  the  Polish  occupation  of 
East  Galicia. 
The  rout  of  the  Polish  forces  and  the  end  of  the  Soviet-Polish  War  in  July  1920 
altered  the  contours  of  the  East  Galician  problem.  On  10  August  1920,  Lord  Curzon, 
the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  telegraphed  the  Soviet  peace  terms  to  Poland,  advising 
them  that  if  they  were  made  in  good  faith,  Poland  should  accept  them.  41  In  the  Treaty  of 
Sevres  between  the  Allied  Powers  and  Poland,  Romania,  the  Serbo-Croat-Slovene  state 
and  Czechoslovakia,  Polish  sovereignty  was  recognised  in  Western  Galicia  along  Line 
A,  as  stated  in  the  report  of  the  Commission  on  Polish  Affairs  of  17  June  1919.  Poland 
refused  to  sign  or  ratify  the  treaty.  According  to  the  treaty  Lemberg  (Lvov)  and  the  oil 
fields  were  to  be  outside  Polish  territory.  East  Galicia  was  mentioned  as  an  area  but  its 
future  status  was  unclear.  42 
Many  East  Galicians,  including  the  president  of  the  West  Ukrainian  government, 
took  refuge  in  Czechoslovakia,  where  they  were  given  a  sympathetic  reception  by  the 
Czech  government.  43 
The  Treaty  of  Riga,  signed  between  Poland  and  Soviet  Russia  along  with  Soviet 
Ukraine,  was  the  final  act  in  East  Galicia's  struggle  for  independence  and  ensured  that 
it  remained  under  Polish  rule  until  1939.  The  Soviet  delegates  agreed  to  a  Polish 
frontier  east  of  the  Curzon  line  but  demanded  that  Poland  recognise  the  independence 
not  only  of  Soviet  Ukraine  and  Belorussia,  but  also  of  East  Galicia.  They  also 
41  Mroczka,  Sp6r  o  Galicjg  Wschodniq,  p.  184. 
42  ibid,  pp.  184-185. 
41  AAN:  MSZ.  Gabinet  Ministra,  odpis,  s.  4.  Warsaw,  January  1  1921. 
180 demanded  a  plebiscite  in  East  Galicia.  Lenin  intervened  however  and  instructed  the 
head  of  the  Soviet  delegation  to  sign  the  treaty  within  ten  days.  If  necessary  the 
delegation  was  instructed  to  accept  the  old  frontier  between  Imperial  Russia  and  East 
Galicia.  The  Treaty  of  Riga  was  duly  signed  on  18  March  1921. 
During  1921  both  the  Poles  and  the  Bolsheviks  supported  armed  interventions  in 
Soviet  Ukraine  and  East  Galicia.  Gradually  however,  the  diplomatic  relationship 
between  them  stabilised.  East  Galicia  remained  under  martial  law  because  of  unrest 
from  1919  to  1923.  Various  acts  of  terrorism  were  committed  there  and  on  30 
September  1921,  a  Ukrainian  student,  Stefan  Fedak,  tried  to  assassinate  Pilsudski  in 
Lemberg  (Lvov)  in  protest  against  a  population  census  being  carried  out  in  the  area. 
The  British  continued  to  press  the  other  Allied  Powers  for  some  form  of 
autonomy  in  East  Galicia  but  the  Poles  resisted  it  fiercely  and  had  the  support  of  the 
French.  Gradually  the  issue  of  East  Galicia  disappeared  from  the  international  agenda. 
East  Galicia  was  on  the  agenda  of  both  the  Genoa  Conference  in  1922  and  also  at  the 
Rapallo  Conference  but  it  is  noteworthy  that  both  the  Polish  and  the  Soviet 
governments  insisted  on  the  borders  agreed  to  under  the  terms  of  the  Riga  treaty. 
From  the  vantage  point  of  1922  and  after,  it  is  obvious  that  the  fate  of  East  Galicia 
was  determined  by  three  main  factors: 
1.  Allied  fear  of  Bolshevism  and  the  association  of  the  Ukrainians 
with  it. 
2.  French  support  for  Poland  as  a  guarantee  against  German  revival. 
3.  Soviet-Polish  rapprochement  after  the  Soviet-Polish  War  and 
their  common  fear  of  Ukrainian  nationalism. 
Other  factors  were  the  fatal  division  between  the  East  Ukrainians  and  Galicians. 
In  many  ways  the  Galicians  paid  a  higher  price  through  their  support  of  the  nationalist 
cause  in  Ukraine,  and  the  betrayal  of  their  province  by  Petliura  left  a  deep 
psychological  wound,  and  created  a  lasting  suspicion  of  the  East  Ukrainians.  This 
division  was  in  essence  inevitable  because  Poland  was  the  oppressor  for  the  Galicians; 
but  because  of  the  policy  of  the  Allied  Powers  on  Ukraine,  the  Ukrainian  nationalists  in 
East  Ukraine  were  pushed  into  the  arms  of  Poland.  The  final  factor  in  finishing  the 
hopes  of  the  Galicians,  was  the  skilful  use  of  propaganda  by  the  Poles  to  create  the 
impression  that  West  Ukraine  was  a  German/Austrian  creation,  and  if  it  achieved 
independence  it  would  become  a  German  satellite  state,  so  weakening  Poland.  Without 
181 the  support  of  the  Allied  Powers  the  struggle  for  independence  of  East  Galicia  was 
fruitless. 
As  Andrew  Wilson  makes  clear,  the  failure  of  East  Galicia  to  attain  independence 
in  1919  was  as  much  a  matter  of  timing  as  anything  else.  East  Galicia's  relationship 
with  Germany  and  Austria  was  central: 
A  west  Ukrainian  version  of  Ukraine  would  have  had  a  more  solid  base  in 
the  civil  society  developed  by  the  Hapsburg  Ukrainian  parties  -in  contrast  to 
the  bunt  (social  explosion)  by  now  engulfing  the  east.  Plans  to  hold  the 
elections  that  would  have  given  a  Ukrainian  government  a  more  solid 
mandate  were  more  advanced  than  in  Kiev.  A  West  Ukrainian  Republic 
would  also  have  had  closer  links  with  the  Central  European  powers,  old  and 
new,  although  it  was  created  at  the  very  moment  -  November  1918  -  when 
Austria-Hungary  had  already  collapsed  and  Germany  was  losing  the  war  in 
the  west.  Instead  of  Vienna  cooperating  with  a  Ukraine  they  more  or  less 
recognised,  Berlin  was  forced  to  work  with  a  Ukraine  it  did  not  (the 
Hetmanate  in  Kiev).  (...  )  Different  approaches  meant  difficult  relations 
between  the  ZUNR44  and  the  various  governments  in  Kiev. 
Wilson  speculates  that  because  the  Hetmanate  collapsed  just  as  the  ZUNR  was 
established,  it  remains  unclear  whether  the  more  conservative  West  Ukrainian 
politicians,  who  were  used  to  court  and  chancellery  politics  under  the  Hapsburgs, 
could  have  cooperated  with  the  Hetmanate.  The  ZUNR  government  was  forced 
instead  to  deal  with  the  left  wing  UNR  regime,  whose  leaders  were  not  as 
fraternal  towards  the  West  Ukrainians  as  they  might  have  been.  45 
Finally,  the  alliance  between  Petliura  and  Pilsudski  left  the  Galicians  out  in  the 
cold,  and  they  in  turn  negotiated  with  Denikin.  Wilson  argues  persuasively  that  with  the 
Hapsburgs  gone,  Polish-Ukrainian  antagonism  was  more  exposed  than  ever  before. 
Furthermore,  Moscow's  support  for  an  anti-Polish  Ukrainian  nationalism  was  always  in 
the  background.  In  fact,  this  was  one  of  the  cards,  which  Soviet  Russia  would  play 
(after  the  signing  of  the  Riga  Treaty)  in  order  to  discourage  Polish  support  for 
Ukrainian  nationalist  partisans,  operating  in  Soviet  Ukrainian  territory.  Wilson  also 
makes  the  point  that,  in  a  kind  of  reverse  `Piedmont  effect',  one  reason  why  the 
"The  Western  Ukrainian  Peoples'  Republic. 
Is  Wilson.  The  Ukrainians.  Unexpected  Nation,  p.  128. 
182 Bolsheviks  had  originally  supported  the  creation  of  the  western  Soviet  republics  was  to 
target  irredenta  populations  in  the  new  Central  European  states,  and  that  the  Ukrainian 
and  Belorussian  SSRs  were  aimed  at  Poland.  Petrushevych,  the  former  leader  of  the 
ZUNR,  and  other  Ukrainian  nationalist  leaders  from  East  Galicia,  continued  to  make 
secret  trips  to  Soviet  Ukraine  in  the  1920's  to  seek  support.  46 
On  the  other  hand,  the  younger  and  more  militant  Ukrainian  nationalists  in  East 
Galicia  would  increasingly  turn  to  Germany  for  support.  This  began  in  the  early  20's, 
but  would  really  blossom  with  the  founding  of  the  OUN  in  1929.47  This  was  a  quite 
logical  development,  for  not  only  was  Germany  Poland's  chief  enemy  in  the  region,  but 
nationalists  in  East  Galicia  looked  back  to  German  and  Austrian  support  for  the 
creation  of  an  independent  Ukraine  in  1918,  and  the  promise  of  some  form  of  autonomy 
from  the  Hapsburgs.  Naturally,  all  of  this  inflamed  Polish  opinion  further  against 
Germany.  German  sympathies  were  certainly  with  the  Galicians,  as  they  would  have 
been  with  any  enemy  of  Poland  in  the  bitter  anti-Polish  atmosphere  of  the  post- 
Versailles  years,  but  nothing  points  to  direct  German  involvement  in  East  Galicia.  The 
Poles  remained  convinced  of  it  however,  and  used  it  to  gain  as  much  support  as 
possible  from  the  French,  and  to  distance  the  cause  of  the  East  Galicians  from  the 
Entente  powers. 
There  was  some  indication  of  an  ending  of  the  impasse  on  East  Galicia  in  early 
1921.  The  territory  was  not  yet  recognised  as  a  part  of  the  Polish  Republic  by  the  Allied 
Powers.  Poland  was  deeply  concerned  about  the  situation  with  Germany  in  Upper 
Silesia  and  East  Prussia  and  no  peace  treaty  had  yet  been  signed  with  Soviet  Russia. 
The  Polish  government  secretly  approached  the  government-in-exile  of  West  Ukraine 
in  Vienna,  led  by  Petrushevych.  They  proposed  autonomy  for  East  Galicia  within  the 
Polish  Republic,  provided  that  Petrushevych's  government  recognised  it  and  ended  its 
diplomatic  actions  against  Poland.  The  West  Ukrainian  government  totally  rejected  the 
proposal  because  it  believed  that  the  Allied  Powers  would  support  Ukrainian 
independence.  48 
4'  Ibid,  p.  129. 
41  Information  provided  by  the  Kiev  historian  Heorhii  Kas'ianov  from  his  study  of  the  Ukrainian  Section  in  the  Central  State 
Archives  in  Prague.  Cited  by  Wilson,  The  Ukrainians,  p.  338  (footnotes).  This  is  also  dealt  with  in  Alexander  J.  Motyl,  The  Turn  to 
the  Right.  The  ideological  origins  and  development  of  Ukrainian  Nationalism,  1919-1929.  (East  European  Monographs:  Boulder, 
1980) 
"  This  is  described  in  the  memoirs  of  T.  Voinarovsky:  (T.  Voinarovsky  and  I.  Sokhotsky),  Istorychni  postati  I  lalychny  XIX-XX  St. 
(New  York  and  Paris,  1961),  p.  66-69,  cited  in  'Polish-Ukrainian  Relations'  by  Ivan  L.  Rudnytsky  in  Ivan  Iw  Rudnytsky,  Essays  In 
Modern  Ukrainian  History  (Edmonton:  CIUS,  1987).  Rudnytsky  comments  that  there  is  no  guarantee  that  Poland  would  have 
honoured  its  promise  to  Petrushevych  but  that  Ukrainian  intransigence  played  into  the  hands  of  Polish  chauvinist  elements,  those 
opposed  to  any  concessions  to  and  understanding  with  the  Ukrainians. 
183 This  was  the  last  occasion  on  which  Poland  showed  any  willingness  to 
compromise  on  the  East  Galician  question. 
As  Rudnytsky  commented,  the  Poles  would  eventually  pay  a  high  price  for  their 
intransigence: 
Poland,  which  had  stubbornly  denied  West  Ukrainian  lands  to  a  free 
Ukraine,  was  in  the  end  forced  to  hand  them  over  to  the  Russian  Empire, 
and  later  to  the  Soviet  Union,  Poland  itself  also  fell  under  the  Russian 
domination.  Thus,  the  inability  of  the  Poles  and  Ukrainians  to  compose  their 
differences  amicably  has  already  twice  caused  the  destruction  of  Ukraine 
and  Poland,  in  that  order,  and  has  paved  the  way  for  Russia's  triumph  49 
The  East  Galicians  were  once  again  to  play  a  major  role  in  the  struggle  for 
Ukrainian  independence  in  the  late  1980's,  and  indeed  were  the  most  vociferous 
supporters  of  independence  in  Ukraine  in  the  last  years  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Their 
reward  was  the  establishment  of  an  independent  Ukrainian  state  in  1991. 
"91bid,  p.  71. 
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THE  TREATY  OF  RIGA  AND  ITS  AFTERMATH 
The  Treaty  of  Riga  was  the  important  international  agreement  governing  the  fate 
of  both  East  Galicia  and  Ukraine.  It  effectively  partitioned  the  Ukrainian  lands  between 
the  two  traditional  enemies  of  Ukraine,  Poland  and  Russia.  Its  outcome  was  not  altered 
until  1939  when  with  German  support  East  Galicia  joined  the  rest  of  Ukraine  in  the 
Soviet  Union. 
The  terms  of  the  armistice  already  agreed  in  late  1920  laid  out  the  basic  contours 
of  what  would  be  the  treaty.  In  the  period  between  the  armistice  and  the  signing  of  the 
treaty  both  the  East  Galicians  and  the  government  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic 
(UNR)  lobbied  the  Poles  furiously  to  be  allowed  to  participate  in  the  treaty 
negotiations.  The  government  of  Petliura  was  in  a  far  stronger  position,  as  under  the 
terms  of  the  Warsaw  Agreement  Poland  could  not  enter  into  any  treaties  on  the  position 
of  Ukraine  without  consulting  the  Ukrainian  leader.  However,  the  armistice 
negotiations  had  already  demonstrated  that  Poland  was  prepared  to  follow  its  own 
interests,  without  any  regard  to  those  of  Ukraine.  Grabski  in  particular  had 
demonstrated  his  total  contempt  for  the  diplomats  and  government  of  the  Ukrainian 
People's  Republic.  The  government  of  West  Ukraine  was  in  an  even  weaker  position, 
as  it  was  technically  still  at  war  with  Poland,  and  was  not  recognised  as  the  de  jure 
government  of  East  Galicia  by  any  European  state,  including  Soviet  Russia. 
Petliura  and  his  government  realised  that  all  was  not  well  in  Soviet  Ukraine  and 
that  there  was  the  possibility  of  an  uprising  if  the  war  with  the  Bolsheviks  was 
continued.  Throughout  late  1920  and  early  1921  many  reports  filtered  out  from  Ukraine 
about  the  activities  of  the  Cheka  and  the  erection  of  concentration  camps  in  some  areas. 
There  were  also  many  reports  of  food  shortages  and  disruption  in  production. 
In  November  1920  Trotsky  visited  the  Donbas  and  sent  a  telegram  to  Lenin  on  19 
November:  "The  situation  in  the  Donbas  is  extremely  serious.  The  workers  are  starving; 
there  is  no  clothing.  In  spite  of  the  revolutionary  Soviet  mood  of  the  masses,  strikes  are 
flaring  up  here  and  there.  One  cannot  help  being  surprised  that  the  workers  are  working 
at  all.  "'  When  Trotsky  was  making  comments  such  as  this  about  the  more  loyal  eastern 
Ukraine,  it  demonstrated  the  extent  of  the  unrest  in  Soviet  Ukraine.  From  1920 
1  The  Trotsky  Papers,  1917-1922,  ed.  and  annotated  by  Jan  M.  Meijer,  Vol  2  (1920-22)  (The  Vague  and  Paris,  1971),  pp.  360-361. 
185 "concentration  camps"  were  set  up  in  the  coalfields  for  criminals,  political  prisoners 
and  violators  of  discipline.  2  Partisan  bands  continued  to  attack  villages,  railways,  mines 
and  factories.  By  1921  their  actions  had  reached  "an  incredible  scale"  in  some  areas  of 
the  Donbas  and  they  had  killed  many  miners.  3  Doubtless  some  of  these  attacks  were 
due  to  the  actions  of  the  followers  of  Makhno,  or  groups  of  lawless  bandits  but  others 
were  loosely  allied  to  Petliura  and  the  nationalist  cause.  Many  of  these  reports  would 
have  reached  Petliura  in  Poland  and  convinced  him  that  Soviet  power  in  Ukraine  was 
built  on  extremely  unstable  foundations. 
On  November  2,1920  Trotsky  sent  a  Top  Secret  message  to  the  Politburo  in 
Moscow  setting  out  his  doubts  about  the  situation  in  Ukraine,  and  the  weak  position  of 
the  Bolsheviks  there:  "With  the  railways  in  Ukraine  the  situation  is  far  from  well.  The 
dominance  of  Wrangel's  and  Petliura's  men  is  far  from  broken.  They  employ  every 
"legal  opportunity"  for  sabotage.  Surveillance  of  all  this  from  the  centre  in  Moscow 
presents  the  utmost  difficulty.  "  He  went  on  to  state  that  the  only  solution  was  to  place  a 
member  of  the  Party,  who  would  be  subordinate  to  the  centre  in  Moscow  and  a  member 
of  the  Ukrainian  Council  of  People's  Commissars,  in  charge  of  all  railways  in  Ukraine. 
He  was  also  deeply  concerned  about  the  military  situation: 
In  the  military  sense  the  decisive  role  in  Ukraine  has  been  played  up  to  now 
by  the  front.  In  the  event  of  the  liquidation  of  the  front  the  highly  acute 
question  of  the  military  administration  of  Ukraine  will  arise.  The  two 
districts  (Kharkov  and  Odessa)  which  come  under  the  orders  of  the  All- 
Russian  General  Staff  will  not  be  able  to  solve  the  enormous  problem 
which,  in  Ukraine,  falls  to  the  lot  of  the  military  authorities;  for  even  after 
the  liquidation  of  Wrangel  and  Petliura  Ukraine  will  continue  to  be  that  part 
of  the  Republic  which  is  most  exposed  to  attack.  At  the  same  time  internal 
complications  will  still  be  experienced  for  many  months. 
Trotsky  recommended  the  appointment  of  Frunze  as  Assistant  to  the  Commander 
in  Chief,  under  the  orders  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Commissar  for  Military  Affairs. 
Trotsky  was  clearly  concerned  about  the  situation  in  Ukraine.  Although  by  December 
1920,  Wrangel  had  been  defeated  and  Makhno  was  on  the  defensive,  the  Ukrainian 
situation  still  seemed  uncertain.  It  was  vital  for  Petliura  to  convince  the  Poles  that  the 
2  Diktatura  uglia.  Sbornik.  Stasi'  l  materialy.  vypusk  Ill.  Posvlashchaetsia  11-mu  Donetskomu  s  ezdu  gornorabochikh  (Kharkov, 
1921),  p.  177. 
3  O.  O.  Kuchner.  Rozhrom  zbroinol  vnutrishnl'oi  kontrrevolutsli  na  Ukraint  u  1921-1923rr.  (Kharkov,  197  1),  p.  125. 
4  The  Trotsky  Papers,  p.  350-351. 
186 struggle  against  the  Bolsheviks  and  the  campaign  for  an  independent  Ukraine  not  be 
abandoned. 
The  Bolsheviks  realised  that  considerable  numbers  of  Ukrainian  nationalist, 
Cossack  and  anti-Soviet  Russian  troops  were  still  based  in  Poland  in  late  1920.  It  was 
extremely  important  for  them  that  these  troops  did  not  engage  Soviet  forces  and  did  not 
receive  any  recognition  or  support  from  Poland.  Article  II  of  the  Armistice  stated  that 
neither  Poland  nor  Soviet  Russia  could  "support  military  actions  of  the  other  side 
against  the  second  side".  Accordingly  the  Polish  government  was  obliged  to  renounce 
the  treaty  with  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  and  terminate  all  military  and  political 
agreements  with  the  other  anti-Soviet  groups.  This  led  to  an  immediate  crisis  in 
relations  between  Petliura  and  the  government  in  Warsaw. 
Petliura's  government  was  now  ensconced  in  Tarnow.  Most  of  his  troops,  who 
had  retreated  into  Poland  in  November  1920,  were  disarmed  and  interned  in  camps  at 
Lancut,  Wadowice,  Aleksandröw  Kujawski,  Pikulice  near  Przemy§l,  Kalisz,  Bronowiec 
and  Lobzowo  near  Krakow,  Piotkbw  Tryb,  and  Bydgoszez.  s 
During  January  and  February  1921  there  was  an  impasse  in  the  peace  negotiations 
in  Riga.  There  were  four  main  points  of  contention.  These  were,  repatriation  of 
prisoners,  extension  of  the  period  for  renouncing  the  armistice,  gold,  and  Upper  Silesia. 
The  Bolsheviks  held  more  than  500,000  Polish  prisoners.  There  was  an  agreement  in 
principle  in  December  but  the  Bolsheviks  would  not  agree  to  immediate  repatriation 
because  they  linked  the  issue  with  the  extension  of  the  period  allowed  for  renouncing 
the  armistice.  In  October  this  period  had  been  agreed  as  two  weeks  but  the  Bolsheviks 
now  demanded  that  it  be  increased  to  six  weeks.  They  were  deeply  concerned  that  the 
Poles  wanted  to  base  their  relations  with  them  on  the  armistice  in  October.  This  would 
mean  that  on  the  repatriation  of  the  prisoners  and  the  payment  of  gold,  the  Poles  could 
launch  a  new  war  with  only  two  weeks  notice.  Warsaw  rejected  the  Soviet  demands  and 
the  Bolsheviks  refused  to  release  the  prisoners. 
The  Poles  wanted  a  payment  of  1.6  billion  roubles  from  the  Russian  gold  reserve, 
as  compensation  for  war  damage.  In  the  armistice  agreement  the  Bolsheviks  had 
promised  to  pay  Poland  an  unspecified  amount  from  the  gold  reserve.  The  precedent  for 
this  was  the  peace  treaties  signed  between  Moscow  and  the  Baltic  States.  Estonia  had 
Alexander  Kolatlczuk.  'Soldiers  of  the  Anny  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  interned  in  Poland  (1920-1924)'  in  Polska  I 
Ukraina.  Sojusz  1920  Roku  Ijego  nastepstwa,  ed.  Z.  Karpus,  et  al.  (Toruri:  Michael  Copernicus  University  Press,  1997),  p.  307. 
187 been  paid  fifteen  million  gold  roubles,  Lithuania  three  million,  and  Latvia  four  million. 
In  December  Dgbski  demanded  three  hundred  million  gold  roubles  for  Poland.  Lenin 
however  wanted  to  make  the  payment  to  Poland  in  the  form  of  trade  concessions  to 
help  the  Soviet  economy.  This  would  have  the  double  effect  of  assisting  Soviet 
economic  growth,  while  encouraging  Poland  to  support  peace.  Lenin  refused  to  agree 
when  Chicherin  reported  on  3  January  1921  that  the  Poles  would  agree  to  receive  ten 
percent  of  their  official  claim. 
Upper  Silesia  was  the  other  issue,  which  influenced  the  peace  negotiations.  At  the 
Versailles  conference  the  Allied  Powers  had  agreed  that  there  should  be  a  plebiscite 
held  in  the  province  to  decide  its  fate.  In  early  1921  the  plebiscite  had  still  not  been 
held  but  it  was  imminent.  Berlin  and  Warsaw  both  believed  that  the  Soviet-Polish  War 
and  the  invasion  of  Poland  had  influenced  opinion  in  East  Prussia.  The  Polish 
government  wanted  no  instability  on  the  eastern  frontier  during  the  Upper  Silesian 
plebiscite.  Berlin  hoped  that  any  peace  agreement  would  be  delayed  until  after  the 
plebiscite.  This  allowed  the  Bolsheviks  to  play  Berlin  off  against  Warsaw.  Prince 
Sapieha,  the  Polish  Foreign  Minister,  began  to  suggest  to  Allied  representatives  that  the 
Bolsheviks  were  delaying  signing  any  peace  treaty,  in  order  to  help  the  Germans  in 
Upper  Silesia.  In  mid-February  Prince  Sapieha,  visiting  London,  suggested  that  the 
delay  in  concluding  the  treaty  "was  due  to  German  intrigue".  6  Once  again  the  German- 
Soviet  axis  had  appeared  marginally  as  a  factor  in  Poland's  policies  on  its  eastern 
frontier.  There  was  also  disquieting  news  from  Vienna. 
The  activities  of  some  of  the  other  Ukrainian  groups  and  organisations  played 
directly  into  the  hands  of  those  such  as  Grabski,  who  sought  to  annul  the  Warsaw 
Agreement.  The  Ukrainian  nationalist  movement  was  split  into  a  plethora  of  competing 
parties.  Although  the  main  division  was  between  Petliura  and  the  Galicians,  led  by 
Petrushevych,  there  were  also  many  other  groups.  One  of  the  most  important  of  these 
was  the  pro-German  faction  of  the  ex-Hetman,  Skoropadskyi,  which  was  agitating 
endlessly  in  Berlin  and  Vienna  and  which  had  a  totally  anti-Polish  orientation.  This 
group's  activities  caused  enormous  embarrassment  for  Petliura;  and  gave  credence  to 
the  charge  of  the  anti-Petliura  Poles  that  Ukrainian  independence  was  a  German 
creation  and  that  the  Ukrainians  would  always  be  the  creatures  of  the  Germans. 
Petrushevych  in  Vienna  and  Skoropadskyi  in  Berlin  did  all  they  could  in  late  1920  and 
5British  Documents  on  Foreign  Affairs:  Reports  and  Papers  from  the  Foreign  Office  Confidential  Print,  ed.  Dominic  Lieven. 
Series  A.  The  Soviet  Union,  Vol  IV,  p.  94. 
188 early  1921  to  totally  wreck  any  last  vestiges  of  the  Polish-Ukrainian  alliance.  The 
governments  of  Germany,  Austria  and  Czechoslovakia  were  all  too  prepared  to  assist 
them  in  this. 
The  Poles  were  kept  informed  about  much  of  this,  and  one  example  of  this  is  the 
report  commissioned  by  the  Polish  General  Staff,  and  issued  on  1  January  1921,  about 
the  activities  of  the  Ukrainian  emigres  in  Vienna.  The  report  had  the  title  `The  Political 
Situation'  and  began  by  commenting  on  the  tendency  of  Petliura's  government  to  use 
its  influence  within  various  Ukrainian  circles,  and  that  this  had  led  to  consolidation  and 
coordination  between  the  various  emigre  groups.  It  continued: 
The  main  exponent  of  these  points  of  view  is  the  Congress  Committee  in 
Vienna.  The  leader  of  this  committee  is  General  Grekov  and  Andreievskyi. 
Representatives  of  all  parties  from  Ukraine  and  Galicia  are  members  of  this 
committee,  except  the  communists,  socialist-federalists,  borotbists,  and 
independents. 
The  committee  accepted  as  its  goals  the  following  points, 
1.  The  removal  of  Petliura  from  power  and  the  creation  in  Ukraine  of  a 
Soviet  based  on  the  union  of  all  political  parties,  except  the 
communists. 
2.  The  creation  of  an  alliance  with  Britain  and  Germany  to  direct 
actions  against  the  Bolsheviks  and  to  stop  Polish  imperialism  and 
recover  the  territory  of  Ukraine. 
3.  To  form  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  the  government  of 
East  Galicia,  led  by  Dr.  Petrushevych. 
4.  To  base  the  Ukrainian  Congress  in  Vienna. 
5.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Vasili  Vishivani,  nee  Wilhelm  von  Hapsburg 
(son  of  the  ex-Emperor  Karl),  General  Grekov  and  Andreievskyi 
were  authorised  to  lead  the  negotiations  with  the  British,  German 
and  French  governments. 
The  committee  made  a  special  declaration  to  Lloyd  George  and  the  French 
government  declaring  that  Petliura  had  not  the  legal  right  to  be  the  leader  of 
Ukraine,  and  that  all  his  attempts  to  seize  power  would  not  be  recognised  by 
the  Ukrainian  government.  Ataman  Oskilko  was  authorised  to  form,  as  a 
189 section  of  the  committee,  the  Insurgent  Army  of  Ukraine.  The 
representatives  of  Hetman  Skoropadskyi  and  Dr.  Petrushevych  became 
members  of  the  committee.  7 
The  Congress  Committee  also  decided  to  open  negotiations  with  the  government 
of  Ukrainian  People's  Republic.  It  decided  also  to  appoint  General  Grekov,  Parfeski 
and  Makarenko  as  members  of  the  Presidium.  This  `Presidium  of  the  All  Ukrainian 
People's  Government'  then  drew  up  a  declaration,  in  which  it  proclaimed  that  the 
decision  had  been  taken  to  remove  Petliura  from  power  and  to  defend  itself  until  the 
territory  of  Ukraine  was  free,  and  until  there  would  be  a  constitutional  provisional 
government.  It  was  clear  from  the  meeting  of  the  Congress  Committee  that  Vassal, 
Leviskyi,  and  others,  demonstrated  an  aggressively  anti-Polish  position.  Ataman  Skulk 
delivered  a  very  sharp  anti-Polish  speech  supporting  the  government  of  East  Galicia. 
An  officer  of  the  UNR  army  also  spoke,  who  could  not  forget  his  9-month  internment 
in  a  Polish  camp.  8 
The  report  also  stated,  surprisingly,  that  the  policy  of  the  Congress  Committee 
had  a  strongly  Francophile  current.  General  Grekov  had  supported  contacts  between  the 
committee  and  the  French  Foreign  Ministry,  where  Berthelot  and  Colonel  Boushe  were 
seen  as  being  on  the  anti-Polish  side.  These  two  had  apparently  tried  to  convince  the 
Ukrainians  to  strengthen  their  ties  with  Rumania  instead  of  supporting  Petliura. 
Petrushevych  had  also  addressed  the  committee,  and  asked  those  states,  which  had 
ideas  about  Ukraine  to  come  forward  to  the  League  of  Nations.  He  believed  that  the 
natural  ally  was  the  Czech  leader  Benes,  who  had  helped  the  Ukrainians  of  Bast  Galicia 
in  presenting  their  case  to  the  League  of  Nations. 
The  report  drew  a  distinction  however,  between  the  views  of  Ben&&  and 
Petrushevych  on  the  future  of  East  Galicia.  Benes  was  seen  as  wanting  to  incorporate 
East  Galicia  into  Czechoslovakia  as  an  autonomous  area,  whereas  Petrushevych  wanted 
independence.  There  was  even  a  division  of  opinion  on  this  between  the  Ukrainians 
-  some  supported  the  Czech  position.  After  the  conference  the  Ukrainian  politician 
Vitviskyi  met  with  Benes  in  Prague.  For  the  Polish  General  Staff  this  demonstrated  that 
Czechoslovakia's  aim  was  not  only  political  -  fermenting  conflict  with  Poland  -  but 
also  economic,  the  reconstruction  of  East  Galicia.  9 
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190 Finally,  the  report  states  that  there  is  a  strong  interest  internationally  in  pursuing  a 
new  war  against  the  Bolsheviks,  using  Russian  army  units  and  the  Ukrainian  army,  and 
that  Skoropadskyi  hoped  that  the  recent  defeat  of  Petliura  would  increase  his  influence 
in  Ukrainian  circles.  Petrushevych  was  arguing  that  Ukraine  was  vital  in  any  war 
against  Bolshevism  and  that  there  could  not  be  any  Ukraine  without  East  Galicia.  The 
Poles  noted  that  these  views  were  gathering  some  support  internationally,  and  that  the 
major  source  of  interest  was  Britain,  where,  in  the  view  of  the  Poles:  "it  is  seeking  ways 
of  increasing  its  influence  in  Russia.  "lo 
The  formation  of  a  common  front  by  the  anti-Petliura  Ukrainian  nationalists  had, 
of  course,  of  its  very  nature  an  anti-Polish  aspect;  indeed  it  could  be  argued  that 
opposition  to  Poland  was  the  central  point  and  that  Petliura  was  merely  regarded  as 
Poland's  puppet.  It  is  not  surprising  that  these  parties  had  a  pro-German  and  a  pro- 
British  orientation.  Skoropadskyi  and  his  supporters  were  based  in  Berlin  and  his 
regime  in  Kiev  had  been  placed  in  power  by  Germany.  Since  his  ignominious  retreat 
from  Ukraine  in  December  1918  he  had  consistently  opposed  any  agreement  with 
Poland  and  had  argued  for  an  alliance  with  Germany.  Petrushevych  and  his 
`government-in-exile'  were  based  in  Vienna  and  the  Austrian  government  was  also  not 
on  friendly  terms  with  Poland. 
The  former  Emperor  Karl  placed  his  thoughts  about  Poland  on  paper  in  October 
1920:  "The  Germans,  when  not  feeling  themselves  able  to  subjugate  Poland,  prefer  a 
Russian  Poland  to  an  independent  Poland....  The  adoptive  parents  that  Poland  chose 
could  not  help  her  on  her  deathbed.  Germany  certainly  will  see  in  Poland  only  a  bastard 
and  will  treat  it  accordingly.  ""  Benes  and  the  Czech  government  had  also  shown 
themselves  sympathetic  to  the  East  Galicians  and  Poland  and  Czechoslovakia  had  a 
border  dispute  in  the  Teschen  area.  Britain  was  regarded  by  the  Ukrainians  as  the 
Entente  power  with  the  least  sympathy  for  Poland.  Lloyd  George  had  shown 
understanding  for  the  position  of  the  East  Galicians  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference,  and 
had  opposed  the  Polish  invasion  of  Ukraine  in  April. 
The  attempt  to  gain  French  support  is  less  understandable;  France  was  Poland's 
staunchest  ally  and  had  supported  Poland  militarily  and  economically  during  the  Polish. 
Soviet  War.  The  policies  of  the  Congress  Committee  suggest  desperation  with  Petliura 
and  Poland,  and  the  search  for  alternative  allies  wherever  they  could  be  found.  There 
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191 can  be  no  doubt  however,  that  there  was  a  tremendous  sense  of  disillusionment  with 
Petliura  and  his  pro-Polish  policy  among  most  of  the  Ukrainian  parties,  and  it  is 
interesting  to  note  that  they  hoped  to  replace  him  by  appealing  directly  to  the  other 
members  of  his  government-in-exile  in  Tarnow.  There  was  no  hope  however,  of  any 
other  state  supporting  the  Ukrainian  cause;  and  there  is  an  element  of  tragic-comedy 
about  this  plethora  of  Ukrainian  groups  desperately  seeking  support,  and  heaping 
opprobrium  on  the  head  of  the  defeated  nationalist  leader. 
In  early  1921  there  was  no  other  option  open  to  the  nationalist  Ukrainians  other 
than  hoping  that  the  Poles  would  seek  favourable  terms  for  their  Ukrainian  allies  in  the 
negotiations  at  Riga.  For  the  Poles  however,  the  reports  about  the  activities  of  the 
Ukrainian  emigres  strengthened  the  opinion  that  they  were  not  to  be  trusted,  and  that 
they  were  intriguing  with  the  Germans  and  Czechs.  This  strengthened  the  position  of 
the  National  Democrats  and  those  sections  of  the  Polish  political  class  who  had  never 
been  sympathetic  to  the  Ukrainian  cause. 
Krasin  arrived  in  Riga  on  19  February  to  join  Joffe  on  the  Soviet  delegation.  On 
24  February,  Krasin  and  the  Polish  finance  minister  reached  an  agreement  over  the  gold 
payments.  Krasin  had  been  authorised  to  pay  thirty  million  roubles.  The  Poles  agreed  to 
this;  and  agreements  were  then  signed  to  begin  the  repatriation  of  prisoners,  and  to 
extend  the  period  in  which  the  armistice  could  be  renounced  to  six  weeks.  It  is 
significant  that  the  Allied  prime  ministers  announced  on  21  February  that  the  plebiscite 
in  Upper  Silesia  would  be  held  on  20  March. 
Some  of  the  Polish  press  were  already  expressing  reservations  about  the  Polish- 
Ukrainian  pact  in  the  last  months  of  1920.  The  newspaper  Nowa  Reforma,  in  its  edition 
of  21  December  1920,  expressed  many  of  the  doubts  of  the  Polish  Right  about 
Pilsudski's  entanglement  with  Petliura,  and  took  the  view  that  the  alliance  was  a 
literary  fiction  and  not  a  realistic  political  one.  It  recommended  the  ending  of  the 
alliance;  because  this  would  end  the  political  ideals  of  those  Ukrainians  who  wanted  to 
divert  Poland  away  from  dealing  with  the  more  central  problem,  for  Poland,  of  the 
situation  in  East  Galicia.  Furthermore,  the  encouragement  of  Ukrainian  ambitions  by 
Poland  would  encourage  those  in  East  Galicia  who  did  not  want  to  recognise  the  Polish 
state.  12 
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192 There  was  also  extreme  nervousness  about  the  possibility  of  a  joint  German- 
Bolshevik  attack  on  Poland.  An  article  appeared  in  Rczeczespospolita  on  December  22 
1920,  making  the  claim  that  three  documents  had  been  uncovered  which  showed  the 
inevitability  of  revolution  in  Germany.  These  had  included  a  letter  from  Zinovicv  to  the 
German  communists,  which  made  reference  to  a  secret  military  organisation.  The 
paper's  view  was  that  both  these  Bolshevik  revolutionaries  and  the  nationalist- 
monarchist  groups  in  Germany  were  opposed  to  the  policies  of  Poland,  indeed  to  its 
very  existence.  13  There  were  those  in  Poland,  mainly  the  National  Democrats  and  their 
supporters,  who  still  saw  the  Ukrainians  as  allies  or  potential  allies  of  Germany,  and 
who  wanted  peace  with  Russia  as  soon  as  possible,  and  an  end  to  the  Ukrainian 
entanglement.  One  of  the  most  important  of  these  was  Grabski,  who  now  played  an 
essential  role  in  the  Riga  settlement.  In  his  Memoirs,  Grabski  gives  the  impression  that 
an  ethno-religious  viewpoint  was  central  for  him  in  the  negotiations  with  the 
Bolsheviks.  Grabski  regarded  Roman  Catholic  and  non-Orthodox  areas  of  the  former 
Russian  Empire  as  being  natural  constituent  parts  of  the  new  Polish  state,  but  Orthodox 
areas  should  automatically  join  the  new  Russia.  He  was  scathing  about  the  Ukrainian 
role  in  the  war  just  over,  and  stated  that  its  population  had  rejected  both  Poland's  and 
Petliura's  overtures  and  stood  on  the  side  of  the  Bolsheviks,  therefore  it  had  chosen  its 
fate.  14 
Petliura  and  his  ministers  were  based  in  Tarnow,  hoping  that  they  would  be  called 
to  the  negotiations  in  Riga.  A  report  on  Petliura's  government  from  the  Soviet  embassy 
in  Berlin  was  intercepted  by  the  Polish  embassy  there  in  early  1921.  It  gives  an 
interesting  description  of  the  situation  in  Tarnow: 
The  position  of  Petliura's  government  in  Tarnow  is  described  as  consisting 
of  only  about  400  people  -  20  ministers  and  10  heads  of  department.  The 
most  important  persons  were  the  State  Secretary  Krishanovskyi;  the  Foreign 
Minister,  Nikovskyi;  the  Justice  Minister,  Levitskyi;  and  the  Prime  Minister, 
Piliptschuk.  The  chief  role  in  the  government  is  played  naturally  by  the 
Foreign  Ministry  because  of  the  representation  abroad  with  their  propaganda 
and  their  ability  to  find  money.  The  second  most  important  post  is  War 
Minister.  Petliura  is  only  the  Supreme  Commander  of  the  rebels;  the 
commander  of  the  army  is  the  War  Minister.  At  present  this  is  a  certain 
Ibid.  p.  308. 
14  St.  Grabski,  Pamielniki  Vol  II.  (Warsaw,  1989).  pp.  172/73. 
193 Vovk,  a  former  staff  captain.  Vice  minister  is  Jaroshevich,  an  old  Lieutenant 
General  of  the  (Russian)  General  Staff  who  was  previously  with  Wrangel. 
The  General  Chief  of  Staff  is  General  Petrov,  a  former  colonel  in  the 
General  Staff  and  his  assistant  Lieutenant  General  Janushevskyi,  former 
Chief  of  Staff  with  Denikin.  The  Supreme  War  Council  is  formed  from 
generals  Junalkov,  Sinkler,  Sialskyi  and  Omilianovich-Pavlenko.  It  is 
debatable  how  many  genuine  Russian  generals  find  themselves  in  this  so- 
called  Ukrainian  army.  Most  of  these  came  shortly  before  the  collapse  of 
Wrangel's  army  from  Crimea  to  Ukraine.  There  are  people  who  say  that  this 
happened  because  they  felt  that  they  were  in  less  danger  in  Ukraine  than  in 
Crimea.  In  the  opinion  of  the  troops  these  people  have  no  real  influence, 
instead  the  troops  follow  their  leaders,  who  arc  interned  with  them  in  the 
camps.  According  to  the  French  lieutenant  Segouant,  approximately  300 
officers  and  700  men  from  Wrangel's  army  joined  Petliura's.  15 
Quite  obviously  this  Soviet  report  is  an  attempt  to  link  Pctliura's  cause  with  that 
of  Wrangel  and  also  to  suggest  that  morale  among  the  Ukrainians  was  low  and  that 
Petliura  had  lost  the  confidence  of  his  troops.  Considering  that  Wrangel  had  shown  no 
inclination  to  support  Petliura  until  his  final  defeat,  it  is difficult  to  assume  that  many  of 
his  officers  and  men  had  willingly  joined  the  banner  of  the  Ukrainians.  It  is  more  likely 
that  some  of  Wrangel's  forces  attempting  to  escape  the  rout  in  Crimea  had  managed  to 
cross  the  Polish  frontier  and  had  been  interned.  This  Soviet  report  was  also  quite  clearly 
an  attempt  to  discredit  Petliura's  government  and  army,  and  to  link  its  destiny  with  that 
of  the  defeated  and  discredited  Wrangel.  It  is  certainly  true  however,  that  the  UNR 
government  maintained  a  small  army  of  diplomats  abroad,  particularly  in  Westens 
Europe.  This  was  because  of  the  absolute  necessity  for  Petliura  of  convincing  other 
states,  especially  the  Entente  Powers,  of  the  legitimacy  of  his  government  and  cause. 
This  was  even  more  urgent  in  early  1921,  when  Petliura  and  his  ministers  were  aware 
that  Poland  was  manoeuvring  to  abandon  them  in  the  negotiations  at  Riga. 
Similar  charges  were  made  about  Petliura  and  his  army  by  his  enemies  on  the 
Ukrainian  left.  The  Borotbist  journal  Borot'ba,  published  in  Vienna,  launched  a  series 
of  articles  on  "the  maniac  Petliura"  in  the  autumn  of  1920.  Among  the  charges  were 
that  he  had  presided  over  the  pogroms  in  Ukraine  and  had  acted  as  the  Chief  Gendarme 
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194 of  the  Poles  and  had  encouraged  Denikin's  former  officers  and  dignitaries  into  his 
entourage.  16  Of  course  the  Borotbists  were  the  allies  of  the  Bolsheviks  and  the  charges 
are  very  similar  to  those  made  by  the  Soviet  embassy.  The  Ukrainian  communists  and 
the  Ukrainian  monarchists  and  Right  were  now  united  in  their  vehement  opposition  to 
Petliura  and  their  total  opposition  to  his  pro-Polish  policy. 
While  negotiations  continued  at  Riga,  Pilsudski  received  an  official  invitation  to 
visit  Paris  from  the  French  government.  This  was  an  opportunity  for  the  Poles  to  press 
the  importance  of  a  peace  settlement  on  advantageous  terms  with  the  French. 
Sir Percy  Loraine,  the  British  ambassador  in  Warsaw,  expressed  his  opinion  on 
Pilsudski's  visit  to  Lord  Curzon,  the  Foreign  Secretary  on  December  20  1920: 
The  Poles  obviously  have  but  few  bargaining  counters  in  their  hands,  and 
from  some  remarks  which  Prince  Sapieha  made  to  me  in  a  recent 
conversation,  I  suspect  that  Marshal  Pilsudski  will  debate  considerably  on 
the  danger  of  a  fresh  Bolshevik  attack  on  Poland  in  the  spring  and  urge  its 
probability  as  a  lever  for  securing  an  ample  supply  of  munitions  and  modern 
armaments  on  easy  terms.  (...  )  No  doubt  Marshal  Pilsudski's  resourceful 
imagination  will  produce  other  arguments,  but  I  fancy  that  the  Red  peril  will 
be  his  principal  line  of  attack  and  defence,  reinforced  by  the  dangers  of 
Bolshevik  co-operation  with  Germany.  17 
Once  again  the  Poles  were  rattling  the  sabre  and  pressurising  the  French  with  the 
prospect  of  a  German-Bolshevik  common  front.  The  French,  smarting  from  the  defeat 
of  Wrangel,  their  protege  in  Russia,  were  even  more  dependent  on  the  Poles  in  Eastern 
Europe  as  allies  and  agents. 
The  Poles  had  agreed,  during  the  negotiations  over  the  preliminary  treaty  in 
October  only  to  recognise  the  delegates  from  Soviet  Ukraine  as  representing  Ukraine. 
Thus,  even  though  the  UNR  representatives  were  at  Riga,  they  did  not  take  part  in  any 
negotiations  and  were  not  recognised  by  either  side.  The  Polish  delegation,  which 
finally  negotiated  the  treaty,  were  as  follows;  Dgbski  (Chair),  Stanislaw  Kauzik, 
Henryk  Strasburger,  Lechowitz,  Wasilewski,  and  a  large  staff  of  experts.  As  mentioned 
above,  the  impending  plebiscite  in  Upper  Silesia  was  always  in  the  background  at  Riga 
and  had  the  effect  of  considerably  speeding  up  the  negotiations.  Dqbski  commented: 
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195 "The  date  of  the  Upper  Silesian  plebiscite  hangs  over  me  like  an  nightmare.  I  realise 
that  if  we  lose  the  plebiscite  or  insufficiently  win  it,  there  will  be  people  who  would 
cast  blame  that  the  peace  was  not  carried  into  effect  soon  enough.  i18  It  was  quite  clear 
that  the  interests  of  Poland  would  prevail  in  the  negotiating  of  the  provisions  of  the 
treaty  and  those  of  the  Ukrainians  would  be  very  much  at  the  end  of  the  agenda.  The 
Polish  delegates  at  Riga  were  in  constant  touch  with  the  Council  for  the  Defence  of  the 
State  and  with  the  Foreign  Minister,  Prince  Sapieha.  Both  were  supporters  of  the 
National  Democrats  and  supported  the  line  proposed  by  Grabski. 
What  was  the  role  of  Pilsudski  in  the  negotiations,  and  why  did  he  not  intervene 
to  support  Petliura  and  the  cause  of  an  independent  Ukraine?  Polish  and  Ukrainian 
historians  have  had  radically  different  argumentation  for  Pilsudski's  apparent  passivity 
during  the  treaty  negotiations.  It  was  the  Marshal  after  all,  who  had  been  the  architect 
of  the  agreement  with  Petliura  and  whose  central  policy  was  the  creation  of  an 
independent  Ukrainian  state.  When  Pilsudski  was  asked,  several  years  after  the  signing 
of  the  treaty,  why  he  did  not  end  the  negotiations  at  Riga,  his  reply  was  that  after  the 
military  setbacks  of  the  summer  of  1920  Poland  had  been  profoundly  shaken.  He 
continued: 
The  nation  suddenly  became  tired  and  lost  its  self-confidence.  I  had  to  take 
this  into  account,  especially  since  my  person  and  my  policy  were  the  object 
of  a  vitriolic,  ruthless  campaign.  Both  the  government  and  the  Sejm  (the 
Polish  parliament)  were  torn  asunder  by  the  campaign.  Considering  all  that, 
I  decided  that  one  cannot  impose  upon  a  reluctant  nation  that  desired  peace, 
the  new  risks  inherent  in  the  usual  ups  and  downs  of  a  war.  Some  of  my 
suggestions  had  been  communicated  to  the  peace  delegation,  but  it  either 
failed  to  understand  or  did  not  wish  to  understand  them.  19 
This  has  been  the  view  put  forward  by  Polish  historians  and  apologists  for 
Pilsudski.  Their  argument  is  that  Pilsudski  remained  loyal  to  the  Ukrainians  but  that  the 
Polish  people  had  had  enough  of  war,  especially  in  view  of  the  near-annihilation  of  the 
Polish  state  and  the  huge  strain  on  manpower  and  resources  caused  by  a  constant  state 
of  war  since  1914.  The  Soviet-Polish  War  had  cost  the  lives  of  a  quarter  of  a  million 
Polish  citizens,  and  large  numbers  were  still  incarcerated  in  Soviet  prison  camps. 
Is  Pokdf  Ryski:  Wspomnienia,  pertraktacje,  tame  uklady  z  Joffem.  em.  listy  (Warsaw,  1931),  p.  173, 
"  K.  Okulicz,  'Dzieje  ziem  Wielkiego  Ksiestwa',  in  A  History  of  the  Grand  Duchy,  ed.  K.  Okulicz.  Z.  Jundzill,  et  at.  (London,  1953). 
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196 Furthermore,  the  attitude  of  the  Press  and  the  majority  in  the  Sejm  was  that  peace  with 
Soviet  Russia  was  an  absolute  necessity.  The  National  Democrats  were  in  control  of 
the  political  situation  and  Pilsudski  was  constrained. 
The  final  treaty  agreed  at  Riga  on  March  18  1921  conceded  large  territories  of  the 
former  Russian  Empire  to  Poland.  The  frontier  agreed  on  was  well  within  the  1772 
frontier  of  pre-Partition  Poland,  and  was  even  further  west  than  Dmowski  and  the 
National  Democrats  had  demanded  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference.  It  was  however  cast 
of  the  Curzon  line  and  included  about  110,000km2  of  the  western  borderlands  (Ukraine 
and  Belorussia).  It  was  much  closer  in  conception  to  the  ideas  of  Pilsudski's  enemies 
the  Polish  Right.  The  Ukrainian  Soviet  politician  Maniuls'kyi  made  a  prophetic 
comment  on  the  results  of  the  treaty,  when  he  claimed  that  Poland  had  become  a  sort  of 
new  Austria  with  an  utterly  mixed  foreign  population.  He  believed  that  Poland,  by  its 
own  policy  had  created  on  its  entire  eastern  border  a  permanent  resistance  movement. 
This  was  certainly  true  in  East  Galicia,  where  violent,  unrest  continued  until  the 
dismemberment  of  Poland  in  1939. 
Dmowski  claimed  in  September  1921  that  his  party  took  the  entire  responsibility 
for  the  Treaty  of  Riga  because  it  had  `dictated  the  preliminaries'.  20  A  Polish  writer  at 
the  time  wrote:  "Dmowski  had  realised  his  principles  and  achieved  his  conception  of  an 
independent  Poland,  though  he  did  not  rule  the  country.  Pilsudski  did  rule  the  country 
but  he  failed  to  fulfil  his  ideas.  s21 
There  were  26  articles  in  the  treaty  and  most  dealt  with  questions  of  reparations 
by  Soviet  Russia  and  Soviet  Ukraine  to  Poland,  while  others  dealt  with  the  rights  of 
Russian  and  Ukrainian  minorities  in  Poland  and  of  Poles  in  Soviet  Ukraine  and  Russia. 
For  Petliura  the  most  important  articles  were  Articles  2,3  and  5. 
It  is  immediately  obvious  that  the  Bolsheviks  did  all  possible  to  give  the 
impression  of  Soviet  Ukraine  being  a  separate  and  sovereign  signatory  to  the  treaty  and 
indeed,  following  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  by  Poland  and  Soviet  Russia,  a  Soviet 
Ukrainian  consulate  opened  in  Warsaw  together  with  a  Polish  consulate  in  Kharkov. 
Poland  had  finally  fully  recognised  Rakovsky's  regime  and,  as  a  corollary,  withdrawn 
recognition  from  Petliura's  government-in-exile  and  his  armed  forces.  It  is  also 
noticeable  that  many  of  the  articles  referred  to  restitution  for  the  actions  of  the  Imperial 
20  AAN:  Akta  AdiutanturyGeneralnej  Naczelnego  Dowodztwa.  1918-1922.  Report  no  21.  April  26,1921.  XXXVII  n275,9.277. 
21  Piotr  S.  Wandycz,  Soviet-Polish  Relations.  1917-1921  (Cambridge,  Mass,  I  larvard  University  Press,  1969),  p.  289. 
197 Russian  government  during  World  War  I  and  indeed  as  far  back  as  the  first  partition  of 
Poland  in  1772.  The  commercial  aspects  of  the  treaty  also  opened  the  way  for  normal 
trade  relations  between  Poland  and  Soviet  Ukraine. 
Poland  had  finally  resumed  normal  relations  with  the  Soviet  states  on  its  castcrn 
frontier  and  Joffe,  the  leader  of  the  Soviet  delegation,  summed  up  the  feelings  of  the 
signatories  in  his  speech  at  the  signing  ceremony.  According  to  Joffc,  the  signing  of 
peace  with  Poland  completed  the  circle  of  peaceful  relations  between  all  the  states, 
which  previously  formed  part  of  the  Russian  Empire  and  he  continued: 
The  Tsarist  policy  of  violence  is liquidated  and  the  peoples  who  have  agreed 
in  amity,  without  malice  and  hatred,  to  go  their  separate  ways,  may  and 
must  now  develop  in  feelings  of  true  friendship  and  neighbourliness  those 
ties  arising  out  of  their  economic  proximity  and  common  interest  which 
were  none  the  less  built  up  during  many  centuries  of  State  imposed  unity. 
(...  )  And  I,  for  my  part,  on  behalf  of  Russia  and  Ukraine,  am  happy  to 
declare  that  if  in  fact  no  interests  foreign  to  the  Polish  people  are  allowed  to 
govern  Polish  policy,  those  friendly  and  good-neighbourly  relations  of 
which  the  respected  chairman  of  the  Polish  delegation  spoke  will  most 
certainly  be  established  between  the  states,  which  have  signed  this  treaty.  22 
Both  countries  were  exhausted  economically  and  militarily,  they  had  both  been 
engaged  in  constant  warfare  since  1914,  and  both  needed  international  legitimacy.  The 
Treaty  of  Riga  provided  both.  For  Poland  it  finally  fixed  its  eastern  frontier,  which 
would  remain  until  the  German-Soviet  Pact  of  1939.  As  Joffe  remarked,  for  Soviet 
Russia  it  was  the  final  peace  treaty  with  the  new  states,  which  had  arisen  from  the 
debris  of  the  Russian  Empire  in  Eastern  Europe.  Pilsudski's  attempt  to  recreate  the 
Polish  Commonwealth  of  the  17`h  century  had  failed,  as  had  Lenin's  attempt  to  export 
communism  to  Central  Europe.  The  Treaty  of  Riga  was  a  compromise  and  the  frontiers 
drawn  up  there  reflected  the  balance  of  power  in  Eastern  Europe  in  1921.  For  the  Poles 
it  was  the  best  that  they  could  expect;  the  Bolsheviks  were  prepared  to  grant  large 
territories  to  Poland.  The  Russian  Whites  and  the  Socialist  Revolutionaries  would  not 
have  been  prepared  to  do  so.  Also,  the  Soviet  creation  of  a  nominally  independent 
Ukrainian  state  on  Poland's  eastern  frontier  would  act  as  a  magnet  for  disaffected 
Ukrainians  within  Poland's  frontiers,  and  indeed  shortly  after  the  signing  of  the  treaty 
22  Izvestiya.  20  March.  1921 
198 Petrushevych  began  negotiations  with  Rakovsky's  regime  in  Kharkov.  This  could 
certainly  have  been  an  attempt  by  the  Bolsheviks  to  destabilise  Polish  rule  in  East 
Galicia. 
Another  factor  for  the  Bolsheviks  was  the  Kronstadt  revolt  which  necessitated  a 
speedy  settlement  with  Poland.  If  Poland  had  its  Upper  Silesian  dilemma,  Russia  had  its 
Kronstadt.  The  Bolsheviks  were  pleased  with  the  settlement  at  Riga.  They  had  been 
forced  to  concede  less  territory  than  they  had  originally  been  prepared  to  offer  Poland 
before  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  They  had  also  held  Ukraine,  which  was  an  area  of  vital 
economic  importance  for  the  new  Soviet  state  and  without  which  Russia  could  not  be 
considered  as  a  major  power  in  Eastern  Europe. 
The  question  now  remained  how  would  Petliura  and  the  UNR  government  react  and 
what  would  be  their  fate  and  that  of  the  thousands  of  Ukrainian  troops  interned  in 
Polish  camps?  There  was  undoubtedly  deep  bitterness  and  an  intense  feeling  of  betrayal 
among  the  Ukrainians  but  their  options  were  extremely  limited.  Under  the  terms  of 
article  five  of  the  treaty  no  anti-Soviet  activities  could  be  carried  on  in  Poland,  and  thus 
the  fate  of  the  UNR  government  and  its  diplomats  hung  in  the  balance.  For 
Petrushevych  and  the  other  anti-Petliura  nationalists  the  Treaty  of  Riga  was  the  ultimate 
vindication  of  their  anti-Polish  stance,  and  they  vehemently  accused  Pctliura  and  his 
supporters  of  having  led  the  nationalists  up  a  political  and  diplomatic  cul-de-sac. 
Petliura's  only  hope  remained  Pilsudski  and  the  Polish  federalists  but  they  were 
powerless  in  the  face  of  public  opinion  strongly  in  favour  of  the  treaty,  and  of  a 
parliament  dominated  by  the  National  Democrats  and  their  allies.  It  is  true  that 
Pilsudski  felt  some  responsibility  for  the  fate  of  his  erstwhile  allies  and  he  visited  the 
main  Ukrainian  internment  camp  on  May  15  1921,  and  apologised  for  the  actions  of  the 
Polish  government  and  thanked  the  Ukrainian  troops  for  their  support  during  the  war. 
Some  Ukrainian  commentators  remarked  that  the  Ukrainians  were  very  moved  and  that 
Pilsudski's  remorse  appeared  genuine.  23  Pilsudski's  disillusionment  with  Polish  politics 
led  to  his  retirement  from  public  life  in  1923,  until  his  return  in  1926.  His  plans  for  a 
series  of  independent  states  to  act  as  a  buffer  zone  between  Poland  and  its  main 
traditional  enemy  had  failed.  Petliura  and  his  supporters  were  left  to  their  own  devices. 
No  help  could  be  expected  from  the  Entente  powers.  France  had  failed  utterly  in 
its  attempts  to  dislodge  the  Bolsheviks  by  means  of  Wrangel's  army  and  was  not 
23  Palij,  The  Ukrainian-Polish  Defensive  Alliance,  p.  175 
199 sympathetic  to  the  cause  of  an  independent  Ukraine.  Furthermore,  its  main  ally  in  the 
east,  Poland,  had  already  recognised  the  Soviet  Ukraine.  The  British  referred  in  their 
Foreign  Office  reports  to  Petliura  as  "the  bandit  Petliura"  and  did  not  regard  him  as  a 
serious  politician  or  statesman.  24 
In  November  1920,  the  forces  of  the  UNR,  together  with  allied  Russian  and 
Cossack  forces  had  launched  an  attack  on  Soviet  Ukraine  but  the  campaign  was  short 
and  disastrous,  without  Polish  support  they  had  no  chance  against  the  Red  Anny.  These 
Ukrainian  troops  (about  19,000)  had  been  interned  in  central  and  western  Poland.  This 
was  one  of  the  reasons  for  Article  5  of  the  Treaty  of  Riga.  The  Bolsheviks  remained 
decidedly  nervous  about  the  possibility  of  a  resumption  of  hostilities  by  the  Ukrainians 
and  dubious  about  Poland's  stated  neutrality.  This  was  to  remain  a  source  of  friction 
between  the  Soviet  Ukrainian  regime  and  Poland  throughout  1921  and  1922. 
Even  after  the  Treaty  of  Riga  unrest  continued  in  Soviet  Ukraine.  A  secret  report 
to  the  British  Foreign  Office  dated  April  5  1921  reported: 
In  order  to  quell  the  constant  risings  that  are  taking  place  in  the  Ukraine,  the 
Bolsheviks  are  transferring  large  forces  there.  The  insurgents  have  three 
objects  in  view  viz,  the  expulsion  of  the  Bolsheviks,  the  establishment  of  a 
Ukrainian  National  Assembly,  and  the  division  of  the  land  among 
themselves.  The  movement  is  very  hostile  to  any  form  of  foreign 
intervention,  especially  on  the  part  of  the  Poles.  In  the  Poltava  and  Kharkov 
districts  the  insurgents  are  led  by  Arkadi  Stepanenko,  a  Ukrainian  Socialist 
Revolutionary  (...  )  In  Podolia  an  insurgent  force  of  about  4,000  strong  with 
artillery  and  machine-guns  has  appeared  in  the  vicinity  of  Shargrod  (north  of 
Mogilev).  It  is  engaged  in  operations  against  units  of  the  14`h  Soviet  Army. 
Forces  under  Atamans  Golub  and  Paduliak  are  also  operating  in  Podolia. 
These  include  well-disciplined  soldiers  of  the  Ukrainian  forces  formerly 
operating  from  Poland.  25 
The  British  report  clearly  indicates  that  Polish  intervention  was  not  welcome  and, 
while  Polish  political  circumstances  dictated  that  there  would  be  no  direct  intervention 
after  1920,  the  Polish  military  must  have  been  aware  of  the  feeling  in  Ukraine.  This 
24  British  Documents  on  Foreign  Affairs.  Reports  and  Papers  from  the  Foreign  Office  Confidential  print.  (ed.  )  Dominic  Lievcn. 
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200 situation  would  have  strengthened  the  hand  of  Polish  politicians  who  wanted  no  further 
involvement  with  Ukraine. 
The  government  of  the  UNR  and  Petliura  remained  in  Tarnow  after  the 
ratification  of  the  Treaty  of  Riga.  The  government  of  the  UNR  decided  in  February 
1921,  on  the  eve  of  the  signing  of  the  treaty,  to  establish  a  Ukrainian  Parliament  in 
Tarnow,  which  would  give  a  greater  semblance  of  legitimacy  to  the  nationalists  in  exile 
in  Poland.  The  parliament  only  existed  for  six  months,  until  August  1921,  and  during 
that  time  drew  up  an  extensive  list  of  legislation  and  tried  to  influence  the  policies  of 
the  government.  The  Prime  Minister  in  March  1921  was  Viacheslav  Prokopovich,  who 
based  his  cabinet  on  a  parliamentary  majority.  The  Ukrainian  politicians  in  Tambw  also 
needed  to  give  the  impression  of  democratic  government  to  the  Entente  powers  and  to 
deny  the  suggestion  that  Petliura's  regime  was  a  dictatorship.  However,  political 
antagonisms  soon  emerged  and  a  hostile  relationship  between  the  parliament  and 
Petliura  developed.  Also,  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  of  Riga  by  the  Polish  Sejm 
meant  that  the  parliament  had  to  work  in  semi-secret  conditions,  as  its  existence  was 
contrary  to  Article  5  of  the  treaty.  A  delegation  from  the  parliament  of  the  UNR 
approached  the  Polish  Sejm  in  April  1921,  to  try  and  appeal  to  it  not  to  ratify  the  Treaty 
of  Riga  but  it  failed  utterly.  One  unexpected  success  was  that  the  government  and 
parliament  of  the  UNR  were  recognised  as  the  de  jure  executive  and  legislature  of 
Ukraine  by  the  Argentine  Republic  early  in  1921.26  However,  recognition  by  Argentina 
was  one  point,  recognition  by  the  Entente  powers  was  another.  Plans  for  an  uprising  by 
the  interned  troops  in  Poland  were  discussed  but  there  were  deep  differences  of  opinion 
and  Petliura  did  not  want  to  antagonise  the  Poles.  7 
The  Bolsheviks  were,  of  course,  aware  of  the  activities  of  the  UNR  administration 
in  Poland,  and  the  worldwide  propaganda  being  carried  out  by  its  diplomats.  The  Soviet 
government  in  Kharkov  appealed  on  numerous  occasions  to  the  Polish  government  to 
act  against  Petliura  and  the  UNR  government. 
On  2  May  1921,  the  Polish  paper  Monitor  Polski  reported  from  the  Press  Bureau 
of  the  Foreign  Ministry  that  the  government  of  Soviet  Ukraine  had  again  protested  to 
the  Polish  government  about  the  activities  of  the  UNR  supporters  in  Tambw.  Kharkov 
quoted  from  Article  II  of  the  preliminary  peace  agreement  and  Article  5  of  the  Treaty  of 
26  Jan  Jacek  Bruski  ,  The  Council  of  the  Republic,  the  Parliament  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  in  exile.  (February-August 
1921)',  in  Polska  t  Ukraina.  Sojusz  1920  Roku  1  jego  nastepstwa,  (ed.  )  Z.  Karpus,  et  al.  (Torun:  Michael  Copernicus  University, 
1997),  p.  341. 
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201 Riga,  that  the  Polish  government  had  undertaken  not  to  allow  hostile  organisations  or 
activities  hostile  to  Soviet  Ukraine  to  be  organised  in  Polish  territory.  According  to  the 
Soviet  Ukrainian  government,  an  organisation  styling  itself  as  "the  government  of  the 
Ukrainian  People's  Republic"  and  based  in  Tarnow  was  carrying  out  anti-Soviet 
propaganda  by  means  of  telegraph  and  printing.  Furthermore,  Kharkov  claimed  that 
groups  of  counter-revolutionary  bandits  based  in  Polish  territory,  and  under  the  control 
of  the  illegitimate  regime  in  Tarnow,  were  launching  attacks  on  Ukrainian  territory  and 
destroying  property  in  Soviet  Ukraine.  These  groups,  it  alleged,  were  also  carrying  out 
anti-Semitic  pogroms  in  Soviet  Ukraine,  and  attacking  the  Red  Army.  28 
It  listed  a  series  of  attacks  by  partisans  within  Ukrainian  territory,  which  it  had 
evidence  of  having  been  directed  from  Tarnow.  The  Soviet  Ukrainian  government 
believed  that  certain  forces  within  Poland  were  still  sympathetic  to  the  Pctliura  regime; 
and  it  gave  as  an  example  of  this  sympathy  the  invitation  to  the  Belverderc  Palace  from 
the  Polish  Head  of  State  (Pilsudski)  to  Petliura,  just  before  Pilsudski's  visit  to  Paris  in 
February  1921.  Kharkov  believed  that  these  forces  were  still  trying  to  ferment  war 
between  Poland  and  Soviet  Ukraine.  The  government  of  Soviet  Ukraine  protested 
against  the  continued  toleration  by  Poland  of  the  UNR  regime,  and  its  being  permitted 
to  carry  out  civilian  and  military  functions  on  Polish  territory.  Finally,  the  Soviet 
Ukrainian  government  stated  that  it  believed  that  all  these  activities  were  contrary  to  the 
provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  Riga,  and  it  requested  Poland  to  act  immediately,  29 
The  Polish  government  replied  that  Ataman  Petliura  and  his  ministers  had  been 
accepted  in  Poland  as  refugees  from  the  Red  Army,  and  as  such  had  the  legal  right  to  be 
granted  rights  of  asylum.  Also,  Poland  had  interned  and  disarmed  all  the  troops  of  the 
UNR  and  placed  them  under  supervision;  as  such  Poland  could  not  be  accused  of 
supporting  armed  attacks  against  Soviet  Ukraine.  The  Polish  Foreign  Ministry  also 
reiterated  that  the  Soviet  delegation  at  Riga  had  been  made  aware  of  the  granting  of 
asylum  to  Petliura  and  his  government  in  Poland,  and  had  accepted  this  without  protest. 
Poland  had  never  supported  any  actions  by  Ukrainian  partisans  within  Soviet  Ukraine 
or  any  anti-Semitic  pogroms.  As  regards  the  invitation  of  Petliura  to  the  Belvedere 
Palace,  this  could  not  be  interpreted  as  a  sign  of  support  for  the  government  of  the 
UNR,  but  was  merely  a  diplomatic  protocol. 
_'  AAN:  Akta  Leon  Wasilewskiego  48,  s.  6. 
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202 Then  the  Polish  Foreign  Ministry  responded  with  several  counter-charges.  It  had 
come  to  its  attention  that  the  Soviet  Ukrainian  government  was  permitting  groups  of 
partisans  to  form  on  its  territory,  who  were  engaged  in  anti-Polish  military  attacks  on 
East  Galicia.  It  listed  several  examples  of  attacks  along  the  border  with  East  Galicia, 
and  also  alleged  that  there  was  a  lb`  Soviet  `Galician'  cavalry  regiment  attached  to 
Budienny's  army,  along  with  a  `Galician'  brigade  organised  under  the  title  `Red 
Galician  Cossacks'.  Some  of  these  Galician  troops  were,  it  stated,  attached  to  the  12`h 
and  14`h  Soviet  armies  as  well  as  Budienny's  cavalry.  Therefore  the  Polish  government 
wished  to  protest  against  these  warlike  activities  taking  place  on  the  territory  of  the 
Ukrainian  Soviet  Republic,  and  wished  to  state  to  the  Ukrainian  Soviet  government  that 
they  were  in  breach  of  Article  II  of  the  preliminary  peace  agreement  and  Article  5  of 
the  Treaty  of  Riga.  30 
This  argument  over  `our  Ukrainians'  and  `your  Ukrainians'  would  continue 
throughout  the  1920's  and  help  to  poison  relations  between  Poland  and  Soviet  Ukraine. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Petliura  and  his  government  continued  to  be  allowed  to 
reside  in  Poland,  chiefly  as  a  weapon  to  use  against  the  manipulation  of  the  East 
Galicians  by  the  Bolsheviks.  Protests  and  diplomatic  notes  continued  but  gradually 
Petliura  realised  that  there  would  be  no  real  further  political  development  for  the 
Ukrainians  in  Poland. 
In  August  1921,  tired  of  the  bickering  and  infighting  by  the  various  parties  in  the 
Ukrainian  parliament,  operating  out  of  the  Bristol  Hotel  in  Tamöw,  Pctliura  dissolved 
the  parliament.  Petliura  ruled  virtually  alone,  over  the  disintegrating  and  disillusioned 
regime  of  exiles.  Finally  in  January  1922  Andrei  Liviskyi,  as  Prime  Minister,  formed  a 
new  cabinet.  31 
There  were  approaches  to  Tarnow  by  the  pro-German  Ukrainians  led  by 
Skoropadskyi,  who  argued  that  there  was  nothing  further  to  be  gained  by  the  pro-Polish 
orientation  but  Petliura  rejected  their  overtures  and  held  his  course.  The  Polish 
government  continued  to  pressurise  Petliura  not  to  take  any  political  risks  and  to  tone 
down  his  anti-Soviet  activities.  There  was  also  increasing  evidence  that  Polish  business 
wanted  to  develop  economic  interests  in  Soviet  Ukraine  and  particularly  wanted  to 
exploit  the  new  conditions  laid  down  for  trade  and  commerce  by  the  Treaty  of  Riga. 
'"  Ibid. 
"  Jan  Jacek  Bruski,  'The  Council  of  the  Republic,  the  Parliament  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  in  exile.  (February-August 
1921).  '  in  Polska  i  Ukraina.  Sojusz  1920  Roku  I  jego  nastepstwa.,  ed.  Z.  Karpus,  et  al.  (Torun:  Michael  Copernicus  University, 
1997),  p.  345. 
203 They  were  particularly  concerned  to  try  and  exploit  the  rich  resources  of  Ukraine  before 
German  business  did.  In  order  to  accomplish  this,  a  good  relationship  with  Rakovsky's 
regime  in  Kharkov  was  necessary. 
In  December  1921,  press  reports  from  Kharkov32  announced  the  appointment  of 
the  first  Soviet  Ukrainian  diplomatic  representatives  to  Poland,  they  were  Olcko 
Shumskyi  as  chief  plenipotentiary  representative,  Isaiah  Ilurgin  as  legal  counsellor, 
Ivan  Sijok  as  first  secretary  and  Mikola  Popiv  as  second  secretary.  On  the  same  day  (12 
December),  a  telegram  from  Kharkov  to  the  Polish  Foreign  Ministry  informed  Warsaw 
about  the  attitude  of  the  new  Ukrainian  Soviet  delegation  towards  Pctliura: 
"Shumskyi's  attitude  to  Petliura  is  that  he  proposes  an  attack  against  him  and  violent 
repression  or  repatriation.  s33  Throughout  1921  and  1922  the  Soviet  Ukrainian 
diplomats  in  Poland  continued  to  demand  the  removal  of  Petliura  and  his  (in  their  view) 
illegal  regime  from  Polish  territory.  By  1922  the  Poles  had  become  aware  of  German 
companies  becoming  established  in  Soviet  Ukraine,  two  of  them  were  the  11offco 
Company  and  the  Agricola  AG,  which  caused  some  concern.  34  From  1921  it  became  a 
policy  of  the  Polish  government  to  develop  closer  economic  and  trade  links  with  Soviet 
Ukraine,  especially  in  view  of  the  developing  German  economic  penetration  of 
Ukraine.  It  was  obviously  imperative  for  the  Polish  government  that  something  should 
be  done  about  Petliura's  regime  in  Tarnow,  which  was  becoming  an  increasing 
impediment  to  better  relations  with  the  government  in  Kharkov. 
Petliura  moved  to  Warsaw  in  1922,  and  increasingly  his  ministers  and  supporters 
began  to  leave  Poland  and  move  to  the  major  cities  of  Western  Europe  -  London, 
Berlin,  Vienna  and  above  all,  Paris.  An  example  of  this  is  a  request  from  the  Ukrainian 
Central  Committee  in  the  Polish  Republic  to  the  Foreign  Ministry  on  3  December  1922, 
that  Mikola  Shulgin,  brother  of  the  UNR  ambassador  in  Paris,  who  is  described  as  a 
political  refugee  from  Ukraine,  currently  living  in  Warsaw, be  allowed  a  visa  to  travel 
to  France.  35  The  committee  appeals  to  the  ministry  on  political  and  moral  grounds 
because  Shulgin  has  been  offered  a  place  at  the  University  of  Aix  en  Provence,  and 
asks  that  the  Polish  Consulate  in  Berlin  be  sent  instructions  to  issue  him  with  further 
papers  for  his  journey.  Paris  was  the  centre  of  emigration  for  all  those  whose  cause  had 
32  AAN:  MSZ.  Gabinet  Minstra  6740A,  s.  155-156. 
33  Ibid. 
N  AAN:  MSZ.  Gabinet  Ministra  6703D,  s.  273. 
35  AAN:  MSZ.  Gabinet  Ministra  6703E,  s.  209. 
204 failed  during  the  Civil  War  and  the  Soviet-Polish  War  -  Russian  Whites,  Socialist 
Revolutionaries,  Anarchists,  and  Nationalists. 
With  the  retirement  of  Pilsudski  from  public  life  in  Poland  in  1923,  and  the 
continuing  domination  of  the  public  sphere  by  the  National  Democrats  and  the  other 
parties  hostile  to  the  Ukrainian  nationalist  cause,  Pctliura  decided  to  finally  leave 
Poland.  He  set  out  for  Western  Europe,  spending  a  short  time  in  Switzerland  and  finally 
settling  in  Paris.  France  held  the  key  to  the  solution  of  the  Ukrainian  problem,  he 
believed.  If  France  and  the  Entente  powers  could  be  convinced  of  the  justice  of  the 
Ukrainian  cause  then  Poland  would  act.  He  constantly  held  to  the  belief  that  an  alliance 
with  Poland  was  vital,  although  Poland  did  not  share  that  view  at  that  point.  He  rejected 
the  overtures  of  Skoropadskyi  and  the  pro-German  Ukrainians  that  an  alliance  with 
Germany  was  the  only  possible  solution  for  Ukrainian  nationalists.  He  also  rejected  the 
views  of  Petrushevych  and  the  Galicians  that  some  sort  of  accommodation  with 
Rakovsky  and  Soviet  Ukraine  was  necessary.  The  Bolsheviks  remained  the  major 
enemy  in  his  eyes. 
In  Paris,  Petliura  and  the  remaining  UNR  officials  worked  tirelessly  for  the 
achievement  of  Ukrainian  independence.  Two  major  obstacles  stood  in  the  way  of 
Petliura's  support  for  the  Polish  alliance.  One  was  the  large  number  of  Ukrainian  troops 
still  interned  in  Poland,  and  these  troops  were  not  finally  released  until  1924.  The  other 
was  the  continuing  unrest  and  anti-Polish  terrorism  in  East  Galicia  and  the  resulting 
repression  by  the  Polish  state.  These  two  factors  in  the  Polish-Ukrainian  relationship 
alienated  many  Ukrainian  nationalists  from  Petliura.  Vynnychenko,  Pctushevych  and 
Skoropadskyi  continued  to  label  Petliura  and  his  entourage  in  Paris  as  `politically  blind' 
and  to  accuse  them  of  having  prostituted  themselves  to  Poland.  All  of  this  changed 
dramatically  when  in  1926  Petliura  was  assassinated  in  Paris  by  an  aggrieved  Jew 
called  Schwarzbard.  Schwarzbard  claimed  in  his  defence  that  Petliura  was  a  war 
criminal  and  had  been  responsible  for  the  major  pogroms  in  Ukraine  in  1919  and  1920. 
It  has  never  been  proven  whether  Schwarzbard  was  acting  independently,  or whether  he 
was  the  first  in  a  long  line  of  assassins  sent  by  the  Cheka,  and  later  the  NKVD,  to 
dispose  of  those  considered  enemies  of  the  Soviet  government. 
The  death  of  Petliura  effectively  spelled  the  end  of  the  UNR  government-in-exile 
and  the  pro-Polish  orientation  of  Ukrainian  nationalism.  Even  the  return  of  Pilsudski  in 
1926  as  Polish  Head  of  State  did  not  alter  the  situation.  The  era  of  Polish-Ukrainian  co- 
205 operation  was  over.  Increasingly  throughout  the  late  1920's  most  Ukrainian  nationalists 
would  look  towards  Germany  as  their  source  of  support,  and  the  ideology  of  Ukrainian 
nationalism  would  move  away  from  the  social  democracy  of  the  UNR  towards  the  new 
hope  of  fascism. 
206 CHAPTER  12 
UKRAINIAN  PRISONERS 
IN  THE  POLISH  INTERNMENT  CAMPS,  1920-1924 
The  ending  of  the  Polish-Soviet  War  in  late  1920  and  the  negotiations  at  Riga  left 
one  major  problem  unresolved,  that  of  the  Ukrainian  troops  interned  in  Poland.  These 
troops  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  were,  in  late  1920,  the  forces  of  an  ally  of 
the  Polish  Republic.  This  altered  when  the  preliminary  peace  agreement  did  not 
recognise  the  legitimacy  of  the  UNR  government,  and  was  finally  scaled  by  the  treaty 
signed  at  Riga  in  March  1921.  These  troops  were  not  alone;  also  interned  were  the 
Russian  anti-Soviet  forces  of  Boris  Savinkov,  led  by  General  Bulak-Balakhovich; 
Cossack  forces  led  by  General  Yakovlev,  and  Belorussian  troops.  These  prisoners 
numbered  about  40,000  in  total  in  October  1920.  The  Ukrainians  were  by  far  the  largest 
group  numbering  about  30,000.1  What  was  to  be  done  with  these  prisoners  and  how  did 
the  Soviet  government  regard  them? 
For  the  Soviet  delegation  at  Riga,  the  role  of  the  large  number  of  Ukrainian  and 
other  anti-Soviet  internees  in  Poland  was  very  important.  The  possibility  that  these 
forces  might  be  mobilised  again  by  the  Poles,  or  possibly  be  allowed  to  act 
independently,  was  a  major  concern.  This  was  the  reason  for  Article  II  of  the 
preliminary  peace  agreement,  which  expressly  committed  each  party  not  to  support 
military  actions  by  either  side  against  the  other.  The  High  Command  of  the  Polish 
Army  offered  these  prisoners  a  choice  in  October  1920.  They  could  either  continue 
their  military  struggle  against  Soviet  Russia  without  Polish  support,  or  they  could  be 
interned  in  Poland.  General  Bulak-Balakhovich  decided  to  move  towards  Mozyrz  and 
then  on  to  Belorussia,  where  he  hoped  to  start  an  anti-Bolshevik  uprising.  The 
Ukrainians  and  the  Cossacks  decided  to  attack  Braslav  and  then  the  Cossacks  wanted  to 
join  up  with  Wrangel  in  Crimea.  2  The  Polish  Sejm  insisted  that  2  November  1920,  be 
the  deadline  for  all  non-Polish  units  to  leave  Polish  territory.  If  they  returned  to  Poland 
they  would  be  disarmed  and  interned.  There  followed  a  short  and  disastrous  military 
campaign.  The  result  was  that  on  November  21  1920,  the  returning  Ukrainian,  Cossack 
and  Russian  troops  were  interned.  Many  of  the  Ukrainians  were  to  remain  in  Polish 
camps  until  1924. 
Zbigniew  Karpus,  Wschodni  Sojusznicy  Polski  w  Wojne  1920  Roku.  (Torus':  Michael  Copernicus  University,  1999),  p.  216. 
2  Ibid. 
207 Several  major  questions  arose  in  late  1920.  What  was  the  relationship  between  the 
prisoners  and  the  UNR  government-in-exile  in  Tarnow?  How  did  the  Polish  authorities 
regard  the  interned  Ukrainians?  Finally,  what  were  conditions  like  for  Ukrainian 
prisoners  in  Poland  after  1920? 
The  General  Commander  of  the  Ukrainian  forces,  General  Omelanovich- 
Pavlenko,  began  to  explore  the  possibility  of  the  eventual  evacuation  of  his  army  to 
France,  and  with  this  in  view  approached  General  Niessel  (the  French  military 
representative)  in  Warsaw.  The  idea  was  never  realised  however,  because  the  French 
government  was  not  interested  in  the  economic  and  political  problems  involved  in 
assisting  the  internees  in  Poland,  and  it  refused  to  help.  3 
At  the  beginning  of  December  1920  the  Ministry  of  War  issued  instructions  on 
the  treatment  of  the  internees  from  Poland's  former  allies.  The  instructions  were 
covered  in  23  paragraphs.  4  The  interpretation  of  paragraph  5  was  that  the  administration 
of  the  camps  in  Poland  would  be  the  responsibility  of  the  nationalities  held  in  the 
camps.  The  Ukrainian  and  White  Russian  officers  and  officials  would  be  strictly 
segregated  from  the  Red  Army  prisoners.  In  the  area  of  every  camp,  according  to 
Paragraph  7,  there  would  be  internal  autonomy  organised  along  military  lines,  i.  e. 
according  to  platoons,  companies,  battalions  and  regiments.  For  the  internal  discipline 
and  maintenance  of  order  in  each  camp,  the  three  highest  ranks  of  officers  would  act  as 
the  intermediaries  with  the  Polish  authorities.  5  Paragraph  13  of  the  instructions  stated 
that  in  order  to  assist  with  the  maintenance  of  order  in  the  camps,  each  internal  camp 
administration  would  be  expected  to  organise  athletic  and  sporting  events,  elementary 
education,  other  courses  of  instruction,  libraries,  drama  groups,  carpentry  shops, 
tailoring  etc.  Apart  from  keeping  the  internees  occupied,  these  courses  were  obviously 
intended  to  provide  some  form  of  training  for  the  time  when  the  prisoners  would 
eventually  be  liberated.  Movement  within  the  camps  was  fairly  uncontrolled  and 
officers  were  allowed  to  travel  outside  the  camps  within  a  7-kilometre  radius,  with  the 
permission  of  the  Polish  camp  commander.  Short  holidays  or  periods  of  leave  beyond 
the  area  of  the  camps  were  at  the  discretion  of  the  District  General  Headquarters 
(Dowodztwo  Okrggu  Genaralnego).  6  All  of  this  suggests  that  as  former  allies  the 
Zbigniew  Karpus,  Jency  I  internowany  rosyjscy  i  ukrainscy  na  terenie  Polski  w  latach  1918-1924.  (Toru6.  Michael  Copernicus 
Press,  1997),  p.  136. 
"  AAN:  Praesidium  Rada  Ministrow,  17021/1921.  The  instructions  were  issued  on  December  2.1920  and  applied  to  both  Ukrainian 
and  anti-Soviet  Russian  internees. 
'AAN:  MSW.  MS  Wojsk,  Vol  17,  instructions  of  2 
XII  1920,  p.  1. 
"  Karpus,  Jency  l  internowani  rosyjscy  t  ukraincy  na  terente  Polski  w  Talach  1918-1924,  p.  137 
208 Ukrainians  were  allowed  some  leeway  by  the  Polish  military  authorities,  both  in  terms 
of  camp  administration  and  freedom  of  movement  within  Poland.  This  may  have  been 
due  to  Pilsudski's  influence  within  the  Polish  military  and  his  sense  of  guilt  at  having 
abandoned  the  Ukrainian  nationalist  cause.  On  the  other  hand,  it  may  simply  have  been 
that  in  the  eyes  of  the  Polish  authorities,  the  Ukrainians  did  not  constitute  a  military  or 
political  threat  -  unlike  the  Bolshevik  prisoners. 
Polish  sources  state  that  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  estimate  exactly  how  many 
Ukrainian  and  other  anti-Soviet  prisoners  were  held  in  Poland  from  1920  to  1924. 
Estimates  were  based  on  information  given  by  Polish  military  units  guarding  the 
frontier.  These  sources  claimed  that  in  December  1920,  approximately  20,000 
Ukrainian  troops  crossed  the  frontier  into  Poland  7  It  was  difficult  for  Polish  officers  to 
differentiate  between  Ukrainian  UNR  troops,  who  had  been  fighting  with  the  Poles,  and 
deserters  from  the  Soviet  army,  as  well  as  Ukrainians  returning  to  East  Galicia. 
However,  in  February  1921  the  Polish  authorities  were  able  to  estimate  that  there 
were  in  total  30,000  internees  in  Poland,  consisting  of  7,000  officers  and  23,000  other 
ranks.  Of  these  approximately  15,500  were  Ukrainians,  that  is  more  than  50%  of  the 
total.  The  others  were  Belorussians,  Cossacks,  and  anti-Soviet  Russian  troops.  The 
Polish  frontier  troops  found  it  hard  to  estimate  how  many  Ukrainian  civilians  linked  to 
the  UNR  army and  government  were  in  Polish  territory.  8 
With  the  aim  of  breaking  up  some  of  the  larger  camps  and  lessening  the  risk  of 
epidemics  such  as  typhus,  among  the  prisoners  (many  of  the  Ukrainian  troops  were 
already  suffering  from  the  disease  at  the  end  of  the  war)  the  Polish  authorities  decided 
to  open  new  camps  in  early  1921,  and  to  transport  the  non-Bolshevik  prisoners  there. 
These  new  camps  were  based  in  Sosnow,  Radom,  Piotrkow,  Czestochowa,  Zdunski 
Wol,  Plock,  Ostrowie  Lomzyriski,  Torun,  Luköw  and  Rolan.  Each  of  these  camps  held 
approximately  1,000-3,000  internees.  9  The  Ukrainian  prisoners  were  concentrated  in 
Wadowice,  Laricut,  Kalisz,  Aleksandröw,  and  Czestochowa  (where  most  of  the 
Ukrainian  civilians  were  interned). 
To  follow  the  history  of  the  interned  Ukrainians  in  the  various  camps  there 
follows  a  table  outlining  the  numbers  of  prisoners  in  each  camp  from  December  22 
1920  to  October  12  1921.10 
7  AAN:  Protokoll  Rada  Ministrow,  3  December  1920,  Card  414. 
1  Karpus,  Jericy  I  Internowani  rosyJscy  tl  ukraincy  na  terenie  Polski  w  latach  1918-1924,  p.  138. 
Ibid,  p.  138. 
1°  ibid,  p.  140. 
209 Strzalkow  (The  first  prisoners  were  brought  there  in  May  1921) 
30/5/1921  23/8/1921  6/9/1921  13/9/1921  12/10/1921 
845  2051  2454  2458  2678 
Wadowice  (the  camp  was  closed  in  October  1921) 
22/12/1920  18/1/1921  4/2/1921  5/3/1921  30/5/1921 
3144  2159  2112  2777  3856 
23/8/1921  13/9/1921  6/10/1921  12/10/1921 
2751  1208  1005  37 
Laficut  (the  camp  was  closed  in  August  1921) 
22/12/1920  22/l/1921  4/2/1921  5/3/1921 
1789  1982  2133  2243 
30/5/1921 
2614 
Kalisz 
22/12/1920  13/1/1921  18/1/1921  4/2/1921 
1854  2052  3289  3922 
5/3/1921  30/5/1921  6/9/1921  12/10/1921 
3889  4395  3518  3296 
Czgstochowa  (the  camp  where  Ukrainian  civilians  were  held).  No  figures  until 
12/10/1921  when  there  are  240  internees  listed. 
In  all  of  these  camps  only  Ukrainian  prisoners  were  held,  the  exception  was 
Strzalkow  where  some  Belorussian  prisoners  were  present.  " 
So  the  total  number  of  troops  from  the  army  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic 
interned  in  Poland,  from  February  1921  to  October  1921  were  as  below:  12 
4/2/1921  30/5/1921  23/8/1921  19/9/1921  12/10/1921 
15258  15005  11194  8928  7874 
Ibid. 
ý:  Ibid,  p.  142. 
210 If  a  comparison  is  made  with  the  number  of  anti-Soviet  Russian  and  Cossack 
prisoners  held,  the  Ukrainians  outnumber  both  the  others.  The  number  of  Russian  anti- 
Soviet  prisoners  held  in  Poland  in  February  1921  and  October  1921  was  14,450  and 
5,028  respectively.  13 
The  unexpected  arrival  in  Poland  of  large  numbers  of  prisoners  (not  excluding 
Red  Army  prisoners)  constituted  a  significant  problem  for  the  Polish  authorities.  The 
infrastructure  to  accommodate  such  numbers  did  not  exist  and  in  late  1920  the  Polish 
military  authorities  had  to  improvise  with  what  was  available.  An  example  of  this  was 
the  camp  at  Aleksandrbw  Kujawski  where,  surrounding  the  core  of  a  derelict  barracks, 
an  internment  camp  was  quickly  erected.  The  Polish  authorities  were  taken  by  surprise 
and  this  led  to  Ukrainian  prisoners  being  held  at  the  local  station  in  wagons  for  several 
days,  while  the  work  was  being  carried  out.  The  camp  was  finally  completed  with  the 
assistance  of  the  Ukrainians.  14  This  and  other  examples  give  some  idea  of  the  ad  hoc 
nature  of  the  Polish  preparations  to  construct  the  internment  camps.  Also,  as  many 
Polish  historians  have  pointed  out,  Poland  -  after  suffering  almost  seven  years  of  war 
and  occupation  -  was  in  no  state  either  economically  or  administratively  to  support 
large  numbers  of  internees.  Such  an  eventuality  had  not  been  included  in  Pilsudski's 
plans  for  the  Soviet-Polish  War.  For  both  the  government  in  Warsaw  and  the  Soviet 
government  in  Kharkov,  the  presence  of  thousands  of  Ukrainian  prisoners  on  Polish 
territory  was  not  welcome. 
An  interesting  comparison  here  is  with  the  situation  of  Ukrainian  prisoners  in 
Czechoslovakia.  After  the  war  against  the  Poles  in  East  Galicia  in  1919,  several 
thousand  Ukrainian  nationalist  troops  had  crossed  the  Czech  frontier  and  been  interned. 
Although  the  numbers  were  far  less  than  in  Poland,  there  were  certain  similarities  in 
their  situation.  The  Czech  government  had  been  well  disposed  towards  the  East 
Galicians  and  had  a  frosty  relationship  with  Poland;  consequently  the  internees  in 
Czechoslovakia  were  not  regarded  as  enemies  but  as  neutrals.  This  can  be  compared 
with  the  position  of  the  Ukrainian  internees  in  Poland,  who  also  were  not  regarded  as 
enemy  prisoners  (unlike  the  Bolshevik  prisoners)  but  as  former  allies.  The  major  camp 
for  interned  Ukrainians  in  Czechoslovakia  was  Josefov.  In  1923  the  International 
Committee  of  the  Red  Cross  received  a  request  from  Father  Bonne,  a  member  of  the 
Ukrainian  Emigrant  Committee  in  Prague,  to  investigate  the  situation  of  Ukrainian 
prisoners  in  Czechoslovakia.  As  a  result  representatives  of  the  International  Committee 
17  Ibid.  p.  142.  14  Ibid. 
211 of  the  Red  Cross  visited  Josefov.  They  reported  that  there  were  1,200  prisoners  in  the 
camp  and  that  most  had  been  there  since  1919  or  1920.  They  observed  that  theatres, 
libraries  and  other  facilities  were  provided  and  that  there  was  electricity  in  the  camp. 
They  also  visited  courses  provided  for  the  internees  by  Ukrainian  professors.  The  Red 
Cross  representatives  estimated  that  there  were  circa  3,700  Ukrainian  internees  in 
Czechoslovakia.  They  were  told  by  the  Czech  Foreign  Ministry  that  it  assisted  many 
internees  to  return  to  East  Galicia,  when  it  could.  According  to  the  Red  Cross 
representatives,  the  sanitation  system  in  the  camp  was  satisfactory  and  the  conditions 
were  reasonable.  15 
Victor  Gloor,  the  leader  of  the  Red  Cross  delegation,  who  visited  Josefov  in 
August  1925,  learned  that  the  Czech  government  was  intent  on  closing  the  camp  in 
October  of  that  year.  To  facilitate  the  exodus  of  Ukrainian  internees  from 
Czechoslovakia,  the  government  was  offering  each  one  a  sum  of  50  Swiss  Francs  to 
return  to  Poland.  Gloor  was  told  that  any  Ukrainians  returning  to  Poland  from 
Czechoslovakia  without  documentation  would  be  arrested  and  imprisoned  for  5  or  6 
days  and  then  allowed  to  return  to  their  villages  in  East  Galicia.  16  Gloor  asked  the 
International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross  to  place  pressure  on  Poland  to  accept 
Ukrainian  internees  from  Czechoslovakia,  so  that  the  camps  there  could  be  closed.  The 
Czech  authorities  in  Josefov  told  him  that  of  the  prisoners  there,  124  wished  to  return  to 
Poland,  132  to  Soviet  Ukraine,  29  to  remain  in  Czechoslovakia  and  only  4  wished  to  go 
to  the  USA.  17  As  to  the  fate  of  the  other  Ukrainians  who  had  been  in  the  camp  there  is 
no  information,  but  obviously  by  August  1925  most  had  already  left  Czechoslovakia. 
Clearly  many  Ukrainian  prisoners  in  Czech  camps  wished  to  return  to  Soviet  Ukraine 
but  the  situation  in  Poland  was  very  different,  where  most  Ukrainian  internees  had  been 
involved  in  fighting  against  Soviet  Ukraine. 
Another  aspect  to  this  contrast  with  the  situation  in  Czechoslovakia  is  referred  to 
by  Palij,  when  he  draws  attention  to  the  role  of  the  Ukrainian  Free  University  in  Prague. 
The  news  of  the  establishment  of  this  and  of  the  general  educational  opportunities 
available  to  Ukrainians  had  a  large  impact  in  the  Polish  internment  camps.  Many 
younger  internees  escaped  to  Czechoslovakia  and  many  entered  schools.  Palij  claims 
that  this  resulted  in  a  diminution  of  overcrowding  in  the  camps  and  life  became  better 
16  British  Red  Cross  Archive,  London  '(hereafter  BRCA)':  International  Review  of  the  Red  Cross.  Vol  Si.  (192I),  pp.  993-995. 
16IRCA:  International  Review  of  the  Red  Cross.  Vol  56.  (1925).  pp.  808-813. 
ýý  Ibid. 
212 for  those  remaining.  18  This  would  explain  some  of  the  large  fall  in  numbers  of  the 
internees. 
There  were  two  major  occasions  when  Red  Cross  delegations  were  called  upon  to 
intervene  in  Poland,  and  both  arose  out  of  unusual  circumstances.  The  first  was  in 
November  1920,  just  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Soviet-Polish  War.  This  delegation  was 
led  by  Lucien  Brunel  and  was  a  result  of  concerns  in  Geneva  about  the  typhus 
epidemic,  which  was  raging  throughout  Poland  and  Ukraine.  The  Polish  Red  Cross  sent 
a  request  to  the  International  Committee  for  assistance  and  Brunel  was  dispatched  to 
Poland.  Brunel  was  the  Secretary  of  the  Missions  Service  of  the  International 
Committee.  19  Brunel  reported  that  the  internment  camps  in  Poland  held  various 
categories  of  prisoners  -  Bolsheviks,  Ukrainians,  Russian  refugees,  and  Jews.  In  the 
course  of  his  investigation  of  the  typhus  epidemic  he  visited  several  camps  and 
described  conditions  there: 
La  nourriture,  qui  est  celle  des  soldats  polonais,  serait  suffisant  si  la  quantito 
fournie  par  la  Gouvernement  polonais  etait  distribuee  regulierement.  Lc 
sucre,  la  graisse  et  la  farine  fout  defaut  (...  )  Le  nombre  des  malade  s'accroit 
tous  les  jours,  et  l'hopital  qui  ne  contient  que  1,300  places  ne  suffit  pas  6 
recevoir  tous  les  malades  atteints  de  la  dysenterie  et  du  typhus.  Un  grande 
nombre  d'entre  eux  sont  poitrinaires  et  las  cas  de  deces  augmentent  avec  la 
mauvaise  saison.  Beaucoup  de  ces  malheureux  ne  passeront  pas  l'hiver  ou 
resteront  invalids.  20 
Brunel  also  met  with  the  UNR  diplomat  Count  Tishkewicz,  who  appealed  to  him 
to  help  Ukrainian  refugee  children.  21  Although  Brunel  did  not  report  specifically  on  the 
situation  for  Ukrainian  internees  in  Poland  but  on  internees  in  general,  his  report  draws 
a  stark  picture  of  illness  and  deprivation  in  the  camps.  It  is  undoubtedly  true  that,  in  the 
chaos  resulting  from  war  and  political  upheaval  in  Eastern  Europe,  Poland  was  overrun 
with  refugees  and  was  not  in  a  position  economically  to  provide  the  necessary 
assistance.  Also,  the  outbreaks  of  typhus  and  dysentery  were  on  a  massive  scale  and 
difficult  for  the  Polish  authorities  to  deal  with.  22 
Palij,  TheUkrainian-Polish  Defensive  Alliance.  p.  175. 
13RCA:  International  Review  of  the  Red  Cross.  Vol  51(1920).  pp.  431.721. 
20  Ibid,  p.  1308  "The  food,  which  is  provided  by  the  Polish  soldiers,  would  be  enough  if  the  Polidh  government  distributed  it 
regularly.  Sugar,  lard  and  flour  were  in  short  supply  ... 
The  number  of  the  ill  is  increasing  every  day  and  the  1,300  hospital  places 
are  not  enough  to  deal  with  all  the  sick  resulting  from  typhus  and  dysentery.  Most  of  them  have  chest  infections  and  the  number  of 
deaths  is  increasing  because  of  the  season.  Many  of  these  wretched  people  will  not  make  it  through  the  winter  or  will  become 
invalids.  " 
21  Ibid,  p.  1309. 
22  Ibid,  pp.  431-721. 
213 In  1922  the  section  of  the  Polish  Red  Cross  dealing  with  prisoners  of  war  ceased 
to  function,  and  its  activities  were  transferred  to  a  repatriation  section  based  in 
Moscow.  The  information  section  continued  collecting  data  on  military  and  civilian 
prisoners  in  Poland  but  the  reduction  in  personnel  constrained  the  activities  of  the 
Polish  Red  Cross  in  this  section.  23  Most  of  the  Polish  Red  Cross's  work  on  prisoners 
seemed  to  be  concerned  with  Polish  prisoners  of  war  in  Russia.  This,  of  course,  left  the 
needs  of  the  Ukrainian  internees  in  Poland  unmet.  The  Ukrainian  Red  Cross  does  not 
seem  to  have  been  concerned  about  their  welfare  and  concentrated  mainly  on  the 
famine  in  Soviet  Ukraine.  Thus  they  fell  between  various  stools  and  were  dependant  on 
various  Ukrainian  emigre  organisations  to  raise  their  concerns.  The  chief  one  was  of 
course  the  diplomatic  corps  of  the  UNR  government  in  Poland,  and  later  in  France. 
The  second  occasion  on  which  the  International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross 
intervened  in  Poland  was  in  the  summer  of  1924.  This  was  a  more  serious  situation  and 
resulted  from  an  article,  which  had  appeared  in  the  French  newspaper  Vere  Nouvelle  in 
June  1924,  signed  by  some  French  politicians  and  accusing  the  Poles  of  ill-treating 
political  detainees,  including  Ukrainians.  The  Polish  Red  Cross  responded  by 
contacting  the  International  Committee  and  suggesting  that  a  delegation  came  to  visit 
prisons  in  Poland.  The  International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross  delegation  visited  20 
prisons  in  Poland,  containing  10,000  political  detainees.  24  By  far  the  largest  group  of 
political  prisoners  were  Ukrainians  but  these  were  probably  those  who  had  been  active 
in  anti-Polish  agitation  in  East  Galicia.  The  delegation  did  not  visit  the  internment 
camps,  and  restricted  its  visits  to  the  prisons.  This  was  likely  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
internees  were  classified  as  POW's  or  refugees  rather  than  as  political  prisoners.  Thus 
one  can  see  that  the  Red  Cross  only  responded  to  what  was  regarded  as  an  international 
health  crisis  in  1920,  and  to  a  specific  request  from  the  Polish  Red  Cross  in  1924 
concerning  political  prisoners.  Other  than  this  the  Red  Cross  did  not  unduly  concern 
itself  about  the  thousands  of  Ukrainians  held  in  Polish  camps  for  more  than  four  years. 
While  the  outside  world  was  oblivious  or  unconcerned  about  their  fate,  the 
Ukrainian  internees  continued  to  organise  their  life  in  the  camps.  In  both  the  camps  at 
Kalisz  and  Strzalköw  cultural  departments  were  organised,  and  in  Strzalkdw  there  were 
even  activities  supervised  by  the  Ukrainian  University  in  Lancut.  There  were  numerous 
publications  and  in  the  camp  at  Aleksandrow  Kujawski  a  newspaper  Nowve  Zyttia  was 
3313RCA:  International  Review  of  the  Red  Cross.  Vol  54  (1923).  p.  1227. 
"Andre  Durand,  History  of  the  International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross.  From  Sarajevo  to  Hiroshima  (Geneva,  1984),  p.  132. 
214 published.  25  Many  cultural  and  other  activities  in  the  camps  were  co-ordinated  by  the 
Orthodox  clergy.  26 
The  presence  of  so  many  anti-Soviet  internees  in  Poland  was  an  embarrassment 
for  the  Bolshevik  regime,  and  shortly  after  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Riga  the  first 
offer  of  amnesty  was  made.  On  20  March  1922  a  Soviet  delegation  entitled  `The 
Russian  Delegation  for  Repatriation'  arrived  in  Strzalköw  offering  an  amnesty  for  those 
who  would  return  to  Soviet  Russia  or  Soviet  Ukraine.  According  to  the  liaison  officers 
from  the  Polish  Foreign  Ministry,  who  were  present,  the  Ukrainians  responded  by 
singing  "Ukraine  will  never  die!  "  and  by  shouting,  "Long  live  independent  Ukraine  and 
Ataman  Petliura!  "  The  Soviet  delegation  then  left.  27  As  a  result  of  the  amnesty  offer 
721  men  from  the  Russian  forces  of  General  Balakhovich  agreed  to  return  to  Soviet 
Russia  but  only  30  Ukrainians,  and  on  March  28  they  were  evacuated  to  Soviet  Russia. 
This  response  to  the  Soviet  amnesty  was  in  marked  contrast  to  the  response  of  the 
Ukrainian  prisoners  in  Czechoslovakia,  where  almost  50%  wanted  to  return  to  Soviet 
Ukraine. 
In  the  following  weeks  the  `Russian  Delegation  for  Repatriation'  visited  other 
internment  camps,  one  was  Tuchol  where  many  anti-Soviet  Russian  and  Cossack  troops 
were  held.  In  Tuchol,  458  men  agreed  to  return  to  Soviet  Russia.  28  By  May  1922  only 
863  internees  in  Poland  agreed  to  return  to  Soviet  territory,  of  these  almost  none  were 
Ukrainians. 
A  decree  passed  by  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  the  Polish  Republic  on  29 
September  1921,  declared  that  the  camps  for  internees  would  come  under  the  control  of 
the  Foreign  Ministry,  which  would  also  co-ordinate  the  Polish  delegation  on  the 
Multilateral  Commission  for  Repatriation,  which  had  its  seat  in  Warsaw.  The  decree 
also  stated  that  the  Foreign  Ministry  and  the  Interior  Ministry  were  to  enter  into 
negotiations  for  the  eventual  transfer  of  competence  for  the  camps  to  the  Interior 
Ministry.  The  deadline  laid  down  for  the  transfer  was  May  1  1922.  After  that  date  all 
affairs  pertaining  to  internees  within  Poland  would  come  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Interior  Ministry.  29 
Karpus  comments  on  the  situation  in  the  internment  camps  in  the  summer  and 
autumn  of  1922: 
15  Karpus,  Jei  cy  i  internowani  rosyjscy  i  ukraincy  na  terenie  Polski  w  latach  1918-1924,  p.  156. 
16  Ibid. 
27  Ibid,  p.  157.  The  Polish  Foreign  Ministry  liaison  officers  made  their  report  on  March  28  1922  and  the  reports  are  in  the  Central 
Army  Archive  in  Warsaw.  Camp  No  I  for  prisoners  and  internees  in  Strzalk6w.  Vol  1. 
21  Ibid. 
29  AAN:  Praesidium  Rada  Ministrow,  Vol  61-86/1922. 
215 The  living  conditions  in  the  camps  were  very  difficult.  The  transfer  of 
responsibility  for  the  camps  to  the  Interior  Ministry  (MSW)  did  not  improve 
the  situation  for  the  internees.  There  appeared  to  be  difficulties  in  supplying 
food  and  there  was  also  a  shortage  of  fuel,  and  the  employment 
opportunities  for  the  majority  of  internees  were  still  very  limited.  Serious 
reservations  led  them  to  address  the  camp  administration,  which  more  than 
once  committed  abuses.  The  assumption  of  responsibility  for  the  camps  by 
the  Interior  Ministry  led  to  an  attitude  ending  the  rule  of  the  previous 
regime,  and  for  that  reason  the  internees  were  referred  to  numerous 
committees,  which  began  to  examine  the  situation  in  each  camp.  The 
inspection  of  the  camp  at  Tuchol  in  mid-May  and  June  1922  confirmed 
accusations  about  maladministration  of  the  camp  because,  for  example, 
wood  for  fuel  had  been  brought  to  Tuchol  all  the  way  from  the  county  of 
Wolyn  (Sam),  while  at  the  same  time  close  to  the  camp  there  were  7  state 
forests.  30 
Although  no  Ukrainians  were  held  in  Tuchol  but  anti-Soviet  Russians,  the  situation  at 
Tuchol  was  probably  not  unrepresentative  of  the  administration  of  the  camps.  Karpus 
does  not  suggest  that  inmates  were  ill  treated  but  rather  that  there  was  corruption  and 
waste,  which  led  to  life  being  more  difficult  in  the  camps  than  it  need  have  been.  It 
would  appear  that  reforms  in  camp  administration  put  in  place  by  the  Interior  Ministry 
were  slow  to  take  effect  and  only  as  a  result  of  regular  inspections  did  the  situation 
improve. 
There  were  also  indications  that  Ukrainians  in  exile  in  Czechoslovakia  were 
taking  an  active  interest  in  the  situation  of  the  internees,  and  this  caused  some  concern 
to  the  Poles.  One  of  these  was  General  Shapoval  and  a  report  on  his  activities  was  sent 
from  Tarnow,  the  seat  of  the  Ukrainian  government-in-exile  on  24  October  1922  to 
Warsaw.  Shapoval  had  had  talks  with  the  Czech  government  in  Prague  about  the 
situation  of  the  Ukrainian  internees  in  Poland.  In  a  conversation  with  the  Director  of  the 
Political  Department,  he  had  underlined  the  fact  that:  "It  is  necessary  soon  at  all  cost  to 
close  the  camps  for  internees.  The  camps  are  a  reason  for  large-scale  demoralisation 
both  among  the  officers  and  men.  The  time  is  due  for  this  demoralisation  to  be  ended. 
The  Supreme  Ataman  (Petliura)  should  abandon  the  Poles.  The  government  (the  UNR 
'0  Karpus,  Jency  t  internowani  rosy/scy  t  ukrainscy  na  terenie  Polski  w  Tatach  1918-1924,  p.  158. 
216 government)  should  demand  this  as  a  minimum  and  should  move  abroad.  "31  Shapoval 
was  of  the  opinion  that  Ukrainian  emigrants  in  Poland  could  be  as  helpful  to  Poland  as 
they  had  been  useful  in  Czechoslovakia.  32  It  is  clear  from  this  report  that  the  Polish 
authorities  were  concerned  about  any  possible  Czech  involvement  with  the  fate  of  the 
internees  or  with  the  UNR  authorities  in  Tarnow.  Indeed  the  following  report  from 
Tarnow  (No  86)  was  entitled  `New  Czech  Intrigues  in  Tarnow'  and  is  dated  26  October 
1922.33  This  report  was  concerned  mainly  with  political  developments  within  the 
structures  of  the  UNR  regime  but  continued  also  to  deal  with  the  visit  of  General 
Shapoval.  The  detail  is  quite  limited  and  refers  only  to  Shapoval's  talks  with  the  UNR 
Prime  Minister,  Leviskyi  on  the  `rescue  of  the  camps'.  34  Petliura's  government  found 
itself  in  a  delicate  position,  for  it  could  hardly  pressurise  the  Poles  too  much  on  the 
issue  of  the  internees,  when  its  own  standing  in  Poland  was  so  precarious.  There  is  no 
evidence  that  Shapoval's  efforts  came  to  anything  and  the  Poles  were  intensely 
suspicious  of  any  involvement  by  the  Czechs  in  Ukrainian  affairs. 
In  the  interim  all  was  not  calm  in  the  camps  themselves.  While  Russian  and 
Cossack  internees  continued  avail  of  themselves  of  amnesties  and  return  to  Soviet 
Russia,  most  Ukrainians  did  not.  By  June  1922  2000  internees  had  taken  advantage  of 
the  amnesty  and  left  Poland.  35  The  Ukrainians  however,  were  demanding  the  right  to 
work  in  Poland  or  to  be  allowed  to  emigrate  to  Western  Europe,  particularly  France.  36 
Without  cooperation  from  France  this  was  impossible  but  there  were  clear  signs  of 
unrest.  With  the  return  of  more  Russian  internees  to  Soviet  Russia  the  Poles  began  to 
close  camps,  and  to  transfer  the  remaining  Russian  internees  to  camps,  which  had 
previously  been  only  for  Ukrainians.  An  example  of  this  was  Tuchol,  where  in  late 
1922  internees  were  transferred  to  Strzalk6w.  37  The  pace  of  return  to  Soviet  Russia  by 
the  non-Ukrainians  increased  rapidly  and  in  January  1923  another  1000  internees  left. 
The  following  table  illustrates  the  situation  from  July  1922  until  the  final  liquidation  of 
all  internment  camps  in  August  1924.  It  is  divided  into  two  sections  -  Ukrainians  held 
mainly  in  Strzalkbw;  and  those  working  outside  the  camps,  who  were  both  Russians 
and  Ukrainians  (no  figures  for  Ukrainians  alone  exist). 
Taras  Hunczak,  Ukraine  and  Poland  in  documents.  1918-1922.  Part  I!.  (New  York,  1983),  p.  451.  Report  No.  86.  Transcript 
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217 Strzalkow 
1  July  1922  30  October  1922  14  June  1923 
2,364  608  700 
19  September  1923  30  November  1923  7  August  1924 
350  and  1157  ex 
internees 
193and700ex 
internees 
180 
The  ex-internees  were  those  who  were  free  to  leave  the  camps  but  because  of  high 
unemployment  in  Poland  continued  to  live  in  the  camps.  38 
Working  outside  the  camps. 
January  1923  19  September  1923 
2,300  7,854 
Those  working  outside  the  camps  were  still  internees  but  were  allowed  to  take  up 
employment  in  the  surrounding  area.  39 
By  late  1922  Strzalkbw  was  the  major  camp  for  Ukrainian  internees.  It  can  be 
seen  immediately  that  there  was  a  rapid  decline  in  the  number  of  Ukrainians  from  late 
1922  but  whether  this  was  due  to  being  offered  employment  outside  the  camps,  or  to 
being  ex  internees  is  not  clear.  The  economic  situation  in  Poland  in  the  carly  twenties 
was  dire  and  it  was  extremely  difficult  for  the  internees  to  eke  out  a  living.  An 
indication  of  this  was  the  colossal  rate  of  inflation  in  Poland;  resulting  in  an  internee 
receiving  an  allowance  of  16,500  Polish  marks  from  the  State  Treasury  in  June  1921 
and  in  June  1923  the  allowance  had  increased  to  526,500  marks  to  take  account  of 
inflation.  40  It  is  also  probable  that  the  drain  on  the  Polish  public  purse  of  maintaining 
large  numbers  of  internees  was  a  factor  in  the  decision  to  finally  liquidate  the  camps. 
Pressure  was  also  increasing  from  the  Ukrainian  emigres  in  Central  and  Western 
Europe  to  finally  resolve  the  issue  of  the  internees.  The  internees  themselves  produced 
propaganda  and  many  pamphlets  and  publications  emerged  from  the  camps  -  many  arc 
now  in  the  collection  of  the  Bibliotheque  Ukrainienne  Sehtort  Petlioura  in  Paris.  One 
example  was  a  journal  produced  in  the  camp  at  Strzalköw  entitled  Lagiernaja  Zizit, 
published  in  1923.41  Some  estimates  are  that  nearly  1000  publications  were  produced  in 
the  camps. 
38  Ibid,  p.  154. 
391bid,  p.  157. 
40  lb  id,  p.  160. 
41  Ibid. 
218 By  1923  the  Interior  Ministry  was  desperate  to  finally  solve  the  problem  of  the 
internment  camps.  Apart  from  liquidating  some  camps,  the  authorities  encouraged 
internees  to  register  as  Romanian,  Estonian,  or  Polish  citizens  and  thus  to  solve  the 
legal  and  bureaucratic  difficulty  of  displaced  persons.  The  ministry  allowed  internees 
leave  to  work  for  the  state  or  for  private  employers;  42  they  also  allowed  some  internees 
to  work  in  labour  battalions  assisting  the  Polish  army.  43  In  this  way  the  Polish 
government  gradually  solved  the  economic  and  fiscal  problems  surrounding  the 
internees.  These  were  only  interim  measures  however,  and  some  permanent  solution 
would  need  to  be  found. 
A  major  breakthrough  in  the  problem  of  the  internees  emerged  in  late  1922.  From 
the  end  of  the  Soviet-Polish  War,  many  of  the  interned  Ukrainians  had  hoped  to  be  able 
to  go  to  France  in  order  to  lead  a  normal  life,  and  in  some  way  contribute  to  the 
Ukrainian  emigre  cause  -  but  the  French  authorities  had  not  been  prepared  to  agree. 
Now,  finally,  the  French  Embassy  in  Warsaw  indicated  to  the  Russian  Committee  for 
the  Welfare  of  Emigrants  in  Poland  that  France  would  be  prepared  to  offer  asylum  to 
the  internees.  In  the  spring  of  1923  registration  of  those  wishing  to  travel  to  France 
began  in  the  internment  camps,  and  1,500  internees  were  registered.  44  Responsibility 
for  the  organisation  of  the  programme  was  given  to  the  Ministry  for  Employment  and 
Social  Welfare,  and  20%  of  the  places  on  the  programme  were  to  be  allocated  to  Polish 
unemployed  persons.  45  Following  an  agreement  between  the  Interior  Ministry  and  the 
Ministry  for  Employment  and  Social  Welfare,  50  internees  left  for  France  in  December 
1923.6  It  is  not  clear  from  the  Polish  records  how  many  of  these  internees  were 
Ukrainian  but,  as  most  came  from  the  camp  at  Strzalkbw,  it  is  likely  that  many  were. 
The  Polish  authorities  in  late  1923  were  determined  to  solve  the  issue  of  the 
internment  camps  and  decided  to  liquidate  the  camp  at  Strzalkdw.  Consequently  in 
November  1923,  all  those  internees,  who  were  already  working  outside  the  camp,  were 
offered  free  accommodation  in  the  camp's  quarters.  7  In  spring  1924  the  camp  at 
Strzalköw  was  liquidated  and  the  former  inmates  were  offered  the  choice  of  200,000 
Polish  marks  and  their  freedom,  or  transfer  to  the  camp  at  Kalisz.  48  Although  the  Polish 
'2  lbid,  p.  161. 
43  Ibid. 
44AAN:  Protokoli  Rada  Ministrow.  No  84,  issued  on  9.7.1923  concerning  Russian 
and  Ukrainian  military  internees  in  Poland.  Vol  68.  PAN. 
43  AAN:  Protokoli  Rada  Ministrow.  No  84,  issued  on  10.7.1923  concerning  talks  with  the 
Interior  Ministry  on  the  liquidation  of  camps. 
46Karpus,  Jency  I  internowani  rosyjscy  i  ukrainscy  na  terenie  Polski  w  latach  1918-1924,  p.  1  62. 
47  Ibid,  p.  162. 
411  Ibid,  p.  163. 
219 government  wanted  to  liquidate  all  internment  camps  in  Poland  by  the  end  of  1923,  a 
lack  of  finances  prevented  the  scheme  from  being  fully  implemented  until  the  following 
year. 
On  March  30  1924  the  interior  Ministry  issued  Order  No.  6,  which  finally 
regulated  the  status  of  all  remaining  internees  in  Poland  and  sought  to  close  all  of  the 
internment  camps.  49  The  content  of  the  order  was  that  all  remaining  persons  in  Poland 
who  did  not  possess  a  passport,  had  to  be  registered  with  the  state  authorities  by  15 
August  1924  and  to  complete  forms.  Those  who  did  not  avail  themselves  of  the  Soviet 
offer  of  an  amnesty  would  be  required  to  return  to  Soviet  Ukraine  or  Soviet  Russia.  The 
internees  who  successfully  registered  with  the  Polish  authorities  would  be  free  to  travel 
throughout  Poland,  but  a  special  permit  would  be  required  to  travel  to  the  eastern 
provinces  (East  Galicia  and  the  territories  adjoining  Belorussia).  The  problem  was  that 
the  cost  of  registration  was  high  -  12  zloty  for  an  asylum  card,  and  as  much  as  24  zloty 
for  those  who  were  not  in  a  position  to  claim  one.  This  meant  that  the  cost  was  too  high 
for  many  of  the  internees.  50  Obviously  in  this  way  the  Polish  authorities  hoped  to 
discourage  many  of  the  internees  and  former  internees  from  remaining  in  Poland.  The 
result  was  that  many  of  the  former  internees  were  forced  to  leave  Poland,  and  without 
passports  this  was  difficult.  Consequently  many  had  to  return  to  either  Soviet  Russia  or 
Soviet  Ukraine.  sl  Although  by  this  point  the  numbers  of  Ukrainian  internees  in  the 
Polish  camps  was  far  less  (as  can  be  seen  in  the  table  above),  it  was  still  a  disastrous 
fate  to  have  to  return  to  a  state  under  the  rule  of  a  regime,  which  they  had  given  their  all 
to  oppose.  On  31  August  1924  all  former  internment  camps  for  Russian  and  Ukrainian 
anti-Soviet  forces  in  Poland  were  liquidated.  The  only  former  internees  excluded  from 
the  terms  listed  above  were  invalids  and  the  elderly.  These  were  permitted  to  remain  in 
Poland  and  came  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Ministry  for  Employment  and  Social 
Welfare.  52  Thus  for  the  Poles  the  problem  of  the  interned  Ukrainians  was  finally 
solved.  53 
The  surprising  fact  is  that  more  Ukrainian  internees  did  not  avail  of  the  offer  to  go 
to  France.  Whether  this  was  due  to  the  French  stipulating  that  only  a  small  number 
could  apply  or  to  a  feeling  on  the  part  of  the  Ukrainians  that  they  wanted  to  remain 
Ibid,  p.  164. 
y0  Ibid. 
sý  ibid,  p.  165. 
s=  Ibid. 
53  Further  information  about  Ukrainian  emigration  in  Poland  is  available  in  Z.  Karpus,  'Emigracja  rosyjska,  ukrainska  i  bialoruska  w 
Polsce  w  okresie  miedzywojennym  (1918-1939).  Stan  badan  i  postulaty  badawcze',  (in)  Reglony  pogroniczne  Europy  Srodkowe- 
WschodnieJ  w  XVI-XX  wieku.  Spoleczenstwo-gospodarka  polityka,  ed.  M.  Wojciechowski  and  R.  Schattowski.  (Torun:  Michael 
Copernicus  University,  1996). 
220 close  to  their  homeland  is  not  clear.  Another  interesting  aspect  is  that  the  Poles,  despite 
having  had  the  forces  of  the  UNR  as  their  allies  in  the  struggle  against  the  Red  Anny, 
were  unwilling  to  allow  them  to  settle  in  Ukrainian  areas  of  the  Polish  Republic  without 
special  permission.  This  suggests  that  they  remained  unsure  of  their  loyalty  to  the 
Polish  state.  The  fortunate  Ukrainians  were  those  who  gained  the  right  to  asylum  and 
who  remained  to  work  in  Poland.  Others  less  fortunate  had  to  return  to  Soviet  Ukraine. 
It  is  certainly  true,  as  Polish  historians  claim  that  Poland  was  not  in  an  economic 
position  to  provide  a  good  standard  of  living  for  its  former  Ukrainian  allies,  as 
conditions  in  the  camps  testified.  However,  to  return  them  to  Soviet  territory  was  a  dark 
page  in  the  history  of  Polish-Ukrainian  relations.  Pilsudski,  the  architect  of  the  alliance, 
kept  clear  of  the  situation  after  his  retirement  from  public  life  in  1923.  The  Ukrainian 
internees  were  left  to  their  fate,  which  would  be  decided  by  a  National  Democrat 
dominated  government,  intent  on  good  relations  with  Soviet  Ukraine,  and  for  whom  the 
internees  were  an  embarrassing  reminder  of  a  failed  policy. 
221 CONCLUSION 
Prior  to  November  1918  Germany  was  the  major  player  in  Ukraine,  although  it 
had  only  been  so  for  the  preceding  six  months.  However,  following  its  defeat  in  the 
West  its  influence  in  Ukraine  rapidly  waned.  Consequently,  most  histories  of  Gcrman- 
Ukrainian  relations  are  confined  to  the  years  of  the  First  World  War,  and  particularly 
the  period  following  the  first  Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk,  and  take  up  the  story  again  with 
the  German  invasion  of  Ukraine  in  1941.  Some  studies  have  followed  the  relationship 
between  Nazi  Germany  and  the  Ukrainian  nationalists  in  the  years  following  the 
establishment  of  the  Third  Reich;  but  there  has  been  a  dearth  of  studies  examining  the 
relationship  between  Ukrainian  nationalists  and  the  Weimar  Republic,  particularly  in 
the  early  years. 
I  have  attempted  to  demonstrate  that  German  economic  and  political  interest  in 
Ukraine  did  not  disappear  following  its  defeat  in  November  1918;  it  simply  took  a 
different  form.  German  industrialists  and  entrepreneurs,  many  of  whose  former  markets 
were  no  longer  accessible  to  them,  continued  to  covet  the  rich  resources  of  Ukraine, 
and  saw  the  Ukrainian  market  as  an  important  one,  for  a  country  recovering  from 
defeat,  Similar  names  appear  in  the  records  of  economic  negotiations,  as  appeared  in 
the  records  of  Imperial  Germany,  for  example  -  Stinnes  and  Thyssen.  The  economic 
importance  of  Ukraine  in  the  years  following  World  War  I  should  not  be 
underestimated.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  however,  that  despite  losing  territory  to 
Poland  under  the  terms  of  the  Versailles  Treaty,  Germany  in  1919  was  far  more  of  a 
Central  European  country  than  it  is  today,  and  far  more  of  its  economic  interests  lay  in 
the  east.  For  the  shipping  interests  of  Königsberg  the  route  to  the  iron  ore  deposits  of 
Ukraine  was  vital,  as  many  of  the  shipping  business  there  consisted  of  iron  ore  being 
exported  through  the  port  to  the  Rhine  and  the  Elbe  via  the  Kiel  canal,  and  thus 
reaching  Germany's  industrial  centres  in  the  Ruhr  and  further  east. 
There  was  a  strong  element  of  opportunism  in  Germany's  economic  policy 
towards  Ukraine  in  these  years,  and  German  economic  interests  (including  the 
Economics  Ministry)  were  prepared  to  deal  with  whichever  regime  held  power  in  Kiev 
or  Kharkov,  whether  that  was  Nationalist,  White  Russian,  or  Bolshevik.  At  various 
times  during  the  Civil  War,  overtures  were  made  by  Germany  to  whoever  held  power, 
in  order  to  further  German  economic  aims.  This  was  understandable,  as  it  was  often 
unclear  which  regime  would  eventually  gain  the  upper  hand  in  Ukraine.  For  German 
222 big  business  the  essential  requisites  in  Ukraine  were  the  maintenance  of  order;  and  the 
political  stability  necessary  for  investment,  and  the  expropriation  of  raw  matcrials,  such 
as  iron  ore.  The  only  period  when  the  nationalists  appeared  to  have  firnt  control  of 
Ukraine  was  in  the  early  months  of  1920,  during  the  Soviet-Polish  War  (and  that  was 
only  Right  Bank  Ukraine).  German  business  regarded  Poland  as  an  economic 
competitor  in  Ukraine.  The  evidence  demonstrates  that  both  Poland  and  Gcrmany  were 
extremely  concerned  about  the  other  becoming  the  dominant  economic  player  in 
Ukraine.  For  German  business,  the  prospects  offered  by  a  Soviet  government  in 
Kharkov  were  promising,  especially  when  viewed  within  the  broader  framework  of  the 
developing  economic  contacts  between  Berlin  and  Moscow. 
For  Poland,  of  course,  the  reverse  was  the  case  and,  especially  after  the  signing  of 
the  Warsaw  Agreement  with  Petliura,  the  prospect  of  a  nationalist  government  in  Kiev, 
beholden  to  Poland,  offered  the  biggest  economic  prize.  For  Poland  there  was  the  added 
dimension  of  the  Polish  landowners  west  of  the  Dnepr,  and  this  was  a  central  part  of  the 
agreement  made  with  Petliura,  as  has  been  demonstrated  by  Ukrainian  historians.  A 
Soviet  government  in  Ukraine  would  mean  the  end  of  the  agricultural  wealth  of  the 
Polish  landowners  there.  There  was  a  real  perception  by  Germany,  that  a  Ukraine 
dominated  by  Poland  would  be  part  of  the  Franco-Polish  economic  block. 
On  the  political  front,  German  policy  was  more  sympathetic  to  the  Ukrainians. 
Although  Germany  disengaged  directly  in  November  1918,  German  troops  remained  in 
Ukrainian  territory  until  March  1919.  Clearly  these  troops  were  there  as  part  of  the 
Entente  policy  on  Ukraine  and  Russia. 
Although  German  forces  in  Ukraine  following  the  fall  of  the  Iietmanate  did  not 
indicate  any  clear  hostility  to  the  nationalists,  and  indeed  often  made  agreements  with 
them  (usually  about  troop  withdrawals),  they  sympathised  more  openly  with  the 
Bolshevik  forces  in  Ukraine.  In  contrast  to  the  situation  in  the  Baltic,  where  the 
Freikorps  divisons  were  actively  anti-Bolshevik  and  counter-revolutionary,  German 
troops  in  Ukraine  were  less  inclined  to  fight.  This  must  be  viewed  however,  in  the  light 
of  the  revolutionary  situation  in  Germany  itself  during  the  early  months  of  1919.  I  have 
also  uncovered  some  evidence,  albeit  from  German  diplomatic  sources  in  Kiev,  that 
there  were  German  communists,  probably  former  prisoners  of  war,  who  were  co- 
operating  with  the  Bolsheviks  in  Ukraine.  Unfortunately,  I  did  not  uncover  any  further 
223 information  on  this  but  it  is  an  intriguing  footnote  to  the  revolutionary  situation  in 
Ukraine  in  late  1918. 
After  the  disastrous  French-led  campaign  of  early  1919,  the  German  military 
indicated  no  further  desire  to  become  embroiled  in  the  affairs  of  Ukraine.  In  fact,  the 
events  in  Ukraine  from  the  fall  of  the  Hetmanate  to  the  evacuation  of  Odessa  seemed  to 
have  cured  the  German  military  command  from  having  any  further  Drang  nach  Osten, 
certainly  regarding  Ukraine.  They  had  too  many  problems  in  the  Baltic,  and  in  the 
disputed  frontier  areas  with  Poland,  to  have  any  desire  for  further  complications. 
Furthermore,  Germany  was  a  defeated  power  and  following  the  Versailles  Treaty,  the 
Reichswehr  was  only  a  shadow  of  its  former  self.  As  an  aspect  of  German  military 
history  and  particularly  as  an  examination  of  Germany's  military  role  in  Eastern 
Europe,  my  study  of  the  role  of  the  German  army  in  Ukraine  in  late  1918  and  early 
1919,  demonstrates  the  contrast  with  the  German  army's  role  in  the  Baltic.  The 
situations  in  both  theatres  of  conflict  could  not  have  differed  more.  Even  the  presence 
of  a  German  minority  in  Ukraine  had  no  effect  on  the  German  army's  reluctance  to 
engage  the  Red  Army  or  the  nationalists. 
This  was  also  the  policy  of  the  German  government  and  of  the  Foreign  Ministry, 
who  feared  being  caught  between  the  twin  poles  of  the  Bolsheviks  and  the  Entente. 
There  is  no  evidence  of  German  involvement  in  East  Galicia,  despite  Polish  claims  to 
the  contrary,  and  although  Berlin  would  have  welcomed  a  setback  for  Poland  there,  it 
was  unable  and  unwilling  to  intervene.  Undoubtedly  the  German  press,  including  the 
Social  Democrat  organ  Vorwärts,  railed  against  `Polish  Imperialism'  in  both  East 
Galicia  and  Ukraine  proper  but  the  German  government  did  not  intervene  in  the  Polish- 
Galician  conflict,  or  in  the  Soviet-Polish  War.  There  cannot  be  any  doubt  that  Berlin 
would  have  welcomed  a  Polish  defeat  in  both  struggles. 
There  was  also  the  small  group  of  Germans  led  by  Rohrbach  who  sympathised 
with  the  aims  of  Ukrainian  nationalism,  and  regarded  an  independent  Ukraine  as  a 
means  of  permanently  weakening  Russia,  and  also  of  limiting  Polish  power  in  the  East. 
For  them  a  Ukraine  linked  to  Germany  provided  the  essential  counterbalance  to  Polish 
power  in  Eastern  Europe,  and  would  also  protect  Germany's  eastern  frontiers  from 
hostile  actions  by  Russia  or  Poland.  These  ideas  were  not  supported  by  the  mainly 
Social  Democrat  governments  of  the  early  Weimar  Republic.  They  were,  however, 
taken  seriously  by  some  on  the  German  Right,  and  would  eventually  be  taken  up  by 
224 ideologues  of  the  German  nationalist  right,  such  as  Rosenberg.  His  ideas  provided  an 
ideological  underpin  for  German  cultural  and  economic  imperialism  in  Eastern  Europe. 
Rohrbach's  and  Rosenberg's  common  Baltic  German  ancestry  played  a  large  part  in 
their  suspicion  of  Russia  and  their  support  for  German  expansion  in  the  cast.  Indeed, 
both  ideologues  looked  towards  the  establishment  of  a  ring  of  pro-German  states  in 
Eastern  Europe,  which  would  have  the  effect  of  limiting  both  Polish  and  Russian 
ambitions  in  the  region,  while  providing  Germany  with  military  allies  and  sources  of 
trade  and  raw  materials.  This  was  Rohrbach's  `Orange'  theory  -  that  the  constituent 
parts  of  the  former  Russian  empire  could  be  separated  into  component  parts,  similar  to 
dividing  up  an  orange. 
Rohrbach's  writings  and  activities  in  support  of  Ukrainian  independence  have 
usually  been  studied  in  the  period  of  the  Kaiserreich  but  I  am  demonstrating  that  he 
continued  his  campaigns  for  Ukrainian  independence  and  German-Ukrainian 
understanding  into  the  Weimar  period,  and  although  he  did  not  succeed  in  influencing 
government  policy,  I  am  demonstrating  a  continuity  in  his  theories,  which  took  the 
form  of  the  establishment  of  societies  for  German-Ukrainian  friendship,  journals  ctc, 
which  would  keep  the  flame  of  German-Ukrainian  relations  alive  during  the  colder 
period  of  the  early  Weimar  Republic. 
For  Poland  the  relationship  with  the  Ukrainians  was  complicated  by  the  East 
Galician  issue.  No  Polish  government  or  politician,  with  the  exception  of  the  Ukrainian 
members  of  the  Polish  Sejm  from  East  Galicia,  was  prepared  to  countenance  any 
separation  of  East  Galicia  from  the  Polish  Republic.  This  was  the  sine  qua  non  of 
Polish  relations  with  the  Ukrainians.  The  military  conflict  in  East  Galicia  in  1919 
poisoned  relations  between  the  Directory  and  Warsaw,  and  led  to  a  lack  of  support  by 
Poland  for  the  aims  of  Ukrainian  nationalism  until  1920.  German  support  for  the 
independence  of  East  Galicia  was  a  useful  propaganda  weapon  for  the  Poles  to  use 
against  the  Ukrainians,  and  was  a  factor  in  securing  Entente  support  for  the  Polish 
occupation  and  subjugation  of  the  region.  Portraying  the  East  Galicians  as  the  agents  of 
Germany  and  the  Bolsheviks,  in  the  febrile  atmosphere  of  1919,  was  a  mastcrstrokc  on 
the  part  of  the  Poles.  I  have  attempted  to  discover  examples  of  German  connivance  and 
assistance  with  East  Galicians  in  the  German  archives,  but  have  found  no  evidence  of  it 
and  it  seems  clear  that  it  was  simply  a  propaganda  weapon 
225 This  is  contrary  to  the  views  of  many  current  Polish  historians,  who  argue  that 
Poland  was  always  sympathetic  to  Ukrainian  nationalism  from  the  fall  of  the 
Hetmanate  onwards.  These  include  Zbigniew  Karpus  and  Waldemar  Renner  from 
Torun,  Michal  Klimecki  from  Warsaw,  Barbara  Stoczcwska  from  Krakow  and  Jerzy 
Kloczowski  from  Lublin.  These  historians  have  attempted  to  connect  the  Polish- 
Ukrainian  relationship  of  1919-1920,  with  that  of  the  period  following  the 
establishment  of  a  democratic  Poland  in  1989,  and  especially  since  the  disintegration  of 
the  Soviet  Union  in  1991  and  the  appearance  of  an  independent  Ukrainian  state. 
The  historical  discourse  during  the  1990's  established  a  link  with  the  political 
one,  drawing  parallels  for  example,  between  Poland  being  the  first  state  to  recognise 
independent  Ukraine  in  1991  and  the  Warsaw  Agreement  of  1920.  Links  were  made 
between  the  "strategic  partnerships"  with  Ukraine  (first  declared  in  1992  and  officially 
established  in  1996).  The  argument  about  the  purpose  of  these  partnerships  as  not  being 
anti-Russian  but  rather  an  attempt  to  counterbalance  Moscow's  enormous  influence  on 
Kiev  was  mirrored  in  the  historical  discourse  and  in  a  range  of  conferences  held 
between  Ukrainian  and  Polish  historians.  Jerzy  Kloczowski  based  in  the  Institute  of 
Central  Eastern  Europe  (Institut  Europy  grodkowo-JVschodnlej)  in  Lublin  argued  that 
these  developments  were  a  continuation  of  Poland's  historical  friendship  and  support 
for  Ukraine.  He  argues  this  thesis  extensively  in  his  recent  work  Itistoria  Eurolpy 
Jrodkowo-Wschodniej  (Lublin,  2000),  where  he  contends  that  Poland  has  always  tried 
to  offer  support  and  assistance  to  Ukraine  against  Russia  and  that  the  Pilsudski-Pctliura 
pact  was  only  one  prominent  example  of  this  tendency. 
As  late  as  2000,  some  Polish  academics  were  arguing  that  the  Polish  and 
Ukrainian  naval  fleets  were  about  to  offer  each  other  reciprocal  rights  in  the  Baltic  and 
Black  Seas.  The  Polish  historians  regarded  this  as  merely  the  continuation  of  a  historic 
trend  in  foreign  and  defence  policy,  which  dated  from  1919,  The  archival  evidence  does 
not  support  this  contention,  and  I  would  go  as  far  as  to  argue  that  prior  to  late  1919,  and 
the  first  negotiations  between  Pilsudski  and  Petliura,  Poland  did  all  it  could  to  damage 
the  Ukrainian  nationalist  cause. 
Where  true  power  would  have  lain  in  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic,  had  it 
been  secured  in  1920,  is  a  contentious  issue.  All  the  evidence  suggests  that  it  would 
have  been  a  Polish  client  state  and  Pilsudski  would  in  the  long  terns  probably  have 
pressed  for  the  formation  of  the  Greater  Polish  Commonwealth  or  federal  state,  along 
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Petliura  and  Pilsudski,  and  Petliura's  influence  in  Berlin  evaporated  after  the  Warsaw 
Agreement.  Germany  would  also  have  probably  refused  to  recognise  the  Polish-backed 
state  based  in  Kiev,  as  all  the  evidence  from  1920  indicates.  Only  with  the  defeat  of  the 
Pilsudski-Petliura  project,  and  the  increasing  anti-Polish  orientation  of  the  Ukrainian 
nationalists  after  1922,  did  German  relations  with  them  begin  to  improve  again. 
From  the  accounts  of  German  diplomats,  especially  those  stationed  in  Warsaw 
and  Kharkov,  it  is  clear  that  German  policy  towards  the  nationalists  in  Ukraine  was 
driven  above  all  by  the  latter's  relationship  with  Poland.  Applying  the  maxim  of  `my 
enemy's  friend  is  my  enemy',  Germany's  relations  with  Petliura  and  his  regime  waxed 
and  waned  in  direct  proportion  to  the  warming  and  cooling  of  Pctliura's  relations  with 
Pilsudski. 
Another  indicator  of  this  was  the  improvement  in  relations  between  Berlin  and  the 
Soviet  Ukrainian  government,  after  the  signing  of  the  Warsaw  Agreement  in  1920. 
Essentially,  the  last  thing  that  Berlin  or  Warsaw  wanted  was  a  Ukraine  allied  to  the 
other.  The  winner  from  this  competition  was  of  course,  Soviet  Russia,  whose  rule  over 
Ukraine  was  recognised  at  Riga  by  Poland,  and  was  also  accepted  by  Germany  as  a  far 
lesser  evil  than  a  Polish  ruled  Ukraine.  The  increasing  rapprochement  between  Moscow 
and  Berlin  would  soon  lead  to  the  Treaty  of  Rapallo. 
However,  just  as  Polish  historians  have  argued  for  a  current  continuation  in  the 
traditional  relations  between  the  two  states,  temporarily  blocked  by  the  advent  of 
communism,  this  theme  is  also  evident  in  the  German-Ukrainian  relationship.  Isere,  the 
role  of  Rohrbach  is  central,  as  the  German  theoretician  and  gcopoliticist,  who  doggedly 
supported  the  claims  of  Ukrainian  independence.  It  is  no  coincidence  that  the  website 
of  the  Ukrainian  Republic's  embassy  in  Berlin,  refers  to  the  role  of  Rohrbach  and  his 
establishment  of  the  German-Ukrainain  Society  in  interwar  Berlin.  Once  again,  the 
theme  is  of  a  historic  friendship  interrupted  by  forty-  five  years  of  Soviet  rule. 
I  have  argued  that  there  was  an  attempt  by  Germany  to  form  a  loose  alliance  with 
Ukrainian  nationalism  in  the  aftermath  of  World  War  I.  While  it  is  certainly  true  that 
Skoropadskyi  and  the  pro-German  Ukrainian  nationalists  in  Berlin  hoped  for  this 
development,  it  did  not  occur,  as  Weimar  Germany  regarded  Ukrainian  nationalism  as  a 
spent  force,  and  also  a  movement  coming  increasingly  into  the  French  and  Polish 
orbits.  The  German  Foreign  Ministry  was  opposed  to  any  involvement  in  the  region  and 
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indeed  to  any  possible  source  of  support.  Germany  was  also  severely  constrained  in 
what  it  could  do  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  regarded  Soviet  Russia  and  Soviet 
Ukraine  as  the  best  hope  for  increasing  its  economic  and  political  influence  in  the 
region.  This  tendency  was  strengthened  by  the  pro-Polish  orientation  of  the  UNR 
regime  from  late  1919.  Because  of  Entente  pressure,  Germany  could  not  assume  an 
openly  pro-Soviet  position  during  the  Soviet-Polish  War  but  it  was  clear  where  its 
sympathies  lay. 
Following  Rapallo,  Weimar  Germany  would  increase  its  economic,  political  and 
even  military  links  with  Soviet  Russia  and  Soviet  Ukraine,  and  go  on  to  provide 
advisors  and  expertise  to  the  fledgling  Soviet  state.  Both  countries  would  share  a 
detestation  of  Poland,  and  a  desire  to  readdress  the  settlements  reached  at  Riga  and 
Versailles. 
I  have  also  addressed  the  earlier  German-Ukrainian  relationship  during  World 
War  I  and  the  recognition  of  Ukrainian  independence  by  Germany  in  the  Brest  Litovsk 
Treaty  of  February  1918.  This  created  a  positive  legacy  in  German-Ukrainian  relations 
and  although  it  did  not  bear  fruit  in  the  early  Weimar  period,  when  Germany  was  too 
weak  and  engaged  to  play  a  major  part  in  Ukraine,  it  did  lead  on  to  a  reawakening  of 
the  German-Ukrainian  axis  towards  the  end  of  the  Weimar  Republic  and  the  beginning 
of  the  Nazi  period.  The  negative  legacy  of  Polish  oppression  of  Ukrainian  nationalism 
in  East  Galicia  and  the  anti-Ukrainian  policies  of  the  pre-1926  National  Democrat 
dominated  governments  in  Poland  also  had  an  impact.  Even  the  Sanacja  regime  of 
Pilsudski  (1926-1936)  also  continued  to  fear  and  to  repress  Ukrainian  nationalism  in 
Poland.  This  led  Ukrainians,  particularly  from  East  Galicia,  to  seek  support  from 
Berlin,  and  as  Germany  was  Poland's  main  rival  in  the  region,  an  attempt  to  forge  an 
alliance  would  follow. 
Polish  and  Ukrainian  historians,  and  particularly  emigre  Ukrainian  historians  in 
Canada,  have  attempted  to  analyse  the  Polish-Ukrainian  relationship  during  this  period. 
For  the  majority  of  Polish  historians,  the  Petliura-Pilsudski  pact  was  a  landmark  in  the 
relations  between  the  two  nations  and  a  missed  opportunity  for  a  new  balance  of  power 
in  Eastern  Europe.  They  have  usually  seen  the  reasons  for  its  failure  in  the  absence  of 
broad  support  for  Ukrainian  nationalism  in  Ukraine.  The  Ukrainian  historians 
conversely  have  also  sometimes  seen  the  pact  as  the  beginning  of  a  new  era  in  Polish. 
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and  chauvinism  towards  Ukraine,  and  a  profound  failure  to  understand  the  Ukrainian 
desire  for  sovereignty.  Rudnytsky  held  this  view  and  believed  that  both  countries  were 
responsible  for  what  occurred.  I  have  attempted  to  analyse  the  various  forces  in  the 
maelstrom  of  the  period,  and  concluding  that  whereas  the  Ukrainian  side  was  motivated 
by  desperation,  which  led  to  subjugation  and  abasement  to  Polish  aims,  the  Polish  side 
was  motivated  by  a  form  of  `manifest  historic  destiny'  and  realpolitik.  In  examining 
this  relationship  I  have  sought  to  explore  the  various  avenues  of  interpretation. 
Apart  from  Karpus,  I  am  not  aware  of  the  question  of  the  Ukrainian  internees  in 
Poland  being  addressed  by  historians,  and  I  have  gone  further  by  utilising  Red  Cross 
reports  to  examine  what  the  true  situation  in  postwar  Poland  was  for  the  internees. 
Although  there  were  no  direct  reports  on  the  camps,  the  Red  Cross  visits  to  Poland 
during  this  period,  indicates  the  type  of  political  atmosphere  in  which  the  camps 
existed.  I  have  also  attempted  to  draw  parallels  between  the  conditions  for  Ukrainian 
internees  in  neighbouring  Czechoslovakia,  and  to  compare  their  situation  with  those  in 
Poland,  in  order  to  ascertain  the  political  orientation  of  Ukrainian  internees  following 
the  defeat  of  1920.  I  did  this  by  utilising  the  sources  in  the  Red  Cross  Society  Archive 
in  London.  It  was  a  disappointment  not  to  discover  reports  on  the  Polish  camps  there 
but  the  reports  on  the  Czech  camps  are,  in  my  opinion,  a  serious  breakthrough  in  terms 
of  the  study  of  Ukrainians  in  internment  throughout  the  region. 
I  have  also  demonstrated  the  extremely  complex  web  of  relationships  between  the 
various  Ukrainian  political  groups  in  exile,  and  their  conflicting  views  on  relations  with 
different  European  states  and  particularly  with  Germany  and  Poland.  The  Polish. 
Ukrainian  alliance  brought  this  contrast  in  views  to  boiling  point  and  I  have  displayed 
the  depth  of  division  between  the  Ukrainian  emigre  groups.  I  have  not  addressed  the 
Soviet  relationship  with  the  Ukrainian  nationalists,  except  insofar  as  it  affected  the 
nationalist  relationship  with  Poland  or  Germany.  An  example  of  this  is  the  clamour 
from  Soviet  Ukraine  after  the  Treaty  of  Riga  for  the  removal  of  the  Petliuran  regime 
from  Polish  territory. 
One  of  my  principal  aims  has  been  to  demonstrate  that  Polish-Ukrainian  and 
German-Ukrainian  relations  did  not  operate  in  a  political  and  economic  vacuum,  and 
although  they  each  had  their  own  dynamic,  they  were  also  influenced  by  the  diplomatic 
and  economic  relationship  between  the  nationalists  and  the  other  state,  Although  the 
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and  dynamics,  the  links  with  both  countries,  are  inevitably  influenced  by  the  paradigm 
of  Polish-German  relations,  within  which  it  operated.  Although  archival  evidence  was 
sometimes  scanty,  I  have  sought  to  highlight  the  details  of  the  Ukrainian  nationalist 
relationship  with  both  Poland  and  Germany  within  this  framework. 
This  period  in  the  history  of  Europe's  second  largest  state,  when  independence 
came  within  its  grasp,  is  a  vital  one  in  the  formulation  of  the  history  of  nationalism  in 
Eastern  Europe.  The  policies  of  the  surrounding  states,  which  impacted  on  the  history 
of  Ukraine,  need  to  be  examined  and  I  have  sought  to  compare  two  of  the  most 
important  of  these  states,  and  their  role  in  the  Ukrainian  struggle  for  sovereignty. 
Almost  no  research  has  been  carried  out  regarding  the  relations  between  early  Weimar 
governments  and  industry  with  Ukraine,  and  this  is  a  contribution  to  the  study  of  a  little 
known  or  understood  aspect  of  Central  and  Eastern  European  history.  Although  the 
archival  sources  were  not  as  rich  as  I  hoped  initially,  some  interesting  light  has  been 
shed  on  aspects  of  German  foreign  and  economic  policy  in  these  years.  Whereas  the 
Polish  involvement  with  Ukrainian  nationalism  during  these  years  has  been  more 
extensively  studied,  the  conflict  in  Petliura's  ideas  about  the  Polish  alliance,  the 
Ukrainian  internees  and  the  discourse  over  contemporary  Polish  historiography  have 
not  surfaced  as  themes  heretofore. 
I  believe  that  this  is  a  significant  contribution  to  the  history  of  Ukraine  in  the 
period  following  the  collapse  of  the  great  European  empires  and  the  attempt  by  Ukraine 
to  forge  its  own  destiny. 
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THE  TREATY  OF  RIGA  (1921) 
1.  Both  parties  declare  that  the  state  of  war  between  them  shall  conic  to  an  end. 
2.  The  boundary  between  Poland,  Soviet  Russia,  Belorussia,  and  Ukraine  is 
settled,  with  minor  rectification  in  favour  of  Poland,  as  agreed  in  the  Preliminary  Peace 
Treaty. 
3.  Both  Soviet  Russia  and  Soviet  Ukraine  abandon  all  rights  and  claims  to  the 
territories  situated  west  of  the  agreed  border.  Similarly,  Poland  abandons,  in  favour  of 
Soviet  Ukraine  and  Soviet  Belorussia,  all  rights  and  claims  to  the  territory  situated  cast 
of  the  border,  while  the  districts  that  are  the  subject  of  dispute  between  Poland  and 
Lithuania  should  be  settled  by  them. 
4.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  part  of  Poland  formerly  belonged  to  Russia,  Poland  shall 
not  be  held  to  have  incurred  any  debt  or  obligation  toward  Soviet  Russia,  except  as 
provided  in  the  treaty.  Similarly  no  debt  or  obligation  shall  be  regarded  as  incurred  by 
Poland  towards  Belorussia  or  Ukraine,  and  vice  versa,  except  as  provided  in  the  treaty. 
5.  Both  parties  pledge  to  respect  each  other's  political  sovereignty,  to  abstain  from 
interference  in  each  other's  internal  affairs,  and  not  to  support  or  create  armed 
detachments  with  the  objective  of  encouraging  armed  conflict  against  the  other  party  so 
as  to  undermine  its  territorial  integrity  or  subvert  its  political  or  social  institutions. 
6.  All  persons  over  the  age  of  eighteen,  who  are  within  the  territory  of  Poland  and, 
on  1  August  1914,  were  nationals  of  Russia  shall  have  the  right  of  opting  for  Russian  or 
Ukrainian  nationality.  Similarly,  all  persons  over  the  age  of  eighteen  who  are  within  the 
territory  of  Russia  and  of  Ukraine,  including  the  descendants  of  persons  who  took  part 
in  the  Polish  struggle  between  1830  and  1865,  shall  be  considered  citizens  of  Poland  if 
they  express  such  a  desire.  The  choice  made  by  the  husband  shall  apply  also  to  his  wife 
and  children  under  the  age  of  eighteen,  if  the  husband  and  wife  have  not  agreed  to  the 
contrary. 
7.  Russia  and  Ukraine  pledge  that  persons  of  Polish  nationality  in  Russia,  Ukraine 
and  Belorussia  shall  enjoy  free  intellectual  development,  the  use  of  their  national 
language  and  the  exercise  of  their  religion.  Similarly  Poland  recognises  the  same  rights 
for  persons  of  Russian,  Ukrainian,  and  Belorussian  nationality  in  Poland. 
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during  the  war  and  to  indemnities  for  damages  caused  to  their  nationals  by  the  war  or 
military  measures  taken  during  the  Polish-Soviet  Russian-Ukrainian  War 
9.  The  agreement  concerning  repatriation  concluded  between  Poland,  on  the  one 
side,  and  Russia  and  Ukraine,  on  the  other,  shall  remain  in  force  as  agreed  in  the 
Preliminary  Peace  Treaty. 
10.  Each  party  guarantees  to  the  subjects  of  the  other  party  full  amnesty  for  all  acts 
directed  against  the  government  and  the  security  of  the  state;  as  well,  acts  committed  in 
the  interests  of  the  other  party  shall  be  regarded  as  political  crimes  and  offences  within 
the  meaning  of  this  article. 
11.  Russia  and  Ukraine  shall  restore  to  Poland  all  war  trophies,  libraries,  archives, 
works  of  art,  and  other  objects  of  historical,  ethnographic,  artistic,  scholarly,  and 
archaeological  value  that  have  been  removed  from  the  territory  of  Poland  by  Russia 
since  1772.  Similarly,  any  collections  or  objects  of  historical  value  that  have  been 
removed  from  Russia  and  Ukraine  during  the  same  period  shall  be  restored  to  Russia 
and  Ukraine. 
12.  Both  parties  agree  that  state  property  of  whatever  nature,  including  properties  of 
all  state  institutions  and  possessions  belonging  to  appendages  and  the  Imperial  Cabinet 
and  Palaces  that  are  within  the  geographic  territory  of  both  parties,  or  are  to  be  restored 
to  the  parties  by  virtue  of  the  treaty,  shall  be  their  property.  Both  parties  mutually 
renounce  the  right  to  any  form  of  compensation  that  might  involve  the  partition  of  state 
property,  subject  to  any  contrary  provisions  contained  in  the  present  treaty. 
13.  Russia  and  Ukraine  agree  to  pay  Poland  within  one  year  after  ratification  of  the 
present  treaty  the  sum  of  thirty  million  gold  roubles  in  specie  and  in  bars,  based  on  the 
active  participation  of  the  territory  of  Poland  in  the  economic  life  of  the  former  Russian 
state. 
14.  Both  Russia  and  Ukraine  shall  hand  over  to  Poland  300  locomotives,  260 
passenger  carriages  and  8,100  freight  cars.  The  total  value  of  the  rolling  stock  to  be 
restored  to  Poland  shall  be  fixed  at  the  sum  of  13,149,000  gold  roubles.  The  total  value 
of  any  railway  material  other  than  rolling  stock  shall  be  fixed  at  the  sum  of  5,096,000 
gold  roubles. 
15.  Upon  the  request  of  the  Polish  government,  supported  by  the  declarations  of  the 
owners,  Russia  and  Ukraine  agree  that  restitution  shall  be  made  to  Poland  for  the 
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administrations,  institutions,  and  legal  and  physical  persons  that  was  taken  from  Poland 
to  Russia  and  Ukraine  from  1  August  1914  to  1  October  1915.  A  restitution 
commission,  composed  of  five  representatives  of  each  party  and  necessary  experts, 
shall  be  created  for  the  purpose  of  implementing  the  provisions  of  this  article  and  shall 
reside  in  Moscow. 
16.  Russia  and  Ukraine  agree  to  settle  with  Poland  accounts  relating  to  funds  or 
capital  bequeathed  to  physical  and  legal  persons  of  Polish  nationality  or  to  Polish  public 
or  private  scientific,  religious,  or  charitable  institutions  or  societies,  which  by  virtue  of 
the  regulations  in  force,  were  deposited  on  account  in  the  state  banks  or  credit 
institutions  of  the  former  Russian  state.  The  fourteenth  of  January  1916  is  accepted  as 
the  fixed  date  for  the  settlement  of  accounts.  The  action  shall  be  effected  by  a  joint 
commission  for  the  settlement  of  accounts. 
17.  Russia  and  Ukraine  undertake  to  settle  accounts  in  respect  of  the  deposits  and 
securities  of  Polish  physical  and  legal  persons  in  Russian  and  Ukrainian  state  banks  that 
have  been  nationalised  and  in  state  institutions  and  savings  banks.  Russia  and  Ukraine 
shall  respect  the  rights  of  Polish  physical  and  legal  persons  as  they  have  been 
recognised.  A  joint  commission  on  the  liquidation  of  accounts  shall  be  entrusted  with 
the  settlement  of  questions. 
18.  A  joint  commission  composed  of  five  representatives  of  each  party  and  the 
requisite  number  of  experts,  with  its  seat  in  Warsaw,  shall  be  established  to  settle 
accounts  provided  for  in  articles  14,15,16,  and  17  of  the  present  treaty,  and  to  draw  up 
rules  governing  these  settlements  and  fix  the  amount,  method,  and  dates  of  payments. 
The  first  of  October  1915  shall  be  the  fixed  date  from  which  all  accounts  shall  be 
settled. 
19.  Russia  and  Ukraine  discharge  Poland  from  all  responsibility  regarding  debts  and 
obligations  incurred  by  the  former  Russian  state,  in  particular  obligations  arising  out  of 
the  issue  of  paper  money,  treasury  bonds,  debentures,  and  certificates  of  the  Russian 
treasury. 
20.  Russia  and  Ukraine  recognise  ipso  facto  and  without  special  convention  the 
claims  of  Poland  and  Polish  nationals  and  legal  persons  to  all  rights,  privileges,  and 
similar  benefits  with  regard  to  the  restitution  of  property  and  compensation  for  damages 
incurred  during  the  revolution  and  civil  war  in  Russia  and  Ukraine. 
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treaty  into  negotiations  concerning  a  commercial  convention  and  a  convention 
regarding  the  exchange  of  goods  by  barter.  They  also  agree  to  commence  negotiations 
with  a  view  to  exchanging  consular,  postal,  telegraphic,  railway,  health,  and  veterinary 
conventions  and  a  convention  for  the  improvement  of  the  conditions  of  navigation  on 
the  waterways  of  the  Dnieper-Wisla  and  Dnieper-Dvina  basins. 
22.  Both  parties  agree  to  permit  the  forwarding  of  goods  in  transit  subject  to  the 
following  conditions: 
a.  The  principle  laid  down  in  this  article  shall  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  future  convention 
on  transit. 
b.  Both  parties  agree  to  the  free  transit  of  goods  by  railways  and  waterways. 
c.  Both  parties  agree  that  goods  transported  to  or  from  Russia  and  Ukraine  through 
Poland  and  vice  versa  shall  be  exempt  from  customs  or  transit  duties  of  any  kind. 
d.  The  transport  of  goods  intended  for  armaments  or  for  military  equipment,  and  of  all 
military  stores  shall  be  prohibited. 
e.  Goods  from  another  state  that  are  in  transit  through  the  territory  of  one  of  the  parties 
shall  not  be  subjected  to  a  different  or  higher  rate  of  duty  than  would  be  levied  on 
similar  goods  if  they  were  sent  directly  from  their  country  of  origin. 
23.  Russia  and  Ukraine  declare  that  all  undertakings  entered  into  by  them  with 
regard  to  Poland,  and  all  rights  acquired  by  them  by  virtue  of  the  treaty,  shall  apply  to 
all  territory  situated  east  of  the  frontier  of  the  state  specified  in  article  2  of  the  treaty, 
which  formed  part  of  the  former  Russian  state  and  was  represented  by  Russia  and 
Ukraine  when  this  treaty  was  concluded.  All  above-mentioned  rights  shall  also  apply  to 
Belorussia  and  its  citizens. 
24.  After  ratification  of  the  treaty,  diplomatic  relations  between  the  contracting 
parties  shall  be  resumed. 
25.  The  treaty  shall  be  drawn  up  in  Polish,  Russian,  and  Ukrainian  in  three  original 
copies.  All  three  texts  shall  be  considered  authoritative  for  purposes  of  interpreting  the 
treaty. 
The  treaty  shall  be  ratified  and  shall  come  into  force  from  the  time  of  the  exchange  of 
the  protocols  of  ratification  unless  otherwise  provided  in  the  treaty  or  annexes. 
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THE  WARSAW  TREATY  (1920) 
The  preamble  of  the  treaty  stated: 
"  The  Government  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  and  the  Govcrnmcnt  of  the 
Polish  Republic,  profoundly  convinced  that  each  people  possesses  the  natural  right  to 
self-determination  and  to  define  its  relations  with  neighbouring  peoples,  and  equally 
desirous  of  establishing  a  basis  for  concordant  and  friendly  co-existence  for  the  welfare 
and  development  of  both  peoples,  have  agreed  as  follows; 
1.  Recognising  the  right  of  Ukraine  to  independent  political  existence  within  the 
northern,  eastern,  and  southern  frontiers  as  they  shall  be  determined  by  means 
of  separate  agreements  concluded  with  the  respective  border  states,  the  Polish 
Republic  recognises  the  Directory  of  the  independent  Ukrainian  People's 
Republic,  headed  by  the  Supreme  Military  Commander  Simon  Petliura,  as  the 
Supreme  Government  of  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic. 
2.  The  frontier  between  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  and  the  Polish 
Republic  is  established  as  follows:  northward  from  the  Dniester  river  along  the 
Zbruch  river  and  continuing  along  the  former  frontier  between  Austria-Hungary 
and  Russia  to  Vishedrudka,  and  proceeding  from  there  in  a  northerly  direction 
through  the  Kremianets  Hills,  and  then  in  an  easterly  direction  from 
Zdolbunovo  and  then  along  the  length  of  the  eastern  administrative  boundary  of 
the  district  of  Rivne  and  continuing  from  there  along  the  administrative 
boundary  of  the  former  province  of  Minsk  to  the  juncture  with  the  Pripet  river 
and  terminating  at  the  mouth  of  that  river. 
The  districts  of  Rivne,  Dubno  and  part  of  Kremianets,  which  are  immediately 
ceded  to  the  Polish  Republic,  shall  be  subject  to  a  more  concise  agreement  to  be 
concluded  later. 
The  final  delimitation  of  the  border  shall  be  accomplished  by  a  special 
Ukrainian-Polish  commission  composed  of  responsible  specialists. 
3.  The  Polish  government  recognises  as  Ukrainian  the  territory  east  of  the 
frontier,  as  defined  in  Article  II  of  this  agreement  and  extending  to  the  1772 
frontiers  of  Poland  prior  to  the  partition  and  occupied  at  present  by  Poland  or 
acquired  in  the  future  from  Russia  by  military  or  diplomatic  means. 
235 4.  The  Polish  government  obligates  itself  not  to  conclude  any  international 
agreements  directed  against  Ukraine;  the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  obligates 
itself  similarly  with  respect  to  the  Polish  Republic. 
5.  The  same  national-cultural  rights  which  the  government  of  the  Ukrainian 
People's  Republic  ensures  citizens  of  Polish  nationality  on  its  territory  shall  be 
ensured  to  citizens  of  Ukrainian  nationality  within  the  frontiers  of  the  Polish 
Republic  and  conversely. 
6.  Special  economic  and  commercial  agreements  are  to  be  concluded  between 
the  Ukrainian  People's  Republic  and  the  Polish  Republic. 
The  agrarian  question  in  Ukraine  shall  be  resolved  by  the  Constituent  Body.  In 
the  period  preceding  its  convocation  the  legal  status  of  landowners  of  Polish 
nationality  shall  be  defined  by  an  agreement  between  the  Ukrainian  People's 
Republic  and  the  Polish  Republic. 
7.  A  military  convention  is  to  be  concluded  and  is  to  be  regarded  as  an  integral 
part  of  this  agreement. 
8.  This  agreement  shall  remain  secret.  It  shall  not  be  revealed  to  a  third  party  or 
published  by  it  in  whole  or  in  part  except  with  the  mutual  consent  of  both  the 
high  contracting  parties.  An  exception  to  this  is  Article  I,  which  shall  be  made 
public  after  the  signing  of  this  agreement. 
9.  This  agreement  shall  enter  into  force  immediately  upon  being  signed  by  both 
high  contracting  parties.  " 
236 APPENDIX  3 
PILSUDSKI'S  PROCLAMATION  OF  APRIL  1920. 
To  all  inhabitants  of  Ukraine 
On  my  order  the  forces  of  the  Polish  Republic  have  advanced  deep  into  Ukrainian 
lands. 
I  formally  declare  that  the  foreign  invaders,  against  whom  the  Ukrainian  people  have 
risen  sword  in  hand  to  defend  their  homes  from  rape,  banditry  and  looting,  will  be 
removed  by  the  Polish  forces  from  territories  inhabited  by  the  Ukrainian  nation. 
The  Polish  forces  will  remain  in  Ukraine  for  such  time  as  may  be  necessary  to  enable  a 
legitimate  Ukrainian  government  to  take  control. 
From  the  moment  that  a  national  government  of  the  Ukrainian  Republic  has  established 
its  state  authority  and  has  manned  the  borders  with  forces  capable  of  protecting  the 
country  against  a  new  invasion,  and  the  free  nation  is  strong  enough  to  settle  its  own 
fortunes,  the  Polish  soldier  will  return  to  the  Polish  Republic,  having  fulfilled  his 
honourable  task  in  the  struggle  for  the  freedom  of  nations. 
Advancing  with  the  Polish  forces  are  the  fighting  sons  of  Ukraine  who  under  the 
leadership  of  Ataman  Semeon  Petliura  have  found  help  and  shelter  in  Poland  in  the 
most  difficult  days  for  the  Ukrainian  people. 
I  believe  that  the  Ukrainian  nation  will  strain  every  nerve  to  obtain,  with  the  help  of  the 
Polish  Republic,  its  own  freedom  and  secure  to  the  fertile  lands  of  its  mother  country 
happiness  and  prosperity,  after  a  return  to  work  and  peace. 
The  forces  of  the  Polish  Republic  assure  care  and  protection  to  all  inhabitants  of 
Ukraine  without  distinction  of  class,  race  or creed. 
I  appeal  to  the  Ukrainian  nation  and  to  all  inhabitants  of  these  lands,  patiently  bearing 
the  privations  of  war,  to  assist  the  Polish  Army  in  its  bloody  struggle  for  their  life  and 
freedom  with  all  means  at  their  disposal. 
Jozef  Pilsudski 
Commander-in-Chief,  Polish  Forces 
26  April  1920. 
Army  Headquarters 
237 APPENDIX  4 
MAP  OF  UKRANIAN  AND  POLISH  RAILWAYS  IN  1921. 
Demonstrating  the  main  rail  routes  from  Ukraine  to  East  Prussia  (in  the  top 
lefthand  corner  of  the  map)  for  retreating  German  troops  from  Kiev  in  1918-1919.  The 
line  passes  through  Brest-Litovsk  and  Bialystok,  reaching  the  German  frontier 
northwest  of  Bialystok.  This  demonstrates  that  the  main  route  to  East  Prussia  crossed 
Polish  territory. 
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